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The article explores a rather debatable question about whether an individual – an entrepreneur – can be considered an official in general and in particular an official of a legal entity of private law. This is what the purpose of the article is. The concept of a subject is established, as well as the fact that the subject of a criminal offense under article 364-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is a special – official person of legal person of private law, regardless of the organizational and legal form. The definition of an official person is provided for in article 18, paragraph 3, of the Criminal Code, according to which the main features of an official person are the presence of organizational, administrative and administrativeeconomic functions, which are indicated in more detail in the Decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine On judicial practice in cases of bribery. The article notes that an individual entrepreneur should be recognized as an official of a legal entity of private law if he exercises organizational, administrative or administrative-economic functions. Examples of jurisprudence are provided in support of this position. With regard to the recognition of a physical person - entrepreneur as a direct subject of a criminal offence under Art. 364-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, this issue is disclosed through an analysis of civil legislation and relevant judicial practice. Organizational and legal forms of legal entities of private law are considered, and it is also indicated that the same normative and legal acts governing the activities of legal entities apply to natural persons – entrepreneurs. It is noted that a physical person – an entrepreneur in economic relations does not participate as a physical person, but as a subject of entrepreneurial activity, which makes him such a legal persons. It is concluded that the physical person of an entrepreneur under certain conditions should be recognized as a subject of a criminal offense under article 364-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. ; У статті досліджується досить дискусійне питання на предмет того, чи можна вважати фізичну особу – підприємця службовою особою загалом і зокрема службовою особою юридичної особи приватного права. Саме це і є метою статті. Встановлюється поняття суб'єкта, а також те, що суб'єкт кримінального правопорушення, передбаченого статтею 364-1 Кримінального кодексу України, є спеціальним – службова особа юридичної особи приватного права незалежно від організаційно-правової форми. Наводиться визначення службової особи, яке передбачено частиною 3 статті 18 Кримінального кодексу України, відповідно до якої основними ознаками службової особи є наявність в неї організаційно-розпорядчих та адміністративно-господарських функцій, про які більш детально зазначається у Постанові Пленуму Верховного Суду України «Про судову практику у справах про хабарництво». У статті наголошується на тому, що фізичну особу – підприємця слід визнавати службовою особою юридичної особи приватного права, якщо він здійснює організаційно-розпорядчі або адміністративно-господарські функції. На підтвердження даної позиції наводяться приклади судової практики. Щодо визнання фізичної особи – підприємця безпосередньо суб'єктом кримінального правопорушення, передбаченого ст. 364-1 Кримінального кодексу України, то вказане питання розкривається через аналіз цивільного законодавства та відповідної судової практики. Розглядаються організаційно-правові форми юридичних осіб приватного права, а також зазначається те, що до фізичних осіб – підприємців застосовуються ті ж самі нормативно-правові акти, що регулюють діяльність юридичних осіб. Наголошується на тому, що фізична особа – підприємець у господарських відносинах бере участь не як фізична особа, а як суб'єкт підприємницької діяльності, що робить його подібним до юридичних осіб. Робиться висновок, що фізичну особу – підприємця за певних умов слід визнавати суб'єктом кримінального правопорушення, передбаченого статтею 364-1 Кримінального кодексу України.

Abstract
This article offers a reading of the concluding paragraph of Walter Benjamin's "Toward the Critique of Violence." It discusses Benjamin's assertion that only a philosophical-historical approach can provide the key to a critique of violence in light of his essay's discussion of legal violence, and in light of his discovery of radically different types of violence. Benjamin argues that the legal order remains enclosed in a cycle of law-positing and law-preserving violence. Moreover, the legal order inherits the essential trait of myth and of mythic violence: ambiguity. This article shows that guilt is the destiny of those subjected to mythic (and legal) forms of violence. The fateful cycle of legal violence can be undone only by the irruption of an absolutely heterogeneous type of violence, which Benjamin calls divine violence. Its peculiarity consists in the fact that, in deposing legal violence (and the legal order as a whole), divine violence also deposes itself as violence. Although divine violence cannot be attested to as a fact or as a force unequivocally acting in the profane—that is, the human—context, it is nevertheless immanent to the profane world. Its immanence is the immanence of the messianic.

Change is here. If this was not evident from the speech of Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon at his welcome ceremony three years ago, it is now. In three short years, Singapore is leading Asia - possibly the world - in the provision of not only legal services but also intellectual capital and resources. The speed of these developments should not be surprising. As Attorney-General V.K. Rajah observed at the Opening of the Legal Year this month, Singapore's law and legal system has come a long way in a short time. The story of the Singapore legal system thus far can be told in three phases: consolidation (1965-1990), refinement (1990s-2000s) and internationalisation (today).

Half Title -- Series Information -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Figures -- Notes on Contributors -- Chapter 1 May It Please the CourtOf Florida, from Florida, for Florida -- 1 Gideon v. Wainwright -- 2 Miami Herald v. Tornillo -- 3 Palmore v. Sidoti -- 4 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah -- 5 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida -- 6 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection -- 7 Bush v. Gore -- Recommended Reading -- Chapter 2 Legal Iconography and Painting Constitutional Law -- 1 Legal Iconography -- 1.1 Abstract Ideas -- 1.2 Instructive Examples -- 1.3 Critique -- 1.4 An Expanding Field -- 2 Xavier Cortada's May It Please the Court -- Recommended Reading -- Chapter 3 Xavier Cortada: Socially Engaged Activist Artist -- 1 Mural Painting as Consciousness- Raising -- 2 Law, Advocacy, and Painting -- 2.1 Gideon v. Wainwright -- 2.2 Palmore v. Sidoti -- 2.3 Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo -- 2.4 Williams v. Florida -- 2.5 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah -- 2.6 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida -- 2.7 Proffitt v. Florida -- 2.8 Bush v. Gore -- 2.9 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection -- 2.10 Florida v. Jardines -- 3 Art, Science, and Building Community -- 4 Conclusion -- Recommended Reading -- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) -- Chapter 4 Gideon v. Wainwright: The Surprising Power of a Prisoner Petition -- 1 The Road to Gideon v. Wainwright -- 2 Gideon v. Wainwright -- 3 The Retreat from Gideon -- 4 May It Please the Court -- Recommended Reading -- Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) -- Chapter 5 Williams v. Florida: What's in a Number? Jury Function and Jury Numbers -- 1 Numbers and Jury Function -- 2 Cortada's Jury.

List of Tables -- Notes on Contributors -- Introduction -- 1 The Bannum in Italian Bankruptcy Law (Fourteenth-Fifteenth Centuries) --   Marta Lupi -- 2 "Without regard to foreignness" The Reciprocal Equal Treatment of Foreign Creditors in the Early Modern German Territories --   Remko Mooi -- 3 Modifying Procedural Practices, Shaping Economic Identities The Middle Class and Negotiated Debt Adjustment in Commercial Courts in Belgium (1883-1914) --   Pieter De Reu -- 4 Citizenship in Early Modern Amsterdam An Artisanal Identity? --   Marco In 't Veld and Maurits den Hollander -- 5 The Pareres of the Governors of the Frankfurt Exchange Legal Opinions of Frankfurt Merchants in the Eighteenth Century --   Sonja Breustedt -- 6 Identity, Conflict and Commercial Law Legal Strategies of Castilian Merchants in the Low Countries (Fifteenth-Sixteenth Centuries) --   Gijs Dreijer -- 7 The Learning Market in Early Modern Antwerp (Seventeenth-Eighteenth Centuries) Circulation of Knowledge within the Context of Private Partnership Contracts --   Patrick Naaktgeboren -- 8 Family, Religion, and Business Cooperation Jewish Private Partnerships in Eighteenth-Century Amsterdam --   Manon Moerman -- 9 "Tolerate their religion, but not their usury" Conrad Summenhart on Tolerating Jewish Bankers in an Era of Mass Expulsions --   Joost Possemiers -- Index.

The theory of law proposed by R. Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously, London, 1977) can be regarded as an alternative to the two usual theories of natural law & legal positivism. Dworkin's theory holds that, within a sufficiently rich legal system, any legal problem will have a discoverable right answer. Thus, policy issues cannot be taken into account in legal decisions, since such issues can be dealt with only by sacrificing rights which the system has already granted to some persons. Dworkin regards this theory both as describing the practices already followed in England & the US, & as a model which should be adhered to more consciously. A number of problems exist in the descriptive theory, which should be tested against actual examples of hard cases. Dworkin's application of this theory to the fugitive slave laws is problematic, since it assumes the Constitution to be founded in a concept of a general right to freedom antagonistic to slavery; this is not the only possible theory of the Constitution, since the theory of preservation of the institutions of individual states is also well supported. Thus, Dworkin's approach in practice leaves judges free to legislate, by deciding which set of principles should be taken as fundamental to the existing body of settled law. W. H. Stoddard.