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It speaks volumes that the death of Henry Kissinger, announced on Wednesday, drew major news obituaries that rivaled those of late American presidents' in length and depth. The news was met with equal parts of vitriol and paeans across social media, the former reflected in words like "war criminal" and "monster," the latter, "genius" and "master."His intellectually-driven, hard-nosed statecraft and strategy has long been embraced by realists who appreciate Kissinger's rejection of ideological doctrine in favor of interest-driven realpolitik. They credit him with détente and managing the Soviet threat in the Cold War. His critics say his approach was responsible for government-led massacres in developing nations and Washington's scorched earth policies in Indochina. Humanity suffered while the "great game" was played, no matter how well, from the Nixon White House and in later presidencies (12 total) for which Kissinger advised.But was his impact on U.S. foreign policy ultimately positive or negative? We asked a wide range of historians, former diplomats, journalists and scholars to pick one and defend it.Andrew Bacevich, George Beebe, Tom Blanton, Michael Desch, Anton Fedyashin, Chas Freeman, John Allen Gay, David Hendrickson, Robert Hunter, Anatol Lieven, Stephen Miles, Tim Shorrock, Monica Duffy Toft, Stephen WaltAndrew Bacevich, historian and co-founder of the Quincy InstituteI met Kissinger just once, at a small gathering in New York back in the 1990s. When the event adjourned, he walked over to where I was sitting and spoke to me. "Did you serve in the military?" "Yes," I said. "In Vietnam?" "Yes." His tone filled with sadness, he said: "We really wanted to win that one."I did not reply but as he walked away, I thought: What an accomplished liar.George Beebe, Director of Grand Strategy, Quincy InstituteHenry Kissinger's impact on American foreign policy, although controversial, was on balance overwhelmingly positive. As he entered office in 1968, America was overextended abroad and beset by domestic political conflict. An increasingly powerful Soviet Union threatened to achieve superiority over America's nuclear and conventional arsenals. The United States needed to extract itself from Vietnam and focus on domestic healing, yet any retreat into isolationism would allow Moscow a free hand to intimidate Western Europe and spread communism through the post-colonial world. Kissinger's answer to this problem, conceived in partnership with President Nixon, was a masterwork of diplomatic realism. Seeing an opportunity to exploit tensions between Moscow and Beijing, he orchestrated a surprise opening to Maoist China that reshaped the international order, counterbalancing Soviet power and complicating the Kremlin's strategic challenge. In parallel, the United States pursued détente with Moscow, producing a landmark set of trade, arms control, human rights, and confidence-building arrangements that helped to constrain the arms race and make the Cold War more manageable and predictable.By comparison to 1968, the scale of the problems we face today seems more daunting. The Cold War architecture of arms control and security arrangements is in tatters. Our middle class is more distrustful and disaffected, our international reputation more damaged, and our ability to manage the challenges of a peer Chinese rival more limited. A statesman with Kissinger's strategic acumen and diplomatic skill is very much needed. Tom Blanton, Director, National Security Archive, George Washington UniversityThe declassified legacy of Henry Kissinger undermines the triumphant narrative he labored so hard to build, even for his successes. The opening to China, for example, turns out to be Mao's idea with Nixon's receptiveness, initially dissed by Kissinger. His shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East did reduce violence but it took Anwar Sadat and then Jimmy Carter to make the peace that Kissinger failed to accomplish. The 1973 Vietnam settlement was actually available in 1969, but Kissinger mistakenly believed he could do better by going through Moscow or Beijing. Meanwhile, Kissinger's callousness about the human cost runs through all the documents. Millions of Bangladeshis murdered by Pakistan's genocide while Kissinger stifled dissent in the State Department. A million Vietnamese and 20,000 Americans who died for Kissinger's "decent interval." Some 30,000 Argentines disappeared by the junta with Kissinger's green light. Thousands of Chileans killed by Pinochet while Kissinger joked about human rights. Untold numbers of Cambodians dead under Kissinger's secret bombing.Adding insult to all these injuries, Kissinger cashed in over the past 45 years through sustained influence peddling and self-promotion, paying no price for repeated bad judgments like opposing the Reagan-Gorbachev arms cuts, and supporting the 2003 Iraq invasion. A dark legacy indeed.Michael Desch, Professor of International Relations at the University of Notre Dame Almost all of the obituaries for Henry Kissinger characterize him as the quintessential realist, harkening back to a bygone era of European great power politics in which statesmen played the 19th century version of the board game Risk otherwise known as the balance of power. Kissinger seemed straight out of central casting for this role with his deep, sonorous voice and perpetual Mittel-Europa accent. All that was missing was a monocle and a Pickelhaube. But in reality, Kissinger was at best an occasional realist. His best scholarly book — "A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22" — came out in 1957 and was more of a work of history than an articulation of a larger realpolitik theory of global politics in which power is used, and more importantly not used, to advance a country's national interest.And while his (and Richard Nixon's) opening to the People's Republic of China in 1972 remains a masterstroke of balance of power politics in action, at the drop of an egg-roll dividing the heretofore seemingly monolithic Communist Bloc, he was more often an inconstant realist.At times Kissinger embraced a crude might-makes-right approach (think of the Athenians bullying of the Melians in Book V of Thucydides) epitomized by the escalation to deescalate the war in Vietnam by invading Cambodia and the meddling in the fractious politics of Third World countries like Chile, seemingly to no other end than that's what great powers do. More recently, he's worked to remain the indispensable statesman through an embarrassingly obsequious pattern of making himself indispensable to nearly every subsequent president, whether or not they were really interested in sitting at the knee of the master realpolitiker. His hedged endorsement of George W. Bush's disastrous Iraq war is exhibit A on this score.Kissinger kept himself in the limelight for much of his career but not as a consistent voice of realism in foreign policy.Anton Fedyashin, associate professor of history, American UniversityIn his long and distinguished career, Henry Kissinger made many decisions that history may judge harshly, but oversimplifying and exaggerating complex geopolitical issues was not one of them. With their instinctive aversion to the trap of conceptual binarism, Kissinger and Nixon applied their flexible realism to China and the USSR in 1972. Abandoning the assumption that all communists were evil forced Beijing and Moscow to outbid each other for U.S. favors. Treating the USSR as a post-revolutionary state that put national interests above ideology, Nixon and Kissinger decided to bring the Soviets into the American-managed world order while letting them keep their hegemony in Eastern Europe.In Kissinger's realist version of containment, statesmanship was judged by the management of ambiguities, not absolutes. As Kissinger put it in an interview with The Economist earlier this year, "The genius of the Westphalian system and the reason it spread across the world was that its provisions were procedural, not substantive." Kissinger's realist wisdom would serve American leaders well as they navigate the rough waters of transitioning to a multipolar world order. The era of great power balancing is back, and non-binarist realism can help Washington manage hegemonic decline rather than catalyzing it.Ambassador Chas Freeman, visiting scholar at Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public AffairsKissinger embodied a global and strategic view and because it was global, it often offended specialists in regional affairs. Because it was strategic, he often made tactical sacrifices for strategic gain. And the tactical sacrifices that he made were often rather ugly at the regional or local level. The classic example of that is the refusal to intervene in the war in Bangladesh. Obviously, he had nothing but contempt for ideological foreign policy. This has led ideologues, of which we have an abundance, to see him as an enemy, and you're seeing this now with some of the coverage after his passing.Kissinger's achievement of detente at a crucial point in the Cold War will be remembered for its brilliance, as will his significant scholarship. His statecraft and scholarship were inseparable. He was a very good negotiator and probably had more experience negotiating great power relations than any secretary of state since early in the Republic. He was moderately successful in the short term. He was not successful in the long term because his interlocutors correctly perceived that he was manipulative. If one wishes to keep relationships open to future transactions, one must not cheat on current transactions. But this problem is not uncommon. It's very typical in American politics. For example, Jim Baker was famously uninterested in nurturing relationships. He was interested in immediate results in his dealings with foreign governments. He left a lot of anger and dissatisfaction in his wake. Kissinger less so, but the same for different reasons, reflecting his personality, his character, and the character of the president he served.John Allen Gay, Executive Director, John Quincy Adams SocietyKissinger's legacy in the Third World commands the most attention and criticism. He has been made the face of the tremendous toll the Cold War took on the wretched of the earth. Yet his work on great power relations deserves more regard. The opening to China he engineered with President Richard Nixon was a masterstroke to exploit division in the Communist world. Granted, the Sino-Soviet split had happened long before, and the opening was more a Nixon idea, but Kissinger set the table. And Kissinger was also a central figure in détente with the Soviet Union.Both policies were deeply unpopular with the forerunners to the neoconservative movement, but reflected the Continental realist mindset that Kissinger, along with thinkers like Hans J. Morgenthau, brought into the American foreign policy discourse. The opening to China and détente were, in fact, linked. As Kissinger pointed out, the opening to China challenged the Soviet Union to prevent the opening from growing; contrary to the advice of Sovietologists, this did not prompt new Soviet aggression, but made the Soviets more pliable. As Kissinger wrote in his 1994 book "Diplomacy" — "To the extent both China and the Soviet Union calculated that they either needed American goodwill or feared an American move toward its adversary, both had an incentive to improve their relations with Washington. […] America's bargaining position would be strongest when America was closer to bot communist giants than either was to the other." And so it was. Today's practitioners of great-power politics would do well to borrow more from this happier part of Kissinger's legacy. They have instead helped drive China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea together, and have no answer to this emerging alignment beyond lectures and sanctions. The19th century European statesmen Kissinger admired would have seen the failure of such a policy. David Hendrickson, author, "Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition"The great oddity of Nixon and Kissinger's record in foreign policy is that they gave up as unprofitable and dangerous the pursuit of ideological antagonism with the Great Powers (the Soviet Union and China), but then pursued the Cold War crusade with a vengeance against small powers. Kissinger's diplomatic career reminds me of the charge that Hauterive (a favorite of Napoleon's) brought against the confusions of the ancien regime, that it applied "the terms sound policy, system of equilibrium, maintenance or restoration of the balance of power . . . to what, in fact was only an abuse of power, or the exercise of arbitrary will."Parts of Kissinger's record, like the bombing of Cambodia, are indefensible, but there are good parts too: had Henry the K been in charge of our Russia policy over the last decade, we could have avoided the conflagration in Ukraine. He was sounder on China and Taiwan than 90 percent of the howling commentariat. He was, in addition, a serious scholar who wrote some good books about the construction of world order (A World Restored, Diplomacy). Young people should take his thought seriously, not consign him to the ninth circle.Robert Hunter, former U.S. Ambassador to NATOLike all outstanding teachers, Henry Kissinger was also a showman — and he could be fun. He used his accent and self-deprecating humor as weapons for his policies and getting them taken seriously. Journalists might at times scorn what he was doing and how he did it, but they were still charmed and tended so often to give him the benefit of the doubt — as well as the credit, even when not deserved. Everyone recalls his roles in promoting détente with the Soviet Union and, even more, the opening to China, with Richard Nixon following in his wake. In fact, both policies sprang from Nixon's mind. But when the dust settled, Kissinger was the Last Man Standing."Henry," we could call him who never worked for him (!), made intelligent and literate speeches on foreign policy that everyone could understand, bringing it into the limelight. A man of great ego, he still recruited and inspired talented acolytes at the State Department and White House — matched only by Brent Scowcroft and Zbig Brzezinski. He had other policy positives in the Middle East ("shuttle diplomacy") but major negatives in Chile, in prolonging the Vietnam War, and bombing Cambodia.Take him altogether, a true Man of History.Anatol Lieven, Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy InstituteThe problem about any just assessment of Henry Kissinger is that the good and bad parts of his record are organically linked. His Realism led him to an awareness of the vital interests of other countries, a willingness to compromise, and a prudence in the exercise of U.S. power that all too many American policymakers have altogether lacked and that the United States today desperately needs. This Realist acceptance of the world as it is however also contributed to a cynical disregard for basic moral norms — notably in Cambodia and Bangladesh — that have forever tarnished his and America's name.When in office, reconciliation with China and the pursuit of Middle East peace took real moral courage on Kissinger's part, given the forces arrayed against these policies in the United States. But in his last decades, though he initially criticized NATO expansion and called for the preservation of relations with Russia and China, he never did so with the intellectual and moral force of a George Kennan.Perhaps in the end the best comment on Kissinger comes from an epithet by his fellow German Jewish thinker on international affairs Hans Morgenthau: "It is a dangerous thing to be a Machiavelli. It is a disastrous thing to be a Machiavelli without Virtu" — an Italian term embracing courage, moral steadfastness and basic principle.Stephen Miles, President, Win Without WarNearly as many words have been spilled marking the end of Henry Kissinger's life as the lives he's responsible for ending, but let me add a few more. It would be easy to simply say that the devastating impact of Kissinger on U.S. foreign policy was clearly and wholly negative. As Spencer Ackerman noted in his essential obituary, few Americans, if any, have ever been as responsible for the death of so many of their fellow human beings. But Kissinger's true impact was not just in being a war criminal but in setting a new standard for doing so with impunity. Earlier this year, he was feted with a party for his 100th birthday attended not just by crusty old Cold Warriors remembering 'the good ole days,' but also by a veritable who's who of today's elite from billionaire CEOs and cabinet members to fashion megastars and NFL team owners. Sure, he may have been responsible for a coup here or a genocide there, but shouldn't we all just look past that and recognize his influence, power, and intellect? Does it really matter what he used those talents for?And in the end, that's the benefit of Kissinger's horrific life and decidedly not-untimely death. By never making amends for the harm he did and never being held accountable for the horrors he caused, he made clear just how truly broken and flawed U.S. foreign policy is. Perhaps now that he has finally left the stage, we can begin to change that. Tim Shorrock, Washington-based journalistKissinger nearly destroyed three Asian countries by causing the deaths of thousands in U.S. bombing raids, covertly intervened to subvert democracy in Chile, and encouraged an Indonesian dictator to invade newly independent East Timor and inflict a genocide upon its people. These were criminal acts that should have made him a pariah. Instead, he is lauded as a visionary by our ruling elite. And it was mostly accomplished through lies and deceit, in the name of corporate profit.I'll never forget in 1972 watching Kissinger declare "peace is at hand" in Vietnam. After years of protesting this immoral war, I truly thought that Vietnam's suffering, and my own countrymen's, was finally over; they had won and we had lost. But my hope was shattered that Christmas, when Kissinger and Nixon ordered B-52s to carpet-bomb Hanoi in an arrogant act of defiance and malice. Afterwards, a shaky peace agreement was signed that could have sparked an honorable U.S. withdrawal. But it took 3 more years of bloodshed before the United States was forced out.Kissinger broke my trust in America as a just nation and overseas sparked a deep hatred of U.S. foreign policy. Few statesmen have caused such harm.Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics and Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityI have a pair of midcentury teak chairs once belonging to the late eminent scholar Samuel P. Huntington in my office. Sam was a colleague and friend of Henry Kissinger's, and a mentor to me. Sam and I sat in these chairs discussing world politics and the everyday challenges of running a scholarly institute. When a new set of chairs arrived, Sam insisted I take the old ones, but not before emphasizing their significance — reminders of the hours he and Kissinger spent in deep debate and casual banter. These chairs have history.Henry Kissinger was, and shall remain, a controversial figure. His gifts were two. First, across decades of U.S. foreign policy challenges, he remained consistent in his conception of power, and how U.S. power should be used to enhance the security of the United States. Second, he was gifted at assembling, mentoring, and deploying cross-cutting networks of influential people. Like many of my colleagues who study international politics, there are policies — his support of Salvador Allende's ouster in Chile, for example — I find odious. I am also uncomfortable with Kissinger's elitism: his preferred policies favored those with wealth and political power at the expense of those without.But what I admire about Kissinger's U.S. foreign policy legacy and, by extension, international politics, was his profound grasp of the importance of historical context: a thing as important to sound U.S foreign policy today as it is rare; and of which I am pleasantly reminded every time I sit in one of Sam's chairs.Stephen Walt, Quincy Institute board member, professor of international affairs at the Harvard Kennedy SchoolHenry Kissinger was the most prominent U.S. statesman of his era, and that era lasted a very long time. His main achievements were not trivial: a long-overdue opening to China, some high-wire "shuttle diplomacy" after the 1973 October War, and several useful arms control treaties during the period of détente. But he was also guilty of some monumental misjudgments, including prolonging the Vietnam War to no good purpose and expanding it into Cambodia at a frightful human cost. His diplomatic acrobatics in the Middle East were impressive, but they were only necessary because he had missed the signs that Egypt was readying for war in 1973 in order to break a diplomatic deadlock that he had helped orchestrate. His indifference to human rights and civilian suffering sacrificed thousands of lives and made a mockery of U.S. pretensions to moral superiority.Kissinger owed his enduring influence not to a superior track record as a pundit or sage but to his own energy, unquenchable ambition, unparalleled networking skills, and the elite's reluctance to hold its members accountable. After all, this is a man who downplayed the risks of China's rise (while earning fat consulting fees there), backed the disastrous invasion of Iraq in 2003, opposed the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, and dismissed warnings that open-ended NATO enlargement would make Europe less rather than more secure. Kissinger also perfected the art of transmuting government service into a lucrative consulting career, setting a troubling precedent for others. Debates about his legacy will no doubt continue, but one suspects that the reverence that his acolytes exhibit today will gradually fade now that he is no longer here to sustain it.Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!

La llibertat d'expressió té els seus origens en el liberalisme de Gran Bretanya i els Estats Units. Les primeres reivindicacions a favor d'un intercanvi lliure d'idees van començar al segle XVII, amb el discurs Areopagitica de John Milton, que demanava al Parlament anglès l'abolició de la censura a la imprempta. El 1971 la llibertat d'expressió es va incorporar a la Constitució dels Estats Units; la seva Primera Esmena declarava: "el Congrés no farà cap llei. per la que es limiti la llibertat de paraula, o la de premsa". Aquest treball es centra en les aportacions a la llibertat d'expressió realitzades per John Stuart Mill, utilitarista anglès, i Oliver Wendell Holmes, realista americà, les quals es van introduir entre la segona meitat del segle XIX i la primera meitat del segle XX. Les obres d'ambdós autors s'estudien tenint en compte el moviment filosòfic al qual pertanyen. En primer lloc, la teoria sobre llibertat de pensament i discussió de John Stuart Mill es relaciona amb la seva filosofia moral i política. En segon lloc, s'analitzen les opinions judicials d'Oliver Wendell Holmes en les que formula el test del "perill clar i actual" i la teoria del "mercat obert de les idees". Aquesta aproximació permet mostrar que ambdós autors van liberalitzar el concepte de llibertat d'expressió imperant a la seva època, i van considerar que els seus fonaments principals eren la recerca de la veritat i l'autorrealització individual. ; La libertad de expresión tiene sus orígenes en el liberalismo de Gran Bretaña y los Estados Unidos. Las primeras reivindicaciones a favor de un intercambio libre de ideas empezaron en el siglo XVII, con el discurso Areopagitica de John Milton, que pedía al Parlamento inglés la abolición de la censura en la imprenta. En 1791 la libertad de expresión se incorporó a la Constitución de los Estados Unidos, cuya Primera Enmienda declaraba: "el Congreso no hará ley alguna. por la que se limite la libertad de palabra, o la de prensa". Este trabajo se centra en las aportaciones a la libertad de expresión realizadas por John Stuart Mill, utilitarista inglés, y Oliver Wendell Holmes, realista americano, las cuales se introdujeron entre la segunda mitad del siglo XIX y la primera mitad del siglo XX. Las obras de ambos autores se estudian teniendo en cuenta el movimiento filosófico al cual pertenecen. En primer lugar, la teoría sobre libertad de pensamiento y discusión de John Stuart Mill se relaciona con su filosofía moral y política. En segundo lugar, se analizan las opiniones judiciales de Oliver Wendell Holmes en las que se formula el test del "peligro claro y actual" y la teoría del "mercado abierto de las ideas". Esta aproximación permite mostrar que ambos autores liberalizaron el concepto de libertad de expresión imperante en su época, y consideraron que sus fundamentos principales eran la búsqueda de la verdad y la autorrealización individual. ; Freedom of speech has its origins in liberalism from Great Britain and the United States. The first claims for a free exchange of ideas started in the 17th century, with John Milton's Areopagitica, in which the abolishing of printing censorship by the English Parliament was demanded. In 1791, freedom of speech was included in the Constitution of the United States, whose First Amendment declared: "Congress shall make no law. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press". This study focuses on the specific contributions to freedom of speech made by the English utilitarian John Stuart Mill and the American realist Oliver Wendell Holmes, which were introduced throughout the second half of 19th century and the first half of 20th century. The works of both authors are discussed bearing in mind the philosophical movement to which they belong. Firstly, John Stuart Mill's theory of thought and speech is related to his moral and political philosophy. Secondly, Oliver Wendell Holmes' judicial opinions on both "clear and present danger" test and the "free marketplace of ideas" are analysed. This approach makes it possible to show both authors liberalize the concept of freedom of speech and consider that its foundations are, basically, the discovery of truth along with individual self-development.

Although sociologists have increasingly abandoned the assumption that secularization is an inevitable byproduct of modernity, they have yet to develop a compelling account for why similar modern countries nevertheless accord religion substantially different roles in public life. This dissertation engages this problem by examining how the United States and Australia came to develop contrasting policies toward religious education in the late twentieth century. Prior to World War II, both countries adopted similar stances on the proper relationship of the state to religion in education: devotional practices were permitted in public schools, while financial support for religious schools was prohibited. Since the late 1940s, however, the two countries have moved in opposite directions. Australia has retained a place for religion in its public schools, while inaugurating generous government support for religious schools. The United States, meanwhile, has retained restrictions on public aid for religious schools while prohibiting devotional practices in its public schools. These changes have occurred, moreover, despite many apparent similarities: both nations are modern, religiously pluralist democracies with common-law legal systems and constitutions with explicit disestablishment clauses.Drawing upon original archival research, as well as a wide array of other primary and secondary sources, this dissertation accounts for these divergent "secular settlements" by detailing how each country's administrative, judicial, and electoral institutions advanced or constrained three common secularizing processes: state-building, professionalization, and religious conflict. In brief, it argues that American political institutions constituted a "permeable state" which facilitated the progress of these processes, while Australian institutions constituted an "insulated state" which inhibited them. The first part of the dissertation describes the genesis of the parallel secular settlements of the nineteenth century, focusing on how the state-building process generated public educational systems with similar policies toward religion, but divergent administrative structures. This prologue sets the stage for the second part, which examines how those administrative institutions affected the fate of religious education in state schools in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. America's decentralized system of educational administration advanced two long-term secularizing processes, professionalization and religious conflict, between 1880 and 1945, while Australia's centralized administrative system constrained them. The permeable American state facilitated challenges to pan-Protestant religious exercises in the public schools by religious minorities and educational professionals, leading to a slow attenuation of religion's position in public education over the early twentieth century. By contrast, the insulated Australian state made these kinds of challenges much more difficult, reducing the leverage religious minorities could bring to bear on policies they opposed, and actively suppressing professionalization among Australian teachers--both of which helped to sustain traditional religious instruction into the third quarter of the twentieth century.The third part of the dissertation demonstrates how courts and parties provided contrasting opportunities and obstacles for concerted campaigns by religious minorities who sought to renegotiate each country's policy toward religion after 1945. Taxpayer standing and a realist hermeneutic made the American courts accessible and open to sustained litigation in ways that Australia's restrictive standing rules and legalist hermeneutic did not allow. By contrast, Australia's system of preference-voting and flexible party structure facilitated Catholics' political campaign to obtain state support for their school system--a campaign that foundered in the United States thanks to unfavorable coalition dynamics within a rigid two-party system. This dissertation makes a number of contributions to contemporary debates about secularization. First, it develops a new, "political-institutional" approach to the study of secularization. Drawing on insights from institutional theory and historical sociology, this approach asserts that secular settlements emerge, not simply from broad modernizing trends or the self-interested calculations of political leaders, but instead from the interaction of general secularizing processes (such as state-building, religious conflict, and professionalization) and each country's specific political institutions. This approach offers increased explanatory power relative to four existing formulations. Second, it reveals that the state, as an institutional structure, has both mediating and constitutive effects on secularization. Both by conditioning the political and professional activities of would-be secularizing actors, and by actively calling into being the very actors who subsequently seek more secular outcomes, the state is a key factor in explaining variation in secularization. Finally, it demonstrates that the actors advancing more secular outcomes are animated by a wider variety of motivations than has typically been acknowledged. Although most existing studies focus on anticlerical or self-interested motives, this study reveals that practical administrative considerations and religious commitments have also been important forces driving the development of new secular settlements.

In her recent book published after the election of Donald Trump as the US President in 2016, Cynthia Enloe argues that the patriarchy, similar to our smart phones, has updated itself as a reaction against the achievements of the second and third wave feminisms. The updated patriarchy has this time renewed itself through the beliefs and values about the ways the world works (2017). The competing foreign policies representing the hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity of the current world politics and its authoritarian leaders are the outputs of this new updated version of patriarchy. Enloe doubts that having gained sustainability with its updates, the patriarchy could be fought against simply with street demonstrations, as it was before. The patriarchy could be forced to retreat only by incessantly asking "curious" feminist questions that would expose all masculine patterns of life (2017). Continuously asking questions without giving up or giving in would make the patriarchy transparent and vulnerable. In the face of curious, non-stop questions from a gender perspective and the conscious use of the terms supporting gender equality, the patriarchy, albeit updated and sustained, does not stand a chance.
Enloe explains the reason why incorporating gender in International Relations has been considered irrelevant by the power- and security dominated character of the discipline. Also, because the heavy majority of the academics associated with International Relations are male, it is them who choose what is important and worthy of 'serious' investigation (Enloe, 2004, 96). This masculine attitude, however, has been clearly excluding multiple human experiences and hindering their capacity to create new possibilities for peaceful co-existence in international relations (Youngs, 2004).
As a matter of fact, when we look at the emergence of International Relations as a separate discipline, and the political theories that it takes as its first point of reference, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen) – the human rights document at the time of the French Revolution – Machiavelli's The Prince; and Man, the State and War, written in 1959 by Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neo-realism, were the mainstream writings that brought liberal (libertarian) and realist perspectives to the discipline of International Relations, respectively. The fundamental aim of these texts was, in fact, to make an analysis based on history and 'his' problems. Although these texts put forward a desire for rights and freedoms, as well as the achievement of peace, these values are mostly targeted towards men. Thus, over time, the prominent concepts of International Relations, such as security and hegemony, were defined from a masculine and patriarchal perspective. For instance, from the theoretical view of realists, hegemony is attributed to the order established and led by the most powerful state of the international system– both militarily and economically– while sovereignty evokes the Hobbesian Leviathan (the Devil), with its masculine nature and might. Raewyn Connell responds to these masculine conceptualizations by pointing out that hegemony includes organized social domination in all spheres of life, from religious doctrines to mundane practice, from mass media to taxation (1998: 246). As Connell reminds us, "hegemonic masculinity" expresses the domination of men over women intellectually, culturally, socially, or even politically, thus establishing an unequivocal linkage between gender and power (Connell, 1998).
Just as the Western approach to reading and identifying the East and its fiction found an answer in Edward Said's critique of Orientalism, the theory of political realism put forth by Hans Morgenthau was criticized by Ann Tickner for conceptualizing international politics through the lens of an assumed masculine subject (Tür & Koyuncu, 2010: 9). Critical theory and postmodernism, as alternative approaches in International Relations, drew attention to the otherization of different geographies, civilizations and identities. Yet, on the issue of gender equality, the otherization of women has not been sufficiently recognized; the superiority of man and patriarchy is made possible through the othering of women. From this point of view, it would be beneficial to make a holistic reading of the International Relations literature, and to dismantle these masculine concepts by asking "curious" questions of the discipline.
In Terrell Carver's words, "Gendering IR" is...a project; "gendered" IR is an outcome" (Carver, 2003: 289). In order to achieve such outcome, it bears utmost importance for the gender-equality advocates to insist on, institutionally and practically, gender-based approaches and to not agree with the priority list of the masculine agenda. Security, order, control and retaliation increasingly dominate the discourse shaping the world politics. The gender perspective in International Relations develops to create alternative paradigms that would break this vicious circle of (in)security.
Feminist theory in International Relations has demonstrated significant progress since the 1990s and opened pathways in an uncharted territory. Cynthia Enloe, Ann Tickner, Spike V. Peterson and Christine Sylvester, among others, are the most prominent forerunners of this field. Through their works, feminist theory has adopted a perspective critical of the masculinity and the masculine values of international politics by taking not only 'women' but a wider category of gender into its centre. These feminist scholars have deconstructed International Relations theories by posing gender-related questions and displayed the masculine prejudice embedded in the definitions of security, power and sovereignty. The feminist theories of International Relations have thus distinguished themselves from the other theories of the discipline by paying a 'curious' attention to the power hierarchies and relation structures through inclusiveness and self-reflexivity (True, 2017: 3).
As Cynthia Enloe puts it, the gender perspective in International Relations must first be guided by a feminist consciousness (2004: 97). The feminist International Relations, however, although more than a quarter of century has passed since its emergence, are still struggling with the masculine theories to be considered as an equally legitimate way of understanding how the world works. Various epistemological, ontological and ethical debates may have enriched the field (True, 2017: 1), but at the same time, too many as they are, such debates may paradoxically be accusing the spreading-thin of the gender coalition. The capacity of the feminist International Relations' ethical principles to participate in the global politics has been limited to the United Nations Security Council's decision number 1325 and the Swedish feminist foreign policy.
The feminist attempt to facilitate substantial change and interaction by creating a normative agenda has been called 'normative feminism' by Jacqui True (2013: 242). Normative feminism is a project of institutionalising gender in foreign policy by focusing on socio-economic and political changes. The special issue here is our attempt to partake in this project of change in international relations. We have aimed to enhance the visibility of the gender norms of behavior and decision-making with the presupposition that they would pose an alternative to the masculine norms in International Relations by better supporting the human priorities of peace and co-existence.
Adopting Judith Butler's notion of performativity, the feminist existence in international politics has an undeniable connection to engaging in continuous activities. As Rihannan Bury suggests, "what gives a community its substance is the consistent repetition of these 'various acts' by a majority of members." "Being a member of community," therefore, "is not something one is but something one does" (2005: 14). In Turkey, too, in order to challenge the recognition of the 'hyper' version of the hegemonic masculinity as the only viable world view, gender-charged normative discourses, interactions and agendas must be continuously created and multiplied. We hope that the Turkish literature-review and the articles published here will serve this purpose.
As is the situation in all disciplines, the feminist International Relations has nurtured many onto-epistemologies, some in competition with one another. Such multitude, though definitely a richness, has been challenging the feminist stance's capacity to stand united against the hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity. In her latest book, Enloe calls for a continuous struggle of a new and wider feminist coalition against the updated authoritarianism of the patriarchy –inspiring our title "Don't Give Up! Don't Give In!." Such expanded coalition could rise on the common purpose of fighting male dominance and ignore the differences of discourse created by the debate on identity. The gender-guided change and transformation desired in international politics could be achieved more easily in this way (Hemmings, 2012: 148, 155). On this account, in parallel with Enloe's proposal of establishing a wider consensus simply on peace and co-existence (2017), a new era, in which questions of identity will, for some time, not be asked, may be dawning. A grand coalition of consensus has better chance of resisting the authoritarian leaders of hyper hegemonic masculinity.
Our special issue of Gender and International Relations opens with a Turkish literature review with the aim of introducing the topic to Turkish readers. Çiçek Coşkun, against a historical background, presents some of the prominent feminist scholars who have left their footprints in this very masculine area with their fresh gender perspectives. In doing that she offers us a comparative framework in which works by the Turkish and international scholars could be assessed simultaneously. Nezahat Doğan's article seeks to establish the relation between global peace and gender by using the data obtained from the Global Peace Index, Gender Inequality Index and Social Institutions and Gender Index. In this way, adopting a currently trendy approach, Doğan investigates the interaction between gender and International Relations through a quantitative method. Zehra Yılmaz's article discusses the temporary position of Syrian women asylum seekers in Turkey from the perspective of the post-colonial feminist concept of subaltern. The article aims to combine feminist migration studies and post-colonial feminist literature within the context of International Relations. Sinem Bal's article questions whether the EU has designed its gender policies as an aspect of the human-right norms of the European integration or as a way to regulate market economy. Bal pursues such questioning through the reading of the official documents of the EU that prescribes what Europeanization is for Turkey. Thus, all articles constitute a well-rounded understanding of what gendered approaches can achieve in the current practice of international studies.
The co-authored article written by Bezen Balamir-Coşkun and Selin Akyüz examined how the images of women leaders in international politics were presented in the international media. The selected images the three most powerful women political leaders list of Forbes in 2017 –Angela Merkel, Theresa May and Federica Mogherini were analysed in the light of the political masculinities literature from a social visual semiotics perspective. It is believed that such an analysis will contribute to the debates about gendered aspect of international relations as well as the current debates on political masculinities. Gizem Bilgin-Aytaç points out that the global policy that emerged after the Cold War and the emergence of the new way of approaching the IR from a feminist perspective have improved the scope of conceptual analysis in peace theories as well. Bilgin-Aytaç discusses global peace conditions with a gender perspective - in particular, referring to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, with a focus on exemplary contemporary issues. Fulden İbrahimhakkıoğlu, in her article, discusses the debate between Ukraine-based feminist group FEMEN staged several protests in support of Amina Tyler, a Tunisian FEMEN activist receiving death threats for posting nude photographs of herself online with social messages written on her body and the Muslim Women Against FEMEN who released an open letter criticizing the discourse FEMEN used in these protests, which they found to be white colonialist and Islamophobic. Thus, İbrahimhakkıoğlu aimes to examines the discursive strategies put forth by the two sides of the very debate, and unveiling the shortcomings of liberalism as drawn on by both positions, the author attempts to rethink what "freedom" might mean for international feminist alliances across differences.

La revolució digital està creant nous riscos i, alhora, múltiples oportunitats per a la comunicació, el comerç i la participació política. El que Ulrich Beck va descriure com la societat mundial del risc i —des d'una altra perspectiva— el que Jürgen Habermas anomena la «constel·lació postnacional» és un desafiament als nostres conceptes de societat i democràcia. La digitalització està impulsant aquest desenvolupament cap a una nova dimensió que ens permet parlar de la «constel·lació digital». Les relacions socials són més denses a través de les fronteres i els continents; el que passa aquí importa com si passés a la nostra pròpia porta. Sorgeixen nous tipus de riscos com a efecte secundari de l'ús creixent de les tecnologies de la informació, mentre que internet també ofereix —per primera vegada— una infraestructura que fa dels conceptes fins ara poc realistes de democràcia cosmopolita (David Held) una opció real. Això inclou l'establiment d'un marc constitucional per als processos normatius que tracta, entre altres desafiaments mundials, de gestionar de manera coherent i eficaç els riscos cibernètics a nivell nacional, supranacional i mundial. El constitucionalisme a diversos nivells es proposa com un mitjà d'aportar una teoria normativa per conceptualitzar l'estructura constitucional d'un sistema de governança en capes que garanteixi el grau màxim d'autodeterminació de l'individu i, per tant, la legitimitat democràtica de les decisions preses en cada nivell, des del local fins al global. Per tant, la constitució per a una acció democràticament legítima a nivell global no qüestiona la democràcia en altres nivells, sinó que ha de ser complementària, basada en estats que funcionin i dissenyada per tractar temes que estan fora del seu abast, incloent-hi la ciberseguretat. ; The digital revolution is creating new risks, together with multiple opportunities for communication, commerce and political participation. What Ulrich Beck described as the world risk society and what – from another perspective – Jürgen Habermas calls the "postnational constellation" is a challenge to our concepts of society and democracy. Digitisation is pushing this development towards a new dimension that allows us to speak of the "digital constellation". Social relations are denser across borders and continents; what happens there matters here, as if it were happening on our own doorstep. New kinds of risks are arising as a side-effect of the increasing use of information technologies, while the internet also offers – for the first time – an infrastructure that makes formerly unrealistic concepts of cosmopolitan democracy (David Held) a real option. This includes the establishment of a constitutional framework for normative processes aiming at managing effectively, among other global challenges, cyber-risks at national, supra-national and global levels in a coherent way. Multilevel Constitutionalism is proposed as a means of providing a normative theory for conceptualising the constitutional structure of a layered system of governance that ensures a maximum degree of self-determination for the individual and, thus, for the democratic legitimacy of decisions made at each level, from local to global. Thus, the constitution for democratically legitimate action at the global level does not question democracy at other levels, but should be complementary, based upon functioning states, and designed to deal with issues that are beyond their reach, including cybersecurity. ; La revolución digital está creando nuevos riesgos y, a la vez, múltiples oportunidades para la comunicación, el comercio y la participación política. Lo que Ulrich Beck describió como la sociedad mundial del riesgo y —desde otra perspectiva— lo que Jürgen Habermas llama la «constelación postnacional» es un desafío a nuestros conceptos de sociedad y democracia. La digitalización está impulsando este desarrollo hacia una nueva dimensión que nos permite hablar de la «constelación digital». Las relaciones sociales son más densas a través de las fronteras y los continentes; lo que ocurre ahí importa como si ocurriera en nuestra propia puerta. Surgen nuevos tipos de riesgos como efecto secundario del uso creciente de las tecnologías de la información, mientras que Internet también ofrece — por primera vez — una infraestructura que hace de los conceptos hasta ahora poco realistas de democracia cosmopolita (David Held) una opción real. Esto incluye el establecimiento de un marco constitucional para los procesos normativos que trata, entre otros desafíos mundiales, de gestionar de manera coherente y eficaz los riesgos cibernéticos a nivel nacional, supranacional y mundial. El constitucionalismo a varios niveles se propone como un medio de aportar una teoría normativa para conceptualizar la estructura constitucional de un sistema de gobernanza en capas que garantice el máximo grado de autodeterminación del individuo y, por tanto, la legitimidad democrática de las decisiones tomadas en cada nivel, desde lo local hasta lo global. Por lo tanto, la constitución para una acción democráticamente legítima a nivel global no cuestiona la democracia en otros niveles, sino que debe ser complementaria, basada en estados que funcionen y diseñada para tratar temas que están fuera de su alcance, incluyendo la ciberseguridad.

The digital revolution is creating new risks, together with multiple opportunities for communication, commerce and political participation. What Ulrich Beck described as the world risk society and – from another perspective – Jürgen Habermas calls the "postnational constellation" is a challenge to our concepts of society and democracy. Digitisation is pushing this development towards a new dimension that allows us to speak of the "digital constellation". Social relations are denser across borders and continents; what happens there matters here, as if it were happening on our own doorstep. New kinds of risks are arising as a side-effect of the increasing use of information technologies, while the internet also offers – for the first time – an infrastructure that makes formerly unrealistic concepts of cosmopolitan democracy (David Held) a real option. This includes the establishment of a constitutional framework for normative processes aiming at, among other global challenges, effectively managing cyber-risks at national, supra-national and global levels in a coherent way. Multilevel Constitutionalism is proposed as a means of providing a normative theory for conceptualising the constitutional structure of a layered system of governance that ensures a maximum degree of self-determination for the individual and, thus, for the democratic legitimacy of decisions made at each level, from local to global. Thus, the constitution for democratically legitimate action at the global level does not question democracy at other levels, but should be complementary, based upon functioning states, and designed to deal with issues that are beyond their reach, including cyber-security. ; La revolució digital està creant nous riscos i alhora múltiples oportunitats per a la comunicació, el comerç i la participació política. El que Ulrich Beck va descriure com la societat mundial del risc i el que, des d'una altra perspectiva, Jürgen Habermas anomena la «constel·lació postnacional» és un desafiament als nostres conceptes de societat i democràcia. La digitalització està impulsant aquest desenvolupament cap a una nova dimensió que ens permet parlar de la «constel·lació digital». Les relacions socials a través de les fronteres i els continents són més denses; allò que succeeix a fora té la mateixa importància que tindria si succeís davant de la nostra pròpia porta. Sorgeixen nous tipus de riscos com a efecte secundari de l'ús creixent de les tecnologies de la informació, mentre que, per primera vegada, internet també ofereix una infraestructura que converteix els conceptes fins ara poc realistes de democràcia cosmopolita (David Held) en una opció real. Això inclou l'establiment d'un marc constitucional per als processos normatius que intenta gestionar de manera coherent i eficaç els riscos cibernètics a nivell nacional, supranacional i mundial, així com d'altres desafiaments mundials. El constitucionalisme multinivell es proposa com un mitjà que aporta una teoria normativa per conceptualitzar l'estructura constitucional d'un sistema de governança en capes que garanteixi el màxim grau d'autodeterminació de l'individu i, per tant, la legitimitat democràtica de les decisions preses a cada nivell, des del local fins al global. Per tant, la constitució per a una acció democràticament legítima a nivell global no qüestiona la democràcia en altres nivells, sinó que ha de ser complementària, basada en estats que funcionin i dissenyada per tractar temes que estan fora del seu abast, com ara la ciberseguretat. ; La revolución digital está creando nuevos riesgos y, a la vez, múltiples oportunidades para la comunicación, el comercio y la participación política. Lo que Ulrich Beck describió como la sociedad mundial del riesgo y —desde otra perspectiva— lo que Jürgen Habermas llama la «constelación postnacional» es un desafío a nuestros conceptos de sociedad y democracia. La digitalización está impulsando este desarrollo hacia una nueva dimensión que nos permite hablar de la «constelación digital». Las relaciones sociales son más densas a través de las fronteras y los continentes; lo que ocurre ahí importa como si ocurriera en nuestra propia puerta. Surgen nuevos tipos de riesgos como efecto secundario del uso creciente de las tecnologías de la información, mientras que Internet también ofrece — por primera vez — una infraestructura que hace de los conceptos hasta ahora poco realistas de democracia cosmopolita (David Held) una opción real. Esto incluye el establecimiento de un marco constitucional para los procesos normativos que trata, entre otros desafíos mundiales, de gestionar de manera coherente y eficaz los riesgos cibernéticos a nivel nacional, supranacional y mundial. El constitucionalismo a varios niveles se propone como un medio de aportar una teoría normativa para conceptualizar la estructura constitucional de un sistema de gobernanza en capas que garantice el máximo grado de autodeterminación del individuo y, por tanto, la legitimidad democrática de las decisiones tomadas en cada nivel, desde lo local hasta lo global. Por lo tanto, la constitución para una acción democráticamente legítima a nivel global no cuestiona la democracia en otros niveles, sino que debe ser complementaria, basada en estados que funcionen y diseñada para tratar temas que están fuera de su alcance, incluyendo la ciberseguridad.

Tutkimus on filosofian historiallinen ja siinä tarkastellaan David Humen (1711-1776) teoreettista filosofiaa (metafysiikkaa, tietoteoriaa ja mielenfilosofiaa). Hume on tunnetuimpia ja tutkituimpia filosofian klassikkoja. Tutkimusongelmana on Humen suhtautuminen filosofiseen oppiin, jota nykyisin kutsutaan metafyysiseksi realismiksi. Metafyysisen realismin mukaan on olemassa mielestä, havaitsemisesta tai havaitsijasta riippumattomia olioita, jotka ovat pysyvästi olemassa havaitsijan ulkopuolella. Tutkimusongelma on merkittävä Hume-tulkintakirjallisuuden ja filosofian yleisestä näkökulmasta. Tunnetuin Hume on aina ollut hänen väitetystä skeptisismistään ja Humen kanta metafyysiseen realismiin on tämän ongelman ydinkysymyksiä. 1900-luvun puolessa välissä Hume-tutkimuksen polttavimmaksi kysymykseksi nousi hänen ajattelunsa suhde naturalismiin: voivatko uskomukset saada esimerkiksi oikeutuksensa niiden luonnollisista syistä. Nykyfilosofian vilkkaimpia keskusteluita on ollut ns. realismi-antirealismi ­debatti, jossa on keskusteltu riippumattomien, ulkoisten ja pysyvien olioiden olemassaolosta. Voidaan myös sanoa, että tämän ongelman äärellä olemme maailmankuvamme ytimessä: onko olemassa ihmisestä riippumaton todellisuus, onko se totuuden mittapuu ja tietomme ja uskomuksiemme perusta. Tutkimus lähestyy Humen suhdetta metafyysiseen realismiin tuoreesta näkökulmasta ja siinä puolustetaan uutta vastausta tähän kysymykseen. Kun Humen filosofinen kanta erotetaan tässä kysymyksessä hänen jokapäiväisestä uskomuksestaan, lopputuloksena on kaksiosainen vastaus tutkimusongelmaan. Filosofina Hume pidättäytyy ottamasta kantaa riippumattomien, ulkoisten ja pysyvien olioiden olemassaoloon. Sen sijaan hänen jokapäiväinen uskomuksensa on uskoa sellaisten olioiden olemassaoloon. Tulkinnassa Hume nähdään siis sekä skeptikkona että metafyysisenä realistina (skeptistä asennetta voidaan havainnollistaa agnostisella suhtautumisella Jumalan olemassaoloon eli kannanotosta pidättäytymisellä siihen, onko Jumalaa olemassa vai ei.) Tutkimusmenetelmä yhdistää tekstuaalisen ja kontekstuaalisen lähestymistavan. Ensisijaisena lähdetekstinä on Humen kypsä mestariteos Tutkimus inhimillisestä ymmärryksestä (An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 1748), jonka viimeisen luvun ensimmäinen osa asetetaan yksityiskohtaisen tekstianalyysin kohteeksi. Analyysissä teksti asetetaan sen kontekstiin Hume tuotannossa, intellektuaalisessa kehityksessä ja filosofisessa ympäristössä. Vaikka metodi on ensisijaisesti historiallinen, tulkintatyössä hyödynnetään nykyfilosofian käsitteitä silloin, kun se on tarpeellista ja hedelmällistä. ; The main problem of this study is David Hume s (1711-76) view on Metaphysical Realism (there are mind-independent, external, and continuous entities). This specific problem is part of two more general questions in Hume scholarship: his attitude to scepticism and the relation between naturalism and skepticism in his thinking. A novel interpretation of these problems is defended in this work. The chief thesis is that Hume is both a sceptic and a Metaphysical Realist. His philosophical attitude is to suspend his judgment on Metaphysical Realism, whereas as a common man he firmly believes in the existence of mind-independent, external, and continuous entities. Therefore Hume does not have any one position; accordingly, a form of no one Hume interpretation (Richard Popkin, Robert J. Fogelin, Donald L.M. Baxter) is argued for in the book. The key point in this distinction is the temporal difference between Hume s philosophical and everyday views. It is introduced in order to avoid attributing a conscious contradiction to him (a problem which has not attracted enough attention in the literature). The method of the work is modelled on Peter Millican s work on Hume and induction. The approach to the main problem is to study the two profound arguments against the senses that Hume presents in the Section 12 of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748). These arguments are first reconstructed in detail resulting in Millican-type diagrams of them and then Hume s endorsement of them is established on the basis of the diagrams. The first profound argument concludes that Metaphysical Realism and thus any Realistic theory of perception is unjustified as well as the existence of God and the soul. The second argument goes further having first conceptual conclusion: the very notions of Real entitity, material substance, and bodies are completely out of the reach of the faculty of understanding. Therefore they ought to be rejected according to Hume. This is a consequence of the consistent use of the Humean faculty of reason: idea-analysis and inductive inference. The second profound argument thus concludes that believing in Metaphysical Realism is inconsistent with the rational attitude that is to refrain from this belief. Hence, if we attributed both of them to Hume, we would end up with a great philosopher who embraces a manifest contradiction. The study is finished by arguing that this sceptical and Metaphysically Realistic interpretation concurs well with (1) Hume s professed Academical philosophy and (2) project of the science of human nature. (1) According to Hume, Academical philosophy is in the first place diffidence, modesty, and uncertainty including suspension on certain issues. Secondly, it is restriction of the range of topics for which experience can provide a standard of truth. This kind of empiricist epistemological realism is coherent with the sceptical attitude on Metaphysical Realism because the latter does not rule out inter-subjective consensus on what we experience. (2) Suspension of judgment on Metaphysical Realism coheres with the mind-dependency of the objects of Hume s science of human nature: the understanding, passions, morals, aesthetics, politics, and the human culture in all of its manifestations. Although the study takes the first Enquiry to be Hume s authorised word on the understanding, his juvenile work A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) is argued to support this no one Hume interpretation. Hume s other works are also discussed when needed.

"Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation"Alexander Hamilton "The whole point of the doomsday machineis lost if you keep it a secret!!"Dr. Strangelove VII) Críticas Una de las principales críticas realizadas al realismo es su imposibilidad de explicar el cambio y, en particular, aportar inteligibilidad al mundo de la posguerra fría. Los cambios provocados por la globalización a partir de la década del 90 han, para muchos autores, resquebrajado profundamente los fundamentos axiomáticos del realismo. Badie (2001: 255-256) identifica tres aspectos fundamentales de este cambio de paradigma: A) Acercamiento: el nuevo orden mundial no es más territorial, sino que se basa en lo transnacional y en la interconexión entre individuos y flujos que no son controlados por el estado, provocando la eclosión de nuevas identidades y lealtades. B) Emergencia de bienes públicos globales. En un mundo globalizado, los bienes públicos dejan de ser puramente soberanos (nacionales). La búsqueda del bien social necesita de la mediación, movilización y cooperación internacionales que sobrepasan el control del estado (ej: medio ambiente, DD.HH, bienes socio-económicos, etc.). C) nacimiento de nuevos actores que reconfiguran la relación tradicional entre el ciudadano y el estado y, en cierta medida, atacan la legitimidad del contrato social y ponen en riesgo a la comunidad política en su conjunto. Esta nueva realidad debilitaría la soberanía y la territorialidad tradicionalmente asociadas al Estado-Nación. La nueva concepción de la soberanía lidia con el mercado transnacional y los nuevos compromisos y lealtades generados por la etno-política. En un mundo globalizado, el poder ya no residiría exclusivamente en la soberanía de un estado unitario, sino que éstos se ven de manera creciente obligados a conciliar o negociar sus estrategias con una multiplicidad de nuevos actores no estatales en una escena internacional pública que ya no puede ser monopolizada por el Estado-Nación. Según Badie, (2001: 258) este proceso sería similar al de la emergencia de la burguesía que demandaba participación política al interior de los Estados-Nación en los siglos XVIII y XIX, llevando al colapso de los regímenes absolutistas. Estos nuevos actores internacionales desafían el rol monopólico y absolutista del Estado-Nación y demandan derechos de participación y definición en la agenda internacional. Para esto, los realistas, clásicos y otros, tienen pocas respuestas. Esta crítica hace eco de lo que los adversarios del realismo han sostenido por décadas, a saber que la suposición (dogmática) realista del estado como actor unitario y racional ha desviado la atención del estudio, necesario, de las complejidades de la estructura del estado, del proceso de formación de preferencias así como de la acción de los actores no estatales (Williams, 2004: 636). Otra crítica importante que han enfrentado todas las escuelas realistas es que a pesar de su resistencia como programa de investigación, en particular en la academia estadounidense, el realismo político ha sido históricamente poco propenso a la verificación científica. Vasquez demuestra que las hipótesis realistas han constantemente fallado la corroboración empírica, mientras que las hipótesis no-realistas, liberales u otras, han demostrado ser estadísticamente significativas (Vasquez, 1983: 202), lo que ha llevado al autor a proponer el abandono del paradigma realista como guía teórica y práctica. La obsesión de la academia estadounidense con el enfoque realista ha sido bien documentada. Ya planteaba Kuhn (1970: 24) los problemas del "fanatismo científico" al advertir que cuando un paradigma se torna dominante, la academia se vuelve intolerante hacia las teorías alternativas y decide trabajar exclusivamente dentro del marco teórico dominante. El problema de esto, como bien marca Karl Popper, es que ese acto tiende a empobrecer a la academia y debilitar el pensamiento original e innovador (Walker y Morton, 2005: 342). ¿Cómo explicar entonces que a pesar de sus falencias el realismo político haya sido el paradigma dominante en el mundo académico y político? La respuesta realista es la siguiente: ningún paradigma rival ha logrado presentar, de manera integral, una visión alternativa, descriptiva y normativa de la acción de los estados y del funcionamiento de las RR.II. Una segunda respuesta es que el realismo, desde el inicio de la Guerra Fría, ha aportado un paradigma legitimador a la política exterior estadounidense. Al centrar el realismo el interés nacional en términos de seguridad y promover el gasto militar, alabar la Realpolitik y minimizar el componente legal o moral de las RR.II, ha encontrado en los decisores de política exterior (así como en el complejo industrial-militar) fervientes defensores de sus principios. No es de extrañar que los principales policy-makers de la Guerra Fría, como H. Kissinger o G. Kennan, hayan sido realistas convencidos (Wittner, 1985: 285). Finalmente, el cambio en el paradigma dominante parece haber seguido, si bien de manera relativamente lenta, los cambios estructurales en el mundo en los últimos 40 años. Walker y Morton (2005: 352) analizaron la producción de artículos académicos entre 1970 y 2000 en los Estados Unidos, agrupando principalmente los estudios en tres grandes escuelas: realismo, liberalismo y otros. Entre 1970-74, los artículos realistas y relacionados al realismo representaban el 73% del universo estudiado (37 artículos) y los artículos sobre liberalismo y otros tan sólo el 28%. En 1989, 61% de los artículos aún estaban bajo el paradigma realista. En el año 2000, tan sólo el 34% de los artículos analizados (515 artículos) versaban sobre el realismo político, contra 65% para artículos liberales y otros (de los cuales 40% eran sólo sobre el liberalismo). Esto demostraría que, por lo menos a nivel de la academia estadounidense, el realismo ha dejado de ser la teoría dominante. A nivel de los decisores de política exterior, el realismo sigue relevante, en particular a partir del 11 de setiembre de 2001. A todas estas críticas los realistas responderán invariablemente: los supuestos que han hecho del realismo político una filosofía política relevante, y dominante, desde hace más de dos mil años, permanecen incambiados hasta el día de hoy. El mundo sigue siendo un lugar anárquico, inseguro e imprevisible. Las guerras modernas entre pequeños estados o entre estados rebeldes y la superpotencia dominante no hacen más que confirmar la hipótesis neorrealista de que la disuasión atómica ha cambiado para siempre la guerra dentro del S.I. Las N.U no tienen más poder hoy en día del que tenían hace 50 años y es difícil imaginar un escenario futuro donde la Organización cumpla un rol eficaz como garante de la seguridad internacional, inclusive, o justamente a pesar de la reforma del Consejo de Seguridad. A pesar de la emergencia de nuevos actores, flujos transnacionales y problemas transfronterizos que demandan una respuesta concertada, los estados siguen siendo los actores principales de las RR.II. Los realistas no niegan la importancia de los nuevos temas de la agenda transnacional pero, argumentan ellos, ninguno de estos asuntos ha cambiado drásticamente la razón de ser de los estados ni alterado su principal obligación: salvaguardar su seguridad. Ni siquiera el terrorismo en su versión más extrema representa una amenaza seria a la integridad de los estados, por más que así haya sido instrumentalizado por los decisores de política exterior, apelando o inspirándose erróneamente en una lectura realista para lidiar con este problema. "The war on Terror" no es, desde una perspectiva realista, una guerra: no es más que una respuesta desproporcionada de un estado poco racional que combate un enemigo no tradicional en términos realistas. La "seguridad nacional" es sin dudas la expresión más utilizada en la arena política estadounidense desde el 11 de setiembre, pero lo que los decisores de política exterior estadounidenses parecen no entender, es que si bien los Estados Unidos no pueden perder esa guerra, tampoco pueden ganarla. Ya lo decía Morgenthau cuando criticaba el involucramiento de EEUU en la guerra de Vietnam: "Our very presence in Vietnam is in a sense dictated by considerations of public relations; we are afraid lest our prestige would suffer were we to retreat from an untenable position. One may ask whether we have gained prestige by being involved in a civil war on the mainland of Asia and by being unable to win it. Would we gain more by being unable to extricate ourselves from it, and by expanding it unilaterally into an international war? …Does not a great power gain prestige by mustering the wisdom and courage necessary to liquidate a losing Enterprise? In other words, is it not the mark of greatness, in circumstances such as these, to be able to afford to be indifferent to one´s prestige?". Si Morgenthau no consideraba la Guerra de Vietnam digna del interés nacional, ¿cómo puede serlo en el siglo XXI la guerra contra Al-Qaeda?. VIII) Consideraciones finales En conclusión, me gustaría refutar en parte el argumento comúnmente utilizado para avanzar la muerte del realismo como doctrina relevante a la hora de explicar el accionar de los grandes estados en el concierto internacional, a saber: el fin del estado nación y la consolidación del supranacionalismo, el ejemplo más estridente siendo la construcción europea. Pero para entender claramente a qué me refiero, conviene recordar brevemente qué es un Estado. Según la definición clásica comúnmente aceptada, un Estado, para existir, debe tener por los menos 4 características incompresibles. El Estado es entonces: a) una población, b) dentro de un territorio, c) con alguna forma de gobierno centralizado y d) que ejerce el monopolio legítimo de la fuerza (o de la coerción) para asegurar, entre otras cosas, la seguridad interna y externa. Ahora bien, si reflexionamos en términos de la Unión Europea y hasta donde ha avanzado la construcción de un Estado Europeo, constatamos que es bien cierto que la UE cuenta con tres de las cuatro características normalmente atribuidas al Estado. La Unión Europea posee una población claramente identificable, los ciudadanos miembros de los estados que la conforman, con derechos y obligaciones propias que no poseen los ciudadanos no europeos. La UE cuenta igualmente con unas fronteras delimitadas y protegidas que separan a este "Estado Europeo" de las naciones no europeas. La UE tiene además su propio gobierno (supranacional), el Parlamento, el Consejo y la Comisión, que poseen importantes potestades legislativas y ejecutivas capaces de imponerse a las legislaciones nacionales. Por lo tanto, la Unión Europea estaría en camino a convertirse en un estado hecho y derecho. Hélas para los defensores de dicha tesis, la cuarta característica, el monopolio de la fuerza, está claramente ausente de las discusiones reales de la construcción europea y ello, por un buen tiempo a venir. Recordemos que para los realistas, clásicos y demás, este cuarto componente, a saber el monopolio de la fuerza, destinado a garantizar la supervivencia del Estado, debe ser casi exclusivamente la única preocupación de los Estadistas y por lo tanto, sin ella, no podemos hablar propiamente de Estado. En consecuencia, mientras que los franceses, los alemanes o los ingleses no hagan un paso en dirección hacia una verdadera política de defensa supranacional (y no internacional o concertada), es decir, hasta el día en que los gobiernos nacionales no cedan la potestad sobre su bien más preciado (según los realistas) a un órgano supranacional sobre el cual ejerzan poco o nulo control, entonces el axioma realista que los grandes estados siguen pensando y actuando antes que nada en términos de seguridad y de poder, seguirá siendo relevante para el estudio de las RR.II. Aquellos que desconocen la penetración del realismo y de la realpolitik y desu fuerza ordenadora como principio de acción de los estados, ciegamente niegan que los estados, en materia de seguridad, continúan avalando, en el siglo XXI, una visión Hobbesiana del S.I. Afirmo plenamente en este epílogo que el realismo sigue siendo una doctrina relevante para explicar, si bien no todos, por los menos varios aspectos cruciales de las RR.II. Me arriesgaría a afirmar igualmente que el realismo progresivamente retomará un lugar de privilegio entre las teorías dominantes. El S.I internacional se encuentra actualmente en un período de transición entro lo que fue el fin de la Guerra Fría, el interludio del dominio unilateral estadounidense y la emergencia progresiva de China como principal potencia antagonista. La historia ha tenido múltiples escenarios de dominio unipolar o hegemónico, desde los siglos que duró el Imperio Romano, los años de la Francia Napoleónica, los meses de la Alemania Nazi hasta los 20 años del nuevo orden mundial capitalista y liberal. Pero, si hay algo que el realismo enseña y predice con infalibilidad matemática, es que el poder en el sistema internacional tiende siempre al equilibrio. Es altamente improbable que la potencia China no expanda su área de influencia hasta chocar irremediablemente con los intereses estadounidenses. En la aceptación mutua de la paridad de fuerzas y en el miedo recíproco entre ambas potencias, encontraremos seguramente las garantías de la seguridad colectiva, tal como predice el realismo, y no así otras teorías. El pensamiento realista ha sido injustamente simplificado y encasillado en lo que parece ser una colección de máximas de galletas de la fortuna: de Clausewitz a Maquiavelo, pasando por Tucídides, Hobbes y Morgenthau, el realismo ha producido enunciados categóricos que parecen despojar al mundo de todo matiz. Si bien es cierto que esas afirmaciones banalizan una de las escuelas teóricas más fecundas, no es menos cierto que la incertidumbre del sistema internacional ha llevado a los teóricos realistas a considerar que la supervivencia del Estado es algo demasiado importante para dejarlo en manos de los buenos sentimientos. 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Germán Clulow es Licenciado en Estudios Internacionales por la Universidad ORT –Uruguay, Master en Ciencia Política por la Université de Genève – Suiza, y Master en Estudios de Desarrollo por el Instituto de Altos Estudios Internacionales y de Desarrollo (IHEID-The Graduate Institute) Ginebra, Suiza.

Stemming from an observation that global power is shifting from North to South, this research project is a critical inquiry of the global power shift through climate negotiation. Climate negotiation has been selected as a case study because of its multinational dimension. Climate negotiation is a multinational process and it requires multinational cooperation. At present, it occupies a central position in International Relations (IR). It is one of the most influential topics of IR and global politics. Climate negotiation helps us to understand current characteristics, changes and transformations in global politics. It has influenced the development narrative. In the main, climate change has made global politics more convoluted. Co-operation is necessary at the international level to cut emissions. These cuts require systemic change in global climate governance. These two issues have brought climate politics to the centre of IR. Conflict and co-operation define climate negotiations, which have been influenced by the response to climate change issues by the actors. The conflict and co-operation game provides a new position to the actors. This dissertation puts forth the hypothesis that climate negotiations are redistributing power and helping actors form new identities in power shifting process. In this power redistribution and group reconstruction process, climate politics and negotiations have indicated the appearance of a new global political order led by China and other advanced developing countries. The central aim of this research has been to develop analytical tools to observe the power shifting process and make the appearance of new global order more visible. In order to conduct this research, this dissertation integrated the idea of Samuels Barkin's constructivist realism and power theory and developed its own typology to examine power redistribution and the process of reconstruction. This dissertation conceives the idea that global politics is anarchic, actors struggle for power for developing the self-help system. Therefore, the typology considers power as controlling the agenda, limiting alternatives to opponent and wining negotiations to improve the self-help system. Based on the analytical tool, this dissertation applied qualitative research methodology to collect data and analysis. Mainly, the foreign policy of actors in climate negotiations has been closely observed based on the statements, proposal and argument in different session in conferences as well as domestic policy document of actors. An intensive semi-structured qualitative interview survey has also been conducted among the negotiators from different sections such as government delegations, NGO activists, or epistemic communities. Climate negotiations are very complicated and many domestic and global issues are connected to the negotiations, therefore, this dissertation follows Sil and Katzenstein's "analytic eclecticism" to analyze collected data. Analytic eclecticism helps us construct new knowledge by combining different approaches in complicated situation. The research findings show that power is indeed shifting. Firstly, power is shifting between different state actors. For example BASIC countries have emerged as a connecting hub among the members of the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) between developed and developing countries. For instance, China is the leader of advanced developing countries by initiating many groups such as BASIC, LMDC, G77, and China. At the same time China has made many joint announcements with USA on climate negotiations as well. China, India, Brazil and South Africa, known as BASIC countries are playing a key role as the main opposition to the developed world in the negotiation process. China has been accepted as leader of negotiating countries and China also shares the power of allied countries in its network, in particular with BASIC members. These countries are interlinked to each other and their leadership has been institutionalized by accepting proposals in decision-making process in many climate conferences. BASIC countries constitute a parallel hegemony against the US-EU hegemony on global politics. A second finding is the emergence of knowledge based non-state actors, for example NGOs, CSOs and the epistemic community. The research project shows that power is not only shifting from state to state actors, but also from state actors to non-state actors as well. Member of NGOs, CSOs and the epistemic community are included in negotiations process and they have influence on decision-making process. According to the research findings, this dissertation stresses two changes in global political structure. First, there is a clear indication of economic and geo-political power shift from north to south or from developed industrialized countries to developing countries and emergence of non-state actors as separate identity in global negotiations. Till the end of the 80s of the last century, world political groups were previously divided into two groups. One side was led by the USA and the other by the former Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, USSR. However, after the fall of the USSR, global politics reshaped into a unipolar system under US leadership and hegemonic structure. Research findings show that the global power structure is gradually restructuring by forming a multi-polar system. China, India, Brazil, and many more players are more active and making the new leadership in the global political landscape along with non-state actors. This dissertation has mainly examined the strategy and position of state actors. It has a small section regarding non-state actors in the climate negotiations. The concluding remarks of this dissertation address the pressing need to begin serious discussion to redefine the role of non-state actors in global politics, particularly for constructivist and realist scholarships. To that end, further study and research is required in order to figure out the role and implication of non-state actors in anarchic global politics.

En ocasiones anteriores, ya hemos hablado aquí en Letras Internacionales sobre qué hace único y distintivo al campo de las relaciones internacionales con respecto a otras disciplinas, y sobre las implicancias generales de teorizar o pensar en términos teóricos acerca del mundo. En esta oportunidad, sin embargo, hablaremos más bien sobre qué iguala a nuestra disciplina con las demás ciencias sociales. Sobre todo en lo que concierne a la teorización. Asimismo, discutiremos con cierto grado de detalle un caso paradigmático y ejemplificador como es la perdurabilidad de la Unión Europea (UE) dentro del marco de explicaciones teóricas de la disciplina. El foco principal de este ensayo está puesto en analizar las implicancias de la existencia de la UE para la teoría de relaciones internacionales; en particular, en lo que respecta a la última gran crisis europea.IEn términos generales, se considera que una teoría debiera poder cumplir dos funciones básicas. Por un lado, simplificar realidades complejas con el fin de ayudar a alcanzar ciertas explicaciones sobre relaciones causales presentes en determinados tipos de situaciones. Es decir, clarificar y dar sentido a fenómenos complejos. Y por el otro, en base a esas relaciones de causas y efectos supuestas y/o constatadas, generar expectativas y predicciones sobre futuros rumbos o resultados concretos a partir de un objeto de estudio determinado. En relaciones internacionales, así como en todas las disciplinas dentro de las ciencias sociales, el acto de teorizar está sujeto a múltiples limitaciones y dificultades.A diferencia de las ciencias "duras" o naturales, por ejemplo, donde quien teoriza tiene la capacidad de experimentar controlando su objeto de estudio —ya sea en un laboratorio o en una computadora—, y donde dicha experimentación puede ser repetida una y otra vez bajo mismas condiciones, en las ciencias sociales cada situación es, como bien dice Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, un suceso esencialmente único e irrepetible. Este punto de contraste entre ambas áreas de estudio también plantea serios obstáculos a la capacidad predictiva de las teorías. En lo exclusivamente concerniente a la teoría de relaciones internacionales, al no poder escapar a estas mismas fuertes limitaciones más generales, ésta va necesariamente detrás de los hechos. En otras palabras, en nuestra disciplina, construir teorías para predecir el futuro es un acto más de fe que de ciencia exacta. A lo sumo, el carácter predictivo de las teorías de relaciones internacionales se asemeja más a una partida de póquer que a una de truco, ya que nuestras expectativas teóricas sobre el futuro no se apoyan en adivinanzas sobre las cartas del otro (o donde es posible y hasta beneficioso "engatusar" al otro con "trucos" y "envidos"), sino en lo que comúnmente se llama "educated guesses" (o "adivinanzas educadas"). Éstas, a diferencias de las otras, son decisiones del tipo de "adivinanza", pero que están respaldadas por estimaciones de probabilidad. Comprender dicha distinción es fundamental para evaluar cuándo estamos frente a una "predicción" simplona que bien podríamos reemplazar con el lanzamiento de una moneda, o bien cuándo estamos frente a una "prognosis", apoyada en cierto conocimiento probabilístico y/o contextual, aunque nunca despojado por entero del gran factor homogeneizador que es la incertidumbre. Con estos elementos introductorios en consideración, veamos ahora cómo algunas de las teorías más importantes de relaciones internacionales tratan el caso de la UE, tanto en su creación como en su perdurabilidad, y los prospectos a futuro.IIDesde el fin de la Guerra Fría, el continente europeo ha brindado la oportunidad de estudiar y contrastar, en los hechos mismos, el grado de validez de muchas teorías de relaciones internacionales. En particular, ha permitido evaluar con profundidad cada una de las "predicciones" destiladas de las diferentes corrientes teóricas. La UE, en tanto caso de estudio, representa una de esas oportunidades históricas inigualables (como se ha dicho más arriba), únicas e irrepetibles, que es de gran utilidad a la hora de evaluar tanto las virtudes como las limitaciones de la teorización en relaciones internacionales.Los argumentos teóricos más importantes acerca de la UE pueden ordenarse en tres grupos. En un primer lugar, existe un grupo numeroso de trabajos que problematiza los orígenes de la UE en clave "seguridad" vs. "economía". Según este grupo, el identificar cuáles son las motivaciones particulares iniciales detrás del proyecto de integración europea es central para la discusión del segundo grupo. Así, en segundo lugar, otro grupo de trabajos problematiza lasustentabilidad del proyecto europeo en el tiempo. Para ambos grupos, entender los orígenes de la UE en términos de amenazas a la seguridad, o de prosperidad económica, plantea grandes diferencias analíticas ya que, uno u otro rumbo, sirven por igual para sustentar distintas explicaciones con respecto a la capacidad de la UE de perdurar en el tiempo, o bien menguar lentamente, a la luz de la implosión de la Unión Soviética (URSS) en 1991. Un tercer grupo de trabajos problematiza el carácter único, distintivo e inédito del proyecto europeo. Según esta última perspectiva, la UE constituye un fenómeno nunca antes visto en las relaciones internacionales y que, por lo tanto, no puede supeditarse tan rígidamente a los mismos estándares teóricos que, por ejemplo, se aplican para entender las relaciones interestatales más vulgares.En la primera discusión, son más bien los autores realistas y neorrealistas quienes plantean de manera más sólida la tesis de la "seguridad" como el disparador de la integración europea. Principalmente, autores como Mearsheimer, Layne, Waltz, Posen, Grieco, Jones, y en especial Rosato, defienden la idea de los orígenes más bien paganos de la UE. En concreto, la UE se explica por el efecto combinado del contexto histórico de hostilidad bipolar de la Guerra Fría, la amenazante presencia cercana de la URSS, y el rol de primacía de los Estados Unidos. Para estos autores, el acercamiento entre los otrora archirrivales Francia y Alemania se explica de manera muy natural y simple por factores que la corriente realista tradicionalmente ha resaltado. Por el contrario, otro grupo sostiene que los orígenes se encuentran en la búsqueda de la prosperidad (principalmente autores liberales europeo-norteamericanos como Moravcsik, Olson, Cooper, Keohane, Hoffmann, Rosecrance; o constructivistas, como Risse-Kappen, Haas, Checkel, o Wendt). Es decir, que el motivo fundamental del acercamiento y la pacificación de las relaciones franco-alemanas, que permitió luego dar inicio a una serie de proyectos integradores a escala continental, no se debió a cuestiones mundanas de seguridad, típicamente destacadas por los realistas, sino que más bien surgió del reconocimiento por parte de los líderes del momento (una versión europea de los "padres fundadores") de que la lucha, el antagonismo y la confrontación crónica de las relaciones europeas sólo había llevado a los países del continente a una posición relegada y disminuida en las relaciones internacionales. En resumidas cuentas, la versión realista de los orígenes de la UE se apoya en consideraciones de seguridad, supervivencia, temor a un enemigo común, y a la presencia protectora del paraguas militar norteamericano. El momento clave para los realistas es, pues, el Tratado de Dunkirk (1947) y el Tratado de Bruselas (1948). Para la versión liberal-constructivista, los puntos de inicio son 1951, año de la creación de la Comunidad Europea del Carbón y del Acero (CECA), y más formalmente 1957, con el Tratado de Roma.En la segunda discusión, nuevamente se da un corte entre realistas, por un lado, y tanto liberales como constructivistas, por el otro. Los primeros sostienen que dada la naturaleza de seguridad de los orígenes de la UE, su evolución y sustentabilidad en el tiempo están estrechamente ligadas a los mismos factores. En concreto, sostienen que en la medida en que tanto la actual Federación Rusa no pueda reemplazar en igual grado de amenaza y antagonismo a la otrora URSS, como que el compromiso norteamericano mengue, las fuerzas estructurales en juego hacia el mantenimiento de una UE coherente y unificada se debilitarán. Como consecuencia principal, para los realistas, la UE en tanto una institución internacional se encuentra en jaque hoy más que nunca ya que los incentivos que le dieron origen y justificación actualmente han desaparecido o están en un franco proceso de retirada. Los segundos, compuestos tanto por liberales como por constructivistas, sostienen una visión mucho más optimista de la UE. Se apoyan en los clásicos argumentos liberales relacionados al rol estabilizador y homogeneizador de las instituciones internacionales por sobre el comportamiento exterior de los estados, así como por sobre las identidades y la configuración de sus preferencias de política exterior. En este sentido, la institución internacional que todos llamamos "Unión Europea" ha cobrado vida por sí misma y, ahora, su perdurabilidad depende de sí y ya no de elementos típicamente realistas. El impacto por sobre los estados-miembro de la UE no sólo se da en el plano institucional, sino también en el de las identidades y la identificación con la forma de gobierno democrático-republicana, y ciertos valores y principios generales que incluyen, pero van más allá, de la declaración de los Derechos Humanos y las normas del derecho internacional.Por último, en la tercera discusión, un grupo pequeño pero creciente de autores da por tierra con todos los argumentos anteriores, ubicándolos en el plano del anacronismo y la obsolescencia. Desde esta nueva perspectiva, las herramientas teóricas tradicionales de la disciplina (y particularmente las provenientes del realismo), ya son parte del pasado, de una forma ya anticuada de ver el mundo, y de una concepción de las relaciones internacionales anclada en una etapa anterior de la evolución del sistema internacional. Por ello, la UE exige la elaboración de nuevos enfoques y herramientas analíticas, de un carácter mucho más original y sui generis. Muchos de los autores dentro de esta última corriente se ubican en lo que comúnmente llamamos teorías del "post-modernismo" en relaciones internacionales, aunque también muchos autores liberales y constructivistas suelen aportar ideas interesantes en este otro campo. Uno de los trabajos más característicos de esta discusión es el libroInternational Relations and the European Union, editado por Hill y Smith en 2005. Esta obra ya clásica, demuestra en todo su esplendor el argumento en pos de una concepción distintiva e inédita sobre la UE, presentando una pléyade de autores que recorren el espectro liberal, de sociedad internacional, marxistas y neo-marxistas, así como otros de difícil categorización.IIIEn suma, entonces, como hemos visto existen diversos tipos de explicaciones teóricas con respecto a los orígenes, el desarrollo y el carácter de la UE, y cada uno de ellos se condice de manera coherente con los preceptos básicos de cada corriente teórica. Sin embargo, aún resta por aclarar algunos aspectos relacionados a la predicción o prognosis de estos mismos enfoques. Por un lado, y si pausamos por un momento los alegatos del tercer grupo, podemos decir que tanto las teorías realistas como las liberales y las constructivistas poseen elementos claramente distintivos unos con otros y que generan potenciales escenarios a futuro de manera clara y coherente. Para unos, más pesimistas, el futuro de la UE está ligado a las condiciones de seguridad iniciales, y dado el actual entorno internacional, su futuro es incierto y problemático. Para otros, más optimistas, las condiciones iniciales de búsqueda de prosperidad económica plantean escenarios prospectivos de otra índole, más estables y duraderos, aún a pesar de los grandes cambios en el entorno.Como conclusión, debemos regresar a nuestro punto de inicio. Dado que, como se ha dicho al comienzo, la teorización en ciencias sociales va más bien por detrás de los hechos, momentos como el actual constituyen una instancia inigualable de testeo de muchas de las premisas y predicciones teóricas de nuestra disciplina. Plantear cuáles perspectivas o autores arrastran más peso sería traicionar los principios planteados por nosotros mismos en este ensayo. Sin embargo, sí puede mencionarse la constante renovación y ascenso en importancia de distintas teorías en distintos momentos históricos de la UE; es decir, el constante estado de auge y declive de ciertos grupos de explicaciones por sobre otras. En los últimos diez años, las corrientes liberales y constructivistas, así como también las post-modernas, parecían reinar por sobre las más tradicionales, simplistas y añejas perspectivas; parecían verse constatadas de manera irrefutable por los hechos. Sin embargo, cual ave Fénix, estas mismas perspectivas se han quedado mudas frente a los renovados embates mundanos de las corrientes siempre-escépticas y más pesimistas de la UE y las relaciones internacionales más en general. De hecho, uno podría argumentar que no son estos embates en sí quienes han descolocado a las explicaciones optimistas de la UE, sino la evidencia de los hechos en sí. Si bien aún es muy temprano para declarar quiénes han sido refutados y quiénes revalidados, las tendencias son cada vez más claras en el sentido contrario a los defensores de la perdurabilidad de lo inédito y lo imaginado. Todo pareciera indicar que el cambio cualitativo en las relaciones internacionales (es decir, uno que modifique sustancialmente y haga trascender la condición "anárquica" o descentralizada del sistema de estados) es más difícil incluso de lo que muchos escépticos creen. Todo pareciera indicar que estamos comenzando a vivir el ayer, una vez más.*Profesor, Universidad Abierta Interamericana (UAI), Buenos Aires.Maestría en Estudios Internacionales,Universidad Torcuato di Tella (Tesista).Lecturas sugeridas: Visiones generales:Filippo Andreatta, "Theory and the European Union's International Relations", en: Christopher Hill y Michael Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European Union(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).Simon Collard-Wexler, "Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the EU", European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2006), pp. 397-432.Joseph M. Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme", Review of International Studies, Vol. 21 (1995), pp. 21-40.Visiones realistas y neorrealistas:John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold War",International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.Eric Posner, "Europe's Missing Identity", Wall Street Journal (June 4, 2010). Disponible en: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704596504575272742111445082.htmlNiall Ferguson, "The End of the Euro", Newsweek (May 07, 2010). Disponible en:www.newsweek.com/2010/05/07/the-end-of-the-euro.html.Sebastian Rosato, "The Untied States of Europe", en: Stephen M. Walt Foreign Policy blog (Wednesday, June 23, 2010). Disponible en: http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/23/guest_post_the_untied_states_of_europe.Barry S. Posen, "ESDP, Response to Unipolarity", Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April-June 2006), pp. 149-186.Sebastian Rosato, "Balancing Act: The Power Politics of European Integration", Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security (PIPES), Fall 2006 Speaker Series, University of Chicago (October 5, 2006), 57 pp.Sebastian Rosato, "The Strategic Logic of Integration", paper presentated at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC (September 2005), 22 pp.John J. Mearsheimer, "Warum herrscht Frieden in Europa?", Leviathan, 37 (2009), pp. 519-531.Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War", International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57.Adrian Hyde-Price, "A 'Tragic Actor'. A realist perspective on 'ethical power Europe'",International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1 (2008), pp. 29-44.Christopher Layne, "America as European Hegemon", The National Interest (Summer 2003), pp. 17-29.Visiones liberales y constructivistas:Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-state and the Case of Western Europe", Dædalus, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Summer 1966), pp. 862-915.Richard Rosecrance, "The European Union: A New Type of Actor", en: Jan Zielonka (ed.),Paradoxes of European Foreign policy (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp. 15-23.Stanley Hoffmann, Robert O. Keohane y John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence. Back to the Future, Part II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe", International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), pp. 191-199.Bruce M. Russett, Thomas Risse-Kappen y John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence. Back to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European Security", International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 216-222.Andrew Moravcsik, "In Defense of Europe", Newsweek (May 30, 2010). Disponible en:www.newsweek.com/2010/05/30/in-defense-of-europe.html.Thomas Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration", en: Antje Wiener y Thomas Diez (eds.), European Integrations Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 159-176.Robert O. Keohane y Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory", International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51.Joseph Jupille, James A. Caporaso y Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Integrating Institutions. Rationalism, Constructivism, and the European Union", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1/2 (February/March 2003), pp. 7-40.John G. Ruggie, "The False Premise of Realism", International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 62-70.Visiones post-modernas: Christopher Hill y Michael Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European Union(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). En especial, ver cap. 1 y cap. 18.Karen Smith, "The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations", The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Winter/Spring 2003), pp. 103-113.Alex Warleigh, "Learning from Europe? EU Studies and the re-thinking of 'International Relations'", European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2006), pp. 31-51.

La historia es una disciplina incómoda para los filósofos de las ciencias sociales. Piénsese en la respuesta a la pregunta: ¿es posible encontrar leyes del desarrollo histórico de las sociedades? K. Popper creía que no y afirmaba que la creencia en dicha posibilidad era la fuente de los totalitarismos del siglo XX. Eso afirmaba en"The poverty of historicism" en 1957. Unos años antes Carl Gustav Hempel creía haber encontrado la fórmula básica para expresar una explicación en términos científicos a través de la formulación de leyes en un estilo nomológico deductivo (ver HEMPEL, 2005). Y creía que dicha fórmula también se aplicaba a la historia. En el campo de la sociología fue George Homans quien dio impulso a las ideas de filósofos como C. G. Hempel y R. Braithwaite quienes creían que era posible llegar a teorías deductivas de la misma naturaleza tanto en las ciencias naturales como en las ciencias sociales (ver HOMANS, 1970). A mediados de la década pasada, Philip S. Gorsky publica un provocador artículo en "Sociological Methodology" con el título "The poverty of deductivism" y retoma la vieja discusión sobre el lugar de la historia en la teorización en ciencias sociales (GORSKY, 2004). Lo hace, afirmando exactamente la tesis contraria a Popper: las ciencias sociales no son más que historia.Como señala Thomas Smith, el estudio de la historia es particularmente importante en la investigación en Relaciones Internacionales:"As either political backdrop or behavioral laboratory, history is never far removed from International theory and research. When theory is constructed from the bottom up, history provides the building blocks. When theory is constructed from the top down, history serves to test or falsify theoretical concepts. Case studies are focused, comparative historical analyses. The learning and institutionalist literature is explicitly historical and evolutionary. When quantitatively oriented researchers speak of 'events data' or 'data making', they are referring to historical representations abstracted from a welter of evidence. Normative theorists stress the historical context of moral action. Marxist theorists seek to uncover the hidden histories upon which international theory is founded, while postmodernists point out privileged views of the past that have shaped the discipline. (…) Formal theory, including game theory is perhaps the most ahistorical of theoretical approaches, yet increasingly it too is being put to the historical test". (SMITH, 1999, 8)La investigación histórica y el problema de la explicaciónEn el presente artículo retomaremos las ideas de uno de los sociólogos vivos más interesantes del siglo XX: Arthur L. Stinchcombe (1) (de aquí en más ALS). Al hacerlo pretendemos presentar una discusión del tema que está a medio camino entre las pretensiones deductivistas y el relativismo histórico. Al mismo tiempo pretendemos aportar elementos que apuntan a mostrar lo fructífero de la obra de investigadores que le dan una importancia clave a la historia en ciencias sociales.Antes de comenzar la exposición creemos importante dejar sentado que sentimos una profunda admiración por las ideas de ambos "bandos": aquellos que defienden el proyecto de que los resultados de la investigación deberían poder ser generalizables como la de aquellos que defienden que la investigación social debe explicar hechos históricos singulares e irrepetibles. Creemos que la postura de Stinchcombe busca un término medio mediante el cual, la investigación social se nutra de la particularidad histórica sin renunciar a encontrar generalizaciones aplicables más allá de los casos concretos que formaron parte del estudio realizado.Abordaremos el libro que ALS especialmente escribió sobre teoría social e historia y que se llama "Theoretical methods in social history" de 1978. En este libro Stinchcombe comienza a delinear una perspectiva sobre la explicación en ciencias sociales que hoy en día es una corriente ya instalada en el panorama de las mismas. Me refiero a la perspectiva analítica, la cual se nutre del pensamiento de cientistas sociales provenientes de diversas disciplinas como la economía (T. Schelling) o la sociología (R. Boudon, P. Hedström), así como de la filosofía (J. Elster, P. Manicas, W. Salmon) (2). La idea de mecanismo social como base de una explicación en términos científicos aparece delineada con claridad en la siguiente cita de Peter Hedström:"A social mechanism, as defined here, is a constellation of entities and activities that are linked to one another in such a way that they regularly bring about a particular type of outcome. We explain an observed phenomenon by referring to the social mechanism by which such a phenomenon is regularly brought about". (HEDSTRÖM, 2005, 11)La idea de "mecanismo" tiene una clara inspiración en el individualismo metodológico, la perspectiva según la cual toda explicación de un hecho social en términos agregados (como puede ser la civilización capitalista, la revolución rusa o las recientes revueltas en medio oriente) debe remitirse en última instancia a individuos y sus acciones. Para expresarlo en términos actuales, toda explicación en ciencias sociales debe tener micro fundamentos (LITTLE, 1991). Más allá de esta especificación, la idea de la existencia de un "mecanismo" vinculante entre causa y efecto pretende ser una alternativa a dos formas tradicionales de abordar la causalidad en ciencia: la explicación en términos nomológico - deductivos (covering law model) y la explicación en términos estadísticos. ¿Qué tiene de diferente la idea de mecanismo? Para entender su singularidad repasaremos en los siguientes excursos los principales elementos de las dos teorías rivales (covering law model y explicación estadística).Excurso 1. Covering law model: Carl Gustav HempelActualmente se reconoce en filosofía de la ciencia que el trabajo de C. G. Hempel sobre la explicación científica es la piedra angular de la discusión sobre la materia en la segunda mitad del siglo XX (SALMON 2006, MANICAS, 2006). Según W. Salmon el artículo original de Hempel con Paul Oppenheim de 1948 "is the fountainhead from which the vast bulk of subsequent philosophical work on scientific explanation has flowed –directly or indirectly" (SALMON, 2006, 8).Más allá de sus aciertos y errores hay que conocer el argumento de Hempel para adentrarse en la discusión contemporánea sobre qué es explicar en ciencia.En su formulación inicial, Hempel establece que una explicación científica adquiere la forma de un argumento deductivo con sus premisas y su conclusión. Supongamos que queremos explicar un cierto evento E. Dar respuesta a la pregunta ¿por qué E ocurre? implicaría subsumir el evento E en alguna ley general. Es decir, E queda explicado cuando su ocurrencia se deduce de ciertas leyes conocidas y de determinadas condiciones en las cuales el evento se produce. La explicación de un evento adquiere la forma de un silogismo en el cual una de las premisas establece al menos una ley general, otra premisa refiere a ciertas condiciones iniciales (ambas constituyen el explanans) y la conclusión es el evento que quiere ser explicado (explanandum). Se posee una explicación cuando el explanandum es una consecuencia lógica del set de premisas que constituyen el explanans.Esta idea puede representarse de la siguiente forma:Si ocurre A entonces ocurre B (la forma de una ley general)A ocurre (refiere a las condiciones iniciales o "relevantes") --- Por lo tanto, ocurre B (evento a ser explicado o explanandum)Esta explicación que está formulada para leyes universales también puede formularse de manera probabilística con lo cual tenemos un tipo de explicación que abarca procesos de pensamiento de tipo inductivo o estadístico (para profundizar en esta posibilidad ver MANICAS 2006; SALMON, 2006; HEDSTRÖM 2005).La debilidad habitualmente criticada a este modelo de la explicación científica es que no es suficientemente restrictivo como para eliminar explicaciones obvias o superficiales. Veamos un ejemplo conocido de este tipo de crítica al modelo de Hempel que aparece en Manicas (2006); Salmon, (2006) y Hedström (2005):Nadie que tome píldoras anticonceptivas en forma regular queda embarazadoPedro toma píldoras anticonceptivas regularmente --- Por tanto, Pedro no ha quedado embarazadoEl problema denunciado por los críticos de Hempel es que el covering law model está construido en términos de un argumento lógico en vez de estar construido en términos de causas y sus "poderes" para la producción de eventos ("poderes" o "capacidades" que hay que dilucidar teóricamente). La consecuencia que tiene esta deficiencia es que explicaciones incorrectas (como la presentada en el silogismo previo) deberían ser admitidas si se sigue estrictamente la propuesta del covering law model. En palabras de Hedström: "The fact to be explained can be logically derived from the premises –both of which can be assumed to be true- but the explanation is nevertheless incorrect because it refers to the wrong causal mechanisms" (HEDSTRÖM, 2005, 16).Veremos en la presentación de las ideas de Stinchcombe sobre la investigación histórica, que en éste tipo de perspectiva analítica no solo importa señalar que dos fenómenos aparecen juntos o uno sucede al otro sino que es necesario establecer por qué eso ocurre de determinada manera y en determinadas circunstancias. Precisamente, para Stinchcombe la investigación histórica es una fuente ineludible para descubrir y probar los mecanismos por los cuales determinadas causas producen determinados efectos.Excurso 2. La explicación estadísticaLa explicación estadística en su formulación tradicional está vinculada a la idea de "correlación" o "dependencia robusta". Si en el covering law model la explicación de un fenómeno implica que se posee una teoría desarrollada capaz de subsumir el fenómeno en sus leyes, el modelo estadístico desconfía de las teorías generales y se dirige a la constatación inductiva de regularidades. Esto es, a la asociación de dos fenómenos lo cual implica, en términos estadísticos, que los valores de dos variables tienden a variar en forma conjunta. Hay una sutileza a tener en cuenta cuando se aborda la explicación estadística: la asociación o correlación entre dos variables no necesariamente implica que una sea la causa de la otra, aunque sí es un indicador de que puede haber una relación de tipo causal. X e Y pueden tener una asociación robusta pero puede suceder que ambas sean un efecto de Z con lo cual la relación entre X e Y es espúrea (en términos llanos: se trata de una falsa relación de causalidad). Si bien siempre existe este riesgo también hay formas de controlar la espuriedad de la relación entre X e Y manteniendo constantes los valores de otras variables y observando qué ocurre con la relación original entre X e Y. De aquí viene uno de los pilares de la explicación estadística: una relación es robusta (y por tanto podemos creer que existiría una relación de causalidad entre ambas) si dicha relación al ser controlada por otras relaciones se mantiene firme.Hay dos problemas con este tipo de explicación. En primer lugar, no es posible controlar una relación entre dos variables mediante todas las posibles variables que podrían oficiar como control. En segundo lugar, constatar una regularidad no implica explicar porqué ocurre dicha regularidad. Ya desde Hume sabemos que la causalidad no es observable y este es un problema con mucha investigación orientada a la búsqueda de explicaciones meramente estadísticas. Por ejemplo, durante mucho tiempo se insistió en la importancia de la educación de la madre como predictor del nivel académico alcanzado por los hijos. Esta afirmación provenía de la constatación de una relación robusta entre el nivel educativo alcanzado por la madre y los resultados académicos de los niños. Ahora bien, ¿por qué ocurre este fenómeno? ¿Se trata de una transmisión de conocimiento desde la madre hacia el hijo? ¿Es debido a que una mayor educación en la madre hace que ésta sea más sensible a la evolución educativa de sus hijos e intervenga para componer problemas en la misma? La investigación estadística es muy útil para explorar la pertinencia de hipótesis alternativas como las planteadas recién, pero no es la herramienta capaz de generar por sí misma explicaciones de los fenómenos. En última instancia, la explicación de las relaciones es una cuestión de teoría, es decir, de una perspectiva teórica capaz de develar los mecanismos por los cuales un cierto fenómeno influye sobre otro. Esta es la principal crítica que desde tiendas "analíticas" se hace al tipo de investigación que confía exclusivamente en la detección y control de regularidades.Una propuesta heterodoxa para la investigación históricaEn "Theoretical Methods in Social History" ALS cuestiona tanto la investigación histórica cuantitativa sin una orientación teórica como la idea deductivista de emplear la investigación histórica sólo para validar teorías. Para ALS la investigación histórica es útil para construir teorías. En sus propias palabras:"Our object has been to analyze how generality can be wrested from historical facts" (1978, 115). El desacuerdo con el deductivismo no pasa por negar que un objetivo del trabajo científico sea elaborar y trabajar con conceptos generales, sino en la metodología para construir dichos conceptos. Por su parte, ALS también se separa de la perspectiva que niega la posibilidad de generalizar a partir del estudio de la historia, "the Nietszche – Dilthey side of epistemology" tal como le llama el autor. ALS afirma que los conceptos deben poder captar la singularidad de los hechos y que esto es clave para construir conceptos generales con alto potencial de ingresar en sentencias causales fructíferas.Para ALS la "gran teoría" (como el marxismo o el estructural funcionalismo) solo sirve como un punto de partida: nos facilita ciertos conceptos que nos ayudan a determinar por donde comenzaremos a observar el fenómeno de interés. En definitiva, las grandes teorías pueden mostrar coherencia lógica, pero no necesariamente ser capaces de explicar de forma coherente una secuencia empírica de eventos.La investigación histórica permite avanzar en la teorización aportando precisamente la clase de ajuste "a los hechos" que toda buena teoría debería tener. Este ajuste hace que la teoría tenga un mayor caudal explicativo. ALS explica su idea con suma claridad en el siguiente párrafo:"Concepts are things that capture aspects of the facts for a theory; they are the lexicon that the grammar of theory turns into general sentences about the world.The argument is that the power and fruitfulness of those sentences is determined by the realism and exactness of the lexicon of concepts, and not by the theoretical grammar. The problem of eliminating false sentences by research, the traditional problem of epistemology, is not as problematic as the problem of having sentences interesting enough to be worth accepting or rejecting. And this is determined by whether or not our concepts capture those aspects of reality that enter into powerful and fruitful causal sentences". (1978, 115) (énfasis agregado M.B.)¿Qué método de abordaje propone ALS para investigar un fenómeno histórico y poder teorizar a partir de él? En su forma más sencilla se compone de cuatro pasos.Tomar una secuencia de hechos claramente delimitada en el tiempoObservar la secuencia de hechos a partir de algún concepto general(tomado de teorías previas) con un foco preciso: tratar de vincular una serie de hechos que están conectados a dicha noción general como causa y efecto.Tratar de componer dicha secuencia de hechos en una teoría causalque pueda explicar la secuencia de interés.Probar los conceptos a partir de su capacidad para generar analogíasA continuación retomaremos cada uno de los pasos planteados por ALS para abordar un objeto de estudio histórico. Nos proponemos mostrar la originalidad de su perspectiva.Tomar una secuencia de hechos claramente delimitada en el tiempoUn gran problema de las grandes teorías de la historia como el marxismo o la teoría de la modernización es que trabajan con largo períodos. Este abordaje lleva al investigador a darle prioridad a los aspectos narrativos de la gran secuencia histórica antes que a la formalización de una secuencia causal capaz de mostrar la conexión entre los fenómenos. El marxismo, la teoría de la concentración del poder político (de Jouvenel) y la teoría de la modernización todas tratan de explicar el transcurso desde el siglo XV al siglo XX apelando a algún mecanismo "maestro" que opera a través de la historia y cuyos efectos son acumulativos. Para el marxismo ese mecanismo está en los conflictos que surgen a partir de la propiedad de los medios de producción, para de Jouvenel está en la concentración de poder en los gobiernos centrales, para la teoría de la modernización está en los procesos de diferenciación. ¿Cómo podemos hacer para establecer cuál mecanismo es el más importante en la generación del mundo moderno?Para ALS, la única forma de hacerlo es investigar una secuencia relevante de acontecimientos históricos de moderada extensión que permita (a partir de la riqueza y profundidad que brinda un contexto específico) probar que el mecanismo explicativo "maestro" puede postularse como variable exógena. Es decir, oficia como causa del output final sin ser afectado por cambios en las variables que integran el modelo.Observar una secuencia de hechos históricos y tratar de componer dicha secuencia en una teoría causalLos pasos 2 y 3 son clave en la exposición de ALS porque es en el proceso de ajustar una secuencia de hechos en una cadena de causas y efectos cuando "emergen" los mecanismos explicativos más fructíferos. ALS afirma que los buenos historiadores que tienen una inclinación teorética, no importando el paradigma del cual parten, pueden llegar a descubrir similares mecanismos teóricos. ¿Por qué? "Por que han mirado los hechos" nos diría el autor. Vinculado a este punto, el autor plantea la siguiente paradoja (la cual intenta resolver en el capítulo 2 del libro de referencia):"De Tocqueville's theory of revolution is almost completely unanticipated in conservative thought, Trotsky's theory of the Russian Revolution almost completely unanticipated in Marxist thought; they are very similar, and both are probably basically true". (1978, 5)La teoría de la revolución que puede extraerse de los escritos de de Tocqueville (sobre la revolución francesa) y de Trotsky (sobre la revolución rusa) son muy parecidas ya que recaen en similares mecanismos explicativos. ¿Cómo es esto posible? Para ALS es posible porque ambos historiadores construyen teorías adecuadas a la secuencia de hechos que quieren explicar y dado que estos hechos son análogos un resultado posible es que las teorías también lo sean. Sin duda, es un argumento fuerte y dedicaremos unos breves párrafos a mostrar la pertinencia del análisis de ALS. Pero antes, es importante que resaltemos la riqueza del pensamiento del autor. Contra toda intuición previa, ALS nos dice que dos investigadores que políticamente se ubican en las antípodas piensan igual cuando trabajan como teóricos de la sociedad. ¿No es acaso una buena prueba de la importancia de "razonar los hechos" ésta que nos ofrece ALS?Sin ser exhaustivos repasaremos un mecanismo explicativo del quiebre revolucionario que –según ALS- aparece teorizado de la misma manera en Trotsky y de Tocqueville.El mecanismo básico del cambio revolucionario que abordan de manera muy similar Trotsky y de Tocqueville es el relativo a la crisis de la autoridad tradicional. Toda revolución implica un cambio de autoridad. Por ello, para ambos autores (Trotsky y de Tocqueville) la reflexión sobre cuáles son los elementos que propician en un sistema social este cambio, es un punto clave en su explicación de la revolución.A ambos les interesa la decadencia de la autoridad real y se concentran en los mecanismos que permiten mantener o que son capaces de erosionar la legitimidad de dicha autoridad.Ambos autores apuntan a conceptos que permitan dar cuenta de qué condiciones favorecen en las masas la formación de la creencia en la posibilidad de una alternativa a la autoridad instituida. Ambos niegan que la privación sea por sí sola capaz de movilizar a los grupos sociales que forman parte del conflicto. Antes que por las condiciones de vida de la población se preocupan por problemas tales como la percepción de injusticia como motor de un proceso de extrañamiento entre los grupos sociales, lo cual genera un contexto que estimula (aunque no sea causa directa) el proceso revolucionario. Como puede verse, ambos autores remiten su explicación a mecanismos que operan a través de individuos. Por tanto, ambos tienen una posición encuadrada dentro del individualismo metodológico.Ambos intentan dar cuenta de un cambio cognitivo en la población que va desde el respeto a la autoridad hacia el activo cuestionamiento de la legitimidad de la autoridad instituida. Este cambio, para ambos autores, no depende exclusivamente de las condiciones de vida (factores estructurales de la situación). Es fruto de un cambio cognitivo en el cual es clave la deslegitimación de la autoridad, la posibilidad de imaginar una alternativa y la evaluación de que dicha alternativa tiene posibilidades de triunfar.Un elemento central de la legitimidad de una autoridad está en su efectividad en el cumplimiento de los fines para los cuales ha sido creada: "effectiveness, especially in services to the public, legitimates authority, and ineffectiveness makes the privileges of authority galling" (1978, 35).Ambos autores intentan explicar cómo ciertos patrones sociales, ciertas prácticas de gobierno y ciertos eventos históricos provocan una distribución desigual de la fé en los propósitos de la autoridad instituida y en la percepción de su efectividad al ser comparada con la efectividad de sus posibles alternativas. El foco del análisis de ambos autores está en los procesos cognitivos (3), fundamentalmente comparativos, que producen deslegitimación de la autoridad. Esta es una lección muy valiosa que surge de la investigación de Trotsky y de Tocqueville sobre los procesos revolucionarios: determinar contra qué es comparada la autoridad instituida (por parte de los grupos sociales que desafían o participan, activa o pasivamente, del derrocamiento de la autoridad establecida).En definitiva, tanto Trotsky como de Tocqueville extraen de sus respectivas investigaciones históricas, mecanismos que operan a nivel de la cognición de los actores y es a partir de estos procesos de cambio que dan una explicación de la particular secuencia de hechos que concluye en el quiebre abrupto de vastos esquemas absolutos de poder. "They are all directed at the problem of explaining the decay of authority, they all have something to do with people forming purposes and believing, or not believing, that particular social organs are effective in pursuing those purposes, and they have to do with the perception of possibilities". (1978, 40)"The gradual spreading of the conviction that perhaps a better alternative is really possible (…) is what both Trotsky and de Tocqueville see as the basic psychological process of undermining the traditional authority". (1978, 40)Así como Trotsky y de Tocqueville enfatizan en los mecanismos que estimulan el proceso revolucionario, también son capaces de encontrar en sus investigaciones, los mecanismos que desestimulan dicho proceso. Para ambos autores, por ejemplo, la discusión pública y la participación de los diferentes grupos sociales en la elaboración de la política tienden a no erosionar la legitimidad de las autoridades instituidas. Este tipo de mecanismo impide que se dispare un proceso de enajenación respecto a la autoridad y quienes la ejercen.Probar los conceptos a partir de su capacidad para generar analogíasAhora bien, ¿cómo es posible saber si la teoría a la que se ha llegado es promisoria? Para ALS, una teoría es "fuerte" cuando los mecanismos causales que emplea para explicar un fenómeno son válidos para explicar diferentes instancias históricas concretas. Es decir, cuando nos permite realizar analogías.La analogía es un típico producto de la investigación empírica. Considerar a dos objetos como similares (los predicados que A y B tienen en común y que los diferencian de un tercer objeto C) surge de una comparación minuciosa entre los objetos. Para ello hay que investigar (puesto que hay que hacer comparaciones). Una vez que tenemos un concepto que separa a dos objetos de otros, tenemos en potencia un concepto con alta capacidad para poder ingresar en sentencias causales. ¿Por qué? Porque podemos presumir que la analogía encontrada es causa de comportamientos similares entre A y B, comportamiento que en otros objetos adquiere valores diferentes.En la medida en que ALS defiende la estrategia de investigar series de eventos históricos de moderada extensión, el hallazgo de analogías fructíferas a nivel del comportamiento de los actores (individuales o corporativos) tiene mayor probabilidad de emerger durante el trabajo de investigación mismo. Ya que el estudio cuidadoso de la historia le ofrece al investigador un campo "rico" en posibilidades para hallar fenómenos análogos (fenómenos en los cuales los mismos mecanismos producen similares resultados). Por tanto, el estudio de la historia para ALS es una fábrica de conceptos con mayor potencial explicativo que el pensamiento teórico en abstracto, desarraigado. Es más fructífero construir conceptos a partir de la elaboración de analogías históricamente situadas que elaborarlos en abstracto sin un "teatro de operaciones" que pueda ayudar al investigador.Esto no implica un llamado al inductivismo ingenuo, "it is about the use of facts to improve ideas, to make them richer, more flexible, more powerful" (1978, 24).Un ejemplo de razonamiento por analogía tomado de Letras InternacionalesPara ejemplificar el método propuesto por ALS tomaremos un análisis realizado en Letras Internacionales por Javier Bonilla en editorial correspondiente al número 100 de la revista. En dicho editorial Bonilla aborda el problema de los "fundamentalismos islámicos" y su explicación en tanto fenómeno político. Dice acerca de los mismos:"Si hoy alguien quiere creer que los talibanes afganos, así como la miríada de grupos más o menos afines, autónomos o apoyados por distintos estados, son sólo "fundamentalistas islámicos" que, indignados por la irrespetuosa fuerza de la globalización generada en Occidente, han optado por defender su identidad religiosa y cultural, estará seguramente en todo su derecho. Pero tendrá inevitablemente que explicar dos cosas.La primera: ¿como se "defiende" la pureza del Islam mediante el expediente de aplicar 200 azotes y ejecutar de tres tiros en la cabeza en la plaza pública a una viuda encinta?. Si esta metodología no es la forma misma de instaurar el Terror para controlar a la población por el ejercicio del Terror mismo, no imaginamos un mecanismo mejor.La segunda: ¿por qué razones, tanto el 'modus operandi' de la exhibición pública del Terror, como el sistemático recurso al desmentido propagandístico cínicamente reñido con las evidencias que utilizan los talibanes, resultan ser prácticamente idénticos a los métodos de Lenin, de Hitler, de Mussolini, de Stalin, de Enver Hoxha, de Tito, de Pol Pot, de Castro o de Kim Jong-il , entre otros ?"(4).Este razonamiento puede ser tomado como un ejemplo de aplicación de la propuesta de ALS respecto a las analogías. Veamos la propuesta del editorialista en términos sencillos:Todo régimen político que es análogo a otro régimen político en el ejercicio del terror en forma pública es también análogo en no aceptar ninguna limitación ética, en la intención de imponer su relato y lograr sus fines (5). En consecuencia, una forma de conceptualizar qué es el régimen talibán es hacerlo formar parte del mismo conjunto que integran la Alemania nazi o la Unión Soviética bajo Stalin.Estas analogías son muy valiosas cuando nos enfrentamos a la explicación de un fenómeno político. En primer lugar, implican una conceptualización que recorre un camino que podríamos llamar "bottom – up". En el sentido que parte desde características observables del régimen y asciende en la conceptualización de las mismas (el camino inverso es despreocuparse de las características observables y aplicar apresuradamente una categoría teórica tomando al régimen como un vago ejemplo de la misma). En segundo lugar, apunta a clasificar las características observadas en alguna categoría análoga y ya conocida de régimen político. Esto permite ahondar en el estudio del fenómeno contemporáneo al menos con una herramienta desarrollada como punto de partida. La comparación minuciosa nos dirá si nuestro punto de partida es el correcto o no. En tercer lugar, nos permite eludir explicaciones aparentemente poderosas como aquella que hace del florecimiento de fundamentalismos la consecuencia de una misteriosa fuerza llamada "globalización" (nunca definida con precisión y desprovista de todo anclaje individual). Eludir este tipo de explicaciones basadas en grandes abstracciones es muy importante aunque los cientistas sociales solemos ser adictos a ellas. Conceptos como "globalización" o "modernidad líquida" son adictivos porque nos transmiten la sensación de que podemos explicar casi cualquier cosa con ellos. Sin embargo, su problema es que la inconsistencia de la definición de los mismos y su nulo anclaje en la actividad concreta de individuos no nos permiten esclarecer cómo es que esa fuerza llamada "globalización" genera aquellos fenómenos que queremos explicar. La utilización indiscriminada de estos conceptos nos hace sentir que al menos tenemos una explicación, aunque no se tenga la más mínima idea de cómo es que opera el explanans en el mundo concreto de los individuos que hacen o dejan de hacer determinadas cosas y con ello producen resultados a nivel colectivo.(1) Arthur L. Stinchcombe (1933) es actualmente profesor emérito en el Departamento de Sociología en Northwestern University. Previamente enseñó en Johns Hopkins, Berkeley, University of Chicago y University of Arizona. En su carrera se destacan tanto sus contribuciones al área de la metodología como de la construcción de teorías en ciencias sociales. Ha escrito más de 12 libros en muy distintas áreas como desarrollo agrícola, organización industrial y educación. Su segundo libro es un clásico en el área de la construcción de teorías y se llama precisamente "Constructing social theories", publicado originalmente en 1968. Dicho libro ha sido traducido al español. Ganó a lo largo de su carrera muchos premios, destacamos los más recientes: en 2004 Distinguished Career Prize, American Sociological Association; en 2007 Lazarsfeld Award for career contribution of methodology, ASA Methods Section. Una excelente entrevista en la que puede leerse sobre su trabajo de investigación hasta finales de la década de 1980 está en Swedberg (1990, ver bibliografía).(2) La lista no es exhaustiva. Pueden consultarse tres antologías de exponentes de la corriente analítica en las siguientes referencias especificadas en la bibliografía de este artículo: Hedström y Silverberg 1998, Hedström y Bearman, 2009 y Noguera et. Al., 2006.(3) Proceso cognitivo que se produce a nivel de los individuos que forman parte de los grupos en conflicto.(4) Disponible en:http://www.ort.edu.uy/facs/boletininternacionales/contenidos/100/editorialbonilla100.html(5) No aceptar limitaciones y pretender una sumisión total es una de las virtudes del concepto de totalitarismo que permiten diferenciar este tipo de régimen de otros que pueden ser similares en algún aspecto. Pablo Brum escribe: "Hitchens acota que totalitarismo 'is a useful term, because it separates 'ordinary' forms of despotism –those which merely exact obedience from their subjects- from the absolutist systems which demand that citizens become wholly subjects and surrender their private lives and personalities entirely to the state, or to the supreme leader'" (BRUM, 2011). *Profesor de Fundamentos de la Investigación Social, Métodos de investigación y Taller de Monografía.Depto de Estudios InternacionalesFACS – ORT Uruguay(ma.baudean@gmail.com). BIBLIOGRAFÍABRAITHWAITE, Richard. 1965 [1953]. La explicación científica. Madrid, Tecnos.BRUM, Pablo. 2011. El Impacto del Totalitarismo en el Siglo XX. Documento de Investigación Nº 62. Montevideo, FACS-ORT.GORSKY, Philip S. 2004. The Poverty of Deductivism: A Constructive Realist Model of Sociological Explanation. En: Sociological Methodology, 2005.HEDSTRÖM, Peter; SWEDBERG, Richard. 1998. Social Mechanisms. An analytical approach to social theory. New York, Cambridge University Press.HEDSTRÖM, Peter. 2005. Dissecting the Social. On the Principles of Analytical Sociology. New York, Cambridge University Press.HEDSTRÖM P., BEARMAN, P. (Editors). 2009. The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology. USA, Oxford University Press.HEMPEL, Carl G. 2005 [1965]. La explicación científica. Estudios sobre la filosofía de la ciencia. Barcelona, Paidós.HOMANS, George C. 1970. Naturaleza de la ciencia social. Buenos Aires, Eudeba.LITTLE, Daniel. 1991. Varieties of social explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science.Colorado: Westview Press.MANICAS, Peter. 2006. A realist philosophy of social science. Explanation and Understanding. New York, Cambridge University Press.Analytical Sociological Theory Papers. En: Papers Revista de Sociología (número especial), 80, 2006, p. 1-307.POPPER, Karl. 1969 [1957]. The poverty of historicism. London, Routledge.SALMON, Wesley. 2006 [1989]. Four decades of scientific explanation. USA, University of Pittsburgh Press.SMITH, Thomas W. 1999. History and International Relations. London, Routledge.STINCHCOMBE, Arthur L. 1978. Theoretical methods in social history. New York, Academic Press.SWEDBERG, Richard. 1990. Economics and sociology. Redefining their boundaries: conversations with economists and sociologists. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

At first glance, it may be surprising to consider the German-Jewish born sociologist Norbert Elias (Breslau, 1897–Amsterdam, 1990) as a reference of primary importance for thinking about the future of democracy and citizenship in Europe and beyond. Until recently, 'classics' of historical sociology as a whole have rarely been considered as highly relevant for investigations of the present state and future of relations between political communities in the age of globalisation. Moreover, in Elias's work, which focuses on very long-term social (including political) processes in pre- modern and modern Europe, the major terms used in European Studies and in political theories on European Union – such as 'legitimacy', 'sovereignty', 'citizenship' or 'democracy' – are rarely mentioned. Elias was obviously not first and foremost a theorist of nationalism or a post-nationalist author. He would even have refused to be considered mainly as a political or social theorist, and even less as a theorist or as a philosopher tout court. Elias's first doctorate was in philosophy but he was to abandon that discipline in favour of sociology, an intellectual break that deeply shaped his subsequent thinking (Elias 1994; Mennell 1998: 7-9). Elias's sociology was then marked by the opposition between positive, descriptive or 'reality congruent' social sciences, on the one hand, and normative philosophy, sometimes denounced as unrealistic or utopian, on the other. In addition, he refused to consider politics or policy as a distinct sphere. Moreover, Elias's historical sociology, in its more political aspects, mostly seems interested in the genesis of the state (Elias 1996; 1997), as were such sociologists as Anderson (1977) and Tilly (1993). However, a closer examination of his work reveals the undoubtedly central character of the question of social and political integration beyond the nation state. This preoccupation is already present in the conclusion of Über den Prozess der Zivilisation (1997, completed in 1939), often considered as his magnum opus, which reveals that, at this early stage in his writings, Elias questioned the relationship between nation-states and democracy. He continued to do so in later essays, especially in the crucial text, 'Changes in the We–I Balance' (1991, written in 1987), on which I will focus in the following discussion, and in Humana Conditio (2010, written in 1985). Now, the nature of this 'link' – historical and contingent, or, alternatively, conceptual or necessary – has led in the past twenty years to a well-known opposition between the so-called 'post-nationalist' authors and the 'national republicans', in France, or the 'liberal' or 'civic nationalists', in Great Britain (see Lacroix 2002; 2004). Even though Elias did not directly confront the problem of transcending national borders in conceiving of, and implementing, democracy in European Union, his intuitions can be read in relation to these recent debates about the pertinence of the national-democratic and post-national paradigms. It is true that Europe in the sense of the actual European Union does not really receive close attention in his writings. Quite obviously in Elias's view, European integration, if it would really take place, should rather be considered as a first step or as a transitional phase towards a more global, worldwide integration. Nevertheless, he demonstrated through all his work how much historical sociology is relevant for thinking about European integration and the very nature of the European Union. In 'Changes in the We–I Balance', Elias did not explicitly examine whether democracy can, or should, exist beyond the nation state, although it appears quite obvious, as in Humana Conditio (2010), that the nation-state is not the end of history. The originality of Elias's sociology lies elsewhere, and is twofold. On the one hand, it is to be found in Elias's forceful suggestion that any immediate political problem has to be considered in the light of long-term developments (see Déloye 2000; 2008) and in an all-embracing sociological perspective. Recently, Stefano Bartolini's book Restructuring Europe (2005) is an exceptional attempt to adopt a genuinely long-term socio-political perspective in order to understand the centralising processes that led to nation-states and to European integration. However, it remains focused on politics whereas Elias's more comprehensive approach includes the domains of psychology and the emotions. On the other hand, Elias's originality consists of his determination not to turn observations into norms or values that could legitimate particular conceptions of politics. If one forgets that sociological, self detached, standpoint, then Elias's propositions might sometimes seem similar to nationalist ideas, of course referring to civic or liberal nationalism (see Miller 1995; 2000) that considers the nation as the 'ultimate horizon of a political identity', or at least to the notion that democracy cannot be detached from the national frame. First of all, Elias strongly insists on the importance of affects and emotions for all kinds of collective identities, including political ones, and for every social and individual process of integration. Furthermore, his writings lay great stress on the enduring importance of the 'national habitus' (Elias 1991; 1996), particularly in the case of the old European countries. Finally, Elias sometimes seems to define the community as founded on conflicts with outsiders, both inside the community (Elias 2008), at the cultural or national level (Elias 1996), and beyond (Elias 1991), which at first glance resembles the fashionable idea (after Edward Said) of 'the Other'. In this paper, I will challenge this 'national' or culturalist reading of Elias's work, a reading that insists on the importance of belonging to a national community that one can find in the French sociologist Dominique Schnapper's essay La communauté des citoyens (1994). I will show that Elias's intuitions, by giving a crucial role to democratisation processes, contribute much more to deepen, from a sociological standpoint and in a critical way, the conceptions articulated by the post-nationalist authors – first of all the concept of 'constitutional patriotism' advocated by Jürgen Habermas[2] (1998; 2000) and that of 'post-national identity' presented by Jean-Marc Ferry (1992; 2000; 2005). And yet, according to Elias, European union, European unity or European integration, is not, first of all, a matter of values or ideals, political will or belief. More generally and less consciously, the growing repulsion towards suffering and pain would reveal a growing emotional identification between human beings over the centuries, though most obviously within their particular nation-states. However, just like Habermas, Elias suggests that a democratic political community could not be entirely based on such a feeling, although it is a 'civilising' one. This is because of his rational preferment that leads him to argue that people should rather base their acts on an understanding of the reality of their social relations. Moreover, there is no reason to consider as typically European in any meaning of the term that conscience-formation process associated with a widening circle of mutual identification. Elias admittedly studied the civilizing process by focusing on modern Western Europe at first, but it has never signified that European people have to be considered as 'civilized', compared to others, or even 'more civilized' thanks to cultural specific features, or in the vanguard of such a decentred conscience-formation process thanks to a specific European process. Not only did Elias severely criticise all nationalist and Eurocentric positions but, in the twentieth century more than ever before, humanity as a whole has to be considered as the real social unit of reference in a wholly interdependent world. In what follows, I firstly propose to review briefly the main ideas of the theory of the civilising process from state formation to globalisation that provides the framework for a long-term historical sociology. In this first part I will emphasize the crucial question of the links between the nation-state and democracy in the twentieth century that constitute the background of the current discussion between (liberal, civic) nationalists and post-nationalists. Second, I will show how the question of post-national interdependence and integration appears as a central problem in Elias's 'political' sociology, that always considers distinctly and together national, European, and global levels in a processual way. Third, I will tackle what are, according to Elias, the main obstacles to post-national political integration in terms of the endurance of national habitus, and will insist on the importance of not conflating the sociological study of such a phenomenon with its political justification. I will end with some comments on Eliasian post-nationalism and on his 'realist cosmopolitanism'. My opinion is that the stimulating tension between Hobbesian and Kantian inflexions in Elias's work, already analysed by Andrew Linklater in the field of international relations theory (Linklater 2004; 2011), is interestingly questioned when post-national integration in Europe or civic patriotism is at stake. My hypothesis is that, from an 'Eliasian' standpoint, the sociological study of long-term historical processes would not only reveal what separates Europeans from each other, but also what (temporarily) binds them together, 'for better and for worse', and what (more definitely) binds Europeans to the rest of the world.

At first glance, it may be surprising to consider the German-Jewish born sociologist Norbert Elias (Breslau, 1897–Amsterdam, 1990) as a reference of primary importance for thinking about the future of democracy and citizenship in Europe and beyond. Until recently, 'classics' of historical sociology as a whole have rarely been considered as highly relevant for investigations of the present state and future of relations between political communities in the age of globalisation. Moreover, in Elias's work, which focuses on very long-term social (including political) processes in pre- modern and modern Europe, the major terms used in European Studies and in political theories on European Union – such as 'legitimacy', 'sovereignty', 'citizenship' or 'democracy' – are rarely mentioned. Elias was obviously not first and foremost a theorist of nationalism or a post-nationalist author. He would even have refused to be considered mainly as a political or social theorist, and even less as a theorist or as a philosopher tout court. Elias's first doctorate was in philosophy but he was to abandon that discipline in favour of sociology, an intellectual break that deeply shaped his subsequent thinking (Elias 1994; Mennell 1998: 7-9). Elias's sociology was then marked by the opposition between positive, descriptive or 'reality congruent' social sciences, on the one hand, and normative philosophy, sometimes denounced as unrealistic or utopian, on the other. In addition, he refused to consider politics or policy as a distinct sphere. Moreover, Elias's historical sociology, in its more political aspects, mostly seems interested in the genesis of the state (Elias 1996; 1997), as were such sociologists as Anderson (1977) and Tilly (1993). However, a closer examination of his work reveals the undoubtedly central character of the question of social and political integration beyond the nation state. This preoccupation is already present in the conclusion of Über den Prozess der Zivilisation (1997, completed in 1939), often considered as his magnum opus, which reveals that, at this early stage in his writings, Elias questioned the relationship between nation-states and democracy. He continued to do so in later essays, especially in the crucial text, 'Changes in the We–I Balance' (1991, written in 1987), on which I will focus in the following discussion, and in Humana Conditio (2010, written in 1985). Now, the nature of this 'link' – historical and contingent, or, alternatively, conceptual or necessary – has led in the past twenty years to a well-known opposition between the so-called 'post-nationalist' authors and the 'national republicans', in France, or the 'liberal' or 'civic nationalists', in Great Britain (see Lacroix 2002; 2004). Even though Elias did not directly confront the problem of transcending national borders in conceiving of, and implementing, democracy in European Union, his intuitions can be read in relation to these recent debates about the pertinence of the national-democratic and post-national paradigms. It is true that Europe in the sense of the actual European Union does not really receive close attention in his writings. Quite obviously in Elias's view, European integration, if it would really take place, should rather be considered as a first step or as a transitional phase towards a more global, worldwide integration. Nevertheless, he demonstrated through all his work how much historical sociology is relevant for thinking about European integration and the very nature of the European Union. In 'Changes in the We–I Balance', Elias did not explicitly examine whether democracy can, or should, exist beyond the nation state, although it appears quite obvious, as in Humana Conditio (2010), that the nation-state is not the end of history. The originality of Elias's sociology lies elsewhere, and is twofold. On the one hand, it is to be found in Elias's forceful suggestion that any immediate political problem has to be considered in the light of long-term developments (see Déloye 2000; 2008) and in an all-embracing sociological perspective. Recently, Stefano Bartolini's book Restructuring Europe (2005) is an exceptional attempt to adopt a genuinely long-term socio-political perspective in order to understand the centralising processes that led to nation-states and to European integration. However, it remains focused on politics whereas Elias's more comprehensive approach includes the domains of psychology and the emotions. On the other hand, Elias's originality consists of his determination not to turn observations into norms or values that could legitimate particular conceptions of politics. If one forgets that sociological, self detached, standpoint, then Elias's propositions might sometimes seem similar to nationalist ideas, of course referring to civic or liberal nationalism (see Miller 1995; 2000) that considers the nation as the 'ultimate horizon of a political identity', or at least to the notion that democracy cannot be detached from the national frame. First of all, Elias strongly insists on the importance of affects and emotions for all kinds of collective identities, including political ones, and for every social and individual process of integration. Furthermore, his writings lay great stress on the enduring importance of the 'national habitus' (Elias 1991; 1996), particularly in the case of the old European countries. Finally, Elias sometimes seems to define the community as founded on conflicts with outsiders, both inside the community (Elias 2008), at the cultural or national level (Elias 1996), and beyond (Elias 1991), which at first glance resembles the fashionable idea (after Edward Said) of 'the Other'. In this paper, I will challenge this 'national' or culturalist reading of Elias's work, a reading that insists on the importance of belonging to a national community that one can find in the French sociologist Dominique Schnapper's essay La communauté des citoyens (1994). I will show that Elias's intuitions, by giving a crucial role to democratisation processes, contribute much more to deepen, from a sociological standpoint and in a critical way, the conceptions articulated by the post-nationalist authors – first of all the concept of 'constitutional patriotism' advocated by Jürgen Habermas[2] (1998; 2000) and that of 'post-national identity' presented by Jean-Marc Ferry (1992; 2000; 2005). And yet, according to Elias, European union, European unity or European integration, is not, first of all, a matter of values or ideals, political will or belief. More generally and less consciously, the growing repulsion towards suffering and pain would reveal a growing emotional identification between human beings over the centuries, though most obviously within their particular nation-states. However, just like Habermas, Elias suggests that a democratic political community could not be entirely based on such a feeling, although it is a 'civilising' one. This is because of his rational preferment that leads him to argue that people should rather base their acts on an understanding of the reality of their social relations. Moreover, there is no reason to consider as typically European in any meaning of the term that conscience-formation process associated with a widening circle of mutual identification. Elias admittedly studied the civilizing process by focusing on modern Western Europe at first, but it has never signified that European people have to be considered as 'civilized', compared to others, or even 'more civilized' thanks to cultural specific features, or in the vanguard of such a decentred conscience-formation process thanks to a specific European process. Not only did Elias severely criticise all nationalist and Eurocentric positions but, in the twentieth century more than ever before, humanity as a whole has to be considered as the real social unit of reference in a wholly interdependent world. In what follows, I firstly propose to review briefly the main ideas of the theory of the civilising process from state formation to globalisation that provides the framework for a long-term historical sociology. In this first part I will emphasize the crucial question of the links between the nation-state and democracy in the twentieth century that constitute the background of the current discussion between (liberal, civic) nationalists and post-nationalists. Second, I will show how the question of post-national interdependence and integration appears as a central problem in Elias's 'political' sociology, that always considers distinctly and together national, European, and global levels in a processual way. Third, I will tackle what are, according to Elias, the main obstacles to post-national political integration in terms of the endurance of national habitus, and will insist on the importance of not conflating the sociological study of such a phenomenon with its political justification. I will end with some comments on Eliasian post-nationalism and on his 'realist cosmopolitanism'. My opinion is that the stimulating tension between Hobbesian and Kantian inflexions in Elias's work, already analysed by Andrew Linklater in the field of international relations theory (Linklater 2004; 2011), is interestingly questioned when post-national integration in Europe or civic patriotism is at stake. My hypothesis is that, from an 'Eliasian' standpoint, the sociological study of long-term historical processes would not only reveal what separates Europeans from each other, but also what (temporarily) binds them together, 'for better and for worse', and what (more definitely) binds Europeans to the rest of the world.

*This series is the result of an adaptation of a paper presented as part of a seminar on "Theories and Research in International Relations" at Hebrew University, July 2012. Commentaries are welcome to daniel.wajner@mail.huji.ac.il Click here to read Part II of the series In the first article of this series we have introduced the debates on the ontology of power, while in the second one we have presented the main epistemological approaches of the different paradigms. In this third and final article we will deal with methodological schemes for Power Analysis in IR, while indicating areas for possible innovation using the "Arab Spring" cases as illustrations. Power, Outcomes, and what brings them togetherAs we have seen in the last part, the contribution made by Barnett and Duvall with his taxonomy of four dimensions of power is very helpful as theoretical framework; nevertheless, it is still weak to implement as a methodological tool - it is very difficult to distinguish in a real case what is originated through the structure or the actor, as well as to measure if the specificity is direct or diffuse.But the same could be expressed about the majority of the mentioned schemes. In fact, Dahl itself warned about the difficulties of combining variables to compare power relations and argued that it depends on the requirements of the research.1 This complexity is even larger when normative factors are included; for example, despite the proposal of Nye of measuring soft power through polls and focus groups, he also cautioned about the limits of the intangible variables.2 Hurt addresses certain ways of skipping the difficulties in measuring the power of legitimacy, such as examining: the rates of compliance, the reasons given for compliance and for non-compliance, the support given by the centers of Power and the need for legitimacy argument (akin to a counterfactual technique).3 But, once again, no combined power relations framework is presented.In addition, Lukes argues that power depends on the "significance" of the outcomes, namely, in the capacity of affecting the interests of the agents. He refers to two methods: by changing incentives structures (indoctrination) and by influencing interests (subject freedom). However, Lukes confesses that the main question remains open: how to use certain power to shape certain preferences?4In conclusion, in these approaches no power relation mechanism explains, in a measurable way, how material and normative resources are combined to shape power and influence decisions. Therefore, I would like to subsequently suggest a very simple framework that may allow us to implement the knowledge mentioned hitherto to study specific cases in IR.In line with the majority of the authors, in order to make power measurable I consider that we have to divide it in two variables: material power (or simply Power) and legitimation power (or legitimacy). In international politics, the power of an actor is expressed by its military (backed-by-economical) resources, and for the scheme it would receive "high" or "low" values. The legitimacy of the actors, which is based on their capacity to be perceived as norms-compliers and to build consensus around them5, would receive also "high" or "low" values.A power analysis based on the combination of those two variables, as it is shown below in illustration I, leads us to the taxonomy of four types of cases, each one ascribed to an "outcome". It is important to clarify that, for this paper, the outcomes would reflect the domestic situation of the main agent (the State) given an international system; it is a sort of outside-in analysis if we take into account Gourevitch´s second image reversed.6 Further work has to be done to adapt this scheme so as to explain the conduct of the State vis-à-vis other States as well as to include the domestic sphere of legitimacy.The first actor, which has high power and high legitimacy, could describe his situation as "stable"; that means, the actor would overcome the domestic and external challenges without internal changes and high international costs.The second actor, having high power but low legitimacy, is considered to be in a "changeable" situation. Although this actor is capable of overcoming internal and external challenges, due to the fact that it lacks of support from the other actors he could suffer from high international costs and possibly domestic changes.Illustration I – Taxonomy of Power-Legitimacy outcomesPOWERLEGITIMACYHigh PowerLow Power High Legitimacy "STABLE" "PROTECTABLE" Low Legitimacy "CHANGEABLE" "REVOLUTIONABLE" To the third actor, which has low power but high legitimacy, his situation is defined as "protectable". Due to his incapacity to overcome alone the internal and external challenges, this actor may count on the support of other actors to reduce the possibility of domestic changes; otherwise he will suffer from it.The fourth actor, with low power and low legitimacy, is placed in a "revolutionable" situation; that means, this actor is candidate to suffer from internal changes and high international costs at the time he would face challenges.Testing the Power Analysis framework with the "Arab Spring"The phenomenon known as the "Arab Spring", composed of dozens of countries in which massive protests were held, constitutes an outstanding test for the theory. A large quantity of those cases happened in a very short range of time, with all the variety of domestic conditions, reactions from the regime and from the world, as well as different outcomes. This makes those events ideal for the present examination; even though it is just a "sample" of a more deeply study.7Although no State of those that suffered uprisings is considered in a "stable" situation at all, Saudi Arabia and Jordan could be mentioned as good examples of Arab countries that combined high power (relatively, of course) and high legitimacy. Their regimes faced the uprisings from the beginning (mid-January 2011), but were capable of overcoming the internal challenges through a combination of repression and reforms, without suffering changes in their regime and being supported by the international community.Egypt is probably the best representation of a country whose regime kept high power at the moment of facing domestic challenges but received low legitimacy from the world; this "changeable" situation caused drastic changes at the top of the leadership (including the president, ministers, etc), albeit not of the whole regime (still leaded by the Military Council). Syria seems to be in a similar situation; while the power of the regime is still high, the legitimacy is not low enough to bring to major changes due to the sustained support of Russia, China and Iran. As a result, Syria constitutes today an excellent test for the power of legitimacy (and norms) in international politics.Between those countries that experienced a combination of low power and high legitimacy, experiencing a "protectable" situation, it is possible to mention Bahrain. Despite its regime was not capable of overcoming the internal revolts alone, it counted with the support of most of the Arab countries in the repression, and the Western approval of the "regional intervention" leaded by Gulf countries around the GCC. Yemen was in a comparable position, but at the end of 2011 the legitimacy of its regime was reduced when the region and the world understood the necessity to remove the President to maintain the remaining, in what was denominated later "the Yemenite option".Finally, Libya constitutes the case in which the regime was in a "revolutionable" situation, owing to its low Power to contain the rapid domestic rebellion and its low legitimacy after the first days of tremendous repression. The international costs were so high that included a military intervention leaded by NATO (with the endorsement of the Arab League), that led to the total collapse of the regime. It is possible to say that Tunisia was in an analogous situation while it did not need for a civil war and an external intervention to consummate finally a revolution (i.e., the complete removal of the existing regime).ConclusionsThroughout the paper we were able to observe that the ontological, epistemological and methodological discussions about the complex concept of Power maintain their relevance in the main schools of IR, and in some cases even constitute an essential part of their latest developments.At the same time, the inter-paradigmatic efforts of the last decades are demanding new power analysis approaches; that means, theoretical schemes that would embed a combination of the different factors at stake (material and non-material, resources and interactions, agents and structures) to specific cases of study.Deeper examinations of the "Arab Spring" cases need to be implemented so as to confirm the presented findings, as it was previously said. However, these small samples could possibly reveal that the implementation of a framework that combines both material and non-material resources is possible and, even more, desirable, to a better understanding of the devices of power in IR. 1 Robert A. Dahl, "The concept of Power", p.2142 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power- The Means to Success in World Politics. p.63 Ian Hurt, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics". International Organization 53 No2 (Spring 1999), 390-3914 Stephen Lukes, "Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds", p.4925 This short definition is based on concepts presented in Ian Clark, "Legitimacy in International Society" (London: Oxford University Press, 2005). It includes components both from the structure and the agent.6 Peter Gourevitch, "The second image reversed – the international sources of domestic politics" International Organization 32 No4, (Autumn 1978), 881-911.7 An investigation is "under construction", called "The Arab League and its legitimation role in the Arab Spring". It focuses on the power of the Arab League to yield legitimacy (or not) in six different cases. Bibliography Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S. "Two Faces of Power". The American Political Science Review 56 No4, (December 1962), 947-952 Baldwin, David A. Paradoxes of Power (NYC: Basil Blackwell, 1989). Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond. "Power in International Politics", International Organization 59, No1 (Winter 2005), 39-75 Berenskoetter, Felix and Williams, Michael J. Power in World Politics. (NYC: Routledge, 2007) Bourdieu, Pierre. Language & Symbolic Power (NYC : Polity Press, 2001) Carr, Edward H., The Twenty Years' Crisis,1919-1939 (NYC: Harper Torchbooks, 1964) Clark, Ian. "Legitimacy in International Society" (NYC: Oxford University Press, 2005) Claude, Inis L., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962). Dahl, Robert A. "The concept of Power", Behavioral Science 2 No3, (July 1957), 201-215 Haas, Ernst B. When Knowledge is Power (University of California Press, 1990). Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), 887-917. Foucalt, Michael. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77 (Brighton: Havester, 1980) Franck, Thomas M., "The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium." American Journal International 88 (2006), 88-106 Gourevitch, Peter. "The second image reversed – the international sources of domestic politics" International Organization 32 No4, (Autumn 1978), 881-911. Guzzini, Stefano, "The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis" Millennium 33 No3, 2005, 495-521. Guzzini, Stefano, "Structural power: the limits of neorealist power analysis", International Organization 47, No3 (Summer 1993), 443-478. Hurt, Ian, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics". International Organization 53 No2 (Spring 1999), 379-408 Ikenberry, John and Kupchan, Charles A. "Socialization and hegemonic power", International Organization 44, No3 (Summer 1990), 283-315. Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence, 2nd edition (New York: Harper Collins, 1989) Krasner, Stephen D. "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables", International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), 497-510 Lukes, Stephen. "Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds", Millennium 33 No3, (2005), 477-493 Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great power Politics (NYC: Norton, 2001) Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics among Nations, 4th edition (NYC: Knopf, 1967). Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power- The Means to Success in World Politics (NYC: PublicAffairs, 2004) Putnam, Robert. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, No3, (1988), 427-460 Risse, Thomas. "Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics," International Organization 54 No1 (Winter 2000), 1-40. Schmidt, Brian C. "Competing Realist Conceptions of Power", Millennium 33 No3, 523-549 Walt, Stephen. The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987) Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. (NYC: McGraw-Hill, 1979) Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. (California: University of Berkeley, 1978. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich). Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46 (1992), 391-425. Wendt, Alexander. "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory", International Organization 41/3 (1987), 335-370. Fabian Daniel Wajner is a Research and Teaching Assistant at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Department of International Relations) and a Fellow of the Liweranth Center for Latin America Studies.

             Previously posted on May 10/22 and Jan 30/23            Kissinger in Washington, May 7, 2022Henry Kissinger will be one hundred years old in a few weeks and has published five books since he turned ninety. Along with President Nixon, he futilely prolonged and escalated the Vietnam War for four years when defeat was already inevitable. But he also received the Nobel Peace Prize precisely for negotiating the ceasefire for that same war.     His doctrine also has these two faces. On the one hand, he conceives international politics as the interaction between states seeking power. On the other hand, he favors the balance of powers so that no one is able to fully impose its dominance on the others.   In the academic literature, Kissinger's approach is called "realism" and is widely accepted. The main alternative is the so-called "liberal" approach, which trusts in the ability of institutions to prevent wars and keep peace. From there arose the League of Nations, which failed, and the United Nations and its specialized organizations, which have had significant success on many issues, but are also currently showing their insufficiency.    The most accurate postulate of the realists is that the world is more peaceful when there are multiple powers than when there are only two, as in the Cold War, or a single super-dominant one, as seemed to be the case with the United States after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.   The success of the formula requires that the multilateral equilibrium could only be overthrown by an effort of a magnitude too difficult to mount. As a historical example, Kissinger has analyzed and praised the so-called Concert of Europe that was formed, after the defeat of Napoleon's France, by Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and also recovered France. According to his interpretation, the Concert "came close to constituting the government of Europe" and achieved a long period without European-wide wars. The balance was upset by the unification of Germany at the end of the 19th century and its consequent aggressive expansionism, which led to the absurd and catastrophic First World War. Taking a similar approach, Kissinger continues to praise the construction of the European Union, which has prevented new general wars on the continent.    During his time in government, the biggest concern was that communism would end up dominating the world according to the domino theory, whereby the fall of a piece like Indochina would be followed by Burma and Thailand, as well as Indonesia (which, in fact, was very close), and from there, India, Japan, the Middle East... That's why the Vietnam war extended to Laos and Cambodia. But this is also the reason for the diplomatic opening to China, to break the Sino-Soviet bloc and achieve a certain multilateral balance.    The current interest of the discussion is that the role of the United States as the only superpower may be less exclusive and exclusionary than it seemed. A version of political realism in academia tends to analyze international relations "after hegemony" as a ground for "anarchy", that is, destructive conflicts and wars. However, the changes around the Ukrainian war can be read as a new opportunity for multilateral cooperation.    The United States has the initiative and many economic and military resources, but, paradoxically, it may have a good opportunity to expand pluralism. In the new situation of divided government between the Presidency and Congress, the most ambitious projects in domestic policy are paralyzed, so Joe Biden can focus on foreign policy, where he has more power, and expand multilateral cooperation.    The European Union is beginning to develop, for the first time, a spirited common international policy, in contrast to the dissent during the Iraq war, when the governments of Britain and Spain were on one side and those of France and Germany on the other. The rulers of China and India, which are rivals to each other, have told Russia that the world is not ready for war.    This configuration with more than three major powers points to a balance of powers capable of avoiding polarization, since, otherwise, a coalition of two-to-one preludes conflict.     Specifically, the Group of Seven, which is the nucleus of a latent world government, needs to work more closely with some members of the Group of Twenty, which includes India and China, so that its decisions are widely accepted and effective.    Negotiations between the US and the EU for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in which substantive agreements had been reached, were paralyzed by Trump, and could now be revived.    The Trans-Pacific Agreement for Economic Cooperation was also abandoned by Trump, but the other eleven initial countries went ahead on their own and ended up signing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), to which China has presented its candidacy. Many in the United States are clamoring for re-entry in what had been its own initiative.    And after the war in Ukraine, a new international structure will have to be defined, especially for Central and Eastern Europe, in which, as Kissinger said in a recent interview, "Russia should find a place."    Realism shows that the seeking for power explains many things, and the balance of power can prevent a general war. But when there is neither a single dominant power nor a confrontation between two, "liberal" rules and institutions may be the best mechanism for peace and multilateral cooperation.Also in Spanish in the daily La Vanguardia-click       While President Biden is not clear, and sometimes he is confusing about how the war in Ukraine could end, some other voices in Washington can speak and suggest more clearly. Several of them did it a few days ago at the Financial Times Weekend Festival, which was held, for the first time outside England, at the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington.The first surprisingly constructive intervention was from William J. Burns, the current CIA Director. Just a year ago, he came from retirement after a long career as a diplomat, and as such, in his presentation, the conversation with an FT journalist, and the dialogue with the audience, he showed a broader vision than the usual spies. When he was Ambassador in Boris Yeltsin's Moscow in the mid-1990s, Burns already felt that the NATO expansion until the borders of Russia was "premature at best, and needlessly provocative at worst." More specifically, to push for NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia was "a serious strategic mistake that did indelible damage" –an opinion that at the time was shared by the governments of France and Germany. In an official encounter, Putin had told him that Ukraine in NATO "would be a hostile act toward Russia."Burns emphasized, of course, that there is "absolutely no justification for the invasion of Ukraine." Yet, he resumed that kind of strategic explanation while dismissing the ideological elaborations that pretend either justify or condemn the attack. In short: Russia has "pushed back" after Ukraine moved westward away from Russian influence.In his view, nevertheless, Putin miscalculated regarding the power of the Russian Army (which was sent to a "special operation" not planned by its generals), about Ukrainian resistance, and with the supposition that the West would be distracted by elections in Germany and France. He tried to explain the recent candidacies of Sweden and Finland to NATO as a deterrent against Putin's other potential attacks in the future. But the Director of the CIA did not utter a word that could be interpreted as supporting Ukraine's NATO membership.Even more thrilling was the participation of Henry Kissinger on "the new world disorder." The former Secretary of State is 99 years old this month, announced a new book of immediate publication, and for nearly one hour was focused, clear, and insightful, also in a dialogue with the audience. Kissinger started by using his academic background and remarking that the foreign policy's main priority of Russia, which is the largest country in the world, has always been to protect its huge territory from invasions. From this perspective, after the Cold War, the country's leadership was "offended" by NATO's absorption of Eastern Europe.Now –he noted— public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation, but by reflecting on the previous failures of the several governments he advised, he lamented that, again, nobody knows where we are going. Kissinger had already opposed Ukraine's candidacy to NATO when President Bush and Vice-president Cheney launched it in 2008. Six years later, at the Russian occupation of Crimea, he warned that Ukraine should not join either the East or the West, but it should function as "a bridge" between the two. He had predicted that otherwise, "the drift toward confrontation would accelerate."Most striking was his warning about the use of nuclear weapons. "I would not make Ukraine's membership to NATO a key issue," he remarked at the Kennedy Center. It would be "unwise to take an adversarial position," mainly because of the horrible danger of a nuclear war. His approach was certainly in contrast with that in the 1970s, of which he was reminded, when the gibberish theory of the "domino" was used to attack one country after another. Bush and Cheney still used that approach in the early 2000s to justify "preventive wars." I got the impression that with aging, intelligent people like Kissinger may feel that it is not worth trying to deceive himself again, and despite his physical frailness (or perhaps because of that), his more mature brain moves in the direction of more honest and clear thinking. His main argument was that in the past, although confrontation was addressed to "preserve the balance of power" between the US and the Soviet Union, at the same time, he also promoted agreements for nuclear arms reduction and control. Nowadays, modern technology would produce much worse destruction, so he claimed for a "new era" in which the governments should take more care about the consequences of nuclear arms and favor diplomacy above all. Kissinger reminded the audience that, in the past, nuclear countries such as the Soviet Union and the United States accepted military defeats from non-nuclear countries, such as in Vietnam and (both) in Afghanistan. Even more now, "we have to deescalate to conventional arms and learn to live with adversarial relations." Kissinger has met Putin more than twenty times and asserted that "there is still room for negotiation" with him. In Spanish in the daily La Vanguardia