Suchergebnisse

This article examines the responses of sub-national governments to international agreements that severely reduce their policy discretion. I focus on their decision to subject public procurement to international competition by joining the Agreement of Government Procurement (GPA) of the World Trade Organization. In a public procurement market, a government becomes both a market participant and a market regulator. I argue that the propensity of governments to join the GPA, thus reducing their discretion as market regulators, depends on the degree of local political competition. Studying state governments in the United States, I find that the degree of political competition positively affects not only the propensity to join the GPA but also the amount of procurement that a government subjects to international competition. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract The much studied relationship between domestic rivalry and export performance consists of those supporting a national‐champion rationale, and those supporting a rivalry rationale. While the empirical literature generally supports the positive effects of domestic rivalry, the national‐champion rationale actually rests on firmer theoretical ground. We address this inconsistency by providing a theoretical framework that illustrates three paths via which domestic rivalry translates into enhanced international exports. Furthermore, empirical tests on the world airline industry elicit the existence of one particular path – an enhanced firm performance effect – that connects domestic rivalry with improved international exports.

602International organizations — Immunity — Jurisdictional immunity — Scope and extent — Principles on which immunity of organizations based — Comparison with State immunity — Whether immunity of organizations extends to acts iure gestionis — Contract of employment — Interpreter — Whether employment of interpreter sufficiently closely connected with decision-making process within organization to be covered by immunity — International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies — Paris Agreement establishing the Centre, 1962 — Reservation by Italy — European Convention on State Immunity, 1972 — Statement of rules of customary international lawTreaties — Reservations — Validity and effect of reservation — Reservation included in annex to agreement — Whether accepted by other parties — The law of Italy

This book explores the emergence, change, and consolidation of institutional restraints on power. It argues that combining the traditional focus on efforts to acquire power with the "Lockean" focus on restraining power offers a more complete depiction of international politics, and shifts focus away from the actions of a handful of powerful states.

This paper examines countries' free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and, second, countries do not have complete information about other countries' non-compliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the country leading the negotiations of the international agreement can reveal its own non-compliance costs through the commitment level it signs in the IEA. Our results show that countries' probability of joining the IEA is increasing in the free-riding benefits they can obtain from other countries' compliance, and decreasing in the cost of not complying with the initial terms of the agreement. This paper shows that, when free-riding incentives are strong enough, there is no equilibrium in which all countries join the IEA. Despite not joining the IEA, however, countries invest in clean technologies. Finally, we relate our results with some common observations in international negotiations.