Suchergebnisse
Filter
50 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
SSRN
Working paper
México: la accidentada consolidación democrática
In: Revista de ciencia política, Band 27, Heft Esp
ISSN: 0718-090X
The Paradox of the Veto in Mexico (1917-1997)
SSRN
Working paper
How Much is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth? — CORRIGENDUM
In: American political science review, Band 117, Heft 2, S. 781-781
ISSN: 1537-5943
Factions with clout: Presidential cabinet coalition and policy in the Uruguayan parliament
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 427-451
ISSN: 1460-3683
We investigate bill passage by party factions in Uruguay and show that those joining cabinet coalitions earn policy influence. The policy advantage of coalition is therefore not collected by the president alone, as often implied: partners acquire clout in law-making and use it to pass bills of their own and to strike deals with outside factions. Analysis of all bills initiated between 1985 and 2005 reveals that the odds of passing a bill sponsored alone by a majority cabinet faction was about 0.5, up from about 0.15 otherwise. Contingent upon the cabinet status of factions involved, the odds of co-sponsored bills conform well to patterns expected by a view that policy rewards are a fundamental part of the politics of coalition in presidentialism. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
Factions with clout: Presidential cabinet coalition and policy in the Uruguayan parliament
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 427-452
ISSN: 1354-0688
Factions with clout: Presidential cabinet coalition and policy in the Uruguayan parliament
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 427-451
ISSN: 1460-3683
We investigate bill passage by party factions in Uruguay and show that those joining cabinet coalitions earn policy influence. The policy advantage of coalition is therefore not collected by the president alone, as often implied: partners acquire clout in law-making and use it to pass bills of their own and to strike deals with outside factions. Analysis of all bills initiated between 1985 and 2005 reveals that the odds of passing a bill sponsored alone by a majority cabinet faction was about 0.5, up from about 0.15 otherwise. Contingent upon the cabinet status of factions involved, the odds of co-sponsored bills conform well to patterns expected by a view that policy rewards are a fundamental part of the politics of coalition in presidentialism.
SSRN
Working paper
Of Coalition and Speed: Passage and Duration of Statutes in Uruguay's Parliament, 1985-2000
In: IBEI Working Papers
SSRN
Working paper
Coalición y Resultados: Aprobación y duración del proceso legislativo en Uruguay (1985-2000)
In: Revista uruguaya de ciencia política, Band 17
ISSN: 1688-499X
SSRN
Working paper
How Much Is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 2, S. 299-309
ISSN: 1537-5943
A key premise of partisan theories of congressional organization is that majority status confers substantial procedural advantages. In this article, we take advantage of changes in party control of the House and Senate, such as that following the Republicans' historic victory in the midterm elections of 1994, to assess the value of majority status in terms of contributions from access-seeking political action committees (PACs). We estimate that majority status in the House was worth about $36,000 per member in receipts from corporate and trade PACs circa 1994—even controlling for the usual factors cited in the literature as affecting members' ability to raise money (such as committee assignments and voting record). The value of majority status in the Senate is even larger in absolute terms, although smaller in proportion to the total amount of money raised. Our results show that majority status is a valuable asset, one worth considerable collective effort to attain.
How much is majority status in the U.S. Congress worth?
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 2, S. 299-309
ISSN: 0003-0554
A key premise of partisan theories of congressional organization is that majority status confers substantial procedural advantages. In this article, we take advantage of changes in party control of the House and Senate, such as that following the Republicans' historic victory in the midterm elections of 1994, to assess the value of majority status in terms of contributions from access-seeking political action committees (PACs). We estimate that majority status in the House was worth about $36,000 per member in receipts from corporate and trade PACs circa 1994 - even controlling for the usual factors cited in the literature as affecting members' ability to raise money (such as committee assignments and voting record). The value of majority status in the Senate is even larger in absolute terms, although smaller in proportion to the total amount of money raised. Our results show that majority status is a valuable asset, one worth considerable collective effort to attain. (American Political Science Review / FUB)
World Affairs Online
The Value of Majority Status in the U.S. House
SSRN
Working paper
ARTICLES - How Much Is Majority Status in the US Congress Worth?
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 2, S. 299-310
ISSN: 0003-0554