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The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland have been co-hosting peace talks in Geneva with the goal of ending the civil war in Sudan that has been raging between the government's Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since April 2023.The talks, which began on Thursday, initially provided hope that they could serve as a reset for broader peace negotiations and move the conflict one step closer to ending. However, news that neither the SAF nor the RSF are attending the talks has dimmed hope that the summit will result in much if any progress.No doubt, the peace process has struggled to gain steam. The Jeddah Process — as the on-again, off-again talks held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, are called — has failed to lead to any long-term peace deal. This is despite U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello expressing hope that a breakthrough would soon occur in an interview he gave to Responsible Statecraft in April.In an interview with Responsible Statecraft, Shewit Woldemichael, a Senior Analyst for Sudan at the International Crisis Group, gave credit to Washington for its mediation efforts, but noted that "the U.S. should have exerted substantial pressure on the warring parties to cease hostilities much earlier."This is particularly true, according to Woldemichael, given that Perriello may not remain in his post following the swearing in of the new U.S. president in January. Depending on the results of the election, U.S. policy could further deprioritize Sudan, and reduce Washington's role as a mediator.The Jeddah Declaration released on May 11, 2023 and signed by the SAF and RSF committed both armies to protect civilians and abide by international humanitarian and human rights law — including guaranteeing access to affected civilians for humanitarian organizations — was honored far more in the breach than observed. A follow-up Jeddah Agreement on May 20, 2023, reaffirmed the importance of civilian protection while implementing a seven-day ceasefire. The ceasefire was broken less than a day after coming into force. Subsequent ceasefire efforts have also failed.On August 9, Sudan's Sovereignty Council, which is headed by SAF Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan sent a delegation to Jeddah to meet with U.S. mediators in preliminary discussions for this week's talks and to lay out the conditions it said must be met before it agreeing to attend the summit itself. The SAF's conditions, including its demand that the RSF hand back control over cities and towns seized during the war, proved wildly unrealistic. In the end, the SAF refused to attend the peace summit in Geneva. Alex de Waal, a Sudan expert and Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation, told Responsible Statecraft that the SAF is a fractious coalition whose members have not agreed on their war aims and therefore cannot trust their ostensible leader, Gen. Burhan, to negotiate any concessions. They thus have stuck to a maximalist position even though it damages them internationally.More surprising is the RSF's absence from the table. Despite showing up to Geneva days ahead of the scheduled start date for the talks, the group decided at the last minute to boycott the negotiations without providing a public explanation. This leaves the talks without either of the main belligerents present, further reducing hopes for a major breakthrough in Geneva.The broader geopolitics of this conflict are a further complicating factor. Egypt and Iran have both reportedly sent weapons and military equipment to the SAF while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has reportedly provided substantial military support to the RSF. These outside influences have hurt peace efforts, with the SAF insisting that it will not attend any peace summit in which the UAE is present. (The UAE is attending the talks in Geneva as an "observer" this week in any event.)A recently released Amnesty International report provides extensive evidence suggesting that a 2004 U.N. arms embargo on the Darfur region of Sudan, much of which has come under the RSF's control, has been continuously breached over the course of the conflict. Turkish-made weapons are being used by fighters on both sides of the conflict, with Gen. Burhan and his main aides using rifles produced by Sarsilmaz, Turkey's "main small arms manufacturer and most important supplier," according to Amnesty.Amnesty's report also claims that weapons coming from Russia, Serbia, Yemen, and China have been used in the conflict, although in some cases it is unclear which party is using these weapons and how they entered Sudan.Ending these arms transfers is critical to ending the war, according to Woldemichael, who noted, however, that "these weapons are traveling through illicit channels, such as across the border with Libya. "There's no way to ensure weapons don't enter Sudan," she told RS.The struggle for power has ravaged the country, with both sides committing widespread human rights abuses, including rape, looting, arson, and summary executions.On August 1, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) released a report that found that inhabitants of the Zamzam Camp, which shelters the largest number of internally displaced people in North Darfur state are suffering from a Phase 5 level of food insecurity, or famine. The IPC defines famine as occurring when at least 20% of the population faces extreme lack of food, acute malnutrition exceeds 30%, and more than 2 per 10,000 people (or 4 children per 10,000) are dying each day from starvation or the interaction of malnutrition and disease.Overall, more than 10 million people have been displaced in the war, with 2.1 million having fled to neighboring states. Aid groups have faced steep challenges in accessing populations in need. Often, fighters refuse to open roads for aid groups leaving innocent Sudanese with little choice but to scavenge for food, at times resorting to eating leaves and soil to stay alive.The two sides are using the humanitarian situation to build arguments against their enemies. The Sudanese government denies that famine conditions exist in Sudan, but blames the RSF for creating a prolonged humanitarian crisis by, according to the SAF, blockading el-Fasher, the capital and largest city in North Darfur.The RSF, in contrast, has shown itself to be more cooperative to international actors. It has accepted the IPC's claim that some Sudanese are suffering from famine and has expressed interest in working with the UN to allow humanitarian aid to enter the country. De Waal said that the RSF "are doing their utmost to repair the reputational damage done by their relentless pillaging and atrocities against civilians. Therefore they are being extremely amenable to international proposals for negotiations, for humanitarian access and even for a ceasefire."Washington's chief interest is to ensure the war remains contained. To that end, reaching an agreement that at least reduces the conflict's severity and limits its spillover effect to neighboring countries would be a win. With refugees fleeing by the millions into neighboring states and key regional powers, such as Egypt, Iran, and the UAE, continuing to arm the warring factions, the war and its destabilizing impact is at risk of spreading.According to Woldemichael, the greatest regional spillover "has so far been in Chad," to which a large number of refugees are fleeing, particularly from Darfur. She also expressed "concern" over the possibility of "Eritrea and Ethiopia becoming engaged in the conflict," with local militant organizations in the area potentially complicating an already complex battlefield. In the end, however, both Eritrea and Ethiopia, according to Woldemichael, appear uninterested in getting entangled in the conflict. But the risk alone, however, should concern the United States.Despite neither of the two main warring sides appearing at the negotiating table in Geneva, Woldemichael holds out hope that the negotiations could still lead to progress. Even without the SAF and RSF present, "you still have important players at the table. As long as this is the case, there is an opportunity to put pressure on external parties to take the appropriate action to move the conflict closer to a peace deal."Moreover, pushing for humanitarian aid is not only a moral imperative, but serves U.S. interests as well. It limits the security and financial strain refugees cause to surrounding governments. The heavy flow of refugees into surrounding states could worsen instability in already unstable countries, thus risking that chaos and conflict spreads.This is particularly problematic if the Israel-Gaza war engulfs the region, given the Middle Eastern actors with stake in the Sudanese conflict."U.S. Envoy Tom Perriello has a sound appreciation of the challenge he faces," said de Waal. "His problem is that even though (U.S. Secretary of State) Blinken is now making a few phone calls, there just has not been enough high-level engagement with the key powerbrokers — UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt — to get them behind a peace plan. Until that happens, there's no chance of significant progress."Woldemichael argues that the principal focus for the United States should be "to continue to put pressure on the sides to participate in negotiations" and to work "to end the war."As the U.S. elections draw near and as pressure mounts on Perriello and the Biden administration to end the war, it is critical for the United States to remain the honest and neutral broker it has thus far been, and to work diligently to produce a lasting peace deal that serves both American and local interests.

The ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is a pivotal event in the modern history of Sudan. With hundreds, possibly thousands of civilians killed in the conflict, there has been a deep sense of horror particularly in Sudan's capital Khartoum, resulting in 2.5 million residents of the city fleeing to nearby regions of Sudan, or neighboring countries Chad and Egypt.For those remaining in Khartoum, fear and anxiety are constant, as gunfire, heavy artillery, and smoke rise above the city, fighter jets fly at low altitude over residential areas. The current war will have a devastating mental health impact, in addition to its many fatalities and physical injuries. Children in particular are more likely to suffer severe depression, flashback and post-traumatic events as a result of exposure to the horrific violence and abuses.Exacerbating these anxieties is the use by both the SAF and RSF of psychological warfare. Through social media, both sides have shared graphic content from the battlefield, intended to intimidate their opponents and influence public opinion in their favor. Much of this content has been impossible to verify independently. The SAF has struggled to gain legitimacy with the public, discredited for being part of the former regime of Omar al-Bashir, Sudan's long-time former dictator. The SAF leadership claims to be fighting for stability in Sudan, despite allowing the proliferation of former regime-backed militias since the ousting of Bashir in 2019.Meanwhile, the RSF leadership has used media outlets to claim they are fighting against the SAF for being part of the former regime. Their stated intention is to restart the process of handing power from the military to civilian politicians in the framework agreement signed with the Forces of Freedom and Change, which came to an end with the military takeover in October, 2021. However, the RSF's claim is grossly misleading, as the RSF has been accused of committing genocide in Darfur since 2003.In both cases, the message is clear. Each side wishes to give the perception that it is winning the war on the ground. But, neither has been strong enough to achieve outright control of Khartoum. Hence, they merely seek to mislead people who are not residents of the city.The current war in Sudan arguably represents a long power struggle between the RSF, currently led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo or "Hemedti," and remnants of the Bashir regime that dominate the SAF, headed by Lieutenant-General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan. Since the Bashir regime was toppled, its supporters have used the transition period to organize.The SAF has targeted activists, members of resistance committees and politicians with arbitrary arrests and accusing them of backing the RSF. Over the last four years, they have waged a war against Sudan's demand for democracy. Effectively blocking all political efforts to ensure a smooth post-2019 transition, they have sought to prevent the outcome of a credible civilian democratic government. They have instigated violence, attacked civilians, and portrayed the revolution as a project planned in the West to divide Sudan.Furthermore, the SAF's leadership has made use of Sudan's lucrative black market to sabotage any economic progress. They have done so through raising the foreign currency rate against the Sudanese pound and creating shortages in the country, prompting the Sudanese people to feel economic pressure and protest against the civilians in power, providing justification for the military counterparts to launch their takeover. The emergence of numerous militias was encouraged, and the security forces that once maintained the Bashir regime's security turned a blind eye to crimes such as robbery, burglary, and aggravated bodily harm.Historically, the SAF is the oldest security institution of the state, and civilian political parties have used it to capture power in 1958, 1969 and 1989. After al-Bashir's coup in 1989, the Sudanese Islamists Movement, precursor of the National Congress Party (NCP), stacked senior officer positions in the SAF with their supporters.Simultaneously, the regime created various security institutions and militias to counterbalance the threat of a further coup, and to crush rebellions in outlying areas of Sudan. One of these security forces was the RSF, which originated in the early 2000s as the Janjaweed, Arab militiamen used by Bashir to defeat insurgencies in Darfur. Most Janjaweed fighters were of the Rizigat tribe, which includes the Mahria branch of which Hemedti is a member. In 2017, Sudan's parliament passed the Rapid Support Forces Act legitimating the militia. When Bashir felt threatened by his competitors within the NCP, he summoned the RSF to Khartoum to protect him; ultimately, it was the RSF's desertion of Bashir which sealed his regime's fate.After Bashir was toppled in 2019, Burhan became the president of Sudan, appointing Hemedti as his deputy in August 2019. Burhan's focus was on staying in power and preventing the transition to civilian rule. Burhan feared that out of power, he may be prosecuted for his claimed role in the Darfur genocide alongside Hemedti. To reduce any possibility of being ousted, he empowered Hemedti by abolishing article 5 of the RSF Act, allowing the RSF to act independently of the SAF command structure, while establishing loose ties to Burhan. Hemedti was able to increase the number of his forces from 20,000 to over 100,000, most being trained in SAF camps in Khartoum. The RSF was tasked with protecting strategic sites in Khartoum, including the presidential palace, general command, Khartoum airport, and the building of Sudan's Television and Broadcast Corporation. Burhan also retired several SAF generals who had criticized the expansion and new roles of the RSF.Ironically, Burhan's focus on staying in power resulted in his clash with Hemedti, who had his own presidential ambitions. Over time, Burhan and Hemedti started to compete with one another, regionally and internationally. Hemedti cemented his ties with Russia through the Wagner Group, a relationship with its origins in Bashir's request for Russia's help in protecting his regime in 2017. In 2018, it emerged that Wagner was contracted to train the regime's security forces, including the RSF, in riot control.Hemedti's relationship with Wagner expanded through gold smuggling operations that helped Russia offset the sanctions for its invasion of Ukraine, and the RSF's support and Hemedti's influence for Wagner's extraction of resources in the Central African Republic (CAR). In January 2023, Hemedti used his forces to close the Sudanese-CAR border, to prevent CAR opposition forces from using Sudanese territory. Wagner has supplied the RSF with anti-aircraft missiles that have deterred the SAF from attacking its positions in Khartoum in the current conflict.The RSF-Wagner relationship has deepened as a result of both paramilitary groups' relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE is a key destination of Sudan's mineral resources, for example receiving 40 percent of Sudan's gold exports. Geopolitically, Wagner, Hemedti and the UAE are all backers of Libya's Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar. Hemedti sent 1000 RSF fighters to support Haftar's attempt to take over Libya's capital Tripoli in 2019, when Egypt refused to send ground forces to support Haftar despite also being an ally. There are indications that, in return, the UAE has been supporting Hemedti and the RSF in Sudan's current conflict.Burhan has also developed close regional alliances. Burhan received military training in Egypt, and the Egyptian Armed Forces today sees the SAF as the only institution that can hold Sudan together, and represent Egypt's own interests in the country. The Egyptian leadership deeply distrusts Hemedti and the RSF, who they view as a mercenary group with no loyalty to the state. Egypt has accordingly provided the SAF with covert air defence aid in its current conflict with the RSF.Burhan also uses his position as the president of Sudan, and commander of the SAF, to win the backing of Saudi Arabia. Strategically, Saudi Arabia needs to ensure the security of its Red Sea investments that are part of its Vision 2030. Saudi Arabia has also proven to be interested in investing in and deepening trade relations with Sudan, putting it in competition with the UAE's influence represented in Hemedti and the RSF.The current conflict has militarily incapacitated the forces of both Burhan and Hemedti, with Khartoum becoming a graveyard for their soldiers. The fighting has shown that both sides are just interested in cementing their own regimes in a post-conflict scenario. It remains to be seen how civilians will be able to resist whichever party, with its regional backers, emerges victorious from the violence, and continue Sudan's long journey towards democracy.

End Of Mission Statement Of The Special Rapporteur On The Negative Impact Of Unilateral Coercive Measures On The Enjoyment Of Human Rights To The Syrian Arab Republic ; 6/3/2018 OHCHR | End of mission statement of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights t… http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23094&LangID=E 1/4 English > News and Events > DisplayNews English | Français | Español Go to navigation | Go to content | русский | العربية | 中文 WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? DONATE HOME ABOUT US ISSUES HUMAN RIGHTS BY COUNTRY WHERE WE WORK HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES NEWS AND EVENTS PUBLICATIONS AND RESOURCES End of mission statement of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights to the Syrian Arab Republic, 13 to 17 May 2018 Arabic End of mission statement 17 May 2018 Preliminary observations and recommendations I would like to begin this briefing by expressing my gratitude to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic for the invitation to visit the country and for the openness and readiness with which it facilitated the meetings for my mission. I would also like to thank the office of the Resident Coordinator, the members of the UN country team and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for their invaluable support. I have been entrusted by the Human Rights Council with the task of monitoring, reporting and advising on the negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights of unilateral coercive measures. The United Nations has repeatedly expressed concern that the use of such measures may be contrary to international law, international humanitarian law, the UN Charter and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States . During my visit, I had the honour of being received by Ministers, Deputy Ministers and senior officials of the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Economy and Foreign Trade, Local Administration and Environment, Social Affairs and Labour, Transport, Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Electricity and Health. I also met with the leadership pf the Planning and International Cooperation Commission, the Central Bureau of Statistics, the Chamber of Commerce, and with the Governor of the Central Bank. I was b riefed by staff from civil society, humanitarian organizations and by independent experts. Last but not least, I am also grateful to the numerous diplomatic missions that shared their views with me during my visit. I very much appreciate the briefings I received from the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia in Beirut prior to my visit. The purpose of this mission was to examine to what extent unilateral coercive measures targeting the Syrian Arab Republic impair the full realization of the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. I will present my full report to the Human Rights Council in September 2018. My present statement contains my preliminary observations on the outcome of my visit. I have examined the situation of the Syrian Arab Republic as a target of unilateral coercive measures 1 134K 118K 2290 6/3/2018 OHCHR | End of mission statement of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights t… http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23094&LangID=E 2/4 I have examined the situation of the Syrian Arab Republic as a target of unilateral coercive measures by a number of source States. I have examined relevant evidence and endeavoured to assess the actual impact of such measures on the Syrian people. One source country has applied unilateral coercive measures since 1979, and they were strengthened in subsequent years. A larger group of States began applying similar measures in 2011. The collective measures call for a trade ban on the import and export of multiple goods and services. It also includes international financial transfers. The superimposition of different packages of collective sectoral measures, together with the across­the­board implementation of financial restrictions, are tantamount in their global impact to the imposition of comprehensive restrictions on Syria. Additional measures targeting individuals by virtue of their alleged relationship with the government have also been applied. Because of their comprehensive nature, these measures have had a devastating impact on the entire economy and the daily lives of ordinary people. This impact has compounded their suffering resulting from the devastating crisis that has unfolded since 2011. Singling out the impact of the unilateral coercive measures from that of the crisis is fraught with difficulty, but this does in no way diminish the necessity to take measures to restore their basic human rights as a whole. It is clear that the sufferings imposed by the unilateral coercive measures have reinforced those that were caused by the conflict. Indeed, it seems ironic that these measures applied by source States out of a concern for human rights are actually contributing to the worsening of the humanitarian crisis as an unintended consequence. The dramatic increase in the suffering of the Syrian people The Syrian economy continues to decline at an alarming rate. Since the application of coercive measures in 2011, and the beginning of the current crisis, the total annual GDP of Syria has fallen by two thirds. Foreign currency reserves have been depleted, and international financial and other assets remain frozen. In 2010, 45 Syrian Liras were exchanged for one dollar; by 2017 the rate fell to fell to 510 liras per dollar. Inflation has dramatically increased since 2010, reaching a peak of 82.4% in 2013; the cost of food items rose eight­fold during this time. This combination of factors visited further devastation on the living conditions of the population that were already degraded by the conflict. This has hit the half of working Syrians living on fixed salaries particularly hard. The unintended consequences of unilateral coercive measures This damage to the economy has had predictable effects on the ability of Syrians to realize their economic, social and cultural rights. Syria's human development indicators have all tumbled. There has been a staggering increase in the rate of poverty among ordinary Syrians. While there was no food insecurity prior to the outbreak of violence, by 2015 32% of Syrians were affected. At the same time unemployment rose went from 8.5% in 2010 to over 48% in 2015. Banking restrictions The most pervasive concerns I have heard during my mission relate to the negative effect that comprehensive financial restrictions have had on all aspects of Syrian life. Restrictions on the Central bank, state­owned and even private banks, and transactions in the main international currencies have comprehensively damaged the ability of anyone seeking to operate internationally. Despite nominally including "humanitarian exemptions" they have proven to be costly, or extremely slow, to access in practice. The uncertainty around what transactions do, or do not violate the unilateral coercive measures, have created a "chilling effect" on international banks and companies, which as a result are unwilling or unable to do business with Syria. This has prevented Syrian and international companies, non­governmental actors (including those operating in purely humanitarian fields), and Syrian citizens from engaging in international financial transactions (including for goods which are legal to import), obtaining credit, or for international actors to pay salaries or contractors in Syria. This has forced Syrians to find alternatives, such as hawala, which result in millions of dollars flowing 6/3/2018 OHCHR | End of mission statement of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights t… http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23094&LangID=E 3/4 y , , g through high cost financial intermediaries, who are alleged at times to be owned by terrorist organizations. These channels which are not transparent, cannot be audited, and increase transaction costs remain the only avenue for smaller companies and Syrian civil society actors to operate internationally. Medical care Syria practices universal, free health care for all its citizens. Prior to the current crisis, Syria enjoyed some of the highest levels of care in the region. The demands created by the crisis have overwhelmed the system, and created extraordinarily high levels of need. Despite this, restrictive measures, particularly those related to the banking system, have harmed the ability of Syria to purchase and pay for medicines, equipment, spare parts and software. While theoretical exemptions exist, in practice international private companies are unwilling to jump the hurdles necessary to ensure they can transact with Syria without being accused of inadvertently violating the restrictive measures. Migration and 'brain drain' While the security situation was a central factor which led to migration flows from Syria, it should be emphasized that the dramatic increase in unemployment, the lack of job opportunities, the closure of factories unable to obtain raw materials or machinery or to export their goods have all contributed to increasing the emigration of Syrians. Some receiving States have selected skilled migrants, while pressuring the less fortunate to return to Syria. This "brain drain" has harmed the medical and pharmaceutical industries in particular, at the worst possible time for Syria. The anticipated end of the current conflict will not put an end to the flows of migrants, especially to Europe, in view of the saturation of neighbouring countries. These flows are likely to continue so long as the Syrian authorities are prevented by unilateral coercive measures from addressing the pressing problems related to their social and economic infrastructure, in particular the restoration of energy and water supplies. Ban on equipment and spare parts The ban on the trade in equipment, machinery and spare parts has devastated Syrian industry. Vehicles, including ambulances and fire trucks, as well as agricultural machinery suffer from a lack of spare parts. Failing water pumps gravely affect the water supply and reduce agricultural production. Power generation plants are failing, and new plants cannot be purchased or maintained, leading to power outages. Complex machinery requiring international technicians for maintenance are failing, damaging medical devices and factory machinery. Civilian aircraft are no longer able to fly safely, and public transit buses are in woeful condition. Whatever rationale source countries may have for restricting so­called dual use goods, greater effort is needed to ensure that goods that are clearly intended for civilian use are permitted, and that they can be paid for. Ban on technology As a result of unilateral coercive measures, Syrians are unable to purchase many technologies, including mobile phones and computers. The global dominance of American software companies, technology companies, and banking and financial software, all of which are banned, has made it difficult to find alternatives. This has paralyzed or disrupted large parts of Syrian institutions. Education Shortages of inputs, energy and water supply as well as of teaching material causing delays in the rebuilding of schools have kept 1.8 million children without access to their classrooms. The ability of Syrians to participate in the international community has been sharply affected. Syrians have been excluded from international educational exchange programs, and the tremendous difficulties involved in obtaining a visa have prevented many from studying or travelling abroad, upgrading their training and skills, or participating in international conferences. By removing consular services from Syria, countries have forced people including the poorest, to travel to neighbouring countries for such applications, which are also placing onerous restrictions on entry for Syrians. 6/3/2018 OHCHR | End of mission statement of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights t… http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23094&LangID=E 4/4 Conclusion I am profoundly concerned that unilateral coercive measures are contributing to the ongoing suffering of the Syrian people. Claims that they exist to protect the Syrian population, or to promote a democratic transition, are hard to reconcile with the economic and humanitarian sufferings being caused. The time has come to ask whether these unintended consequences are now more severe than can be reasonably accepted by democratic States. Whatever their political objectives, there must be more humane means by which these can be achieved in full compliance with international law. In view of the complexity of the system of unilateral coercive measures in place, there needs to be a multi­stage approach to addressing the dire human rights situation prevailing in Syria. This would imply a sequenced approach involving addressing the crucial humanitarian needs of the population throughout the whole of Syria, without preconditions, when these touch on issues of life and death. A first stage could include addressing the urgent needs of the food insecure, which represent nearly one third of the population. The second stage is to translate at the ground level effective measures to fulfil the commitment of source States to meet their obligation to allow humanitarian exemptions, particularly for financial transactions. Finally, there must be a serious dialogue on reducing unilateral coercive measures, starting with those that have the most egregious effect on the population, along with those that will promote confidence building between the parties, with the ultimate aim of lifting the unilateral coercive measures. I hope that my report and my future work can contribute in this end. Thank you. Note: 1. More information on this prohibition can be found in the reports and resolutions on the website of the Special Rapporteur. Home CONTACT US Frequently Asked Questions OHCHR on Social Media OHCHR Memorial Employment Mobile App Site Map © OHCHR 1996­2018

As Iran's president-elect Massoud Pezeshkian is sending messages about his readiness to reengage with the West, the newly elected European Parliament seems to be moving ever further in a hawkish direction. That can be concluded from the appointment of the German Green Party lawmaker Hannah Neumann to chair the EP's delegation to Iran in the assembly. Save for a major, and unlikely, upset, she'll be formally endorsed in that position when the body reconvenes after its summer recess.According to European Parliament rules, the task of inter-parliamentary delegations is to maintain and deepen relations with the parliaments of non-EU countries. Delegations are not the most influential bodies in the EU but they can offer a valuable channel of communication with third countries, particularly in cases when official relations are strained, as is the case with Iran. Or, alternatively, they can become a forum for ventilating grievances against those countries, thus contributing to shaping negative narratives and creating a political climate detrimental to productive diplomacy.Neumann is not a newcomer to the Iran file. It remains to be seen how she'll approach her new position, but if her past activities are any indication, we should expect a rather confrontational stance.A member of the German Greens, the same party to which German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock belongs, Neumann was outspoken in her criticisms of the Iranian government. She consistently campaigned for the inclusion of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) in the EU terrorist list — a step opposed by the EU's former high representative on foreign policy Josep Borrell on legal grounds. Politically, blacklisting an official security force of Iran will likely provoke more problems in the EU's relations with Tehran. When Borrell's successor, former Estonian prime minister Kaja Kallas, acceded to the post, Neumann urged her to take that step, even though unanimity among the all member states will be required to make it effective.In one particularly strident intervention on the heels of the "Woman. Life. Freedom" movement in Iran, Neumann last year disparaged Borrell's diplomatic engagement with Tehran by calling on him to "stop stabilizing the brutal regime while the people of Iran are prepared to die for its downfall." In a debate in April, following exchanges of strikes between Israel and Iran, she spoke of the need to build a regional security architecture to stop the cycle of escalation yet seemed to blame mostly Iran and its allies for that escalation — while she condemned, rightly, Iran's strike on Israel, she did not mention the Israeli deadly strike on the Tehran's diplomatic compound in Damascus, which provoked Iran's retaliation in the first place.While Neumann has chastised the Islamic Republic's lack of democratic representation, her pro-democracy zeal was markedly less pronounced in her role as the chair of the European Parliament's delegation for relations with the Arabian Peninsula (2019-2024) which covers ties with all the Persian Gulf countries. In 2021, the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning human rights abuses in the United Arab Emirates that included a clause urging the EU to boycott the Expo 2020 in Dubai as a sign of disapproval of Abu Dhabi's repression. Nevertheless, Neumann visited the Expo in clear contravention of the parliament's position, which was overwhelmingly supported by her own political faction.Neumann praised the late president of the UAE Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan for ushering the UAE into "an unprecedented era of growth and modernization," without any reference to the country's human rights record, even as she lashed out at Borrell, EU Council President Charles Michel, and humanitarian aid commissioner Janez Lenarcic for following the standard diplomatic protocol of expressing condolences for the death in a helicopter crash of the Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi two months ago.Neumann compared working with the Gulf's Arab countries to walking a diplomatic tightrope, suggesting the need to balance human rights concerns with other interests, such as climate change, women's rights, economic cooperation, etc. That is sensible. However, it doesn't appear as if she is prepared to embrace the same spirit in dealing with Iran. In fact, she greeted her appointment as the chair of the Iran delegation with a narrow focus on a "fight for a democratic and free Iran."If anything, such rhetoric risks turning the delegation into an echo chamber of constantly regurgitated talking points about how bad the Iranian regime is and the need to remove it. It may work well on social media and offer a sense of moral satisfaction, but it is unlikely to advance a more nuanced understanding of Iranian realities. The delegation, in concrete terms, would likely not be welcome in Tehran to meet with its counterparts in the Iranian Majles, which is one of the primary tasks of the body. In the past, such visits occurred with a certain regularity, and that did not preclude participating MEPs from expressing strong opinions on human rights and other aspects of the Iranian policies. Neumann, however, appeared to rule out any legitimacy for the current parliament which was elected this spring. As an organizer and participant of many such undertakings in the past, I can definitely affirm that mutual visits help to build trust, better understand the other side's perspectives — without necessarily agreeing with those perspectives — and ultimately widen the space for diplomacy. Contrary to Neumann and many other MEPs' criticisms of a diplomatic outreach to Iran, the truth is that in the past 45 years, there was never too much of it but rather too little. Shutting down one available channel, at a time when Tehran is showing more flexibility towards the West, especially Europe, would not be wise, and would work to reduce the EU's diplomatic relevance.

On December 14 and 15, 2023 European Union leaders met for a summit in Brussels. Despite happening multiple times a year, this meeting was historic for the future of EU integration. The EU leaders gave a green light to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and grant candidacy status to Georgia. They also held discussions on several other vital issues, such as the EU's next Strategic Agenda, the ongoing concerning situation in Gaza, the Union's security and defense capabilities, and the mid-term review of the current EU budget (2024-2027), that includes the much need financial lifeline for Ukraine—in the end blocked by Hungary. Our experts share their insights on the results of the Summit and how they set the EU's course for the future.Merissa Khurma, Director at Middle East Program, The Wilson CenterThe ongoing Hamas-Israel war and the wider Palestinian-Israeli conflict was at the top of agenda during last week's EU Summit. While more EU members voted for a ceasefire at the United Nations General Assembly last week, the EU failed to unify at the summit around ending hostilities. Those in favor of a ceasefire have indicated growing concerns over the surging number of innocent civilians killed by Israel's military operations in Gaza as well as the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis in the besieged strip. Their argument is that taking such a stance will empower the EU to play a more integral role in diplomatic, humanitarian, and developmental efforts post war. The EU is one of the largest donors to the Palestinian people, through the Palestinian Authority that rules over the West Bank but has also long been a supporter of Israel and its right to defend itself against Hamas and other militant factions listed as terrorist organizations by the EU, the United States and other countries worldwide. Striking a balance during this war has proven challenging, precisely because different EU member governments have taken divergent positions. Countries such as Germany and Austria have held steadfast in their ironclad support of Israel, while others such as Ireland and Belgium have been critical of Israel's military campaign in Gaza and called on Israel, rather emphatically, to respect international law. Many member countries in the EU have also witnessed waves of protests calling for a ceasefire as well as the release of the hostages taken by Hamas on October 7th that have shaken the Palestinian-Israeli and wider regional arena, which remains to be integral for Europe's national security. The EU remains to be a critical market for Israel as well as other countries in the MENA region and up until this attack and the ensuing war, the EU was seen a lot more favorably than the United States in varying public opinion polls of the region. The EU remains to be a critical partner in any diplomatic efforts led by the United States or the international community to prioritize a political solution to the longstanding Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Both the EU and the United States have reiterated their commitment to the two-state solution that is adopted by the Palestinian Authority as well many other countries across the Arab and Muslim world. The ongoing war and the divides across the region as well as in Europe highlights the importance of the EU's pre-October 7th efforts on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September to resuscitates diplomatic peace process through a comprehensive peace package that results in an independent Palestinian state living side by side to Israel in peace and security. It is imperative that the EU stays on course to play that role even as the going gets tough. It is the only path to peace.Nicholas Lokker, Research Associate in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)The historic decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine is a very welcome signal of the European Union's willingness to respond strategically to the geopolitical shock of Russia's full-scale invasion. Yet as it moves forward with Kyiv's integration, the EU can no longer continue to ignore the elephant in the room when it comes to enlargement—namely, the ongoing stalemate in the Russia-Ukraine war.As long as active fighting continues, full EU membership will not be possible for Ukraine, given that the bloc's mutual defense clause would require other member states to become directly involved in the conflict. While EU leaders are well aware of this potential issue, the debate on enlargement has so far refrained from directly addressing it. Instead, they seem to be operating under the assumption of future peace in Ukraine. This is most obvious in European Council President Charles Michel's promise of membership by 2030—a date by which peace is by no means guaranteed.Rather than making promises it may be unable to keep, the EU should find pragmatic ways to integrate Ukraine even while fighting continues. This will mean pursuing forms of progressive or gradual accession, which while frequently proposed, have yet to make it on to the EU's high-level political agenda. Offering Kyiv (and other candidates) benefits of integration prior to full membership could help sustain the momentum of the enlargement process, even if it takes time to overcome the thornier barriers in its way (which, in addition to the war, also include the need for reform to the EU's institutional functioning).However, partial integration in the short-term cannot replace the ultimate goal of full integration in the long-term—an understandable fear that has so far prevented the concept from gaining enough support. The EU must therefore strike the right balance in its approach, making clear to Ukraine that although it remains committed to welcoming it as a full member once peace is reestablished, it will meanwhile work to bring Kyiv as close as possible to the bloc under current conditions.Iren Marinova, PhD Candidate in Political Science, Colorado State UniversityAmong several strategic topics that were discussed at the European Council Summit on December 14 and 15 in Brussels, one of them was the EU's Strategic Agenda over the next 5 years. With the upcoming European Parliament elections and the change of the Commission in 2024, a question that will undoubtedly be asked relates to the geopolitical role and ambitions of the EU and whether they will persist or change over the next five years. In a period of continuous crises, security threats, and global order shifts, the Summit outcomes on some critical foreign policy issues hold important clues to this matter.First of all, the idea of a "geopolitical" EU remains murky. Attempts have been made to provide clarity by addressing some scholarly concerns about the nature and implementation of the concept. Specifically, it has been presented as a more "realistic" vision of the world by the EU that relatively moves away from previous rather "naïve" over-reliance on the power of economic interdependence and towards a sobering realization of the true nature of the international system based on competition and conflict. It also means being ready to take risks and face the consequences. A question that is rarely asked, however, concerns the perceptions and visions of EU member states and their leadership on what "geopolitical" EU should and could look like.The historic achievement from the Summit is undoubtedly the agreement to open membership talks with Ukraine. Simultaneously, the highly anticipated €50 billion aid package meant to support Ukraine could not pass. In both situations, the deciding common denominator was one and the same— Hungary's Viktor Orbán—who continues to play the role of the rogue European leader in high-stakes matters. In the first case, he had to exit the room for the decision to pass, while he decided to block the financial package in the second. Whether Orbán will be persuaded to lift his veto in the next round of talks in January, or whether the EU will find other ways to circumvent him will be a key issue to observe in the coming weeks. With the uncertainty surrounding the United States' commitment to the Ukrainian war effort and the country's upcoming tumultuous election year, the EU's ability to find ways to continue its support for Ukraine would be important not just for Kyiv, but for the EU's "geopolitical" vision and its long-term security.Another concerning outcome of the Summit was the inability to achieve consensus on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza in light of several member states' call for ceasefire. The lack of a decision on the matter demonstrates a persistent division among member states that continues to call into question the EU's vision for being a key geopolitical player on a regional and a global stage.Whether the EU has become more "geopolitical" or whether it will transform itself into a "geopolitical power" and what that means is still open to interpretation and remains to be seen. A question that deserves attention is what the concept means in theory and practice to the member states and if a common vision on the matter can be achieved.European Council President talking to journalist immediately after the approval to open the accession negotiation with Ukraine and Moldova, December 14, 2023.Image CreditMaša Ocvirk, Program Coordinator at Global Europe Program, the Wilson CenterLast week's meeting of European Union leaders in Brussels was historic. The decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova is a high water mark for EU enlargement. However, as uncertainty on this and other decisions prevailed until the last moment, it also—more than ever before—showed a clear need for internal EU reforms. While the Council conclusions do recognize this need, it is only in the context of welcoming new member states into the Union. In the current geopolitical context, the need for EU institutions to function effectively should be reason enough on its own terms, the enlargement momentum only adding to the urgency of internal EU reform. The future of enlargement as well as the EU's capability to act might otherwise be at stake. Prime Minister Orban walking out amid the vote on the future of Ukraine's path toward EU membership cannot be a sustainable solution to reach decisions. Hungary's later decision to block the approval of the Ukraine Facility—a crucial financial lifeline for Ukraine—and with that postponing the adoption of the revised EU budget to February 1, 2024, is a case in point.The EU is beginning to run out of symbolic options to show support for Ukraine. By opening the negotiations, where each further step needs unanimity from member states, progress becomes increasingly more intertwined. The latest EU Summit should therefore be a wake-up call, if the EU wants to continue having EU enlargement as its most important and successful geopolitical tool. 2024 will be a defining year for the EU in many ways, let's hope one of them is getting closer to answering the call of history.Robin S. Quinville, Director of Global Europe Program, the Wilson CenterIn September's "State of the Union" speech, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen challenged Europeans to "answer the call of history." European Union enlargement, she emphasized, was the future–for Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkans, and Georgia. History demanded that the EU "work on completing our Union.And the EU has been working. November's Enlargement report set the stage for the December Summit; it recommended opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. The recommendation was a powerful recognition of the tough reform decisions both Ukraine and Moldova have taken, specifically to convince the EU they are also ready to tackle the demanding accession process.Despite the report's strong recommendation, the December 14-15 Summit meeting was a nail-biter. Hungary signaled early it could play the spoiler, stalling negotiations. But in the end, Hungary split its decision–allowing the EU to open negotiations but blocking much-needed funding for besieged Ukraine. Individual EU countries have indicated they will step up bilateral efforts, and the EU will revisit this issue in January. The process is a strong reminder to both EU institutions and the member states: they can no longer paper over the long-standing divergence between Hungary's government and the EU's values. Managing Hungary is the EU's new challenge. Dr. Dimitris Tsarouhas, Research Director at Center for EU and Transatlantic Studies, Virginia Tech and Adjunct Professor at Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown UniversityLast week's European Council was a vital demonstration of Europe's steadfast support to Ukraine's cause. Opening accession talks with Ukraine (and Moldova) and awarding Georgia the candidate country status was far from a foregone conclusion, given well-documented objections by Hungary's Prime Minister Orban, the inherent complexity that each enlargement entails, and the war-related fatigue that has settled in the west as we approached the conflict's second anniversary. By use of a highly creative and rarely used formula ten years after the Euromaidan, 26 EU leaders circumvented Hungarian objections and sent out a powerful message: the future of Ukraine and Moldova lies irrevocably in Europe. President Zelensky's enthusiastic reaction to the decision indicates that, for Ukrainians, the decision is far from only symbolic: Europe has embraced them and their search for belonging in a community of values they can call their own is over.Of course, this isn't to suggest all is done and dusted: accession talks will last unpredictably long, admission remains subject to veto players obstructing progress, and EU public opinion is wary of admitting more net "takers" from the EU budget. However, Ukraine's heroic pushback since February 2022 and its application for membership have revived enlargement as a geopolitical tool. Most EU leaders now recognize that admitting new, vulnerable members in the post-Soviet space and the western Balkans is first and foremost in Europe's own interest.The challenge now facing the Union is twofold: first, to convince Western Balkan states to return to a reformist path to move their EU admission prospects meaningfully forward. The decision to open accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina soon reflects the realization that too much precious time has already been lost, but the lack of progress regarding Albania and North Macedonia indicates that the current stalemate has yet to be overcome. Second, to prepare the ground for enlargement through internal reform that will enhance EU absorption capacity but also apply strict yet fair conditionality. Given the continued controversy around Hungary and its access to EU money, the Union needs to apply technical criteria that fulfill set milestones whilst mindful of the political repercussions of its actions, and the message this sends to friends and foes alike.

On December 14 and 15, 2023 European Union leaders met for a summit in Brussels. Despite happening multiple times a year, this meeting was historic for the future of EU integration. The EU leaders gave a green light to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and grant candidacy status to Georgia. They also held discussions on several other vital issues, such as the EU's next Strategic Agenda, the ongoing concerning situation in Gaza, the Union's security and defense capabilities, and the mid-term review of the current EU budget (2024-2027), that includes the much need financial lifeline for Ukraine—in the end blocked by Hungary. Our experts share their insights on the results of the Summit and how they set the EU's course for the future.Merissa Khurma, Director at Middle East Program, The Wilson CenterThe ongoing Hamas-Israel war and the wider Palestinian-Israeli conflict was at the top of agenda during last week's EU Summit. While more EU members voted for a ceasefire at the United Nations General Assembly last week, the EU failed to unify at the summit around ending hostilities. Those in favor of a ceasefire have indicated growing concerns over the surging number of innocent civilians killed by Israel's military operations in Gaza as well as the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis in the besieged strip. Their argument is that taking such a stance will empower the EU to play a more integral role in diplomatic, humanitarian, and developmental efforts post war. The EU is one of the largest donors to the Palestinian people, through the Palestinian Authority that rules over the West Bank but has also long been a supporter of Israel and its right to defend itself against Hamas and other militant factions listed as terrorist organizations by the EU, the United States and other countries worldwide. Striking a balance during this war has proven challenging, precisely because different EU member governments have taken divergent positions. Countries such as Germany and Austria have held steadfast in their ironclad support of Israel, while others such as Ireland and Belgium have been critical of Israel's military campaign in Gaza and called on Israel, rather emphatically, to respect international law. Many member countries in the EU have also witnessed waves of protests calling for a ceasefire as well as the release of the hostages taken by Hamas on October 7th that have shaken the Palestinian-Israeli and wider regional arena, which remains to be integral for Europe's national security. The EU remains to be a critical market for Israel as well as other countries in the MENA region and up until this attack and the ensuing war, the EU was seen a lot more favorably than the United States in varying public opinion polls of the region. The EU remains to be a critical partner in any diplomatic efforts led by the United States or the international community to prioritize a political solution to the longstanding Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Both the EU and the United States have reiterated their commitment to the two-state solution that is adopted by the Palestinian Authority as well many other countries across the Arab and Muslim world. The ongoing war and the divides across the region as well as in Europe highlights the importance of the EU's pre-October 7th efforts on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September to resuscitates diplomatic peace process through a comprehensive peace package that results in an independent Palestinian state living side by side to Israel in peace and security. It is imperative that the EU stays on course to play that role even as the going gets tough. It is the only path to peace.Nicholas Lokker, Research Associate in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)The historic decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine is a very welcome signal of the European Union's willingness to respond strategically to the geopolitical shock of Russia's full-scale invasion. Yet as it moves forward with Kyiv's integration, the EU can no longer continue to ignore the elephant in the room when it comes to enlargement—namely, the ongoing stalemate in the Russia-Ukraine war.As long as active fighting continues, full EU membership will not be possible for Ukraine, given that the bloc's mutual defense clause would require other member states to become directly involved in the conflict. While EU leaders are well aware of this potential issue, the debate on enlargement has so far refrained from directly addressing it. Instead, they seem to be operating under the assumption of future peace in Ukraine. This is most obvious in European Council President Charles Michel's promise of membership by 2030—a date by which peace is by no means guaranteed.Rather than making promises it may be unable to keep, the EU should find pragmatic ways to integrate Ukraine even while fighting continues. This will mean pursuing forms of progressive or gradual accession, which while frequently proposed, have yet to make it on to the EU's high-level political agenda. Offering Kyiv (and other candidates) benefits of integration prior to full membership could help sustain the momentum of the enlargement process, even if it takes time to overcome the thornier barriers in its way (which, in addition to the war, also include the need for reform to the EU's institutional functioning).However, partial integration in the short-term cannot replace the ultimate goal of full integration in the long-term—an understandable fear that has so far prevented the concept from gaining enough support. The EU must therefore strike the right balance in its approach, making clear to Ukraine that although it remains committed to welcoming it as a full member once peace is reestablished, it will meanwhile work to bring Kyiv as close as possible to the bloc under current conditions.Iren Marinova, PhD Candidate in Political Science, Colorado State UniversityAmong several strategic topics that were discussed at the European Council Summit on December 14 and 15 in Brussels, one of them was the EU's Strategic Agenda over the next 5 years. With the upcoming European Parliament elections and the change of the Commission in 2024, a question that will undoubtedly be asked relates to the geopolitical role and ambitions of the EU and whether they will persist or change over the next five years. In a period of continuous crises, security threats, and global order shifts, the Summit outcomes on some critical foreign policy issues hold important clues to this matter.First of all, the idea of a "geopolitical" EU remains murky. Attempts have been made to provide clarity by addressing some scholarly concerns about the nature and implementation of the concept. Specifically, it has been presented as a more "realistic" vision of the world by the EU that relatively moves away from previous rather "naïve" over-reliance on the power of economic interdependence and towards a sobering realization of the true nature of the international system based on competition and conflict. It also means being ready to take risks and face the consequences. A question that is rarely asked, however, concerns the perceptions and visions of EU member states and their leadership on what "geopolitical" EU should and could look like.The historic achievement from the Summit is undoubtedly the agreement to open membership talks with Ukraine. Simultaneously, the highly anticipated €50 billion aid package meant to support Ukraine could not pass. In both situations, the deciding common denominator was one and the same— Hungary's Viktor Orbán—who continues to play the role of the rogue European leader in high-stakes matters. In the first case, he had to exit the room for the decision to pass, while he decided to block the financial package in the second. Whether Orbán will be persuaded to lift his veto in the next round of talks in January, or whether the EU will find other ways to circumvent him will be a key issue to observe in the coming weeks. With the uncertainty surrounding the United States' commitment to the Ukrainian war effort and the country's upcoming tumultuous election year, the EU's ability to find ways to continue its support for Ukraine would be important not just for Kyiv, but for the EU's "geopolitical" vision and its long-term security.Another concerning outcome of the Summit was the inability to achieve consensus on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza in light of several member states' call for ceasefire. The lack of a decision on the matter demonstrates a persistent division among member states that continues to call into question the EU's vision for being a key geopolitical player on a regional and a global stage.Whether the EU has become more "geopolitical" or whether it will transform itself into a "geopolitical power" and what that means is still open to interpretation and remains to be seen. A question that deserves attention is what the concept means in theory and practice to the member states and if a common vision on the matter can be achieved.European Council President talking to journalist immediately after the approval to open the accession negotiation with Ukraine and Moldova, December 14, 2023.Image CreditMaša Ocvirk, Program Coordinator at Global Europe Program, the Wilson CenterLast week's meeting of European Union leaders in Brussels was historic. The decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova is a high water mark for EU enlargement. However, as uncertainty on this and other decisions prevailed until the last moment, it also—more than ever before—showed a clear need for internal EU reforms. While the Council conclusions do recognize this need, it is only in the context of welcoming new member states into the Union. In the current geopolitical context, the need for EU institutions to function effectively should be reason enough on its own terms, the enlargement momentum only adding to the urgency of internal EU reform. The future of enlargement as well as the EU's capability to act might otherwise be at stake. Prime Minister Orban walking out amid the vote on the future of Ukraine's path toward EU membership cannot be a sustainable solution to reach decisions. Hungary's later decision to block the approval of the Ukraine Facility—a crucial financial lifeline for Ukraine—and with that postponing the adoption of the revised EU budget to February 1, 2024, is a case in point.The EU is beginning to run out of symbolic options to show support for Ukraine. By opening the negotiations, where each further step needs unanimity from member states, progress becomes increasingly more intertwined. The latest EU Summit should therefore be a wake-up call, if the EU wants to continue having EU enlargement as its most important and successful geopolitical tool. 2024 will be a defining year for the EU in many ways, let's hope one of them is getting closer to answering the call of history.Robin S. Quinville, Director of Global Europe Program, the Wilson CenterIn September's "State of the Union" speech, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen challenged Europeans to "answer the call of history." European Union enlargement, she emphasized, was the future–for Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkans, and Georgia. History demanded that the EU "work on completing our Union.And the EU has been working. November's Enlargement report set the stage for the December Summit; it recommended opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. The recommendation was a powerful recognition of the tough reform decisions both Ukraine and Moldova have taken, specifically to convince the EU they are also ready to tackle the demanding accession process.Despite the report's strong recommendation, the December 14-15 Summit meeting was a nail-biter. Hungary signaled early it could play the spoiler, stalling negotiations. But in the end, Hungary split its decision–allowing the EU to open negotiations but blocking much-needed funding for besieged Ukraine. Individual EU countries have indicated they will step up bilateral efforts, and the EU will revisit this issue in January. The process is a strong reminder to both EU institutions and the member states: they can no longer paper over the long-standing divergence between Hungary's government and the EU's values. Managing Hungary is the EU's new challenge. Dr. Dimitris Tsarouhas, Research Director at Center for EU and Transatlantic Studies, Virginia Tech and Adjunct Professor at Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown UniversityLast week's European Council was a vital demonstration of Europe's steadfast support to Ukraine's cause. Opening accession talks with Ukraine (and Moldova) and awarding Georgia the candidate country status was far from a foregone conclusion, given well-documented objections by Hungary's Prime Minister Orban, the inherent complexity that each enlargement entails, and the war-related fatigue that has settled in the west as we approached the conflict's second anniversary. By use of a highly creative and rarely used formula ten years after the Euromaidan, 26 EU leaders circumvented Hungarian objections and sent out a powerful message: the future of Ukraine and Moldova lies irrevocably in Europe. President Zelensky's enthusiastic reaction to the decision indicates that, for Ukrainians, the decision is far from only symbolic: Europe has embraced them and their search for belonging in a community of values they can call their own is over.Of course, this isn't to suggest all is done and dusted: accession talks will last unpredictably long, admission remains subject to veto players obstructing progress, and EU public opinion is wary of admitting more net "takers" from the EU budget. However, Ukraine's heroic pushback since February 2022 and its application for membership have revived enlargement as a geopolitical tool. Most EU leaders now recognize that admitting new, vulnerable members in the post-Soviet space and the western Balkans is first and foremost in Europe's own interest.The challenge now facing the Union is twofold: first, to convince Western Balkan states to return to a reformist path to move their EU admission prospects meaningfully forward. The decision to open accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina soon reflects the realization that too much precious time has already been lost, but the lack of progress regarding Albania and North Macedonia indicates that the current stalemate has yet to be overcome. Second, to prepare the ground for enlargement through internal reform that will enhance EU absorption capacity but also apply strict yet fair conditionality. Given the continued controversy around Hungary and its access to EU money, the Union needs to apply technical criteria that fulfill set milestones whilst mindful of the political repercussions of its actions, and the message this sends to friends and foes alike.

On December 14 and 15, 2023 European Union leaders met for a summit in Brussels. Despite happening multiple times a year, this meeting was historic for the future of EU integration. The EU leaders gave a green light to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and grant candidacy status to Georgia. They also held discussions on several other vital issues, such as the EU's next Strategic Agenda, the ongoing concerning situation in Gaza, the Union's security and defense capabilities, and the mid-term review of the current EU budget (2024-2027), that includes the much need financial lifeline for Ukraine—in the end blocked by Hungary. Our experts share their insights on the results of the Summit and how they set the EU's course for the future.Merissa Khurma, Director at Middle East Program, The Wilson CenterThe ongoing Hamas-Israel war and the wider Palestinian-Israeli conflict was at the top of agenda during last week's EU Summit. While more EU members voted for a ceasefire at the United Nations General Assembly last week, the EU failed to unify at the summit around ending hostilities. Those in favor of a ceasefire have indicated growing concerns over the surging number of innocent civilians killed by Israel's military operations in Gaza as well as the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis in the besieged strip. Their argument is that taking such a stance will empower the EU to play a more integral role in diplomatic, humanitarian, and developmental efforts post war. The EU is one of the largest donors to the Palestinian people, through the Palestinian Authority that rules over the West Bank but has also long been a supporter of Israel and its right to defend itself against Hamas and other militant factions listed as terrorist organizations by the EU, the United States and other countries worldwide. Striking a balance during this war has proven challenging, precisely because different EU member governments have taken divergent positions. Countries such as Germany and Austria have held steadfast in their ironclad support of Israel, while others such as Ireland and Belgium have been critical of Israel's military campaign in Gaza and called on Israel, rather emphatically, to respect international law. Many member countries in the EU have also witnessed waves of protests calling for a ceasefire as well as the release of the hostages taken by Hamas on October 7th that have shaken the Palestinian-Israeli and wider regional arena, which remains to be integral for Europe's national security. The EU remains to be a critical market for Israel as well as other countries in the MENA region and up until this attack and the ensuing war, the EU was seen a lot more favorably than the United States in varying public opinion polls of the region. The EU remains to be a critical partner in any diplomatic efforts led by the United States or the international community to prioritize a political solution to the longstanding Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Both the EU and the United States have reiterated their commitment to the two-state solution that is adopted by the Palestinian Authority as well many other countries across the Arab and Muslim world. The ongoing war and the divides across the region as well as in Europe highlights the importance of the EU's pre-October 7th efforts on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September to resuscitates diplomatic peace process through a comprehensive peace package that results in an independent Palestinian state living side by side to Israel in peace and security. It is imperative that the EU stays on course to play that role even as the going gets tough. It is the only path to peace.Nicholas Lokker, Research Associate in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)The historic decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine is a very welcome signal of the European Union's willingness to respond strategically to the geopolitical shock of Russia's full-scale invasion. Yet as it moves forward with Kyiv's integration, the EU can no longer continue to ignore the elephant in the room when it comes to enlargement—namely, the ongoing stalemate in the Russia-Ukraine war.As long as active fighting continues, full EU membership will not be possible for Ukraine, given that the bloc's mutual defense clause would require other member states to become directly involved in the conflict. While EU leaders are well aware of this potential issue, the debate on enlargement has so far refrained from directly addressing it. Instead, they seem to be operating under the assumption of future peace in Ukraine. This is most obvious in European Council President Charles Michel's promise of membership by 2030—a date by which peace is by no means guaranteed.Rather than making promises it may be unable to keep, the EU should find pragmatic ways to integrate Ukraine even while fighting continues. This will mean pursuing forms of progressive or gradual accession, which while frequently proposed, have yet to make it on to the EU's high-level political agenda. Offering Kyiv (and other candidates) benefits of integration prior to full membership could help sustain the momentum of the enlargement process, even if it takes time to overcome the thornier barriers in its way (which, in addition to the war, also include the need for reform to the EU's institutional functioning).However, partial integration in the short-term cannot replace the ultimate goal of full integration in the long-term—an understandable fear that has so far prevented the concept from gaining enough support. The EU must therefore strike the right balance in its approach, making clear to Ukraine that although it remains committed to welcoming it as a full member once peace is reestablished, it will meanwhile work to bring Kyiv as close as possible to the bloc under current conditions.Iren Marinova, PhD Candidate in Political Science, Colorado State UniversityAmong several strategic topics that were discussed at the European Council Summit on December 14 and 15 in Brussels, one of them was the EU's Strategic Agenda over the next 5 years. With the upcoming European Parliament elections and the change of the Commission in 2024, a question that will undoubtedly be asked relates to the geopolitical role and ambitions of the EU and whether they will persist or change over the next five years. In a period of continuous crises, security threats, and global order shifts, the Summit outcomes on some critical foreign policy issues hold important clues to this matter.First of all, the idea of a "geopolitical" EU remains murky. Attempts have been made to provide clarity by addressing some scholarly concerns about the nature and implementation of the concept. Specifically, it has been presented as a more "realistic" vision of the world by the EU that relatively moves away from previous rather "naïve" over-reliance on the power of economic interdependence and towards a sobering realization of the true nature of the international system based on competition and conflict. It also means being ready to take risks and face the consequences. A question that is rarely asked, however, concerns the perceptions and visions of EU member states and their leadership on what "geopolitical" EU should and could look like.The historic achievement from the Summit is undoubtedly the agreement to open membership talks with Ukraine. Simultaneously, the highly anticipated €50 billion aid package meant to support Ukraine could not pass. In both situations, the deciding common denominator was one and the same— Hungary's Viktor Orbán—who continues to play the role of the rogue European leader in high-stakes matters. In the first case, he had to exit the room for the decision to pass, while he decided to block the financial package in the second. Whether Orbán will be persuaded to lift his veto in the next round of talks in January, or whether the EU will find other ways to circumvent him will be a key issue to observe in the coming weeks. With the uncertainty surrounding the United States' commitment to the Ukrainian war effort and the country's upcoming tumultuous election year, the EU's ability to find ways to continue its support for Ukraine would be important not just for Kyiv, but for the EU's "geopolitical" vision and its long-term security.Another concerning outcome of the Summit was the inability to achieve consensus on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza in light of several member states' call for ceasefire. The lack of a decision on the matter demonstrates a persistent division among member states that continues to call into question the EU's vision for being a key geopolitical player on a regional and a global stage.Whether the EU has become more "geopolitical" or whether it will transform itself into a "geopolitical power" and what that means is still open to interpretation and remains to be seen. A question that deserves attention is what the concept means in theory and practice to the member states and if a common vision on the matter can be achieved.European Council President talking to journalist immediately after the approval to open the accession negotiation with Ukraine and Moldova, December 14, 2023.Image CreditMaša Ocvirk, Program Coordinator at Global Europe Program, the Wilson CenterLast week's meeting of European Union leaders in Brussels was historic. The decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova is a high water mark for EU enlargement. However, as uncertainty on this and other decisions prevailed until the last moment, it also—more than ever before—showed a clear need for internal EU reforms. While the Council conclusions do recognize this need, it is only in the context of welcoming new member states into the Union. In the current geopolitical context, the need for EU institutions to function effectively should be reason enough on its own terms, the enlargement momentum only adding to the urgency of internal EU reform. The future of enlargement as well as the EU's capability to act might otherwise be at stake. Prime Minister Orban walking out amid the vote on the future of Ukraine's path toward EU membership cannot be a sustainable solution to reach decisions. Hungary's later decision to block the approval of the Ukraine Facility—a crucial financial lifeline for Ukraine—and with that postponing the adoption of the revised EU budget to February 1, 2024, is a case in point.The EU is beginning to run out of symbolic options to show support for Ukraine. By opening the negotiations, where each further step needs unanimity from member states, progress becomes increasingly more intertwined. The latest EU Summit should therefore be a wake-up call, if the EU wants to continue having EU enlargement as its most important and successful geopolitical tool. 2024 will be a defining year for the EU in many ways, let's hope one of them is getting closer to answering the call of history.Robin S. Quinville, Director of Global Europe Program, the Wilson CenterIn September's "State of the Union" speech, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen challenged Europeans to "answer the call of history." European Union enlargement, she emphasized, was the future–for Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkans, and Georgia. History demanded that the EU "work on completing our Union.And the EU has been working. November's Enlargement report set the stage for the December Summit; it recommended opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. The recommendation was a powerful recognition of the tough reform decisions both Ukraine and Moldova have taken, specifically to convince the EU they are also ready to tackle the demanding accession process.Despite the report's strong recommendation, the December 14-15 Summit meeting was a nail-biter. Hungary signaled early it could play the spoiler, stalling negotiations. But in the end, Hungary split its decision–allowing the EU to open negotiations but blocking much-needed funding for besieged Ukraine. Individual EU countries have indicated they will step up bilateral efforts, and the EU will revisit this issue in January. The process is a strong reminder to both EU institutions and the member states: they can no longer paper over the long-standing divergence between Hungary's government and the EU's values. Managing Hungary is the EU's new challenge. Dr. Dimitris Tsarouhas, Research Director at Center for EU and Transatlantic Studies, Virginia Tech and Adjunct Professor at Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown UniversityLast week's European Council was a vital demonstration of Europe's steadfast support to Ukraine's cause. Opening accession talks with Ukraine (and Moldova) and awarding Georgia the candidate country status was far from a foregone conclusion, given well-documented objections by Hungary's Prime Minister Orban, the inherent complexity that each enlargement entails, and the war-related fatigue that has settled in the west as we approached the conflict's second anniversary. By use of a highly creative and rarely used formula ten years after the Euromaidan, 26 EU leaders circumvented Hungarian objections and sent out a powerful message: the future of Ukraine and Moldova lies irrevocably in Europe. President Zelensky's enthusiastic reaction to the decision indicates that, for Ukrainians, the decision is far from only symbolic: Europe has embraced them and their search for belonging in a community of values they can call their own is over.Of course, this isn't to suggest all is done and dusted: accession talks will last unpredictably long, admission remains subject to veto players obstructing progress, and EU public opinion is wary of admitting more net "takers" from the EU budget. However, Ukraine's heroic pushback since February 2022 and its application for membership have revived enlargement as a geopolitical tool. Most EU leaders now recognize that admitting new, vulnerable members in the post-Soviet space and the western Balkans is first and foremost in Europe's own interest.The challenge now facing the Union is twofold: first, to convince Western Balkan states to return to a reformist path to move their EU admission prospects meaningfully forward. The decision to open accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina soon reflects the realization that too much precious time has already been lost, but the lack of progress regarding Albania and North Macedonia indicates that the current stalemate has yet to be overcome. Second, to prepare the ground for enlargement through internal reform that will enhance EU absorption capacity but also apply strict yet fair conditionality. Given the continued controversy around Hungary and its access to EU money, the Union needs to apply technical criteria that fulfill set milestones whilst mindful of the political repercussions of its actions, and the message this sends to friends and foes alike.