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High costs have long been seen as motivating conflict participants to seek peace. This article discusses two types of deviations from the 'hurting-stalemate' logic: negotiations in the absence of high costs and non-negotiation in the face of high costs. Two prominent explanations for these deviations are discussed and evaluated, initially through a statistical analysis of peace overtures in intrastate conflicts and then through a case study of the Indian civil war in Kashmir. The results suggest that theoretical explanations focusing on the preferences and political strength of leaders have traction at all levels of violence. Variables associated with shifts in perception, such as leadership change or political shocks, seem to have different effects as the level of violence in a conflict changes. Adapted from the source document.

NUEVO LEÓN IS A RELATIVELY RICH NORTHERN MEXICAN STATE, where incomes are much more equally distributed than in other parts of the country. For several years—prior to the declaration of a war on drugs by the Mexican government and the subsequent exponential increase in drug violence1—major political conflict had been almost absent in this region. The state showed a relatively stable political situation that was reflected in a fair degree of cohesion among the different social-economic-political groups and actors. The following two chapters explain political cohesion—or the relative absence of high-intensity political conflicts—in Nuevo León in the second half of the twentieth century and first six years of the twenty-first century, and identify its main causes. Such an explanation begins with a brief account of Nuevo León's history and a description of the state's social, economic, and political context.

As police with tear gas and water cannons fuel unrest across Turkey, it seems that many eyes are wearily cast over Europe's favourite neighbour, soon to join the list of potentially unstable Middle-East nations. Yet even as Erdogan's messy power play brings Turkey's democratic survivability into question, the nation's solar energy industry is breaking new ground and massive nuclear power capacity is quietly being prepared to relieve the nation's energy import dependency. In Brazil, riots breaking out over a transport price hike reflect the pressures of inflation and widespread corruption: an outburst fuelled by a long history of mismanagement and ineffective policy at state and federal levels. Nevertheless, big plans are underway for the expanding of Brazil's power grid, set to underwrite national economic growth into 2030 and beyond. Behind these gruelling scenes of democratic upheaval, lie two distinct cases of energy policy in the making, in spite of overt political turmoil. This post highlights two instances of critical energy policy, unfolding behind the scenes.

Abstract
High costs have long been seen as motivating conflict participants to seek peace. This article discusses two types of deviations from the "hurting-stalemate" logic: negotiations in the absence of high costs and non-negotiation in the face of high costs. Two prominent explanations for these deviations are discussed and evaluated, initially through a statistical analysis of peace overtures in intrastate conflicts and then through a case study of the Indian civil war in Kashmir. The results suggest that theoretical explanations focusing on the preferences and political strength of leaders have traction at all levels of violence. Variables associated with shifts in perception, such as leadership change or political shocks, seem to have different effects as the level of violence in a conflict changes.