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Objectives, concepts, and theories -- Trends in nuclear security assessments -- Trends in policy and spending preferences -- Terrorism -- Opinion stability at the individual level -- Mass belief structures -- Making sense of public beliefs and preferences about security policy -- Appendix 1: Research methodology -- Appendix 2: Questions, distributions, and means.

Employing data from two dozen national surveys of the American people conducted between 1993 and 2011, we analyze trends in mass views on key dimensions of nuclear security. We specifically address four questions. (a) How are the risks of nuclear conflict and further nuclear proliferation assessed? (b) How does the public view the relevance and value of US nuclear weapons? (c) What future directions are preferred for the US nuclear weapons stockpile? (d) How are public views about retaining US nuclear weapons structured? Our data show that nuclear conflict with Iran and North Korea and the risks of nuclear weapons or materials being acquired by transnational terrorist groups are seen as the greatest nuclear threats. Most Americans continue to value the efficacy of nuclear deterrence, consider nuclear abolition to be desirable but not yet feasible, and support modest mutual reductions in nuclear weapons. Employing causal modeling, we find that mass beliefs about the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons are hierarchically structured in coherent ways, and therefore are likely to be both resilient and relevant to policy debates on nuclear security.

We argue that the treatment of trans‐subsystem change, and particularly the role of public opinion in fostering such change, within the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) has been underspecified. We propose a model of "policy topography" that combines the concepts of public opinion, clusters of linked subsystems, and policy issue venues. While the ACF has characterized subsystems as relatively self‐contained, we argue that they are more usefully understood as operating in a relatively permeable fashion among evolving clusters of subsystems linked together by networked relations, strategically overlapping policy considerations, and public opinion disruptions. The "policy topography" model offers opportunities to assess the relationships across policy subsystems, and to better specify the critical relationship between public policy and mass opinions. We offer examples, and suggest hypotheses along with avenues for appropriate empirical analysis.

Our research examines the implications of political beliefs for the relationship between preferences for freedom and security. We briefly situate the relationship in historical context and relate it to today's struggle with terrorism. Then we examine the influence of political beliefs on normative preferences for how liberty and security should be related and for perceptions of how they currently are being balanced. Using original data from a national Internet survey of more than 3,000 respondents, we examine causal relationships among core, domain, and policy context beliefs for preferences about balancing freedom and security.

Objective. Our objective is to explain how scientists interpret less‐than‐certain scientific findings to inform policymakers' choices on controversial science policy issues. We focus on two particularly difficult policy cases concerning global climate change and low‐dose radiation protection.Methods. Our method is to analyze data from a unique multination survey of scientists to analyze the ways their views about what is scientifically correct are translated into judgments about appropriate policy. The surveys asked scientists, randomly drawn from U.S. and E.U. subscribers to the journal Science, to indicate the "most likely" relationships between greenhouse gas emissions and average global temperatures and between radiation dose and incidence of cancer in humans. Follow‐up questions asked for their judgments about appropriate policy targets for reductions in greenhouse gas emission and safety standards for radiation exposure. The data permit analysis of the relationships between scientific certainty and policy judgments in these two cases.Results. Our results shed light on when and how scientists reach precautionary policy conclusions, demonstrating that scientists' application of precaution is dependent on context. In the case of radiation protection, greater certainty is associated with less precaution. But with respect climate change, we found the opposite relationship.Conclusions. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for the role of scientists, and scientific advice, in the policy process.

ObjectiveOur objective is to explain how scientists interpret less-than-certain scientific findings to inform policymakers' choices on controversial science policy issues. We focus on two particularly difficult policy cases concerning global climate change and low-dose radiation protection. MethodsOur method is to analyze data from a unique multination survey of scientists to analyze the ways their views about what is scientifically correct are translated into judgments about appropriate policy. The surveys asked scientists, randomly drawn from U.S. and E.U. subscribers to the journal Science , to indicate the "most likely" relationships between greenhouse gas emissions and average global temperatures and between radiation dose and incidence of cancer in humans. Follow-up questions asked for their judgments about appropriate policy targets for reductions in greenhouse gas emission and safety standards for radiation exposure. The data permit analysis of the relationships between scientific certainty and policy judgments in these two cases. ResultsOur results shed light on when and how scientists reach precautionary policy conclusions, demonstrating that scientists' application of precaution is dependent on context. In the case of radiation protection, greater certainty is associated with less precaution. But with respect climate change, we found the opposite relationship. ConclusionsWe conclude with a discussion of the implications for the role of scientists, and scientific advice, in the policy process. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractWe test traditional assumptions about the volatility of mass opinion in times of national crises using data about views of terrorism from national surveys of the United States general public in 1995 and 1997, findings from a national survey immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and panel data from a follow‐up survey in 2002. We compare public assessments of the threat of terrorism, willingness to restrict speech to prevent terrorism, support for employing conventional military force against countries that support terrorism, and levels of certainty about culpability required prior to using military force. Results show stable and measured public views prior to 9/11, immediately following the events of that date, and in the subsequent year. Our findings support democratic and modernist theories of public capacities while challenging long‐standing traditional precepts about widespread volatility of mass public opinion.

We test traditional assumptions about the volatility of mass opinion in times of national crises using data about views of terrorism from national surveys of the United States general public in 1995 & 1997, findings from a national survey immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), & panel data from a follow-up survey in 2002. We compare public assessments of the threat of terrorism, willingness to restrict speech to prevent terrorism, support for employing conventional military force against countries that support terrorism, & levels of certainty about culpability required prior to using military force. Results show stable & measured public views prior to 9/11, immediately following the events of that date, & in the subsequent year. Our findings support democratic & modernist theories of public capacities while challenging long-standing traditional precepts about widespread volatility of mass public opinion. Tables, Figures, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

To study the homogeneity and influences on scientists'perspectives of environmental risks, we have examined similarities and differences in risk perceptions, particularly regarding nuclear wastes, and policy preferences among 1011 scientists and engineers. We found significant differences (p0.05)in the patterns of beliefs among scientists from different fields of research. In contrast to physicists, chemists, and engineers, life scientists tend to: (a)perceive the greatest risks from nuclear energy and nuclear waste management; (b)perceive higher levels of overall environmental risk; (c)strongly oppose imposing risks on unconsenting individuals; and (d)prefer stronger requirements for environmental management. On some issues related to priorities among public problems and calls for government action, there are significant variations among life scientists or physical scientists. We also found that–independently of field of research–perceptions of risk and its correlates are significantly associated with the type of institution in which the scientist is employed. Scientists in universities or state and local governments tend to see the risks of nuclear energy and wastes as greater than scientists who work as business consultants, for federal organizations, or for private research laboratories. Significant differences also are found in priority given to environmental risks, the perceived proximity of environmental disaster, willingness to impose risks on an unconsenting population, and the necessity of accepting risks and sacrifices.