Suchergebnisse

Many of the problems of military research and development are not special, either because they are common to other comparable research and development programs or because they are common to other parts of the military pro grams. The military programs are concerned with research, but the main emphasis is on development and on the entire chain of activities necessary to improve the capabilities of the operational forces. The magnitude and complexity of the pro grams are tremendous; these factors, particularly the complex nature and interrelations of their objectives, are at the root of most of the problems of military research and development. The basic organizational problem is to find a way to centralize responsibility for the crucial decisions involving selections among alternative military capabilities and technical ap proaches, while at the same time decentralizing detailed man agement to allow a maximum of freedom and flexibility in the actual conduct of research and development work. The prob lems of military research and development culminate in the budget process. Making the proper allocation to military re search and development within the over-all limitations and dis tributing this amount to individual research and development projects are the most difficult problems of our time.

The paper examines the present escalation of armaments, both conventional and nuclear, the mind-boggling stockpiles (with the capacity to destroy all life on earth many times over), the incredible speed of replacement of old and innovation and deployment of ever newer, ever more sophisticated and ever more lethal weapon system in their dynamic development. It identifies four factors of the armaments dynamic and, after examining each of them, comes to the conclusion that the most important and most dangerous is the military R&D. It has engulfed all scientific disciplines - natural, social and behavioural - and penetrated into industry, laboratories, universities, special research institutes and centres of learning. Military R&D not only absorbs the best scientific and technological talent, but also distorts priorities in scientific research itself. Having forged a symbiotic relationship with the structures of economy, politics and state bureaucracy, it has acquired an autonomous and self-propelling existence, making of the armaments race an exponential curve - rapid and steep and unending - and defying any kind of social control. Military R&D has also become an instrument of diplomacy; it blocks all attempts at arms limitation, even on a very modest scale, by vitiating the very negotiating process: efforts to achieve quantitative limitations are offset by qualitative compensations, and arms control negotiation is turned into a collaborative exercise in armaments escalation. Above all, military R&D gobbles up the resources that could well go to relieving mass poverty and providing the basic necessities of life to people around the world. The paper ends by suggesting a series of action to undermine, if not dismantle, the formidable structure so as to open the way to disarmament.

Benutzerkommentar

In 2012, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) commissioned a consensus report from the National Research Council on ethical and social issues associated with military research and development (R&D). DARPA's interest was both principled and practical. It wanted to do the right thing, as defined by US and international law, the Geneva Conventions, the laws of armed conflict, and similar prescriptions. Here, Fischhoff demonstrates how military R&D can become sensitive to ethical concerns, as discussed in the 2013 report Emerging and Readily Available Technologies and National Security: A Framework for Addressing Ethical, Legal, and Societal Issues. Adapted from the source document.

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. ; DRAFT ; The Sea Land Air Military Research initiative (SLAMR) is intended to address the "whole of country" challenges that face our Nation in a time of renewed great power competition by breaking down the barriers between government and citizen innovators.

Frontmatter -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- Tables -- Introduction -- I. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology -- II. Ménage à Trois: The University, Federal Support, and the Instrumentation Laboratory -- III. First Strike: The Research Stowage on March 4, 1969 -- IV. Reconnaissance: The Pounds Panel -- V. Accommodations and Negotiations -- VI. Student Offensive: Confrontation and Crisis -- VII. The Decision to Divest -- VIII. Universities and the Ethic of Responsibility -- Appendix I. Contrasting Assumptions of C. S. Draper and the Activists -- Appendix II. Statement by President Howard W. Johnson on the Special Laboratories, October 22, 1969 -- Appendix II./ Statement by President Howard W. Johnson on the Special Laboratories, May 20, 1970 -- A Note on the Program on Science, Technology, and Society -- Abbreviations -- Index