Suchergebnisse

Libro de Investigación ; ¿Cómo influyen los existentes modelos globales de crecimiento económico, con su énfasis en la creación de "nuevos mercados" y el creciente énfasis en la creación de consumidores globales en lugar de ciudadanos, en el desarrollo del cristianismo en todo el mundo? ¿La mentalidad de "expandir y crear nuevos mercados" ha entrado en la iglesia? ¿Está la iglesia más preocupada por encontrar consumidores para su producto que por educar a los cristianos para que asuman una responsabilidad madura de desarrollar su fe tanto a nivel personal como comunitario? Todas estas preguntas me vienen a la mente cuando intento arrojar luz sobre la relación entre economía y teología. En este trabajo, construiré puentes entre antropología (libertad), economía (desarrollo, medios de comunicación y consumo) y eclesiología (configuración de la Iglesia). Mi objetivo en este trabajo es describir cómo interactúan el capitalismo y nuestra tradición cristiana en el mundo globalizado. En el capítulo I, muestro cómo los conceptos de "masas" y "minorías", desarrollados por Juan Luis Segundo, son un marco sólido para ilustrar la relación entre el ámbito económico y la configuración de las iglesias. La comprensión de la vida humana de Segundo puede describirse como un proceso evolutivo o una dialéctica en la que dos vectores se relacionan entre sí. En la perspectiva económica (capítulo II), explico cómo el modelo de desarrollo humano de Amartya Sen supera y completa el modelo neoliberal de desarrollo económico. Amartya Sen define el desarrollo como la mejora de las libertades que permiten a las personas llevar vidas que tienen razones para valorar. Él cree que los economistas han puesto demasiado énfasis en el PIB como la medida fundamental del desarrollo. Sin embargo, si el crecimiento del PIB no se acompaña de otros factores que definen un alto nivel de vida (por ejemplo, libertad de proceso político, disponibilidad de oportunidades sociales que incluyen educación y atención médica para todos los ciudadanos, y protección contra el hambre y la muerte prematura), entonces El país se está haciendo cada vez más rico en términos estrictamente materiales. En otras palabras, el país no se está "desarrollando" en el sentido más completo. A través de la perspectiva antropológica (capítulo III), muestro cómo un modo de consumo maduro / responsable es la mejor manera de integrar el desarrollo humano genuino en una comprensión del ser humano como una entidad integral. Finalmente, en el capítulo IV, describo la situación por la cual las tendencias hacia el consumo masivo o compulsivo no solo socavan nuestra capacidad de moldear nuestra libertad y nuestra vida diaria, sino que presentan una pregunta desafiante a nuestra formación religiosa. La formación que ofrecen las industrias culturales parece completamente inevitable y esto ha debilitado nuestra capacidad de resistencia. En mi opinión, una visión del desarrollo humano que incluya una conducta responsable con respecto al consumo puede ayudar a las Iglesias cristianas (y especialmente a los católicos) a encontrar una forma madura de acercarse a la vida cotidiana. Esta tendencia se apoya en una experiencia personal de Dios y busca un "Ministerio basado en la Gracia eclesial" que aborde un modelo de configuración de la Iglesia como comunidad de solidaridad. Esto corrige un "Ministerio basado en la demografía eclesiástica", donde la iglesia está más preocupada por encontrar "consumidores" para sus productos en lugar de centrarse en una experiencia personal de Dios. Concluyo señalando que la forma en que consumimos es parte de cómo expresamos nuestra condición humana. La cultura del consumidor es el contexto mismo en el que mi libertad hace discernimientos difíciles a diario. En un mundo donde mi libertad está condicionada por las marcas, la cultura del consumidor es el campo de batalla donde mi madurez se prueba implacablemente. La forma en que me relaciono con asuntos relacionados con la economía manifiesta mi nivel de madurez como ser humano y pone a prueba la forma en que mi comportamiento es testigo de lo que confío. ; How do the prevalent global models of economic growth, with their emphasis on creating new markets and growing emphasis on creating global consumers rather than citizens, influence the development of Christianity throughout the world? Has the expanding and creating new markets mindset entered the church? Is the church more concerned with finding consumers for its product rather than educating Christians to assume a mature responsibility for developing their faith both on a personal and communal level? All these questions come to my mind as I attempt to throw light upon the relation between economy and theology. In this work, I will build bridges among anthropology (liberty), economy (development, mass media and consumption) and ecclesiology (configuration of the Church). My goal in this work is to describe how capitalism and our Christian tradition interact in the globalized world. In chapert I, I show how the concepts of masses and minorities, developed by Juan Luis Segundo, are a solid framework to illustrate the relation between the economic arena and the configuration of the churches. Segundo s understanding of human life can be described as an evolutionary process or a dialectic in which two vectors relate to each other. In the economic perspective (chapter II), I explain how Amartya Sen s model of human development far surpasses and completes the neoliberal model of economic development. Amartya Sen defines development as the enhancement of freedoms that allow people to lead lives that they have reason to value. He believes that economists have placed too much emphasis on GDP as the pivotal measure of development. However, if GDP growth is not accompanied by the other factors that define a high standard of living (e.g., freedom of political process, availability of social opportunities including education and health care for all citizens, and protection from hunger and premature death), then the country is only growing richer in strictly material terms. In other words, the country is not "developing" in the fullest sense. Through the anthropological perspective (chapter III), I show how a mature/responsible mode of consumption is the best way to integrate genuine human development into an understanding of the human being as an integral entity. Finally, in chapter IV, I describe the situation whereby tendencies towards mass or compulsive consumption not only undermine our capacity to shape our freedom and our daily life, but they present a challenging question to our religious formation. The formation offered by culture industries seems utterly inevitable and this has weakened our capacity to resist. In my opinion, a vision of human development that includes responsible conduct regarding consumption can help the Christian Churches (and especially Catholics) find a mature way to approach daily life. This tendency leans on a personal experience of God and looks for a Ministry based on Ecclesial Graciousness addressing a model of configuring the Church as community of solidarity. This corrects a Ministry based on Ecclesiastical Demographics, where the church is more concerned to find consumers for its products rather than focusing on a personal experience of God. I conclude by noting that the way we consume is part of how we express our human condition. Consumer culture is the very context in which my freedom makes difficult discernments on a daily basis. In a world where my freedom is conditioned by brands, consumer culture is the battlefield where my maturity is relentlessly tested. The way I relate to matters involving the economy manifests my level of maturity as a human being and tests the way my behavior witnesses to what I trust. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Credibly demonstrating actual progress towards a genuinely sustainable transport situation remains a challenge. A key problem is that the incorporation of sustainability in transport policy and planning at present is not systematic. A motivating assumption behind this thesis is that a transition toward a sustainable transport system will require strong support from decision-support processes and assessment tools that do not only adopt the language of sustainability, but fully integrate an explicit notion of sustainability in all of their conceptual, operational and procedural approaches. There is therefore a general need to improve processes, methods and tools applied in transport infrastructure decision making so as to make them more resonant to the needs of both current and future generations corresponding to the fundamental definition of sustainable development. The core focus of the thesis is on how to ensure project impacts in terms of sustainability are identified and become inputs to decision making. The benefits of increased mobility based on speed and capacity are significant and visible, creating a wide range of reachable activities for a great number of people. Negative externalities of transport systems such as accidents, local air pollution and noise have long been monetised and accounted for in conventional transport project appraisal. But the transport sector today (in Denmark, in the EU and globally) is also an increasingly large contributor to the two core planetary boundaries of climate change and biosphere integrity. Such wider, more complex and longer terms effects that are also external to local interests and market transactions are not only increasingly observed in transport but are also far less well accounted for. The risk here is that evidence-based decision-making becomes discredited, as was already found to be the case for high-speed rail appraisal in the UK, which is the most important case analysed in this thesis. This thesis contributes to the following three challenges: the overarching conceptualisation of sustainable development as an ethos for transport infrastructure policy, the operational specifics of impact assessment based on indicators and methods for their prioritisation, and stakeholder representations applied in assessment procedures, with a particular focus on creating a explicit 'future generations' viewpoint. The research takes a starting point in Sustainable Transport Indicator Frameworks (STIFs), then expands to decision-support processes and assessment tools, and finally explores issues relevant for the wider field of transport planning and decision-making. A main underlying concern of the research is to develop new thinking and assessment methods that bridge the techno-rationalist//instrumental approach of conventional impact assessment tools with a wider communicative planning rationality. This is needed because of the complex, dynamic and interdependent nature of transport planning and decision-making. Methods This thesis draws from multiple research methods which are both qualitative and quantitative. For the conceptual work, I rely on purposive literature reviews, including extensive reviews on sustainability theory and the implication of this body of knowledge for sustainable transport, as well as a detailed review of selected literature on the topic of sustainable transport indicator frameworks. Case study work draws upon extensive desktop-based analysis of impact assessment reports and other publically available material about real cases of large transport infrastructure appraisals. The HS2 high-speed rail (HSR) project appraisal in the UK is used as a case study in three of the articles that compose this thesis, first because of the long tradition for comprehensive and open appraisal processes in the UK, and second for the significant wider environmental, social and economic impacts of the scheme, which is an opportunity to examine sustainability in the context of transport appraisal in more detail. The work specifically concerned with the elaboration of assessment tools and decision-support processes is based on an adaptation of multi-criteria analysis tools (MCA) and more particularly on the Multi-Actor Multi-Criteria Analysis (MAMCA) approach, which gives more prominence to the explicit integration of stakeholders in transport project appraisal. Empirical work was conducted ex-post and consists of structured interviews based on online questionnaires following standard MCA steps. Finally in order to complement the research I also conduct exploratory work consisting of face-to-face unstructured interviews and structured observation of passengers' activities in actual high-speed rail trips in the UK. Results The first article in this thesis develops a metaframework for what should inform the analysis and eventually the design of STIFs. The article identifies and describes a total of 21 'metacriteria' that are grouped based on the framework function they are contributing to. Going beyond indicators, this article led to examining in more detail issues related to prioritising sustainability impacts, capturing trade-offs in the long term, and informing strategic sustainable transport choices, which are also relevant for other assessment and decision-support tools. The second and third articles investigate the conceptual foundations and address the operational challenges in incorporating a sustainability viewpoint using multi-criteria analysis tools (MCA). The nested model of sustainability is found to be a useful approximation of strong sustainability principles when used as guidance for prioritising impacts. However a key contribution of these articles is the implementation of a 'future generations' stakeholder in transport appraisal processes, which in turn is proposed as a key feature for sustainable transport appraisal (STA) processes. One practical outcome of the research is a comprehensive list of project impacts for ex-ante assessment of large transport infrastructure projects like HSR. Structured interviews based on an online questionnaire are also found to be well adapted to the challenge of addressing biases in expert- and stalkeholder-based assessment methods. This approach provides a means to both address the need for quantifying and comparing complex impacts between various options, and to enable the systematic inclusion of stakeholders, therefore allowing for a level of reflexivity and 'democratic renewal' in appraisal processes. In the fourth article, the issue of trade-offs between the two interrelated issues of biosphere integrity and climate change is investigated in more detail, where it is shown that current state-of-the-art decision-support processes and assessment tools lack formal ways of dealing with complex impacts with local and global implications that unfold over long periods of time. And finally the last article is a more conceptual piece that adopts a critical view on the historic emphasis for minimising travel time in transport planning, and contributes to a better understanding of the value of travel time from a traveller's perspective. The concept of reasonable travel time (RTT) is introduced, where travel time is reframed based on the traveller's experience of time in a total door-to-door journey. It is expected that RTT could lead to different thinking about the effectiveness of future transport investments, which is particularly relevant in a technological age where the overall quality of travel time can bring positive outcomes without necessarly changing the quantity. Taken together, the articles and chapters that compose this thesis contribute to defining the emerging field of 'sustainable transport appraisal'. STA goes beyond the instrumental approach of conventional transport impact assessment methods that attempt to reduce, measure and forecast impacts in a cool, dispassionate way. It does so by adopting sustainability as an explict goal based on first-order principles, by integrating stakeholder perspectives in the decision-making process, and by incorporating the interests of future generations. Moving from impact assessment tools to appraisal processes means refocusing transport planning on decision-support and decision-making, which are technical and political endeavours that cannot easily be separated.

Welcome to a Special Issue of the International Journal for Educational Integrity: Best papers from the Plagiarism Across Europe and Beyond Conference, Brno, Czech Republic, 12–13 June 2013. The IJEI acknowledges the generous collaboration and collegial support of the organisers of the conference, particularly Tomas Foltýnek (Conference Convenor) and Irene Glendinning, Project Leader of the Impact of Policies for Plagiarism in Higher Education across Europe Project (IPPHEAE). Selected 'best papers' were submitted to the IJEI for consideration and additional double-blind peer review. As a result of subsequent revisions, the papers in this issue are substantially different from the original versions presented at the Czech conference. We open the issue with an overview and summary of results from the IPPHEAE by Project Leader Irene Glendinning from Coventry University, UK. Funded by the European Commission (2010–2013), the IPPHEAE is possibly the broadest study of academic integrity in Europe ever conducted, with a comparative study of academic integrity policies and procedures in higher education institutions (HEIs) across 27 European Union member states. The project used online questionnaires, student focus groups, structured interviews and analysis of documentary evidence to determine how well institutional procedures were understood, to what extent they were operating as intended and whether there was consistency of outcomes within and between institutions. Almost 5,000 responses were received in 14 different languages. Participants included students (at undergraduate and masters' levels), teaching staff and senior managers. Glendinning presents results from the survey that focused specifically on institutional policies and highlights examples of good practice as well as areas of concern. In keeping with international research from other settings and locations, the IPPHEAE findings indicate that there is no 'one size fits all' approach to academic integrity policy and practice. Each country and indeed each HEI needs to develop a tailored approach according to individual context, and taking into account the maturity of existing policies and systems. IPPHEAE project partners Tomáš Foltýnek and Jirí Rybicka from Mendel University, Czech Republic, and Catherine Demoliou from the University of Nicosia, Cyprus, use data obtained from the project survey to address the question: 'Do students think what teachers think about plagiarism?'. The researchers compare and contrast the overall data on students' and teachers' attitudes to academic writing, their perceptions of plagiarism and plagiarism penalties, and their knowledge of institutional policies/ procedures on plagiarism. Results indicate that there is a discrepancy in understanding between these two key stakeholder groups relating to how students learn about academic integrity, the challenges of academic writing, the causes of student plagiarism, identifying plagiarism, appropriate penalties for plagiarism, and knowledge of institutional policy. The authors contend that teachers' attitudes may require reflection and realignment to ensure they have a better understanding of students' educational needs and perceptions of plagiarism so that appropriate support can be offered. In the third paper, Rui Sousa-Silva from Universidade do Porto, Portugal, uses a forensic linguistics approach to analyse real-life plagiarism cases by higher education students. The author compares suspected plagiarised strings of text against the most likely original text, and demonstrates that strategies other than literal borrowing (wordfor- word text) are being increasingly used by students to plagiarise. Sousa-Silva provides examples to illustrate why existing automated text-matching software may fail to detect these cases of plagiarism. The paper concludes that while text-matching software is able to detect literal, verbatim plagiarism, it should not necessarily be considered a good 'plagiarism detection system' particularly when other strategies are used, such as translation, word substitution or reordering. The author also reminds us of the need for manual analysis by a 'human detector' to ensure that any accusations of plagiarism take into account both the linguistic and educational complexity underlying textual similarities. Finally, Sousa-Silva calls for more research and improvements in computational linguistics and natural language processing to increase the accuracy and reliability of the machine-detection procedure. In addition to the burgeoning international research on student plagiarism, Erja Moore, from Karelia University of Applied Sciences, Finland, suggests that accuracy of referencing might be another useful aspect to explore when examining students' writing practices. Moore analyses both the accuracy of referencing and plagiarism in 91 electronically published theses published in the Finnish Theseus database. In-text citations were compared to references, and in the case of frequent inaccuracy a Google search was used to scrutinise possible plagiarism. The accuracy of referencing was categorised into four classifications: accurate, some inaccuracy, constant inaccuracy and misleading referencing/plagiarism. Moore provides useful examples of inaccuracy, misquoting and plagiarism and also points to 'secondary source plagiarism', which occurs when text with accurate citations and references is copied from the original source and presented as the student's own. The analysis in Moore's study indicated that nearly one third (31%) of theses had major referencing inaccuracies, or referencing which could be categorised as misleading or plagiarised. It is clear from this study that constant inaccuracy and misleading referencing are categories that overlap with plagiarism. The results of Moore's study require careful consideration because they demonstrate that in Finnish higher education theses containing major inaccuracies have been accepted and published. The title of the conference Plagiarism Across Europe and Beyond points to the widespread interest in the topic of plagiarism, well beyond Europe. Robert Craig and David Dalton, from the Petroleum Institute, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, investigated the perceptions of first-year students concerning the proportion and frequency of cheating among their peers, as well as the main reasons for cheating behaviour. Their findings demonstrated that at the start of the undergraduate programme, three quarters to four fifths of the students viewed copying as serious or very serious, but after only one semester this percentage had dropped considerably for some areas. The data established that there was a clear problem in need of a remedy. The authors provide details of how the Communications Department of the Petroleum Institute facilitated a new, enquiry-based approach which facilitated student engagement, ownership and buy-in and which ultimately had a mitigating effect on copying and plagiarism. The authors make recommendations based on the experiences of their successful programme. In particular, they advocate for crossdepartmental collaboration, a consistent institutional voice on academic integrity, and curriculum based on experiential and enquiry-based learning. Taking the lessons on academic integrity in the UK to countries outside Europe is the central theme in the final paper by Stephen Gow, University of York, UK. Gow's research was based on interviews with ten Mainland Chinese master's students who had studied at a UK university and then returned to work at joint-venture educational institution in Shanghai. Gow examined participants' accounts of plagiarism and compared and contrasted the experience of plagiarism in Chinese and British educational contexts. He anticipated that the study would uncover the extent to which returnee scholars transmit academic integrity and the concept of plagiarism when returning to work in transnational education in China. The findings, using the qualitative methodology of interpretative repertoires, suggest that the participants used UK institutional vocabulary and developed a strict approach to plagiarism and academic integrity during their master's courses and in their subsequent educational careers. Furthermore, the participants in the study were able to "act as linguistic and cultural interpreters, promoting institutional relationships", despite some of the complexities of living, studying and working in two such different cultural and educational environments. Gow suggests that having moved between and adapting to these contexts, with appropriate support these returning Chinese graduates have the potential to act as a cultural bridge for academic integrity within internationalised higher education. I trust you will discover new insights in this Special Issue of the International Journal for Educational Integrity as it provides a broad range of perspectives on academic integrity in the many contexts of Europe, and well beyond. Tracey Bretag, IJEI Editor June 2014

In the last years we have experienced the growing interest of the communities in further discovering and interacting with their environments. To this end we have been witnesses of initiatives to develop smart environments to control our houses, hospitals, factories, etc., in an attempt to increase our quality of life and improve our experiences as users. Such initiatives have been possible due to the Internet of Things (IoT), considered as the next step in the evolution of the information and communication technologies (ICT). The IoT is taking connectivity to new devices, such as RFID tags, sensors, actuators, etc., and with these devices, new ways to interact with our environments. However, these initiatives do not end with smart homes or factories but had also spread to Smart Cities. Smart Cities is a field on the rise that attracts interest not only of the research community but also of companies and public governments. From a user point of view, a smart city can be seen as an integration of the services, such as traffic management, public transport scheduling, etc., devoted to making cities more citizen friendly, efficient and sustainable. However, to provide the users with such services, the research community should consider the smart city from a lower point of view and regard it as an environment where different agents producing and/or consuming information coexist. Hence, in a smart city are equally important the agents that obtain measurements from the environment and those that act on behalf of an user to answer a certain query. The knowledge of any of these agents, as well as the smart city's knowledge, can be semantically represented using different ontologies. To have an open smart city that is fully accessible to any agent and hence to provide the enhanced services to the final users, there is the need to ensure a seamless information exchange between the different agents and the city. If the different agents and the smart city use a common ontology, the information exchange would be straight. However, in most cases, this is not the case. A smart city is usually developed in several stages and possibly by different parties since it is common that public and private deployments coexist within the same smart city. In each one of such stages, a new sub-system is added to offer a new range of services, which rely on a new set of devices and which define new types of agents to interact both with the devices and with the final users. In order to ensure, that this new sub-system is compatible with the previous ones, some approaches propose forcing the ontologies of the different types of agents to comply with that of the smart city. Another approach would be to provide the smart city with a set of predefined correspondences between the concepts represented in the different ontologies and exploit such equivalences as bridges to translate the information. However, these solutions would either contradict the open nature of a smart city, as in the first case, or limit its evolution, in the second. For instance, using the first approach, a user-agent from another city would not be able to use any service and it would not be possible to reuse sub-systems between smart cities. Following the second approach, it would be necessary to manually update all the equivalences in case that an ontology changed and propagate such changes all over the smart city. In this thesis we describe a novel proposal to tackle this problem: relying on ontology matching techniques to guarantee the automatic information exchange between the agents and the smart city. In order to develop our proposal we have studied both the background on ontology matching and smart cities aiming at gaining knowledge on the different matching solutions, on how to apply them to a practical scenario as a smart city and what the requirements of ontology matching in smart cities are. To gain such knowledge we have performed a review of the literature published on ontology matching within the last decade and we have also performed a practitioner-oriented survey to obtain first-hand knowledge on the main challenges in ontology matching. This review and subsequent survey supported our intuition that the amount of practical applications where ontology matching is used is far below the theoretical developments and that this fact still remains as an area of concern for practitioners. With this background review, we have also confirmed that the integration of ontology matching solutions in smart cities has not been addressed before. By themselves, both the literature review and survey are also useful tools for new practitioners approaching the field get a general idea at a stroke. We have applied this knowledge to the definition of a new ontology matching algorithm, which we have named OntoPhil, to be integrated in a smart city and to assume the task of matching the different agent's ontologies to the ontology of the smart city avoiding human interaction. In this algorithm we have used different matching techniques that exploit both the linguistic features of the ontologies and their internal structures. In the scope of this algorithm we have also defined a new measure to determine the similarity between the concepts in the ontologies to match. This algorithm works in three main steps. First, by relying on the similarity measure that we have defined, OntoPhil computes some initial correspondences between the entities of the ontologies. We named these initial correspondences binding points. Then, taking these binding points as pivots, we rely on structural matching techniques to discover other binding points to exploit them as well, this way iteratively building a set of possible correspondences between the ontologies. As final step, this set of correspondences is filtered to produce the final output of the algorithm, where only the most promising correspondences are kept. The next step in the evolution of our thesis was validating the defined algorithm. To do this, we have followed a twofold approach. First, as matching algorithm, we have used the benchmarks and datasets provided by the Ontology Alignment Evaluation Initiative (OAEI'13), to assess the overall behavior of OntoPhil in different matching tasks. These tests also allowed the comparison of OntoPhil with some state-of-the-art matching algorithms. Such comparison was done by relying on the results of the OAEI matching tasks and also supported by a subsequent statistical evaluation procedure. For this statistical evaluation we have applied the Friedman's test and the Holm's procedure on the results of one of the OAEI matching tasks. The results obtained account for the validity of OntoPhil as matching algorithm and place it among the top performing algorithms. Besides, the application of the statistical procedure can be used as an example for other researchers as procedure to compare different versions of their algorithms or an algorithm to some reference others. The second part of the validation was to test the performance of OntoPhil as part of a smart city. To this end, we have defined some specific experiments, involving the SOFIA ontology for smart cities and several agents' ontologies. These agents' ontologies represent the main type of agents that are deployed in a smart city and were retrieved online out of websites devoted to projects and initiatives of IoT and integrated in our testbed. The results obtained corroborate the usefulness of ontology matching in smart cities and open the door to further developments in this field.

This dissertation deals with the old topic of EU law regarding access by individuals to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to challenge the validity of Union acts. The study is based in two landmark judgments rendered by the CJEU in 1986, i.e. Les Verts and Johnston, and it argues that the bridge between these two decisions has not been fully built in the CJEU's case-law, which has left room for uncertainties, ambiguities and insufficiencies in what concerns the judicial protection of private parties vis-à-vis the EU. In light of the Les Verts judgment, the dissertation argues that the CJEU's case-law is dominated by an objectivist, institutional and systemic approach which has given rise to gaps of judicial protection of private parties in the Union legal order and underlies the inability of the CJEU to fill in such lacunae. In this context, the dissertation stresses (i) the restrictive interpretation of standing requirements of private parties to bring an action for annulment; (ii) the irrelevance of the finding of a breach of the right to effective judicial protection at the Union level; (iii) the generous view to other objective and institutional dimensions of the Union system of judicial review; and the (iv) systemic concerns regarding the docket control of the CJEU combined with a certain view of the Union judicial architecture said to be fundamentally anchored in national judiciaries. Furthermore, it is submitted that the alternative routes to the direct access by individuals to the Union courts put forward by the CJEU have proved inadequate and ineffective, because of the objectivist, institutional and systemic conceptual approach underlying to the CJEU's case-law on the scope and nature of such avenues. At this point, the dissertation discusses the issue of national procedural autonomy, the nature of preliminary references, and the TWD doctrine. Additionally, it is argued that the CJEU's case-law regarding judicial review in the field of the former intergovernmental pillars suggests an institutional and objectivist trend as well. In drawing attention to the objective elements, the institutional preference and the systemic views enshrined in the CJEU's case-law the dissertation brings to the fore institutional guarantees, as a reflex of the objective dimension of fundamental rights. In contrast with the previous approach, it is argued that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty requires the CJEU to adopt a more subjectivist approach to the issues of judicial protection of individuals in the EU. Such an approach is anchored in the Johnston verdict which laid the first stone regarding such issues in the Union legal order. It is submitted that the new Article 6 TEU involves a paradigm shift regarding fundamental rights protection in the EU. In this context, the dissertation discusses the procedural impact of the formal constitutionalization of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and of the accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty regarding judicial review of Union acts at the initiative of individuals are discussed in light of said constitutional shift. The dissertation puts forward several proposals regarding the interpretation of Article 19 TEU and Articles 263(4) and 275 TFEU — taking into consideration the recent GC's decision in the case of Inuit — in light of the pro actore approach which should arguably underlie to the CJEU's case-law in this regard. Lastly, the issue of a more generous approach to direct access by individuals to the Union courts is discussed in view of the CJEU's workload concerns. The possibility of a European certiorari, among other possible judicial reforms, is analysed therein. ; A presente dissertação, que tem por objeto o acesso dos particulares ao Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia (TJUE) — um tema clássico de Direito da União Europeia — assenta em duas decisões fundamentais proferidas pelo TJUE, em 1986, nos casos Les Verts e Johnston. Considera-se aqui que a "ponte" entre os dois referidos acórdãos não foi totalmente estabelecida na jurisprudência do TJUE, abrindo espaço para incertezas, equívocos e insuficiências no que diz respeito à tutela jurisdicional dos particulares na União Europeia. À luz do acórdão Les Verts, a dissertação começa por considerar que a jurisprudência do TJUE adota uma abordagem objetivista, institucional e sistémica que tem dado origem a lacunas na proteção jurisdicional dos particulares, e justifica a incapacidade do mesmo tribunal no suprimento das referidas lacunas. Neste contexto, chama-se a atenção para (i) a interpretação restritiva das condições em que aos particulares é permitido intentar uma ação de anulação; (ii) a irrelevância do argumento fundado na violação do direito fundamental à tutela jurisdicional efetiva na apreciação da admissibilidade de ações de anulação; (iii) a abordagem generosa que o TJUE tem adotado relativamente a outras dimensões objetivistas e institucionais do sistema de controlo jurisdicional da validade de atos da União; e (iv) as preocupações sistémicas relativas ao controlo do volume de processos que o TJUE tem de decidir, associadas a uma certa visão da arquitetura judiciária europeia, considerada fundamentalmente ancorada nas jurisdições nacionais. A acrescer a estas considerações, chama-se ainda a atenção para o facto de os meios de tutela alternativos ao acesso direto dos particulares aos tribunais da União se demonstrarem inadequados e ineficazes, precisamente em virtude da abordagem objetivista, institucional e sistémica que subjaz à jurisprudência do TJUE no que diz respeito ao âmbito e à natureza jurídica dos referidos meios de tutela. A este propósito, a dissertação discute, em particular, o princípio da autonomia processual dos Estados-membros, a natureza jurídica do mecanismo do reenvio prejudicial e o sentido e alcance da doutrina TWD. Acrescenta-se ainda que a jurisprudência do TJUE relativamente ao controlo jurisdicional da validade de atos da União no domínio dos chamados "pilares intergovernamentais" sugere igualmente uma tendência objetivista e institucional. Salientando os elementos objetivos, a preferência institucional e a visão sistémica que decorrem da jurisprudência do TJUE nesta matéria, a dissertação chama à colação a figura das garantias institucionais, enquanto reflexo da dimensão objetiva dos direitos fundamentais. Rompendo com a abordagem anterior, considera-se então que a entrada em vigor do Tratado de Lisboa impõe que o TJUE adote uma orientação dita subjetivista relativamente à tutela jurisdicional dos particulares na União Europeia. Esta nova abordagem funda-se em primeira linha no acórdão Johnston que lançou a primeira pedra nesta matéria na ordem jurídica da União. Na verdade, o novo artigo 6.º do Tratado da União Europeia implica uma mudança de paradigma constitucional no que diz respeito à proteção dos direitos fundamentais na União Europeia. Neste contexto, a dissertação discute o impacto processual da constitucionalização formal da Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União, e bem assim da adesão à Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Homem. À luz da referida mudança de paradigma constitucional, analisam-se as alterações introduzidas pelo Tratado de Lisboa no que respeita ao controlo da validade de atos da União por iniciativa dos particulares. A este propósito, tomando em consideração a recente decisão do Tribunal Geral no caso Inuit, a dissertação propõe diversas soluções relativas à interpretação dos artigos 19.º do Tratado da União Europeia e 263.º § 4 e 275.º do Tratado relativo ao Funcionamento da União Europeia à luz do princípio pro actore que deverá alegadamente orientar a jurisprudência do TJUE nestas matérias. Por último, é discutida a questão do alargamento do acesso dos particulares ao TJUE tendo em conta as preocupações veiculadas pelo tribunal relativamente ao aumento do volume de processos que pode ameaçar comprometer o adequado funcionamento do sistema judicial da União. Aqui, analisa-se a possibilidade de criação de um mecanismo europeu de certiorari, juntamente com outras reformas jurisdicionais que têm sido objeto de debate e reflexão na comunidade jurídica.

Eurooppalainen identiteetti esiintyy tiheästi sekä akateemisissa tutkimuksissa että arkikielessä, mutta sen sisältö ja muotoutuminen näyttäytyy yhä epäselvänä. Väitöstutkimuksessa selvitetään empiirisen diskurssianalyysin keinoin miten ja millainen eurooppalaisen identiteetin diskurssi ranskalaisessa ja suomalaisessa lehdistössä rakentuu Turkin EU-jäsenyyttä käsittelevissä teksteissä. Tutkimus muodostaa siten kuvaa kielenkäytön, kollektiivi-identiteettien, median ja sosiaalisen todellisuuden suhteesta. Diskurssi nähdään sosiaalista todellisuutta rakentavana, kielenkäytössä rakentuvana ja ilmenevänä versiona todellisuudesta. Tutkimuksen lähtökohtana on, että eurooppalaista identiteettiä ja sen kriteerejä ei pidetä annettuina, vaan ne määrittyvät diskurssissa. Toisin sanoen työssä esitellään identiteetille kielenkäytöllä tuotettuja sisältöjä. Olennaista ei ole ainoastaan se mitä sanotaan, vaan myös miten se sanotaan, koska diskurssi nojaa tiettyjen merkitysten rakentamiseen kielenkäytössä ja niiden vakiinnuttamiseen vallitseviksi ja lopulta niin sanotuksi totuudeksi. Analyysi osoittaa, että koko aineistossa esiintyy yllättävänkin yhdenmukaisia kielenkäytön tapoja, jotka rakentavat eurooppalaista identiteettiä: aineisto ilmentää siten kansallisten diskurssien sijaan yhtä eurooppalaisen identiteetin diskurssia. Turkin toiseuden rooli identiteettidiskurssissa on olennainen: Turkki sijoitetaan jatkuvasti ei vain unionin, vaan myös Euroopan ulkopuolelle ja syynä Turkin erilaisuudelle esitetään enemmän tai vähemmän implisiitisti uskonto. Eurooppalaisen identiteetin diskurssissa Eurooppaa (kulttuurisena, historiallisena tai maantieteellisenä käsitteenä) ja unionia ei eroteta toisistaan, vaan Eurooppa esiintyy yhtä aikaa poliittisena ja kulttuurisena käsitteenä, joka muodostaa siteen poliittisen integraation ja identiteetin välille. Tämänhetkisessä EU-kriisissä eurooppalainen identiteetti voi tuntua utopistiselta, mutta väitöskirja osoittaa, että Turkin EU-jäsenyys mahdollistaa yhtenäisen eurooppalaisen identiteetin rakentumisen kielenkäytössä sekä Ranskassa että Suomessa kielenkäyttö on identiteetin kannalta olennaista. Zygmunt Baumanin mukaan toiseus on niin olennainen osa kollektiivi-identiteettiä, että ilman heitä ei ole meitä : tämän tutkimuksen tulosten perusteella voitaisiin puolestaan eurooppalaisuudesta todeta, että ainakin silloin kun on he , on olemassa myös me . ; European identity often appears in academic research and in everyday language, but it still remains ambiguous what it actually means and how it is formed. This study examines the construction, manifestation and content of European identity through the means of empiric discourse analysis. The corpus is composed of texts on Turkey s EU membership process in Finnish and French daily newspapers (Le Figaro, Le Monde, Helsingin Sanomat, Aamulehti) in four distinct periods in 2004-2009. Turkey s potential membership forms a special context for the construction of European identity: Turkey has occupied the role of Other in European history and otherness is considered an integral component of collective identities. The main hypothesis is that the corpus reveals a discourse of European identity, which is grounded on Turkey s otherness. In this study, discourse is defined as a version of reality constructed in language use, which constructs social reality. The aim of the study is to find out how and with what sorts of linguistic tools is the identity constructed in discourse. A comparative corpus is meant to investigate if there can be found one, cohesive discourse or if it was more accurate to talk about discourses and identities in plural. The theoretical framework of this research is composed of three elements. Discourses manifest themselves through language and under the conditions it sets forth. In consequence, the micro-level of the theory is based on linguistic concepts, which compose the foundation for the empirical analysis. In addition to defining the concrete manifestations of discourse sign, utterance (énoncé) and text , the description of meaning and concepts related to meaning become essential. I ended up distinguishing a contextually neutral linguistic meaning from a meaning in use , the latter being essential when analyzing discourse: it is linked to context and partially built on connotations and the implicit. Discourse analysis forms the macro level theory, which allows linking the linguistic analysis to the construction of social reality. Due to the diversity of discourse analysis, it is essential to define the concept of discourse thoroughly. In this study it is used in two meanings. The object of research is a discourse of European identity, which is defined as a specific way of conceptualizing and constructing the social reality in language use: meanings and concepts are defined from a specific ideological point of view. Ideology may become naturalized in discourse as knowledge , the implicit holding an essential role in this process. On the other hand, the concept of discourse is also used as a tool of classification when referring to the discourse type of the corpus as journalistic discourse, which then divides into different genres. Journalistic discourse and genre help to describe the corpus and the context in which the texts are produced and interpreted. The third theoretical aspect is formed by identity and otherness, which not only describe the socio-cultural context of the object of research and the corpus but also outline what is analyzed in corpus. In this study identity is seen from a poststructuralist point of view as a constantly changing phenomenon constructed in discourse and based on difference, which adapts individuals thinking and action. No given criteria is designated to European identity: instead, the point is to describe the contents that have been produced and which form part of the context of discourse. It is the discourse that defines the (dominating) criteria for the identity. The linguistic categories, which rise in the corpus as particularly significant in the discourse of European identity are the participant and process types manifesting categorization, metaphors and implicit. However, the implicit is not analyzed apart because it is often difficult to pin down in text and it is essentially intertwined with the two other categories. Therefore it is constantly taken into consideration in the description of the analysis. The empirical analysis shows that the discourse of European identity has common, specific features: the whole corpus shows coherent ways of using language, which contribute in the construction of identity. The coherence of the discourse can be regarded as somewhat surprising: the discourse of identity seems to cross national borders and the differences between the two countries mostly regard the occurrence of different phenomenon. Thus, it can be said that the corpus manifests one discourse of European identity instead of national discourses. The analysis of participants and processes shows that in the discourse European identity is closely related to the concept of Europe and the contrasting categorization of Europe and Turkey. The difference between Europe and Turkey is constructed both with syntactic structures and semantic content attached to the categories. Indeed, there can be seen a semantic change in the meaning in use of Europe; in the discourse of European identity it is both a political and a cultural concept, thus forming the tie between political integration and identity. The exclusion of Turkey from Europe is systematic and it seems to rely mainly on religion, which is (more or less implicitly) presented as a source of fundamental difference. The analysis of metaphors shows similar elements for the construction of identity: the corpus manifests extensive (and surprisingly coherent) metaphorical conceptualizations, in which the construction of identity relies not only on the exclusion of Turkey from Europe, but also on the concretization of Europe and on constructing an emotional dimension to it. The exclusion of Turkey is still an absolute and a natural state of things, thus naturalizing the discourse of European identity as knowledge or the truth . The third essential discovery is the fundamental role of implicit in the discursive construction of identity: it is exactly through implicit that ideology becomes naturalized in discourse. Implicit enables to express ideology in texts that appear to be factual, thereby enforcing the discourse of European identity by presenting the meanings that it constructs as self-evident truths. In the study it is shown that semantic concepts form the bridge between discourse theory and linguistic analysis since discourse relies on constructing specific meanings in language use and on establishing them as dominant and finally as the truth . Hence, this study offers tools for the discursive analysis of collective identities and fills some of the empirical deficiencies both from the point of view of European identity and that of discourse analysis. It also forms an image of the relationship between language use, collective identities, media and social reality.

Many stories of the development of political theory in the Anglo-American world in the 20th C could be told to involve many different actors, events, and ideas. This dissertation tells a story that centers on the development of modern liberalism by locating within it the development of the ideas of Charles Taylor (1931-). Taylor's writings on the study of human behavior, the relationship between selfhood and morality, the contemporary relevance of German Romantic philosophy, and the need for advocating multiculturalism and democracy in politics have captured the major debates internal to these fields and have earned him wide recognition as a leading philosopher of our times. By making clear how his arguments about human agency and knowledge form the basis of how social practices should be understood for the strong values they embody, this project shows how the connections between his philosophy of social sciences and his writings on morality and politics constitute a highly salient defense of interpretivism and humanist liberalism for our times. This dissertation brings to light a range of problems, themes, and arguments that mark an "interpretive turn" in philosophy and across the sciences that helped to shape political theory in the Anglo-American context in the 20th C, and explains the ways in which some of those 20th C concerns continue to be of especial importance for political theorists today. Since the demise of logical positivism and the rise of critical forms of thought that render suspect the means for rational debate over normative claims or for discourse without domination, the central project of political theory in the 20th C has been to grapple with what makes for satisfactory ways of understanding social actions and meanings. The last century saw key shifts in ways of thinking where previous philosophical concerns about the possibility, nature, and foundations of knowledge, and preoccupations with the structure of language and the analysis of meaning gave way to greater interest in and new controversies over questions about interpretation: the role of interpretation in human life, the kinds of knowledge to which interpretation gives rise, what interpretative practices presuppose about the knowing subject and the subject matter, and how to judge between interpretive successes and failures. Such questions not only augured epistemological problems for the human sciences, but doubts about established notions of science, truth, and objectivity also bespoke of impediments to comprehensive reflection across cultural, traditional, or linguistic lines, and to the pursuit of rational debate over values. Perceived failures within philosophy combined with lessons drawn from the hermeneutic tradition as well as developments in the interpretive disciplines of historiography, philosophy of science, jurisprudence, cultural studies, and literary criticism served to challenge all forms of foundationalism - epistemological, moral, and cultural, and have redrawn traditional boundaries of knowledge across disciplinary lines. As we grapple with how best to understand human practices and social meanings, political theorists also face a variety of reasons to doubt what intelligible loci exists for understanding texts, what means we have for rational debate over substantive goods, or whether normativity without domination is ever possible.This dissertation shows how Taylor is a major figure in this historical and philosophical context by explaining how his arguments continue to capture the major internal debates in each of the areas of philosophy of social sciences, moral philosophy, and political theory today. His defense of anti-naturalism pertains to the major issues in the debate over naturalism and the use of scientific techniques in the human sciences. By further probing on what grounds anti-naturalism is right - if it is - Taylor's arguments pierce through much of the controversy within moral philosophy over the grounds for normative theory, refashioning a version of moral realism that learns from each the emotivist, rhetorical, and historicist alternatives, while eschewing their pitfalls. By taking an interpretive approach to both theory and practice, Taylor's humanist liberalism also attempts to break the impasses within political theory between moral philosophers, critical theorists, and intellectual historians. The view of politics that arises from Taylor's philosophy of social sciences is neither one derived from moral philosophy, nor one focused solely on structures or power. Nor is the practice of political theory meant to be an apolitical, antiquarian exercise in uncovering the meanings of past texts. Taylor's is a vision of politics that urges recognizing, grasping, and debating the intersubjective meanings that make up collective life, a view that enables social and political criticism while circumventing the strongest arguments both about the practical contradictions of deconstruction, and those against moral realism. As a project on the history of contemporary political thought that begins with a study of Taylor's earliest influences, this dissertation contributes to the growing interest among scholars today to examine the development of analytic philosophy as a matter of history, which reverses long-standing assumptions of an ineluctable development of the purportedly essential features of analytic philosophy in the 20th C. Tracing the historical roots and philosophical contours of Taylor's interpretivism and humanist liberalism in the arguments of Berlin and Hampshire against the intellectual context of positivism and modern empiricism, moreover, shows the development of an alternative strand of thinking within the analytic tradition that strongly opposes what is regularly thought of as "analytic" theory today, especially in the liberal tradition. Reading Taylor as a humanist liberal, therefore, provides a corrective to the erroneous interpretations of his political theory as opposing liberalism that still persists due to the many commentators who remain in the long shadow of the liberal-communitarian debate of the `80s. And calling attention to this alternative interpretive and humanist liberal mode of inquiry that despite undergoing changes, nonetheless persisted through the rise and fall of logical positivism thereby unseats the commonplace notion that Anglo-American political theory post-WWII lay moribund until Rawls reinvigorated it in the 1970s. This dissertation shows how Taylor's engagements in the flight from positivism in the philosophy of social sciences, his interventions in the rise of post-foundationalist challenges to modern moral philosophy, and his confrontations with the problem of justification for liberal political theories all serve to define the distinct yet related implications of a turn to interpretation in the triplicate areas of knowledge, values, and politics. Taylor's interpretivism shows us that defending anti-naturalism in the human sciences after the fall of logical empiricism and the demise of positivism requires a sophisticated, post-linguistic turn, positive case for moral realism that is based on an interpretive understanding of human beings necessarily and always engaged in social practices. Taylor's particular brand of interpretivism, moreover, opens up the possibility, after the demise of logical positivism, for a philosophy of social sciences to be more than strictly a knowledge enterprise but itself a critique and a politics. Taylor makes it possible to bring moral argument back in to the study of politics without choosing between a fixed foundation for knowledge and the practical contradictions of deconstructivism, by reconciling what appear to be incommensurable opposites. By rejecting the autonomy of ethics and combining ethical individualism with ontological communitarianism, Taylor has reformulated what seems antithetical about dichotomies and has shown how rejecting representationalist theories of knowing, objectivist explanations of human conduct, and essentialist notions of the good need not entail a radical "epistemology without a subject", render theory as mere conversation, or values simply as whatever happens to be preferred. The following pages, therefore, serve not only to clarify Taylor's positions as they relate to current debates in political theory, but also to narrate the multiple and competing intellectual traditions from which contemporary political theories in the Anglo-American context have arisen by locating Taylor's place in it. This project makes a sustained inquiry into the relationship between political theory and the broader movements in philosophy in the 20th C that have called the former into question that simultaneously bridges the study of modern liberal theories with key issues of justification and meta-methodology in the philosophy of social sciences.

El presidente Barack Obama partió de Washington, el martes 2, en una gira relámpago por Arabia Saudita y El Cairo en la que, más allá de una breve estadía en Europa, espera establecer algunas bases firmes para el mejoramiento de las relaciones entre los EE.UU y los países musulmanes.Conviene recordar que ésta no es la primera vez que Obama toma contacto con esa vasta entidad que es el mundo islámico: ya estuvo una vez, luego del G- 20, en Turquía y en Irak. Pero, en realidad, ese primer contacto no es un antecedente válido. Turquía es un aliado de los EE.UU en el seno de la OTAN y la visita de Irak fue, sobre todo, la visita a un país ocupado por el ejército del país del visitante.El espíritu de esta gira es claramente otro: ahora Obama dice que pretende dirigirse "al Islam" para llevar a cabo un acercamiento de posiciones respectivas que se han endurecido más allá de lo recomendable. La gira tiene, esencialmente, dos etapas.La primera, en Arabia Saudita, debería estar desarrollándose sin demasiados contratiempos. Allí la agenda es relativamente clara: Obama presionará para obtener más flexibilidad de parte de los "players" árabes en el conflicto arabe-israelí; se hablará muy probablemente de Irán y, con toda seguridad, del precio del barril de petróleo. Al menos en el primer punto, todo hace pensar que la respuesta saudí será: los árabes ya hemos mostrado mucha flexibilidad, no hay espacio político para más concesiones -(como lo demostraría el crecimiento de grupos como Hamas y Hizbollah)- por lo que la pelota está en la cancha de Israel.En realidad es el día jueves cuando se pone en juego la pieza central de esta operación de política internacional: el discurso que Barack Obama pronunciará en la Universidad de El Cairo en el que pretende dirigirse "al Islam". O, para ser más precisos: "He will discuss how the United States and Muslim communities around the world can bridge some of the differences that have divided them" fueron las palabras textuales utilizadas por Robert Gibbs, el Secretario de Prensa de la Casa Blanca, para esbozar las grandes líneas de lo habrá de ser el tan esperado discurso.En nuestra opinión es precisamente alli donde reside el primero de los dos grandes desafíos de su iniciativa: en concreto ¿a quien se va a dirigir Obama? ¿Quién ostenta la representación del "Islam"? ¿Arabia Saudita, Hamas, el ex régimen baasista de Bagdad, Indonesia o Bangladesh?Es precisamente en esta indefinición del interlocutor -(por general que sea, todo discurso va dirigido a un interlocutor, implícito o explicito)-, esta imprecisión sobre el destinatario del mensaje, donde radica uno de los principales riesgos de la operación que intentará Obama en el día de mañana. Esta indefinición del interlocutor no puede no haber sido advertida por la Casa Blanca. Así que todo indica que es un riesgo calculado que toma Obama: los costos que puede tener el hecho de que cualquier régimen, país, o autoridad religiosa musulmanes se sientan aludidos, deben de estar compensados por alguna ventaja o beneficio. Sabemos, además, que Obama y su equipo son capaces de manejar los medios de comunicación con eficacia.En el terreno de las hipótesis -(ya que el discurso recién se conocerá mañana)-, una imaginable es que Obama está apostando a una suerte de "bonapartismo" de nivel internacional. En otros términos, dirigirse, vía medios de comunicación, lo más directamente posible, a cientos y cientos de millones de musulmanes sin tomar en cuenta a las autoridades políticas que los representan y que, con bastante claridad, no han ayudado mucho en esta cuestión de las tensiones generadas, particularmente, por el gobierno Bush, de un lado y el terrorismo islámico del otro.De ser cierta esta hipótesis, Obama está apostando a que el hombre y la mujer común de El Cairo, Teherán, Bagdad, Ankara o Islamabad, adviertan que él es alguien que, de buena fé, viene a presentarse como muy diferente a Bush y que representa un país "no- agresivo" para ese ciudadano común y que, además, hasta por su nombre, es un poco como ellos.Por ingenuo que esto pueda parecer, en las últimas 48 horas se sucedieron dos eventos que parecen ser consistentes con esta hipótesis. Al-Qaeda, que no se caracteriza por su locuacidad y que cultiva el silencio y el secretismo como armas políticas, salió por dos veces a la palestra. Primero se pronunció Ayman Al-Zawahiri, "el número dos" de Al-Qaeda, desde un sitio de internet en Egipto y, luego, a través de la cadena Al-Jazira de Qatar, se difundió una grabación de audio del propio Osama Bin Laden. Para el laconismo de estos terroristas, parecen ser demasiadas palabras, y todas ellas destinadas a mandar un solo mensaje: "no le crean, Obama es igual a Bush". Todo parece indicar que alguna cuerda sensible hizo vibrar el Presidente Obama al esgrimir su difuso y aparentemente ingenuo discurso dirigido a "las comunidades musulmanas del mundo". En los hechos, el terrorismo islámico se alimenta del sencillo malestar popular contra los EE.UU. Si Obama logra mejorar la imagen de su país, la cantera donde Al Qaeda y sus adláteres se alimentan, comenzará a secarse.Pero queda un segundo desafío que conviene señalar antes de que veamos cómo se desempeña Obama en este delicado trance. Cuando salió de Washington, entre sus muchas declaraciones, destaca la siguiente: "La democracia, el estado de derecho, la libertad de expresión, la libertad religiosa no son solamente principios occidentales que pueden ser extendidos a esos países (musulmanes), yo pienso que son, más bien, principios universales de los cuales ellos pueden agarrarse y pueden afirmarlos como parte integrante de su identidad nacional".Esta declaración plantea, en su formulación misma una serie de problemas que no son fáciles de sortear. Si algo caracteriza a muchos de los países islámicos involucrados en un permanente enfrentamiento con los EE.UU. y con otros países de Occidente, es precisamente que nunca lograron procesar históricamente lo que la frase pretende expresar.En su gran mayoría, los países "problemáticos" del mundo musulmán -(y algunos no problemáticos también)- son países que fracasaron, total o parcialmente, en su proceso de secularización. Mientras que la identidad nacional que invoca Obama esté constituida de manera más religiosa que política, mientras tengamos confundidas en una sola persona o institución, el poder religioso y el poder político -(y este segundo, severamente ontrolado por el primero)- el llamado contenido en esa frase de Obama es ininteligible.Es precisamente porque la secularización de la política y de la sociedad ha fracasado más o menos generalizadamente en el mundo islámico, que la posibilidad de pensar la identidad nacional en base a conceptos universales, como lo hace Occidente, es una empresa imposible. Que se nos disculpe la afirmación siguiente: imaginar que algunos regímenes musulmanes -(Afganistán, Irán)- acepten el dispositivo político democrático liberal aludido en la frase de Obama, es como querer convencer a los Templarios y a su jefe, Balduino I, transformado en rey de Jerusalén, el 18 de Julio de 1100, que debía pensar liberal y democráticamente y poner a discusión el control del Santo Sepulcro obtenido, unos años antes, por su hermano Godofredo de Bouillon.Más allá de lo que algunos pretendieron caracterizar, caricaturalmente y no sin cierta superficialidad, como un "choque de civilizaciones", no es eso lo que está en juego. Aunque así lo plantéen los terroristas islámicos, la cuestión no es entre Occidente y el Islam. La verdadera cuestión es cómo organizar una sociedad internacional donde convivan estrechamente, por obra y gracia de la globalización, sociedades seculares y sociedades no secularizadas.Y esa cuestión, no se arregla en una gira.

* Tobacco control efforts in California during the 2001-2002 legislative session were hampered by the resurgence of the tobacco industry and a lack of commitment from the Davis Administration. * During the 2001-2002 legislative session, the tobacco industry spent a total of $5.95 million in political expenditures, which is an increase of $1.3 million over the previous legislative session. * Campaign contributions from the tobacco industry to legislators, legislative candidates, political parties and constitutional officers totaled $1.66 million, a 13% increase over the previous election cycle. * Tobacco industry to campaign contributions continue to favor Republicans over Democrats, although the divide is not as great as in previous years. Thus, of the $1,153,466 that was contributed to an identifiable party (including candidates, constitutional officers, legislators and political parties) during the 2001-2002 legislative session, $706,150 went to Republicans (61%) compared to $447,316 to Democrats (39%). This is an increase from the previous election cycle, when Republicans received 58% ($857,023) of the tobacco industry's contributions in California and Democrats received 42% ($613,587). * An additional $513,000 was contributed to non-partisan committees in 2001-2002. * The largest recipients of tobacco industry funds during the 2001-2002 legislative session were Assemblyman Tony Strickland (R-Dist.37), who received $63,000 and Senator James Brulte (R-Dist.31) who received $67,500. * On average, for every one point increase in a legislator's tobacco policy score, tobacco industry campaign contributions decreased by $3,270. This is a slight decrease from the 1997-1998 legislative session when a one point increase in the policy score resulted in a $3,690 decrease in tobacco industry campaign contributions *During the 2001-2002 legislative session, 74 candidates and elected officials did not accept contributions from the tobacco industry; 16 Republicans (23% of 69 Republicans) and 59 Democrats (59% of 100 Democrats). * Among the committees that review tobacco control policy, members of the Assembly Governmental Organizations Committee received the highest average tobacco industry campaign contribution among those recipients who accepted tobacco industry funding: $16,988 per member accepting tobacco funds. The Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee ranked a close second ($16,750 per accepting member), followed by the Senate Governmental Organizations Committee ($14,694 per accepting member) and the Assembly Health Committee ($12,778 per accepting member). With the exception of the Assembly Budget and Appropriations Committees, all of the Republican members of these committees accepted tobacco industry campaign contributions. * The tobacco industry spent $4.29 million on lobbying expenditures during the 2001-2002 legislative session, including $3.64 million paid directly to lobbying firms and an additional $649,076 on activities and other expenditures to influence policy making in California. Excluding activity and other expenditures, the tobacco industry increased its lobbying expenditures by $1.05 million (a 41% increase) between the 1999-2000 and 2001-2002 legislative sessions. * The tobacco industry has adopted a new strategy of using independent expenditure committees, which are not required to report political expenditures, to attack and discredit policy makers sympathetic to tobacco control in California. * Of the 10 tobacco-related bills that were enacted during the 2001-2002 legislative session, the tobacco lobbying firms reported lobbying against seven of them. The three bills not lobbied on included: a) AB2205 which increases the penalty for knowingly holding or selling tobacco products without having paid the appropriate tobacco tax, b) AB 1867 which expands the area around totlots in which smoking is prohibited and c) SB 322 which prohibits the sale of bidis. * Of the 17 tobacco-related bills that were not enacted during the 2001-2002 legislative session, the tobacco lobbying firms reported lobbying against 12. * The tobacco industry has also made efforts to gain legitimacy in the public's eye through youth prevention programs and image changes, such as Philip Morris changing its name to Altria and renewing its efforts to donate funds to community projects. The result is that policy makers, such as Carole Migden, are starting to state that the tobacco industry has changed as a justification for accepting tobacco industry campaign contributions. * The effectiveness of California's tobacco control efforts were recognized by the tobacco industry in September 2002 when R.J. Reynolds filed suit against the California Tobacco Education Media Campaign, claiming that the media campaign made it impossible for the tobacco companies to receive a fair trial with an unbiased jury. Judge Michael T. Garcia ruled against the tobacco company. * R.J. Reynolds made a second attempt at legitimacy in the court of public opinion, this time in conjunction with Lorillard, by returning to the California Courts in April 2003, filing allegations of vilification by the Media Campaign. * The tobacco industry spends more than $1.2 billion annually on advertising and promotions in California alone. At the same time, California's Tobacco Control Program was funded at only about 12% of the tobacco industry's expenditures on advertising and promotions. * The Tobacco Control Program's budget has continued to erode at the hands of the Davis Administration. The Governor's Proposal for the 2003-2004 Budget appropriates approximately $86 million for the program, which is a decrease from $108 million in 2002-2003 and $154 million in 2001-2002. The decline in revenues is due to a decrease in Proposition 99 revenues as a result of decreased tobacco consumption and a lack of new funds dedicated to the Tobacco Control Program. At the same time, inflation has reduced the purchasing power of the funds that are available. * In 2001, Governor Davis increased funding for the Media Campaign $19 million in FY1999-2000 to $45 million for FY2000-2001 and FY2001-2002. In 2001, Governor Davis also allocated $20 million from the state's share of MSA revenues for a youth anti-smoking campaign. However, this commitment to the Tobacco Control Program was short-lived, as Governor Davis withdrew the additional funds in 2002. * While rates of tobacco use in California have remained stable at about 17% between 2000 and 2001, the prevalence decreased to 16.6% in 2002. This drop may be a reflection of the additional funds provided in 2000 and 2001. * In 2002, there were three proposals introduced to increase the cigarette excise tax. Governor Davis introduced a 50 cent increase which was changed to a 63 cent increase in the Senate's revision of the budget, Senator Deborah Ortiz introduced a 65 cent increase, and Speaker Herb Wesson proposed a $2.13 increase. While Senator Ortiz intended the revenues from a tax increase to go to tobacco control and access to health care programs, neither the Governor nor Speaker Wesson earmarked any portion of the tax for tobacco control efforts. None of these proposals were enacted. * In January 2003, Governor Davis included a $1.10 cigarette tax increase in his 2003-2004 Budget proposal, but these funds were intended to bridge the $34.6 billion budget deficit and as of April 2003, none of the revenues were earmarked for tobacco control efforts. * In his May 2003 budget revision, Governor Davis proposed only a 23 cent tax increase in 2003-2004 and an additional 40 cent tax increase in 2004-2005. This decision was made despite a 61% public approval for a cigarette tax increase of $2.00 and a 68% approval for a cigarette tax increase of 75 cents. * While state officials decided to securitize $2.5 billion in Master Settlement Agreement revenues in January 2003, the Governor's May 2003 budget revision indicated that the state would not securitize its remaining share of funds. Instead, the $173 million expected for the next fiscal year would be used to cover General Fund expenditures for the Healthy Families Program. *. While the Governor's May revision of the 2003-2004 Budget did not reflect the Tobacco Education and Research Oversight Committee's funding recommendations, funding for the Tobacco Control Program was increased by 6% as opposed to a decrease or a diversion of funds as a result of a one time increase in the Proposition 10 backfill. * While the Davis Administration has not exhibited the hostility to the Tobacco Control Program evidenced during the Wilson years, it has also failed to give an effective program a priority. Progress only took place when the administration was faced with external pressures, either mounted by health advocates or, in one case, a legal challenge by the tobacco industry.

Article in U.S. News and World Report based on excerpts from Hays' book A Southern Moderate Speaks ; Inside Story of Little Rock ."I had always regarded myself as serving the Governor's wishes . . . even though he and I did not see eye to eye regarding his use of troops" afternoon to spend a few days at the home of my father in Russellville, 75 miles west of Little Rock. We stopped at the town of Morrilton for dinner, and I tried to call the White House. I found the lines busy and was not able to get in touch with Sherman until 11 p. m., his time, after I had reached Russellville. My opening comment, "I'm afraid I got you out of bed," was confirmed, but he apparently was not upset. It was in this conversation that Sherman indicated that the idea of the President's inviting Faubus should give way to a request from the Governor, directed to the President, suggesting that a conference would be helpful. Early in the discussion, he emphasized that all of this was in response to my offer to be helpful and that the White House did not wish to be in an attitude of initiating anything. I gave him all necessary assurances on that point. Negotiations With the White House I spent Tuesday and Wednesday, September 10 and 11, at my father's home and was in constant telephone contact with the White House and the Governor's Mansion during that time. An enormous amount of time was spent in talking to Little Rock and Washington in negotiating the terms for the Newport meeting. Among other things, the exact language for the telegrams to be exchanged had to be agreed upon. True to their code, the telephone operators handled the calls in routine fashion but let drop indications of interest in the fact that some rather historic calls were coming over the little Russellville switchboard. On Tuesday I talked at least five times with the White House and about as many times with Governor Faubus. After Sherman indicated that I should help create the wording of the Governor's request for an audience with the President, I gave him some intimation of what the Governor should say and would say, and he commented here and there-reminding me that it was "my responsibility" and "my message" and that these were my overtures. I could understand his reason for being emphatic on that point, but he had some very clear ideas about what the telegram should and should not say. The Governor capitulated on language at practically every point, made a suggestion or two which Sherman said would not alter the Administration's approval of the idea in general, and finally it was agreed, when I read the draft of the request to Adams, that it would go in just that form. The Governor said he was satisfied with the wording, and I thought everything was in shape, until an hour after the telegram should have been sent. Then I had a call from W. J. Smith saying that we should change the first sentence. Before going into the nature of the change, I protested vigorously, and Bill said, "O. K., the telegram will go through as agreed on." He accepted my explanation that it would mean starting all over again, would undo two days' work, and would put me and the Governor both in an embarrassing position, since I had read the message to the White House and they had said, "If received in that form, the President would certainly grant a conference." I had always regarded myself as serving the Governor's wishes in this matter, even though he and I did not see eye to eye regarding his use of troops, and he had said when I left the Mansion on Monday, "This would be the greatest favor you ever did a Governor if you help us work it out." We reached several delicate points in the various stages of the developments which followed. In the first instance, my ability to carry out my role in the early negotiations depended on my success in keeping out of the newspapers. The Washington "Post," however, learned of what was taking place and let it leak out that they knew someone had been in touch with Sherman Adams-and he naturally did not like it one bit. He did not blame me, but he said that, if such leaks were repeated, obviously he could not go on with the step-by-step discussion of arrangements for a conference. I think I satisfied him that such minor breaks are inevitable. The reporters saw me go into the Mansion, and they could not help speculating on the significance of this, coupling it with the fact that Sherman and I had been friends for a long time. Another serious question concerned whether the Governor would accept a federal-court summons for a hearing scheduled on September 20 on a petition for a preliminary injunction against his and the Arkansas National Guard's obstructing integration. His acceptance of this summons on Tuesday relieved much of this tension and made my work more manageable. With Faubus expressing respect for the orderly processes of law, the Administration was more likely to be willing to negotiate. The next problem to arise concerned the wording of the telegram to be sent to the President. As agreed upon, it read, "I have accepted summons of the U. S. District Court, etc.," but the Governor's lawyer wanted it to read, "I have been served with summons." After it was made clear that I had given Sherman firm assurance, on Governor Faubus's authority, that the telegram in that exact form would be sent, he withdrew his objections. It seemed a very minor point to me, since the Governor did actually accept the summons. How Faubus Would Use Troops On Wednesday, Sherman and I talked a little about the basis for a discussion, while we worked out final details of the message exchange. We needed to have some clear idea of the use of military force by the Governor, when it should cease, and how it could be used to enforce the court orders, not to obstruct those orders. While I was unable to clarify any of these points, I could say that Faubus was prepared to go along fully and was eager to get the meeting behind us. After several talks during the day, Adams said to me, "You have rendered a great public service and I have only praise for your work." All along in these telephone conversations, however, I was conscious of not being in the circle of political advisers for either of the principals. This was not really a handicap. The only stage in the proceedings at which I had reason to feel that advisers were unduly hampering steps for the conference was at the time of sending the telegram. It was therefore a source of great personal satisfaction to help bridge the gap between the federal and State governments. It was good that there was only one occasion on which anyone other than the Governor himself was a party to negotiations at the Little Rock end of the line. It was at this stage that I gave Sherman the Governor's private unlisted telephone number, since I feared there might be a mishap resulting from the indirect conversations. When Governor Faubus agreed to indicate his respect for the courts in his message to the President, I felt we had the basis for a productive conference. The Governor seemed anxious for a truce, such as integration beginning by mid-term after the situation had settled down. He also seemed to think 122 U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 23, 1959

Regional integration in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is crucial for its further economic development and, more importantly, its structural transformation away from agriculture towards higher value-added activities, such as manufacturing and services. Yet there are many paths towards greater integration, some of which are easier than others. In order to gain insights into how regional integration is occurring in SSA, determine impediments to it, and develop recommendations for how the World Bank and other development agencies can help further facilitate it, the World Bank commissioned a set of political economy of regional integration studies covering sector analyses of agriculture, financial services, professional services, trade facilitation, and transport. This report summarizes the findings from the sector studies and suggests recommendations for further efforts in these areas by the World Bank and other development agencies. In a comparative context, the findings of the studies suggest cautious optimism for regional integration efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. Economic integration is more likely to succeed when it occurs alongside regional attempts at improving political stability and or developing joint infrastructure.

This paper is organized into three main sections. Section one presents the background, objectives, scope, and limitations of the study. It also provides a general definition of OM and presents prototypical OM arrangements for rural CDD and community-based subprojects. Section two presents the detailed case studies for the seven selected projects. Section three summarizes the conclusions from the review and recommends steps for moving ahead. Five annexes provide extra background information, including the complete list of projects from which the seven main case studies were selected, as well as: examples of maintenance requirements for rural infrastructure; considerations for task teams planning for OM design and implementation; sample OM measures and timelines; and links to OM materials.

Romania faces today the critical need to enhance the coordination of public investment programs and projects in order to 'do more with less,' maximizing development impact given limited financial resources available. In this context, 'value for money' is the key guiding principle of public investments, making this final report is both critically important and timely. Romania's preparations for the 2014-2020 EU programming period are in full swing, with multiple operational programs recently approved. In parallel, the Government is working on revamping instruments financed entirely from the state budget. The core focus is on the National Local Development Program (PNDL), the main state-budget-funded investment program for local infrastructure development, though findings and recommendations may be extrapolated to other state-budget-funded instruments (e.g., the Environment Fund) and, indeed, as decentralization and regionalization may evolve in the future, subnational governments may also apply the lessons of this work. The main goal of this work is to recommend and facilitate the adoption of prioritization and selection criteria that enhance coordination at the level of infrastructure programs and the projects they finance.

Ivan's Self-deception and Hypocrisy in Leo Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych Ayu Widyaningrum English Literature Faculty of Languages and Arts State University of Surabaya Ayu_widya75@yahoo.com Drs. Much. Khoiri, M.Si. English Department Faculty of Languages and Arts State University of Surabaya Much_choiri@yahoo.com Abstrak Penelitian ini focus pada penggambaran penipuan diri yang dilakukan oleh tokoh utama dalam novel The Death of Ivan Ilych oleh Leo Tolstoy dan bagaimana penipuan diri tersebut memunculkan kemunafikan. Penipuan diri terjadi sebagai hasil dari ketidaksiapannya dalam menerima kenyataan bahwa dia sedang menghadapi kematian. Untuk menjawab permasalahan pertama, penelitian ini menggunakan teori penipuan diri oleh Annette Barnes yang didukung oleh beberapa filsuf dan dengan tanda-tanda orang yang menipu dirinya sendiri oleh James Peterman. Permasalahan kedua dijawab dengan menggunakan konsep kemunafikan. Data dalam penelitian ini menyajikan tentang penipuan diri yang dilakukan oleh Ivan dan bagaimana penipuan diri tersebut memunculkan kemunafikan dalam dirinya. Analisis dalam penelitian ini mengungkapkan penipuan diri yang dilakukan oleh Ivan dan tanda-tanda bagaimana dia menjadi seseorang yang menipu dirinya sendiri. Penipuan diri ini digunakan untuk mengurangi kecemasannya terhadap ketidaksiapannya dalam menghadapi kematian. Selain itu, penipuan diri ini muncul sebagai hasil dari kecemasannya tentang keinginan hidup yang tidak terpenuhi karena sakit yang dialami. Selanjutnya, penipuan diri yang dialami memunculkan kemunafikan dalam dirinya. Ivan mengalami tiga macam kemunafikan, kemunafikan kepura-puraan , kemunafikan menyalahkan , kemunafikan inkonsistensi. Perilaku kemunafikan tersebut bersumber dari sikap penipuan diri. Kata Kunci : Penipuan Diri, kemunafikan, kecemasan, kematian Abstract This study focuses on depicting self-deception performed by the main character and how his self-deception gives raise to his hypocrisy. The self-deception is used as the result of his unreadiness in accepting the truth that he faces death. To answer the first problem, this study uses the theory of self-deception by Annette Barnes and supported by several philosophers and the symptoms of Self-Deception offered by James Peterman. The second problem is answered by using the concept of hypocrisy. The data presents Ivan Ilych's self-deception and how his self-deception gives raise to his hypocrisy. The analysis reveals Ivan's self-deception and the symptoms how he becomes a self-deceiver. The self-deception is used to reduce his anxiety toward his unreadiness in facing his death. Besides, his self-deception emerges as the result of his anxiety about the desire of life which is unfulfilled because of the illness. Furthermore, his self-deception gives raise to his hypocrisy. Ivan experiences three kinds of hypocrisy, they are hypocrisy of pretense, hypocrisy of blame, hypocrisy of inconsistency. Those hypocritical behaviors are rooted by his self-deception. Keywords: self-deception, hypocrisy, anxiety, death INTRODUCTION Novel is literary work which presents more detail and complicated problems. The readers will get more experience, fantasy and imagination by reading it. A great novel is born from a great writer. With a lot of great novels in the world, automatically there are also many great writers whether they are from west or east part of the world. There are many problems and phenomenon that is existed by the writers in their literary works, such as culture and tradition, sociological and psychological problem, and so on. There are many writers exist the psychological problems which is related to the personality of the characters in their literary works. It can be seen in Russian writers. There are so many literary works from Russia and their several novels state about psychological problem that is related with the personality of the characters. One of the great famous Russian writer is Leo Tolstoy. Leo Tolstoy, the author who was born in Yasnaya Polyana, Russian Empire in 1916. There were many literary works which were made by this Russian writer, such as short stories, poems, plays, essays. Some of his works are war and peace and Anna Karenina are acknowledge as two of the greatest novels of all time and pinnacle of realist fiction. His novels are so well planned, written, and executed that Tolstoy's finished story is a perfectly formed narrative. And, critics agree that his work alone defines the true nature of an epic novel that eerily depicts the joys and sorrows of real life. Tolstoy is equally known for his complicated and paradoxical persona and for his extreme moralistic and ascetic views, which he adopted after a moral crisis and spiritual awakening in the 1870s, after which he also became noted as a moral thinker and social reformer. During the 1860s, and encouraged by his publisher, Tolstoy wrote War and Peace. During this time, he also endeavored to write a novel about Peter I the Great and about educational pedagogy, but thereafter finished what would become the greatest book of his time. Following, Tolstoy released Ana Karenina, which was considered as important as War and Peace, but with a slightly different focus – ethics and virtues can evolve and change over time. Unhappy with the Russian Orthodox Church and its teachings, which he found blasphemous, Tolstoy started his own church based on five tenets. For this, he was excommunicated, but gained his own followers, who were more like cult members than clergymen. These five tenets inspired Gandhi in his passive approach to violence – evil cannot be combated with evil. His novella, entitled The Death of Ivan Ilyich is often regarded as one of the best short novels ever written. The Death of Ivan Ilych, first published in 1886, is considered as one of the masterpieces of his late fiction, written shortly after his religious conversation of late 1870s. The Death of Ivan Ilych is deeply religious work, but religious of its own terms. The protagonist is a somewhat clueless, spiritually empty hero whose long illness forces him to confront the meanings of both death and life. Ivan Ilych represents a small but important class of urban bureaucrats, prominent in the day-to-day running of Russian affairs in Tolstoy's days, whose live became increasingly detached from nature, the land, and spiritual values. By exposing the horrible vacuity of Ivan Ilych's life, Tolstoy explores the self-deception, immorality and alienation of a whole class of individuals. Although Ivan is nowhere near as intelligent as his creator, like Tolstoy he comes to accept death and gain deep, if painful understanding of what his life has meant. The novel embodies the kinds of values and purpose Tolstoy thought literature should have. The Death of Ivan Ilych conveys the existential horror of sickness and morality while describing civilization as a web of lies designed to distract people from an awareness of death and also it is perfectly demonstrates this introspection as it magnifies a man's struggle with how to live his life. There are considerations of taking the novella as the main source of analysis. The first is novella performs the characteristics of self-deception and hypocrisy which experiences by the main character of the novel. The second reason is that in Leo Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych, he set out merely to describe a single segment of society or to present a single example of humanity and also his writing is very honest. Besides, the story uses words which are easier to understand. The last consideration can be the best reason why this novella is analyzed by using theory of self-deception. In The Death of Ivan Ilych also has conflict and problem, both external conflict and internal conflict. Ivan is everyman an average nineteenth century bureaucratic functionary, a bourgeois, a middle class citizen (Sklare, 1965 : 3). The Death of Ivan Ilych is about an ordinary man, has a bright childhood and good life. His pleasure of life changed, since his marriage brings him unpleasantness and incurable illness that tortures him biological and psychologically until he dies. The illness makes him to stay in bed day and night with a great pain, worse than biological pain, psychologically it tortures him by the horror of death. Not believing that he will die, he struggle to avoid death by deceives his own self that he is not dying and hides his real condition by being hypocrite to his environment, but his efforts are useless. Having fought against death, ultimately he realizes that he is mortal. At the end, he accepts it and dies in piece. Death is such a taboo subject to discuss in our society, but actually it is human nature. What Woody Allen writes may be able to explain how allergic people are to death. "I am not afraid of dying, but I just don't want to be there when it happens" (Coon, 1992 : 436-437). Psychology finds that people do not like to talk about death because they are afraid of it. The pool to 1500 adults shows that there are no fears of death ; yet. They find another possibility. It may be more exact to say that the people hide and intense denial to death (Coon, 1992 : 436). The fact that all men must die is hardly news, and as an abstract statement it dulls our fears at least as much as it aroused them. The Death of Ivan Ilych is one of interest novella by Leo Tolstoy that can be analyzed because it tells about psychological sides of human's life that lead to the main point self-deception and hypocrisy of the main character named Ivan Ilych. Having the feeling of anxious in facing death makes people tend to do something which can reduce his anxiety. People tend to deceive himself by believing that he is not facing death and forces to think that his condition is better while he knows well that he suffers illness which leads him to the death. The topic in this thesis is about self-deception and hypocrisy, because it is the most important one and it is suffered by the main character, Ivan. Self-deception is a mental defense mechanism by which some people cope with intensely painful emotions. They avoid becoming aware of, or accepting the truth about, a current life circumstance or person simply because it is too painful or scary to do so (from http://nirmukta.com/2010/06/21/self-deception-as-a-coping-mechanism-among-victims-of-the-sai-baba-cult/). Meanwhile, there is also another term that almost has the same meaning as self-deception which is hypocrisy. Based on the online dictionary, hypocrisy is "the condition of a person pretending to be something he is not, especially in the area of morals or religion; a false presentation of belief or feeling. The study of self-deception and hypocrisy are related to the main character in Leo Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych. In this novella Ivan as the main character of the story experiences self-deception. He forces himself to believe something which he knows that it is false. It happens when he faces illness that leads him to the death. He knows well that the illness will leads him to the death, but he keeps forcing himself to think that everything will fine even his life will not be disturbed by the illness. Ivan is someone who has ambitious in life. He desires that his life should be easy, pleasant and decorous. When he gets the illness, he feels fear that it will give big impact in his life. He feels anxiety that his desires about life will not fulfill because of that illness. That is why he uses self-deception to reduce his anxiety. Meanwhile there is also another term that almost has the same meaning as self-deception is hypocrisy. Self-deception is so related to hypocrisy. It is because self-deception is the root of hypocrisy. If someone experiences hypocrisy in his life, it can be analyzed that he also experiences self-deception as the root of his hypocritical behavior. Furthermore, if someone experiences self-deception in his life, it might also lead him to have hypocritical behavior. The main character Ivan experiences self-deception in his life, and his self-deception give raise to his hypocritical behavior. He pretends that he is fine, hides his real condition even though in the depth of his heart he knows that his illness is getting worse and will lead him to the death. In addition, this novel ever discussed about the anxiety by Anita Christina HR from English Literature 2004 entitled Ivan's Enxiety in Leo Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych. It tells about the anxiety experienced by the main character Ivan in this novel. This study will not same with that previous study, because this study will discuss about self-deception in the main character Ivan, and how Ivan's self-deception give raise to his hypocrisy. The idea to unearth the self-deception and hypocrisy of the main character probably is not the main message of the novel, but the freedom of reader's interpretation lets unguessed ideas be out of the author's purpose, even exceed the consciousness of the author. These all ground the creating this thesis with potential title "Ivan's Self-deception and Hypocrisy in Leo Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych". RESEARCH METHOD The used method is descriptive quality; it means the quality of the data becomes the reference to work rather than the quantity of the data. Besides, a technique is needed to understand the data. Technique of interpretation must be used to interpret and analyze the data. Through interpretation the analysis can be worked. Interpretation is a crucial step that has to do before analyzing the data. Then, extrinsic approach is used as an approach toward the analysis in which environment belongs to it. According to method above, the first thing that has to do is collecting data. In collecting data this research focuses on reading and documentation. Reading novel. In this step, novel becomes the object of the research. The novel is entitled The Death of Ivan Ilych, written by Leo Tolstoy. To collect the correctly data, it needs reading more than once, because to get interpretation, it needs understanding all contents completely with all possibilities both intrinsically and extrinsically. Inventorying data. This step is collecting data through noting the quotations related to the statement of the problems and objectives of the study, it is including in words, sentences, and discourse that can represent self-deception and hypocrisy in Leo Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych. Thus, all data that will be analyzed are started and sourced through the novel's contents. Classification data. It is appropriate to the statements of the problems about self-deception and hypocrisy in Leo Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych. Tabling the data. It is to simplify reading the data and classify data that is used in the analysis for the readers. Continuously, the selected data or the collected data, which are related to the statements of the problems and the objectives, are analyzed through self-deception and hypocrisy to the main characters in Leo Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych. SELF-DECEPTION Barnes argues that in self-deception, self-deceivers must intentionally get themselves to believe something they know or truly believe is false (Barnes, 1997 : 4). It means that self-deception only involves one person, she/he is not only as deceiver but also deceived. It is the difference between interpersonal deception and self-deception, that in interpersonal deception, one intentionally gets the other one to believe something, but in self-deception, deceivers intentionally get themselves to believe something. The same thing is also confirmed by Mele in his book Irrationality. The conception of self-deception as lying to oneself is fueled by the idea that interpersonal deception necessarily involves lying to another. If deceiving someone else is getting him to believe something that one knows (or correctly believes) is false, it is natural to understand self-deception as getting oneself to believe something that one knows (or correctly believes) is false. (Mele, 1987 : 122). Deceiving someone else is to make the other person believe something that the deceiver knows it is false. While in self-deception, deceivers make themselves to believe something which they know it is false. Self-deception involves just one person, where she or he is not only become deceiver but also deceived. In self-deception, deceivers must intentionally get themselves to believe something which they know or truly believe is false. I deceived myself, then (Barnes, 1997 : 18) : (a) As deceiver, I must believe of some proposition that it is false, and at the same time, as deceived, believe that it is true, and (b) As deceived, I must be taken in by a deceitful strategy that, as deceiver, I know to be deceitful As quoted by Mele, according to Demos self-deception exists when a person lies to himself, that is to say, persuades himself to believe what he knows is not so. In short, self-deception entails that B believes both p and not-p at the same time. (Mele, 1987 : 122). It means that in self-deception, deceivers know what they believe is actually false, but they keep believing something false in themselves. . That is called as self-deceivers believes both p and not-p. they know the truth, but still keep believing the false. Self-deceptive belief functions to reduce anxiety. The self-deceptive belief that p may function to reduce anxiety that not-p, it can sometimes function instead to reduce anxiety about some other proposition (Barnes, 1997 : 36). This suggests that when self-deceivers deceive themselves into believing that some future event will occurs, their self-deceptive beliefs function to reduce their anxiety about the non-occurrence of that event. Self-deceptive belief always functions to reduce a self-deceiver's anxiety, whether the self-deceptive belief is about what will occur, what has occurred, or what is occurring. A belief that p functions to reduce anxiety that not-q when (Barnes, 1997 : 59) : (1) the belief that p is caused by the anxious desire that q and (2) the purpose of the occurrence of the belief that p is to reduce anxiety that not-q According to requirement 1, the anxious desire plays a casual role in the person's coming to have that belief. According requirement 2, the having of the belief that p is purposive. Its purpose is to reduce anxiety that not-q. Barnes argues that self-deceiver's anxious desires cause them to be biased in favor of beliefs that reduce their anxiety (Barnes, 1997: 59). People have self-deceptive beliefs because having self-deceptive beliefs reduces their anxiety. Something (having a self-deceptive belief) which has a certain effect (reducing anxiety) is explained by the fact that it has that effect (Barnes, 1997 : 60). HYPOCRISY People do something because they have a motive. Everything which is done by them is a sign of their motive or the aim they have. When they want to get attention from others, they tend to do something which can make the other people give them attention. It can be done by the people who did not intend to deceive. They do something which is consistent with their motive. Deceit is done by the signs of outward deeds. Such as when a person pretends to have a good purpose or intent through their actions, but in reality it was a bad goal. The purpose is actually bad and not in accordance with the action they did. It can be said as a lie. The lie can be regarded as hypocrisy. A deed is a sign of the person's intention. But it is not so for the hypocrite, who by outward signs of deeds or things signifies that which he is not (Spiegel, 1999 : 20) As quoted by Spiegel, philosopher Gilbert Ryle suggests that to be hypocritical is to try to appear actuated by a motive other than one's real motive (Spiegel, 1999 : 23). A hypocrite takes an action to deliver a purpose that is not the real goal. They tend to hide the real goal with actions which they are doing. So it conveys through his actions, others will accept that the goal is not their real goal. They made their actions as a mask to hide the true purpose. Hypocrisy is an act to make a 'belief', in which he pretended to believe what he actually knows that's not the real problem/case. These actions will continue to do so leads to a different motive other than the actual motive. The hypocrite engages in action which, as it were, contradict or "negate" one another morally. One is morally good, while the other is bad. Thus, the hypocrite is irrational, because inconsistent, in the moral sense (Spiegel, 1999 : 30). Hypocrisy hates the truth. Because a hypocrite's self-worth is based on maintaining an illusion of righteousness and godliness to himself and the others, he must continually deceive himself and others that his righteousness is genuine. However, since his righteousness is not genuine, he must be on constant guard against fact, circumstances, or people that might expose him. Instead of the truth being the foundation of his life, values, and hope, it becomes an enemy against which he must always be on guard (Matthew 6:23 ; Luke 11:34-36 ; john 3:19-21) ( http://questions.org/attq/whats-so-dangerous-about-hypocrisy/ ) Others will be difficult to understand what he was hiding. It is because the hypocrite will continue to provide the signs, through actions to cover up the truth. Not only through actions, hypocrites with their self-consciously deceive others through his language, the words they said to others. Those are why the lie will be difficult to be understood. KINDS OF HYPOCRISY Roger Crisp and Christopher Cowton offers a fourfold distinction of the vice, which are (Spiegel, 1999 : 30) : Hypocrisy of Pretense The hypocrisy of pretense occurs when a person puts up a front of being morality or physically better than he is. Pretentious hypocrites are motivated by desire for selfish gain. But as Crisp and Cowton note, pretenses may be motivated by malice, shame, and even interest in others (Spiegel, 1999 : 30). Nor must the pretense aim to sham genuine virtue. People experiences hypocrisy of pretense when they hide their real motive which is better rather that the real motive. For instance, a person is feeling in bad condition but when the other people ask about his condition he tends to hide by telling that his condition is good. This example can indicate that this person is experiencing hypocrisy of pretense. Hypocrisy of Blame Hypocrisy of blame, defined as moral criticism of others by someone with moral fault of their own. The vice often appears to lie particularly in the fact that the fault of the critic is worse than criticized (Spiegel, 1999 : 31). Hypocrisy of the blame Occurs when the perpetrator has an error then he tends to put the blame on to someone else. it is done with the purpose to cover up his own mistakes. By blaming others actually he does not realize that his sin was far worse than the mistake he accuses. It was because he had an error and then add the mistake of accusing others with the intent to cover up his mistake which ended up being worse. Hypocrisy of Inconsistency The third category of hypocrisy is that inconsistency, which is defined as the uttering of some (overriding) moral requirement that does apply to oneself and then failing to live up to it. Hypocrisy of inconsistency occurs when a person's action is not in accordance to his words. For instance, a person told to his friend that he would read a novel but then the other friend of this person sees that he is not reading a novel but he is playing piano. The other example which can be indication of hypocrisy of inconsistency is when a person promised to himself or another person about something, but in fact he does not do what has been said by his own self. Judith Sklar regards it as "the distance between assertion and performance" (Spiegel, 1999 : 31). Hypocrite are generally regarded as insincere the faults of the other two characters are quite different. The hypocrite engages in action which, as it were, contradict or "negate" one another morally. One is morally good, while the other is bad. Thus, the hypocrite is irrational, because inconsistent, in the moral sense. Hypocrisy of complacency Lastly, complacency in certain conditions can be said a form of hypocrisy. To be guilty of this is to ignore the demands of morality when they become costly, to be content with one's moral status, refusing to improve or even to reflect upon it, while carrying on a pretense of virtue blaming others for they vices, or failing to practice what one preaches. Thus, as Crisp and Cowton note, complacent hypocrites protect "their complacency from criticism on the grounds of the first three kinds of hypocrisy" (Crisp and Cowton, 1994: 343-345). The hypocrisy of complacency could also fall into any of these categories, as suggested by Crisp and Cowton's own assertion that such hypocrites may sustain their complacency through any of the other forms of hypocrisy ; pretense, blame or inconsistency (Spiegel, 1999 : 32). RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-DECEPTION AND HYPOCRISY Some writers maintain that at least in some form, hypocrisy is rooted in self-deceit. The self-deceived which can be called as 'internal' hypocrite is characterized by psyche fractured by refusal to fully own up to some moral truth she knows in her heart to heart (Spiegel, 1999: 33) . The self-deceived person tends to act that way because of she/he wants to refuse some moral truth she/he knows. It can be caused by her/his unreadiness of accepting the truth. The self-deceived person tends to 'make believe' in which he/she pretends to believe what she/he knows that it is not the case. The delusional person experiences no conflict in her belief of a lie, for she is completely convinced. On the other hand, the self-deceived does experiences conflict because of her belief contradicts her knowledge. Self-deceived actually knows that what she/he has done contradicts to her knowledge. Hypocrisy involves self-deception when it results from either: (1) A false belief resulting from a motivated bias of some sort, (2) A disavowal of some continuing engagement in which one is involved, or (3) Some combination of 1 and 2. Some writers prefer to see hypocrisy as a "second order" or "meta" vice. It means that self-deception occurs as the result of self-deception that happened before. In the words of Crisp and Cowton, it is symptomatic of "a failure to take morality seriously" (Spiegel, 1999 : 35). It can be said that it is metavirtuous to acknowledge the domain of morality, that is, to be moralist. But the hypocrite is metavicious, for someone tacitly refuses to do so, and is therefore an amoralist such a person considers herself somehow exempt from moral constraints. And yet, being aware of how the moral community operates and when and why rewards are doled out to the virtuous, the hypocrite plays a part for personal gain. As quoted by Spiegel, Christine McKinnon notes that hypocrite "wishes a certain status and she recognizes that this can be achieved if she can manage the elicit positive moral assessments" (Spiegel, 1999 : 35). So like the self-deceived hypocrite, the amoralist hypocrite gains praise and respect for qualities she does not really possess. But unlike the self-deceived hypocrite, she experiences no psychological dissonance, because she is genuinely convinced that she is not the subject to the relevant moral rules. As quoted by Szabados and Solfer, Shklar argues that allowing self-deception to count would result in a regrettable proliferation of accusations of hypocrisy (Solfer, 2004 : 256). It is possible that such hypocrisy involves, not only deception to others, but rather than self-deception, which may not similarly involve knowledge that one is engaged in deception. In short, self-deception and hypocrisy are two terms which cannot be separated because they have relationship each other. Self-deception can also be called as internal hypocrisy, a hypocrisy which is done to his/her own self. A deceived and a deceiver are the same person. Meanwhile hypocrisy can also be called as interpersonal deception, a deception which is done to the other people. Hypocrisy involves more than two people, there is a deceiver and also involves the other people which become deceived. Besides, self-deception can give raise to hypocrisy when a person becomes self-deceiver, there is a possibility that makes him/her becomes hypocrite. It is because self-deception is the cause of hypocritical behavior. One and the same hypocrite's actions are as resulting from self-deceit or lack of moral seriousness. Self-deceit and amoralism as dual causes of hypocritical behavior (Spiegel, 1999 : 36). If self-deception is deceiving their own selves to believe something they know that it is false. If the self-deceptive belief results action, behaviour, language or something else which lead them to deceive others rather than their own selves, it can be said that their self-deception give raise to their hypocrisy. Thus we can see how self-deception and hypocrisy have relationship each other and cannot be separated. DEPICTION OF IVAN'S SELF-DECEPTION Self-deception is a mental defense mechanism by which some people cope with intensely painful emotions. The self-deceivers are becoming aware of, or accepting the truth about, a current life circumstance or person simply because it is too painful or scary to do so. In this novel, the central drama of the story is Ivan's struggle with illness and death, and Tolstoy gives us quite the setup. He tells us Ivan's whole life story up to the point when he becomes sick. We get to know Ivan, his habits and desires, his family and friends, and his circumstances. The main character Ivan is someone who experiences self-deception because he is not ready in accepting the truth that he is facing illness which leads him to the death Ivan forces himself thinking that he is getting better. He keeps forcing himself to believe that the illness is getting better and the medicine begins to take the effect. But then the usual pain is coming back to him, he becomes more painful because the illness feels more serious. As he grows sicker, Ivan's mood and attitude toward life begin to change dramatically. He starts having to struggle with fear, discomfort, and isolation. The illness begins after he slipped when he was preparing his new house. Ivan feels everything is well after his move to his new house, but sometimes Ivan complains of a strange taste in his mouth and something wrong with his left side, but this could hardly be called as an illness. The something wrong grows worse, and although it is not real pain, it is a feeling of pressure in his side which throws him into a constant state of depression. The state of depression depends and begins to spoil the pleasure of the easy and decorous life that the Golovin family had recaptured. As his ill humor begins to mar the easy and agreeable lifestyle he has worked so hard to construct, volatile disputes with his wife occur more and more often. Ivan goes to see the doctor. To him, the only important question is whether his case is serious or not. But ignoring Ivan's concern, the doctor focuses on the strictly medical question of whether Ivan's problem is a floating kidney or appendicitis. This question the doctor answers brilliantly, and as Ivan thought, in favor of the appendix. Ivan gets the feeling that his case is very serious and he is struck by the doctor's indifference and utter lack of sympathy to a matter of such importance. After think about his illness, he becomes more realize that he is going closer to the death. It shows that Ivan reviews from the beginning when the first time he gets the pain from his illness. It begins when he slipped in his new house, then he get a bruise which hurts a little. But then it becomes more painful, so he visit to the doctor to consul about the pain he feels. He is not sure to the doctor's diagnosis then he intents to see another doctor to get more accurate diagnosis. But from the other doctors, he gets the same diagnoses which resume that his illness is chronic. Then from doctor's resume, he gets the thought that it is not the case of what disease he is suffering, but it is about life and death. Demos argues that self-deception exists when a person lies to himself, that is to say, persuades himself to believe what he knows is not so, self-deception entails that someone believes both p and not-p at the same time (Mele, 1987 : 122). This argument also confirms what is being experienced by Ivan, because based on quotations in the novel it is clear that he believes something contradictory at the same time. On the one hand he fully understands that there is something bad in him as a result of his illness, he knew it was the explanation from the doctors he visited. On the other hand, he forced himself to think that there would be no bad thing in him, and believe that it is not a chronic disease, unlike what has been described by doctors. Then it can clearly be seen that in this case Ivan lies to himself. Barnes argues that a belief that p functions to reduce anxiety that not-q when (1) the belief that p is caused by the anxious desire that q (Barnes, 1997 : 59). In Ivan's case, a belief about his illness that it is just a small thing functions to reduce his anxiety that it is a chronic illness not a small thing as he believes. It occurs because his belief is caused by his anxious desire that it is a chronic disease. Ivan has anxious feeling about his illness, he will not it becomes chronic because it will make him die. In the depth of his heart, he feels so anxious with what has been said by the doctor, he knows well that the doctor diagnoses there are something bad in himself because of his illness. He also feels that his condition becomes worse gradually, and becomes more understand about the illness from medical book he read. All these things make his anxious feeling becomes worse. That is why he always forces himself to think that he is getting better and his illness is just small thing, it functions to reduce his anxious feeling. It occurs when the purpose of the occurrence of the belief that p is to reduce anxiety that not-q (2) (Barnes, 1997 : 59). Barnes explain that the belief about p does not only function to reduce anxious feeling but also has the purpose to reduce it. Ivan's belief about his illness does not only function to reduce his anxious feeling, it also has a purpose. His purpose to have a belief that his illness is just a small thing is to reduce his anxious feeling that it is a chronic disease. Ivan feels anxious that his illness will mar his pleasure of life. Ivan is someone who has desire in life that his life ought to be easy, pleasant, and decorous. He has bright childhood, good life, and good physic, mental and social background. . He is someone who has big ambitious in life, especially in his job. He will do everything to fulfill his pleasure of life. In his mind, the happy frame of life comes from his success in job and the harmonious relation with his wife, the one augmenting the other. Everything goes in accordance with what he desires in his life. But since he married with Praskovya Fredorovna, his easy, pleasant and decorous of life changes gradually. He feels that his marriage cannot bring him the pleasant of life. He realizes that being married at least to this wife, does not necessarily augment the pleasures and proprieties of life, but on the contrary, threatened them and that therefore he must guard himself against these threats. Something worse happens and then begins to mar his easy, pleasant and decorous life. He suffers the chronic illness which makes his condition became worse gradually. Since he got an incurable illness that has tortured him biologically and psychologically, Ivan feels anxious. He feels anxious because he seems that he is not ready in facing death and also he feels anxious that his illness will mar his easy, pleasant and decorous life. As the time goes by, and the illness becomes worse more than before, automatically Ivan cannot live his life like he used to live, easy, pleasant and decorous. Peterman describes in the symptoms of self-deceiver that A part of the explanation for A's believing that P is that A desires that P (Spiegel, 1999 : 56). If it is used to analyze Ivan's case, the A stands for Ivan as the self-deceiver and P is Ivan's belief that his illness is just a small thing. Ivan believes it because he desires it to be. Ivan believes that his illness is just a small thing that it is actually not a chronic diseases because he indeed desires everything is well. Then his desires lead him to keep believing that his illness is just nothing, just a small thing. he does not want his illness will destroy what he has believed about his life that it should be run in accordance with what he believed : easy, pleasant and decorous. REVEALATION OF IVAN'S SELF-DECEPTION GIVES RAISE TO HIS HIS HYPOCRISY There is also another term that almost has the same meaning as self-deception which is hypocrisy. Based on the online dictionary, hypocrisy is "the condition of a person pretending to be something he is not, especially in the area of morals or religion; a false presentation of belief or feeling" (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/hypocrisy). Indeed, hypocrisy is very close to self-deception but it may affect one else rather that just between his/ her own self. Self-deception and hypocrisy are two terms which are cannot be separated. It is because at least in some forms, hypocrisy is rooted in self-deceit. Self-deception is also called as internal hypocrisy. Self-deception is deceiving themselves to believe something they know that it is false (Spiegel, 1999 : 33). If the self-deceptive belief results action, behavior, language or something else which lead them to deceive others rather than their own selves, it can be said that their self-deception give raise to their hypocrisy. It has been analyzed that Ivan experiences self-deception in his life, but unfortunately his self-deception give raise to his hypocrisy. Ivan does not only deceive himself in the matter of facing his illness. His self-deceptive belief results action, language and behavior which lead him to deceive others rather than his own self. Ivan's self-deception give raise three kinds of hypocrisy, they are hypocrisy of pretense, hypocrisy of blame, and hypocrisy of inconsistency. HYPOCRISY OF PRETENSE Ivan experiences hypocrisy of pretense in himself. It happened when he had to struggle with the illness. As explained in the previous analysis of self-deception, he has a belief in himself that his illness is just a small thing. Ivan believes that his illness is just a small thing, that it is actually not a chronic disease. It is because he indeed desires everything is well. Then his desires lead him to keep believing that his illness is just nothing, just a small thing. he does not want his illness will destroy what he has believed about his life that it should be run in accordance with what he believed : easy, pleasant and decorous. He realizes that his illness will destroy his faith about life. Then he forces himself to think that he is getting better. But then it appears the internal conflict in his heart, because his belief contradicts with the fact that his illness is a chronic disease. He knows that he is dying, but he is unable to grasp the full implications of his mortality. He sees that he is dying, and he is in a constant state of despair. In his heart of hearts he knows he is dying, and it is not simply that he could not get used the idea that he could not grasp it, could not possibly grasp it. He hides his real condition by pretending though his words that "the appendix is getting better". But then the painful feeling of his illness follows his words. By doing so, everyone especially his wife in this case, will consider that indeed he is in a good condition because he say to her that "the appendix is getting better". It occurs to a hypocrites, they will act through their action and language by their self-conciously that this action or this utterance is false. It is done to hide the actual case. That occurred in Ivan's case, when his friend and his wife or everyone in his environment considers that Ivan illness is just a small thing, Ivan success becoming hypocrite. A hypocrite takes an action to deliver a purpose that is not the real goal. They tend to hide the real goal with actions which they are doing. So it conveys through his actions, others will accept that the goal is not their real goal. They made their action as a mask to hide the true purpose (Spiegel, 1999 :20). From the quotation above, Ivan uses "cheerfully" action as a mask to hide his condition, so it leads the other goal which is his wife will assume that his condition is good. It is called that Ivan's pretense will raise another perception in his wife's perspective, rather than the actual case that Ivan never forget about the pain which is caused by his illness. He pretends and hides his real condition to everyone, so then it leads the thought of everyone that Ivan is in a good condition. Everyone think that Ivan is just suffers simply disease, not a chronic disease. The only thing that Ivan need is simply following the doctor's treatment and taking his medicine regularly. By doing so, Ivan will get better again as he used to be before he got the illness. Others will be difficult to understand what he was hiding. It is because the hypocrite will continue to provide the signs, through actions to cover up the truth (Spiegel, 1999 : 23). The quotation above shows that how everyone does not know about the real condition of Ivan. It is because Ivan always hides it by acting like he is not suffering the chronic illness. HYPOCRISY OF BLAME Ivan's self-deception give raise to his hypocrisy of pretense because in the matter of hiding his condition, Ivan does not only experience hypocrisy of pretense, but also hypocrisy of blame. When everything goes but it is not in accordance with what he wants, he blames his wife. He also blames his wife's attitude that it seems like his wife does not notice him. Ivan's attitude in hiding his condition causes his wife's attitude towards his illness. Ivan thinks that his wife seems not notice and will not understand about his condition. It is described clearly by the statement above, that his wife's attitude is actually his own fault. But Ivan seems that he is blaming his wife because of her attitude. In this case, his wife's attitude toward him happens as a result of his own deception. As it has been described in the previous analysis about hypocrisy of pretense, that Ivan hides his real condition by pretending through his "cheerful" action, then it leads to his wife's perspective, she assumes that indeed Ivan is in good condition. By thinking that way, automatically she also will not too worry with his condition. So then his attitude in blaming his wife can be called as his hypocrisy of blame, which is rooted by his own deception. Ivan hides the doctor's diagnose about his illness from everyone even his wife. Ivan seems blame everyone's attitude toward him that they seem annoyed and do not want understand about his condition. He does not realize that the environment's attitude toward his illness is a result of his hypocritical behavior which he pretends as he is not suffering chronic disease. Then it automatically leads the thought that he is indeed in a good condition, so then everyone will notice him like a person who is in good condition and will not give more attention like the attention to person who is suffering chronic disease. Ivan hates his wife who is actually always giving him attention but he himself always rejects it. The only one to blame is actually Ivan himself, it was because he pretends and hides the actual condition. The second is because he always refused any attention that is given by his wife. When someone is always giving attention, but the attention she gives was rejected then she will feel bored to continue giving attention to the same person. Likewise with Ivan's wife, who wants to give him more attention even by every simple way, but Ivan always refused and thought that his wife would not understand his real condition. Actually it is Ivan's mistake because he does not want show the doctor's diagnosis to everyone, including his wife. When his wife tries to ask about the doctor's diagnosis he lies and hides it by telling that everything is fine. With all his mistakes, he blames his wife. He does not realize that actually the only one to blame is his own self which is cause by his own behavior, not the mistakes of other people even his wife. Finding Ivan's condition even worse, however, his wife chooses to tell Ivan to take his medicine rather than make the announcement. Ivan looks at his wife with extreme animosity and tells her to let him die in peace. Ivan greets the doctor with the same hostility, declaring that the doctor can do nothing for him. The doctor admits to his wife that Ivan's case is very serious, and that he can only administer drugs to ease the pain. Yet more than his physical sufferings, Ivan's mental sufferings cause him the greatest torture. One night Ivan begins to doubt whether he has lived his life correctly. It occurs to him that his official life, the arrangement of his family, and all his social interests are actually false. He wants to defend his life path, but finds that there is nothing to defend. Realizing that the only truth in his life was when he attempted to struggle against the expectations and values of high society, Ivan realizes that his life "was not real at all, but a terrible and huge deception which had hidden both life and death." Seeing the footman, his wife, his daughter, and all the other people he comes across in his daily routine confirms to Ivan the truth of his realization. This consciousness increases his suffering "tenfold." For the first time, Ivan recognizes the hypocrisy and artificiality of his life. He calls into question the values that he has lived by, and he honestly entertains the conclusion that the way he lived has obscured both life and death. A proper view of life, Ivan now understands, entails an acknowledgment of the inevitability of death, as well as an appreciation of the true joys of life. The two go hand in hand. By accepting unpleasantness as a fact of life, one can derive full benefit from life's joys. Ivan's realization has affected a shift in the focal point and intensity of his spiritual suffering. Ivan no longer feels obliged to take part in the pretense around him. He confronts both his wife and the doctor with the truth of his condition. Now, however, Ivan's spiritual pain is caused by the possibility that his whole life has been in error. Yet despite Ivan's new knowledge, Ivan still does not wholly relinquish the hope that his life was lived rightly. Even though he is now keenly aware of the spiritual component of life, he is not yet ready to fully admit the error of his life. In a sense, he knows it, but does not acknowledge it. In this manner, Tolstoy paves the way for the resolution of the life and death of Ivan Ilych. HYPOCRISY OF INCONSISTENCY Ivan's attempts to deal with the disruption caused by his illness are also revealing. By following the doctor's orders in a scrupulous and exact fashion, he not only takes up the position that his illness is purely physiological, but he also demonstrates his belief that life is well regulated and predictable. With his wife's pregnancy, Ivan managed to adopt a perspective that ignored the disagreeable aspects of her behavior. And when the proper channels of complaint failed to gain Ivan notice when he was passed over for promotion, a sudden and miraculous reorganization of the government landed him a better position. Yet unlike the previous incursions of unseemliness and unpredictability into his life, Ivan's illness resists such decorum restoring measures. When meticulous attention to the doctor's instructions fails to help, Ivan tries to force himself to think that he is better. But even self-deception is unsuccessful when problems with his wife, difficulty at work, or bad cards at bridge make him conscious of his disease. The fact that life's unpleasantness causes the pain that Ivan experiences is a key to Ivan's condition. If Ivan's condition is not physiological, but is truly caused by a misperception of the nature of life, i.e., if Ivan's illness stems from his belief that life is always proper, formal, decorous, and neat, then any signs to the contrary would serve to aggravate his symptoms. A close look at Ivan's night of bridge seems to point to the same conclusion. Ivan enjoys bridge because it mirrors his perception of reality. Bridge, in a sense, is a metaphor for Ivan's ideal of a proper life. Thus, when Ivan realizes that his excitement at making a grand slam (the best possible bridge hand) is ridiculous in light of his present condition, bridge seems to lose all its appeal. Ivan's illness makes him conscious of the fact that bridge does not reflect the true nature of life. Missing a grand slam, as Ivan does when he misplays his hand, is really a trivial occurrence. Ivan simply does not care. And the reason that "it is dreadful to realize" why he does not care is because that realization implies the destruction of his worldview. Although Ivan has not yet completely relinquished his view of life as neat and predictable, his illness is gradually making him aware that a world and a reality exist outside of the one he occupies. He begins to deal with himself that he should stop being too aware of his condition as the impact of his illness, the only thing he should do is just going to one doctor and follow the instruction in order to get better. Ivan believes and hopes when he follows the instruction and takes the medicine regularly, his condition will get better. But then his wife tells to the doctor how Ivan does not follow the doctor's instruction by not taking his medicine. Then it clearly described that Ivan becomes inconsistence, because his action is not accordance with what has been said by him. Two more weeks pass by, and Ivan's physiological condition degenerates further. One morning Praskovya enters Ivan's room to tell him that their daughter's suitor has formally proposed. Finding Ivan's condition even worse, however, she chooses to tell Ivan to take his medicine rather than make the announcement. Ivan looks at his wife with extreme animosity and tells her to let him die in peace.Ivan does not want follow his wife's demand, he did not take the medicine even his condition has become more serious and worse. Ivan greets the doctor with the same hostility, declaring that the doctor can do nothing for him. The doctor admits to Praskovya that Ivan's case is very serious, and that he can only administer drugs to ease the pain. His wife tells that Ivan does not take the medicine and does not follow the doctor's instruction. The only thing he does is just lying in his bed while his legs up, because he feels better by doing so. Ivan does not consistence with what he has been told and promised that in the previous he said that he will follow the doctor's instruction and take his medicine regularly, but in fact he does not do it. It indicates that what Ivan is not in accordance with what he has told that it can be said as hypocrisy of inconsistency. As Judith Sklar regards about hypocrisy of inconsistency is that "the distance between assertion and performance" (Spiegel, 1999 : 31). Where it can be described that what happen to Ivan is hypocrisy of inconsistency, does as Ivan said, not as Ivan does. CONCLUSION Based on the whole analysis of the study in chapter 3, there are several conclusions in line with the statement of the problem. Based on the definition of self-deception which has been explained by Barnes that self-deception involves just one person, that person does not only become deceiver but also deceived. The deceivers are getting themselves to believe something that they know or truly believe is false. It occurs to the main character Ivan in The Death of Ivan Ilych. The central drama of the story is Ivan's struggle with illness and death, and Tolstoy gives us quite the setup. He tells us Ivan's whole life story up to the point when he becomes sick. The writer gets to know Ivan, his habits and desires, his family and friends, and his circumstances. Ivan experiences self-deception in his life as a result of his unreadiness in accepting the truth that he is facing death. Barnes argues that the self-deceptive belief functions to reduce anxiety. It also occurs to Ivan that he feels afraid in facing his illness. He seems aware even anxious that the illness will disturb his pleasure of life. That is why he uses self-deception to reduce his anxiety about not fulfilling of his pleasure of life and the anxious because of his unreadiness in facing death. Furthermore, Ivan's self-deception gives rise to his hypocrisy. Self-deception is deceiving themselves to believe something they know it is false, if this self-deceptive believe result action, language, behaviour or something else which lead them to deceive others rather than their own selves, it can be said that his self-deception give raise to his hypocrisy. In Ivan's case, his self-deception results action, language, behaviour and something else which lead him to deceive others rather than his own self. So it can be analyzed that Ivan's self-deception gives rise to his hypocrisy. Ivan's self-deception gives rise to three kinds of his hypocritical behaviours those are hypocrisy of pretense, hypocrisy of blame and hypocrisy of inconsistency. His hypocrisy of pretense appears to hide his real condition from people around him. Besides hypocrisy of pretense, Ivan's self-deception also gives raise to his hypocrisy of blame. Ivan blames his environment's attitude toward his condition that they tend does not pay more attention to his condition. Actually it is his own mistake that he hides his real condition which leads the attitude of everyone that they will not give him more attention. Ivan blames the other person which actually the only person to blame is his own self. Lastly, Ivan also experiences hypocrisy of inconsistency. It occurs because he does not take his medicine regularly. Whereas he has promised that he will allow the doctor's instruction by taking his medicine and does not eat food which is forbidden by the doctor. It indicates that what Ivan does is not in accordance with what he has said. All hypocritical behaviours performed by Ivan are rooted by his self-deception. Basically self-deception is root of hypocrisy. When someone experiences self-deception, she/he has possibility to be hypocrite. But in the end story of Ivan, Ivan realizes that he has actually been traveling opposite his intended direction. Moving up in social esteem has not led to joy, fulfillment and life, but to misery, emptiness and death. Blinded by the values of high society, he has been traveling in the wrong direction on the road of life. After Ivan's climactic realization, his waking life is defined by one thing, suffering, and lots of it. But he has at least finally stumbled on the thing he needs to recognize: his life was wrong. when Ivan realizes his error and comes to a fuller understanding of the nature of life, he is reborn spiritually and experiences extreme joy. REFERENCES Barnes, Annette. 1997. Seeing Through Self-Deception. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Coon, Dennis. 1992. Introduction to Psychology : Exploration and application (6th Edition). St Paul : West Publishing Company. Jabrohim. 2001. Metodologi Penelitian Sastra. Yogyakarta : PT hanindita Graha Widia. Mele, Alfred R. 1987. Irrationality. Oxford : Oxford University Press. Sklare, Arnold B. 1965. The Art of the Novella. New York : The Macmillan Company. Solfer, Bela Szabados & Edon. 2004. Hypocrisy : Ethical Investigation. Canada : Broadview press, Ltd. Spiegel, James S. 1999. Hypocrisy : Moral Fraud and Other Vices. United States of America : Baker Books. Tolstoy, leo. 1960. The Death of Ivan Ilych and Other Stories. London : The New American library of World Literature, Inc. Waluyo, Herman. 2002. Apresiasi dan Pengajaran Sastra. Surakarta : Sebelas Maret University Press. Wellek, Rene & Austin Warren. 1949. Theory of Literature. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

To be clear, my time in Europe is not over, and Mrs. Spew has a few more days, but Berlin is, well, home enough for me that tomorrow I will be returning to my apartment and my normal.  I will still be doing a heap of tourism but now as tour guide for my wife and my sister and her boyfriend.  So, I will just highlight some stuff we saw the past few days here in Lombardy (which reminds me that Italy is the country that gave us irredenta as a word!) and then some thoughts about intra-Italy contrasts before moving onto some thoughts about the trip as a whole.I made a fun mistake--we ended staying in a very nice hostel rather than a hotel.  Not a huge mistake as it worked out fine, but the Hilton (and its points) nearby was actually not that much more expensive.  It would have meant a larger elevator, perhaps slightly older neighbors, and, perhaps we wouldn't have roomed with Molly Mosquito.  We bought a package of transportation/museum tickets/etc, but couldn't really get the metro part of that to work for us.  But Milan has some turnstiles where you can just tap your credit cards.  Once we figured that out, the metro was a breeze.  We were deterred from the trams (bigger, uglier, slower than those in Erfurt) as I was not sure how to pay.  The package did pay off for getting us into the Duomo (but only the stairs to the terrace, which meant not for us), the fortress, and the Ambrosian Library.The Duomo lift situation reminded of how the Church did and does perpetuate inequality.  Three ways to get to the top--stairs for those who pay a bit extra, elevator for those who pay more than that, and then an express elevator for those who yet more.  No line for the last one, of course.  Whenever I see cathedrals, I always think about how they exploited the peasants to make them.  But to be fair, these projects involved a lot of jobs for a long time (several hundred years in this case).  On the other other hand, sculptors made lots of Saint Lucy statues since she is the patron saint of the bline, and carving marble .... was not good for one's eyes.  I have a question: are sculptures in cathredals normally this violent?  I can't recall anything like this.  What is this scene depicting?  In the museum next to the Duomo, they had a bunch of statues that are no longer in the cathedral, mostly for preservation/safety reasons.  Lots and lots of Abraham nearly smiting his son--which is one of the key points in my religious education which led me to being pretty hostile to religion.       The fortress, designed by Leo Da V, was pretty amazing.  Just a beautiful structure that seemed impossible to attack.  Not sure it was ever successfully attacked.  Too much art inside to get into the history.  Museum for musical instruments, museum for furniture, plenty displays of glass and ceramics, etc.  Most impressive.  But our fave museum in Milan was the Ambrosian Museum--it had a lot of incredible displays.  My faves were an exhibition where they gave artists moleskin notebooks and they went to town on them in many different ways;  the Raphael drawing that serves as guide to the Philosopher's football meeting; and Da Vinci's own notebooks.  It was very cool to see his own handwriting.    Because we couldn't make reservations for the big museums for our first day in Milan, we headed off to Como to see lake and mountains and George or the Smiths.  And, yes, Como is beautiful--lake and mountains and the buildings all make it a special place.  We didn't have time to either use the funicular (can't spell it without fun) or rent a boat or take a ferry.  But we did have time to walk around, people watch, and check out the area.   The food, including the gelato, was terrific.  I had a great calzone in Como, had some wonderful pasta in Milan, and had an amazing sandwich with the freshest foccacia bread just off a canal in the Navigli area--the Venice of Milan.  Hmm, how many Venices of have I been to?  Copenhagen, Amsterdam, Stockholm, ... am I missing any?  I only repeated gelato flavors once--coffee!  Milan vs Venice: Milan has some amazing museums, and we didn't really get a taste of that in Venice.  Venice has a heap more beautiful sights, but damn it is crowded outside of peak season.  Milan was far easier to walk with only bridges/canals in Navigli.  The food was amazing in both.  Milan was not quite the tourist trap that Venice is.  Venice had Murano and Burano, and I guess we could have tried to see some other parts.  I am glad we did both.Northern Italy vs my memories of southern Italy: I spent one overnight in Naples in 2001 on my way to Bosnia, and my other Italian experience was Rome/Florence in 1987.  I remember the roads/the walking to be far more chaotic and, um, thrilling in the south than in the north. While we saw some old stuff here in Milan and in Venice, well, it doesn't get much older than Rome (except my trip to Jerusalem 5 years ago).  The food?  My palate has changed a lot and I am willing to pay much more now (not traveling on $25/day max anymore) so I can't make any comparisons.  I didn't get food poisoned this time, so there's that!  Much more English this time, which is no surprise.  Navigating via google maps made things far easier this time--to use the metro system, to get to the sights, to navigate the alleys of Venice, to find excellent restaurants, and only get gelato at places rated 4.5 or higher.Overall, how would I rank the places we visited over the past ten days?  Venice.  Just too pretty, too much fun.  Points off for not letting us into their castle.Erfurt. Small and sweet and I knew it complete. Kept up our castle streak nicely with its citadel.Dresden.  Its old town is spectacular--huge buildings of all different kinds of shapes and histories, nicely positioned on the Elbe (fun to be on the river that divided Soviet and western forces at the end of the war).  Bumps up with the Schloss nearby that we enjoyed so much.  We had our best German food here--a German tapas place if I remember correctly.Nuremberg.  The rise and fall of Nazis in one place with site of rallies and the trials plus a really cool castle.  Some great food.Milan.  Only this far down the list because the other places were that special.  Definitely gets points for a fantastic Da Vinci designed castle, terrific food (the last dinner's service had much to be desired).  Points off for Mosquito Molly.  Leipzig.  It was ok, didn't knock our socks off.And yes, between the German heavy food of Franconia and the gelato of Italy, I blew my diet bigtime.  Hopefully my lack of treadmilling was offset by all the walking.I will be spending another three months in Berlin next winter/spring for the second half of the Humboldt Award, again at the Hertie School.  Where will I wander next time?  The Italian Alps are calling--good snow and better food than the Austrian Alps.  Maybe Greece, maybe some part of the Balkans, depends on a variety of things including the possibility of traveling with my daughter.  Anyhow, as always, I am so lucky.  I was very frustrated with my career at the start and for some time, but I have been in a good place in spirit and physically for quite some time.  I do have a plan for the next sabbatical in seven years.  Hopefully, it can come into fruition as well as this one.