Suchergebnisse

Introduction / Kálmán Pócza -- Research methodology / Kálmán Pócza and Gábor Dobos -- The Czech constitutional court : far away from political influence / Katarína Šipulová -- The German federal constitutional court : authority transformed into power? / Oliver W. Lembcke -- The Hungarian constitutional court : a constructive partner in constitutional dialogue / Kálmán Pócza, Gábor Dobos and Attila Gyulai -- The Polish constitutional tribunal : deference beyond the veil of activism / Artur Wolek and Iga Kender-Jeziorska -- The Romanian constitutional court : muddling through democratic transition / Csongor Kuti -- The Slovak constitutional court : the third legislator? / Erik Láštic and Max Steuer -- Courts compared : the practice of constitutional adjudication in Central and Eastern Europe / Kálmán Pócza, Gábor Dobos and Attila Gyulai

This Article engages the two hundred year history of corporate constitutional rights jurisprudence to show that the Supreme Court has long accorded rights to corporations based on the rationale that corporations represent associations of people from whom such rights are derived. The Article draws on the history of business corporations in America to argue that the Court's characterization of corporations as associations made sense throughout most of the nineteenth century. By the late nineteenth century, however, when the Court was deciding several key cases involving corporate rights, this associational view was already becoming a poor fit for some corporations. The Court's failure to account for the wide spectrum of organizations labeled "corporations" became increasingly problematic with the rise of modern business corporations that could no longer be fairly characterized as an identifiable group of people acting in association. Nonetheless, the Court continued to apply the associational rationale from early case law and expand corporate rights into the realm of speech and political spending without careful analysis of when the associational approach would be appropriate. We set forth a theoretical framework that we believe is consistent with the underlying logic of the Court's jurisprudence, based on the concepts of derivative and instrumental rights. Specifically, we argue that the Court, to date, has not granted constitutional rights to corporations in their own right. Instead, it has granted rights to corporations either derivatively, when necessary to protect the rights of natural persons assumed to be represented by the corporation, or instrumentally, when necessary to protect the rights of parties outside the corporation. Further, we consider the implications that this framework, with a more nuanced view of the spectrum of corporations in existence, would have if applied to recent corporate rights cases, such as Citizens United. We believe this framework provides a principled path forward for the ...

"This book provides an up-to-date interdisciplinary assessment of the accountability of the executive power in different European States and at the European Union level. From a legal perspective, it wonders to what extent the forms of responsibility and accountability of executive power have evolved in terms of legal technique or framework. From a historical perspective, it looks at the evolution of responsibility paradigms. From a political science perspective, it examines responsibility and the expectations of European democracies in terms of authority and efficiency. The volume also has a quantitative aspect identifying, gathering and analysing statistical material on responsibility and accountability in current political regimes. The book will be a valuable resource for researchers, academics and policy-makers in Constitutional Law and Politics, Public Law, Comparative Law, Comparative Politics, Legal History and Government"--