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In an outcome that appeared unlikely just weeks ago, the Senate passed the $95 billion national security supplemental on Tuesday morning, by a vote of 70-29. Whether the bill will eventually become law remains an open question.The legislation — which included $60 billion in aid for Ukraine, approximately $14 billion in security assistance for Israel, $9.2 billion in humanitarian aid for Gazans and people in other war zones, and almost $5 billion in aid for partners in the Indo-Pacific — received support from 22 Republicans and 48 Democratic senators. Two Democrats, along with Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), voted against the package in opposition to the money being sent to Israel as it conducts its retaliatory war in Gaza which has so far resulted in over 28,000 deaths, according to the Gazan health ministry. Among Republicans, support slowly grew during a series of procedural votes, but ultimately less than half of the caucus voted for a bill that was supported by most of party leadership in the Senate. For months, the next tranche of Ukraine aid has been hanging in the balance. After a tumultuous few days, there now appears to be the chance of passage, though the road ahead is murky. Earlier in February, the Senate —which has largely been more supportive of continued aid for Ukraine than has the House — had devised to include border security measures as a way to convince skeptical Republicans to support aid for Ukraine.But the bill was dead essentially as soon as it landed, with a large group of Republicans opposing the border language, which had been negotiated by Sens. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), Kyrsten Sinema (I-Ariz.), and James Lankford (R-Okla.) . Within two days Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, (R-Ky.), who had earlier championed the legislation, acknowledged that "we have no chance to make a law" from the current proposal. Instead, the Senate returned to the Biden administration's plan A, by bringing his sprawling foreign aid package to the floor. A group of Republicans, led by Sens. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), J.D. Vance (R-Okla.), and Mike Lee (R-Utah) used procedural tools to drag the process out, opposing the quick passage of the bill and what they see as a misguided push to keep funding Kyiv's war effort. "It was the bipartisan foreign policy consensus, the experts, that got us into a 20 year war in Afghanistan, where American taxpayers, for two decades, funded things like how to turn Afghanistan into a flowering democracy, or how to ensure that the Afghans had proper American thoughts about gender in the 21st century. Well, maybe that was a waste of money, and maybe the experts were wrong," Vance said during a floor speech on Monday. ""Now, those experts have a new crusade. Now those experts have a new thing that American taxpayers must fund and must fund indefinitely. And it is called the conflict in Ukraine." Following an overnight filibuster, the Senate eventually passed the bill. McConnell declared victory on Tuesday morning. "Today, we faced a clear test of that resolve. Our adversaries want America to decide that reinforcing allies and partners is not in our interest, and that investing in strategic competition is not worth it. They want us to take hard-earned credibility and light it on fire," the minority leader said in a statement. "History settles every account. And today, on the value of American leadership and strength, history will record that the Senate did not blink."Getting this legislation through the House, however, presents another, likely even more difficult, test. Speaker of the House Mike Johnson (R-La.) said late on Monday in a statement that the House will "work its own will on these important matters," and that "America deserves better than the Senate's status quo." Johnson has maintained that the supplemental should include border security provisions, but he has also said that he does want to support Kyiv.If the legislation is ever brought to a vote, it is likely to have enough votes, but Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.), an opponent of Ukraine aid, has pledged to use a "motion to vacate" to remove Johnson from the speakership if he allows a vote on funding Kyiv. Accusations that he had made a "secret deal" with Biden to send more aid to Ukraine was partially responsible for ending Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) term as Speaker last year.To get around this roadblock, congressional Democrats have floated voting to keep Johnson in power if he allows a vote on the national security spending package to proceed. Alternatively, strong supporters of Ukraine in the House could use a discharge petition to overcome opponents of the legislation — a process that can allow a House majority to bypass leadership and force floor action on a bill that has been stuck in committee (RS explained in more detail how this process could work last year).

Abstrak Surabaya memiliki potensi perdagangan ikan hias yang besar di Jl irian barat. Pedagang ikan hias di Jl irian barat merupakan PKL yang sudah berdagang secara turun temurun. Relokasi ke Pasar ikan hias Gunungsari dilakukan untuk memperbaiki kualitas lokasi dan juga meminimalisasi kemacetan akibat dari lokasi sebelumnya. Pemerintah Surabaya membuat kebijakan berupa stan dalam gedung diperuntukkan pedagang asli Surabaya sedangkan pedagang dari luar Surabaya hanya boleh menempati stan luar gedung terbatas beraktifitas pada hari Rabu dan Sabtu. Pedagang di luar gedung disebut pedagang grosiran. Tujuan penelitian ini yaitu mendeskripsikan karakteristik pedagang ikan hias grosiran di pasar ikan hias Gunungsari Surabaya menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan pendekatan fenomenologi. Pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan cara wawancara mendalam, observasi dan studi dokumentasi. Teknik analisis data dilakukan dengan tiga tahapan yaitu reduksi data, penyajian data dan kesimpulan. Kemudian untuk teknik keabsahan data menggunakan empat tahapan yaitu kredibilitas, transferabilitas, dependabilitas dan konfirmabilitas. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa karakteristik sosial tingkat pendidikan pedagang grosiran mayoritas SMA/SMK, keterampilan mereka termasuk minim sehingga hanya berdagang yang bisa dilakukan. Usaha berdagang ikan hias sudah ada sejak tahun 1985 menjadikan berdagang ikan hias tradisi keluarga secara turun temurun. Ikan hias mudah didapat dari daerah asal dan posisi pasar ikan hias Gunungsari sebagai pasar ikan hias terbesar di Jawa Timur. Keterkaitan anggota menjadi solusi tenaga kerja/rekan usaha terpercaya karena ikut berkecimpung dalam usaha berdagang ikan hias. karakteristik ekonomi pendapatan adalah alasan utama memilih berdagang ikan hias. Beban tanggungan keluarga adalah pengeluaran utama dalam berdagang ikan hias. Modal usaha didapat dari dana sendiri fasilitas pinjaman bank atau pinjaman dari petani/pengepul ikan untuk membawa ikan hias terlebih dahulu dan dibayar setelah terjual. Faktor pendorong motif berdagang menunjukkan Banyaknya penduduk sekitar juga berdagang ikan hias dan pekerjaan turun temurun. adanya petani/pengepul ikan hias di lokasi tempat tinggal. Relokasi yang dibuat pemerintah menjadikan tidak ada pilihan lain selain berdagang di pasar ikan hias Gunungsari Surabaya. Harga yang ditawarkan lebih murah dari pedagang stan gedung menjadikan pedagang ikan hias grosiran membuat konsumen tertarik membeli dalam jumlah besar atau reseller. Koperasi dibentuk dengan tujuan menyelaraskan harga dan membentuk kerjasama dalam menjual diantara pedagang grosiran menjadi faktor pendorong mereka tetap berdagang di pasar ikan hias Gunungsari Kata Kunci : Karakteristik pedagang ikan hias, pedagang ikan hias grosiran Abstract Surabaya have a Great potential aquarium fish market on West irian street. Merchant in West irian street also a street vendor and trade as family tradition for generations. Relocation to Gunungsari aquarium fish market is done to improve the quality of the location and also minimize traffic jams. Surabaya's goverment made a policy which native merchant may use intended both inside the main building while traders from outside Surabaya may only occupy a booth outside the limited activity on Wednesdays and Saturdays. Outside traders also called merchant wholesale. The purpose of this study is to describe the characteristics of aquarium fish wholesale traders in aquarium fish market Gunungsari Surabaya using qualitative method with phenomenological approach. Data collection using indepth interview, observation and study documentation. Data analysis techniques uses three stages namely, reduction, data display and conclusion. Data validity techniques uses four stages namely, credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. The results showed that the social characteristics of educational level wholesalers majority of SMA / SMK, they possesed minimal skills so that only tradeis the only thing the possibly done. Aquarium fish trade effort has been around since 1985 making aquarium fish trade family tradition for generations. Aquarium fish easily obtained from the area of origin and Gunungsari aquarium fish market position as the largest aquarium fish market in East Java. The close ties beetwen member to be the solution of labor / business partners reliable for participating in the business of aquarium fish trade. economic characteristics of income is the main reason for choosing the aquarium fish trade. The burden of family responsibilities is a major expense in the aquarium fish trade. Venture capital derived from its own funds or loan bank loan facilities of farmers / fish collectors to bring the fish in advance and paid after selling. Factors driving motive trade shows number of people around also trade of aquarium fish and jobs hereditary. There farmer / collector of aquarium fish in the location of residence. Relocation which made the government makes no other choice but to trade in aquarium fish market Gunungsari Surabaya. The price is cheaper than building a booth traders make aquarium fish wholesale traders make consumers interested in buying in bulk or resellers. Cooperative was formed with the aim of aligning prices and establish cooperation between the wholesaler in selling the driving factor they still trade in aquarium fish market Gunungsari Keywords: Characteristics of aquarium fish merchant, merchant wholesale aquarium fish

L'obiettivo di questa ricerca è di mettere a confronto la giuria popolare francese con quella italiana sviluppando uno studio socio-antropologico basato sulla pratica giudiziaria osservabile nelle corte d'assise. Si è cercato di mostrare le differenze nel modo di vivere l'esperienza di giurato osservando accuratamente, per ciascuno dei due contesti, il rituale giudiziario, le interazioni e le relazioni tra componenti laici e togati presenti durante una sessione. Quali sono i principali risultati che emergono dal paragone delle giurie popolari francesi e italiane? Ne emergono soprattutto tre. Primo, sebbene ci siano delle somiglianze dell'impianto teorico su cui si fondano i due sistemi della giuria popolare, l'osservazione del "diritto in movimento" rivela quanto il loro funzionamento pratico sia diverso. Si descrivono nei dettagli i meccanismi del funzionamento della giuria popolare mettendoli in rapporto con la cultura giuridica di ogni paese mostrandoci, allo specchio, le caratteristiche dei loro costumi democratici. Secondo, la giuria popolare appare come un'"istituzione di sociabilità" per chi vi prende parte. La dimensione sociale influisce sull'"esperienza autentica" vissuta dai giurati agendo direttamente sul modo di percepire la sofferenza altrui e del funzionamento dei processi democratici. Terzo, il confronto tra giuria francese e italiana ci permette di porre l'accento sull'attuale modernità di questa istituzione e sulle sue implicazioni nel funzinamento della corte d'assise. La giuria popolare può essere considerata come un'"istituzione buona" in grado di contribuire all'attendibilità del procedimento giuridico, di conferire autorevolezza alla pratica quotidiana dei magistrati togati e di indurre la consapevolezza, in ogni giudice popolare, dell'importanza della sua partecipazione attiva per il mantenimento del legame sociale. ; The purpose of the research is to compare French and Italian juries through a socio-anthropological study of judicial practice in criminal courts. It reports on the different experiences of jurors by carefully studying court procedure, as well as the interactions and relations between laymen and legal professionals within a session. What are the main findings that emerge from comparing French and Italian juries? They can broadly be divided into three parts. Firstly, observation of "the law in motion" reveals that, despite the theoretical similarities between the two systems, the practicalities of involving citizens in judging crimes are different in France and Italy. It is then possible to examine the mechanics in view of the legal culture in both countries and, in return, the characteristics of their juries give us an insight into France and Italy's democratic values. Secondly, juries appear to be a "socializing institution" for individuals who are required to attend court. This element of socialization has a decisive influence on the "authentic experience" of jurors, making it a "direct experience" of the suffering of others and the functioning of democracy. Thirdly, comparing French and Italian juries provides an opportunity to reflect on modern times and the current issues surrounding the presence of laymen within the judiciary. Juries may be seen as a "worthy" institution able to restore the credibility of the judicial system, stimulate legal professionals and raise individual awareness amongst jurors of the importance of their participation in maintaining social cohesion. ; L'objectif de cette recherche est de comparer les jurys criminels français et italien à travers une étude socio-anthropologique de la pratique judiciaire observable dans les cours d'assises. Il s'agit de rendre compte des différents aspects de l'expérience vécue par les jurés en étudiant minutieusement le rituel judiciaire ainsi que les interactions et relations qui se jouent entre les profanes et les professionnels de la justice le temps d'une session. Quels sont les résultats principaux qui émergent de la comparaison des jurys populaires français et italien ? Ils sont essentiellement de trois ordres. Premièrement, l'observation du « droit en mouvement » révèle que, malgré les similitudes des deux systèmes étudiés sur le plan théorique, la mise en œuvre pratique de la participation des citoyens au jugement des crimes est différente entre la France et l'Italie. Il est alors possible d'en détailler les mécanismes de fonctionnement au regard de la culture juridique de chacun des pays étudiés et en retour, les caractéristiques de chacun des jurys nous apportent des informations sur les mœurs démocratiques française et italienne. Deuxièmement, le jury populaire apparaît comme une « institution de sociabilité » pour les individus appelés à siéger temporairement à la cour d'assises. Cette dimension socialisante influence de manière décisive l'« expérience authentique » vécue par les jurés, et en fait une « expérience directe » de la souffrance d'autrui et du fonctionnement de la démocratie. Troisièmement, la comparaison des jurys criminels français et italien permet de rappeler la modernité et les enjeux actuels liés à la présence des profanes au sein de l'institution judiciaire. Le jury populaire peut être considéré comme une « institution bonne » capable à la fois de redonner de la crédibilité à l'institution judiciaire, de fournir aux acteurs professionnels la possibilité de « ré enchanter » leur quotidien, et enfin d'orchestrer une prise de conscience individuelle pour les jurés sur l'importance de leur participation pour le maintien du lien social.

In a previous note on these same pages, we made reference to Obama's unpredictable use of executive power and his tendency to overuse it for certain domestic policies, while deferring to the military and foreign policy establishmenton issues he is ambivalent about, such as the international use of force. We also alluded to his tendency to isolate himself and rely excessively on his own judgment in shaping policy, to the detriment of his relations with staff, cabinet and other leaders. The long-drawn decision to seek Congressional approval before striking Syria is a case study of these proclivities.After resisting calls for intervention in Syria by Senate Republican "hawks"and foreign policy specialists since 2011, a year ago Obama conceded that, in spite of his aversion to intervene in "sectarian struggles",certain actions such as the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime against the opposition would constitute a "red line" which, once crossed, would automatically bring about an armed response by the United States. This week he had to face the consequences of his own words.Whenrobust evidence of the use of sarin gas by Bashar Al Assad's forces in rebel occupied territory was produced, the President had no choice but to spendthelast week of the month of Augustfrantically building a case for immediate intervention. Acting simultaneously as Chief Executive, policy shaper and his own spokesman, he used several venues, including an NPR interview, to announce to the American people that the time had come to act.But while Secretary of State John Kerry made a compelling speech on the need to act swiftly to punish the "moral obscenity" committed by the Assad regime, Obama appeared much more circumspect in his appeals to the American people. His early words conveyed both his outrage at the disproportionate actions by Assad as well as his empathy with the war-weary American citizens. In private, he confided he had qualms both about the legality and the political legitimacy of military action. In public, his argument focused on the violation of an international convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and the absolutely unavoidable duty to enforce it. But the fact that UN inspectors had not completed their field report on the attack, coupled with the refusal of the UN Security Council to consider armed action, gave him pause and forced him to confront his own doubts once again.In the meantime, momentum was building in the United States where, according to press reports, it was all but certain there would be a military strike to "punish and deter" the Syrian regime, by Labor Day weekend. GOP Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham were vocal in their support of intervention but demanded more than just a punitive strike and showed some impatience towards the President's pondering an action that should have been decided long ago.Abroad, Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia were in favor of the US action. As it is widely known, Russia was against it and that is why the US had to bypass the UN Security Council where Russia has veto power. While NATO allies all offered strong support (indeed, both France and Britain were the first to insist on support for the rebels a year ago), Prime Minister David Cameron was delivered a strong blow when he lost a vote in the House of Commons, with some of his own backbenchers voting against intervention. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, facing a coming election and against the perennial background of German Basic Law constraints, had already told the President that Germany would stand in the sidelines, while offering moral support. The long shadow cast by the Iraqi war around the world once again became evident. But the French President, not required by the Fifth Republic Constitution to consult the legislature, and encouraged by France's recent successful actions in Mali and Libya, remained firm.By Friday, Obama's tortured deliberations came to an end as he abruptly changed courses. Against the advice of his National Security and political advisors team, he made a dramatic announcement from the Rose Garden: his decision on the need for a narrow punitive action against Syria had been made, he said, but he had decided to ask for Congressional authorization first. As Commander in Chief, and in spite of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, he is not obligated to do this. He thus appears to be shifting responsibility onto the legislature while simultaneouslybuying some time to explore diplomatic solutions in the upcoming G-20 summer.The cerebral constitutional law professor and the risk- taking politician in him have made a Faustian bargain. If Congress authorizes the use of force, he will have both legal and political cover for his action while at the same time fulfilling his moral duty of punishing a violator of the Chemical Weapons Convention and of Humanitarian law. If they vote No, he can just blame them for his own lack of action and use all the power of the Presidency on his domestic agenda.It is, in any case, a big gamble, one that has the potential of weakening him and turning him into a lame duck for the rest of his Presidency. The GOP is internally divided on many issues, among them foreign policy, where conservative ideologies run the gamut from minimalist /isolationist to neo-cons/regime- change interventionists and all the shades in-between. And the far left in Obama's own party is against intervention. So there is no guarantee he will get Congressional approval. The cost of losing this vote is enormous: it may set a strong precedent in diminishing Presidential prerogatives.To be fair to the President and his vacillating stance, this is not an easy decision. None of the world leaders have made a compelling public case for a strategic need of intervention in Syria. The proposed limited "punitive" strike will most likely be inconclusive: it will not deter further extreme actions by Assad, who has now been given time to disperse his military assets and capabilities. The strike will not significantly degrade his capacity to fight, and there will be little change in his main goal, namely, to destroy the opposition and regain total control of the country.This is a fight to the end by both sides. If overthrown, Assad and his Alawite supporters (as well as the Christians who have traditionally been under his protection) will be massacred. There are no desirable outcomes in this conflict. The rebels are divided and the biggest group is that ofthe jihadists with strong support of Al Qaeda. While Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel are on the side of the United States and want a moderate alternative to the Assad regime, Iran, to an extent Iraq, and Hezbollah in Lebanon are on the dictator's side (as, incongruously, is Venezuela). The Palestinian group Hamas, previously favoring Assad has now changed sides and is supporting the rebels. So in many ways this is a war by proxy that could become a generalized regional war. There is no indication that the President or anyone else has a political plan or a diplomatic effort in mind for the post-strike scenario.However, US inaction at this time undermines the security of its allies, especially Israel. Even though Netanyahu has adopted a "no comment" stance and hasn't, accordingly, said a word on this issue, other Israeli politicians are worrying out loud about the implications the US lack of resolve will have on other "red lines": Will the United States act when Iran crosses the nuclear threshold? Or will Israel find itself facing Iran alone?They bitterly remind themselves of Obama's speech in Jerusalem, in March this year, when he said in Hebrew: "Atem lo levad" ("You are not alone"). They are very skeptical, now more than ever, that the President will match his lofty rhetoric with action.In the United States the momentum is gone, Congress won't reconvene until September 9, and the President is using the last week of summer to energetically lobby House and Senate leaders and persuade skeptics through intelligence briefings. Urgent issues in the domestic agenda will thus have to be postponed.What no one, either at home or abroad denies, is that the credibility of the Presidency and with it, that of the United States, is at stake. International support for the operation is unlikely to improve. A negative vote by Congress will further weaken the President and may complicate the White House legislative agenda, where he will have to spend all his political capital and still,perhaps, fall short.In a keynote speech to the National Defense University earlier this year, Obama expressed the need to chart a new way in American foreign policy, one that would end the "perpetual wartime footing" that characterized the post 9-11 era, after G.W. Bush got a virtual blank check from Congress in the use of military force and intelligence gathering. So far, Obama has ended two protracted unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is clear he will not engage in regime change. But a new foreign policy strategy has not crystallized yet. There is no Obama doctrine, no overall framework to guide his decisions and give predictability to his actions.His whole approach to the Middle East, the most explosive region in the planet today, is misconceived. His tepid reaction to the Egyptian situation had already given some approximation of how reluctant he is about taking sides in conflicts in the region. Syrian use of chemical weapons has confirmed his ambivalence and exposed his indecision. At the same time, it has provoked a collapse of American credibility abroad, anduncertainty about its reliability as an ally. Regardless of what follows after this week, his hesitancy will have dire consequences for American foreign policy into the future.The larger problem that looms over the heads of world leaders and that few seem to acknowledge is that this is not about Syria or Egypt or Libya or Yemen or Tunisia as separate conflicts; it is a regional conflagration that has to be addressedcomprehensively, within the larger regional and international context. All major actors, whether it is Europe, Russia, or China and of course the United States, have a stake in the region and it is in their interest to define the rules of the game and together find an overall solution to this predicament.

The White House released its budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2025 on March 11th, and the news was depressingly familiar: $895 billion for the Pentagon and work on nuclear weapons at the Department of Energy. After adjusting for inflation, that's only slightly less than last year's proposal, but far higher than the levels reached during either the Korean or Vietnam wars or at the height of the Cold War. And that figure doesn't even include related spending on veterans, the Department of Homeland Security, or the additional tens of billions of dollars in "emergency" military spending likely to come later this year. One thing is all too obvious: a trillion-dollar budget for the Pentagon alone is right around the corner, at the expense of urgently needed action to address climate change, epidemics of disease, economic inequality, and other issues that threaten our lives and safety at least as much as, if not more than, traditional military challenges.Americans would be hard-pressed to find members of Congress carefully scrutinizing such vast sums of national security spending, asking tough questions, or reining in Pentagon excess — despite the fact that this country is no longer fighting any major ground wars. Just a handful of senators and members of the House do that work while many more search for ways to increase the department's already bloated budget and steer further contracts into their own states and districts.Congress isn't just shirking its oversight duties: these days, it can't even seem to pass a budget on time. Our elected representatives settled on a final national budget just last week, leaving Pentagon spending at the already generous 2023 level for nearly half of the 2024 fiscal year. Now, the department will be inundated with a flood of new money that it has to spend in about six months instead of a year. More waste, fraud, and financial abuse are inevitable as the Pentagon prepares to shovel money out the door as quickly as possible. This is no way to craft a budget or defend a country.And while congressional dysfunction is par for the course, in this instance it offers an opportunity to reevaluate what we're spending all this money for. The biggest driver of overspending is an unrealistic, self-indulgent, and — yes — militaristic national defense strategy. It's designed to maintain a capacity to go almost everywhere and do almost anything, from winning wars with rival superpowers to intervening in key regions across the planet to continuing the disastrous Global War on Terror, which was launched in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and never truly ended. As long as such a "cover the globe" strategy persists, the pressure to continue spending ever more on the Pentagon will prove irresistible, no matter how delusional the rationale for doing so may be.Defending "the Free World"?President Biden began his recent State of the Union address by comparing the present moment to the time when the United States was preparing to enter World War II. Like President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1941, Joe Biden told the American people that the country now faces an "unprecedented moment in the history of the Union," one in which freedom and democracy are "under attack" both at home and abroad. He disparaged Congress's failure to approve his emergency supplemental bill, claiming that, without additional aid for Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin will threaten not just that country but all of Europe and even the "free world." Comparing (as he did) the challenge posed by Russia now to the threat that Hitler's regime posed in World War II is a major exaggeration that's of no value in developing an effective response to Moscow's activities in Ukraine and beyond.Engaging in such fearmongering to get the public on board with an increasingly militarized foreign policy ignores reality in service of the status quo. In truth, Russia poses no direct security threat to the United States. And while Putin may have ambitions beyond Ukraine, Russia simply doesn't have the capability to threaten the "free world" with a military campaign. Neither does China, for that matter. But facing the facts about these powers would require a critical reassessment of the maximalist U.S. defense strategy that rules the roost. Currently, it reflects the profoundly misguided belief that, on matters of national security, U.S. military dominance takes precedence over the collective economic strength and prosperity of Americans.As a result, the administration places more emphasis on deterring potential (if unlikely) aggression from competitors than on improving relations with them. Of course, this approach depends almost entirely on increasing the production, distribution, and stockpiling of arms. The war in Ukraine and Israel's continuing assault on Gaza have unfortunately only solidified the administration's dedication to the concept of military-centric deterrence.Contractor Dysfunction: Earning More, Doing LessIronically, such a defense strategy depends on an industry that continually exploits the government for its own benefit and wastes staggering amounts of taxpayer dollars. The major corporations that act as military contractors pocket about half of all Pentagon outlays while ripping off the government in a multitude of ways. But what's even more striking is how little they accomplish with the hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars they receive year in, year out. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), from 2020 to 2022, the total number of major defense acquisition programs actually declined even as total costs and average delivery time for new weapons systems increased.Take the Navy's top acquisition program, for example. Earlier this month, the news broke that the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine is already at least a year behind schedule. That sub is the sea-based part of the next-generation nuclear (air-sea-and-land) triad that the administration considers the "ultimate backstop" for global deterrence. As a key part of this country's never-ending arms buildup, the Columbia is supposedly the Navy's most important program, so you might wonder why the Pentagon hasn't implemented a single one of the GAO's six recommendations to help keep it on track.As the GAO report made clear, the Navy proposed delivering the first Columbia-class vessel in record time — a wildly unrealistic goal — despite it being the "largest and most complex submarine" in its history.Yet the war economy persists, even as the giant weapons corporations deliver less weaponry for more money in an ever more predictable fashion (and often way behind schedule as well). This happens in part because the Pentagon regularly advances weapons programs before design and testing are even completed, a phenomenon known as "concurrent development." Building systems before they're fully tested means, of course, rushing them into production at the taxpayer's expense before the bugs are out. Not surprisingly, operations and maintenance costs account for about 70% of the money spent on any U.S. weapons program.Lockheed Martin's F-35 is the classic example of this enormously expensive tendency. The Pentagon just greenlit the fighter jet for full-scale production this month, 23 years (yes, that's not a misprint!) after the program was launched. The fighter has suffered from persistent engine problems and deficient software. But the official go-ahead from the Pentagon means little, since Congress has long funded the F-35 as if it were already approved for full-scale production. At a projected cost of at least $1.7 trillion over its lifetime, America's most expensive weapons program ever should offer a lesson in the necessity of trying before buying.Unfortunately, this lesson is lost on those who need to learn it the most. Acquisition failures of the past never seem to financially impact the executives or shareholders of America's biggest military contractors. On the contrary, those corporate leaders depend on Pentagon bloat and overpriced, often unnecessary weaponry. In 2023, America's biggest military contractor, Lockheed Martin, paid its CEO John Taiclit $22.8 million. Annual compensation for the CEOs of RTX, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and Boeing ranged from $14.5 and $22.5 million in the past two years. And shareholders of those weapons makers are similarly cashing in. The arms industry increased cash paid to its shareholders by 73% in the 2010s compared to the prior decade. And they did so at the expense of investing in their own businesses. Now they expect taxpayers to bail them out to ramp up weapons production for Ukraine and Israel.Reining in the Military-Industrial ComplexOne way to begin reining in runaway Pentagon spending is to eliminate the ability of Congress and the president to arbitrarily increase that department's budget. The best way to do so would be by doing away with the very concept of "emergency spending." Otherwise, thanks to such spending, that $895 billion Pentagon budget will undoubtedly prove to be anything but a ceiling on military spending next year. As an example, the $95 billion aid package for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan that passed the Senate in February is still hung up in the House, but some portion of it will eventually get through and add substantially to the Pentagon's already enormous budget.Meanwhile, the Pentagon has fallen back on the same kind of budgetary maneuvers it perfected at the peak of its disastrous Afghan and Iraq wars earlier in this century, adding billions to the war budget to fund items on the department's wish list that have little to do with "defense" in our present world. That includes emergency outlays destined to expand this country's "defense industrial base" and further supersize the military-industrial complex — an expensive loophole that Congress should simply shut down. That, however, will undoubtedly prove a tough political fight, given how many stakeholders — from Pentagon officials to those corporate executives to compromised members of Congress — benefit from such spending sprees.Ultimately, of course, the debate about Pentagon spending should be focused on far more than the staggering sums being spent. It should be about the impact of such spending on this planet. That includes the Biden administration's stubborn continuation of support for Israel's campaign of mass slaughter in Gaza, which has already killed more than 31,000 people while putting many more at risk of starvation. A recent Washington Post investigation found that the U.S. has made 100 arms sales to Israel since the start of the war last October, most of them set at value thresholds just low enough to bypass any requirement to report them to Congress.The relentless supply of military equipment to a government that the International Court of Justice has said is plausibly engaged in a genocidal campaign is a deep moral stain on the foreign-policy record of the Biden administration, as well as a blow to American credibility and influence globally. No amount of airdrops or humanitarian supplies through a makeshift port can remotely make up for the damage still being done by U.S.-supplied weapons in Gaza.The case of Gaza may be extreme in its brutality and the sheer speed of the slaughter, but it underscores the need to thoroughly rethink both the purpose of and funding for America's foreign and military policies. It's hard to imagine a more devastating example than Gaza of why the use of force so often makes matters far, far worse — particularly in conflicts rooted in longstanding political and social despair. A similar point could have been made with respect to the calamitous U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan that cost untold numbers of lives, while pouring yet more money into the coffers of America's major weapons makers. Both of those military campaigns, of course, failed disastrously in their stated objectives of promoting democracy, or at least stability, in troubled regions, even as they exacted huge costs in blood and treasure.Before our government moves full speed ahead expanding the weapons industry and further militarizing geopolitical challenges posed by China and Russia, we should reflect on America's disastrous performance in the costly, prolonged wars already waged in this century. After all, they did enormous damage, made the world a far more dangerous place, and only increased the significance of those weapons makers. Throwing another trillion dollars-plus at the Pentagon won't change that.This article was republished with permission from TomDispatch.

Hamas's attack on Israel last week was what any reasonable person would consider an atrocity deserving of moral outrage. Hundreds of innocent civilians were killed, and dozens more were taken into captivity. It thus is understandable that such an event would elicit intense emotion and a thirst for revenge.Being understandable is not the same as being wise or effective, for Israel itself or for regional peace and security.Israel has now embarked on a violent offensive against the Gaza Strip and its residents. However, as much as that offensive may be defended as intended to establish deterrence or to destroy a hostile military force, it is in large part an act of raw revenge. It is a national catharsis amid an atmosphere of intense grief and anger.The casualty count from the Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip is rising too fast to venture an up-to-date figure, but Palestinian health authorities reported that as of Monday, 2,800 Palestinians had been killed and 10,000 wounded, with more than half of the dead being women and children. In addition, Israel — which already had maintained a blockade of Gaza — cut off all movement of food, fuel, water, and electricity to the territory. This is quickly generating a humanitarian disaster of a proportion commensurate with the Strip's population of more than two million, with specific consequences ranging from hospitals lacking the supplies and electric power needed to treat the wounded to families running short of food.On top of all this, Israel, through a pre-invasion warning leaflet, has told the more than one million residents of Gaza City and the rest of the northern half of the Strip to head south. Given the lack of food, water, and housing wherever those people could go, such a movement, as U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres has stated, ranges between the "extremely dangerous" and the "impossible." Evacuation does not even buy safety, as indicated by lethal Israeli attacks on convoys that were using what Israel had designated as a "safe route."The scale of physical human suffering in the Gaza Strip already exceeds what Hamas inflicted on Israel last week. And Israel is just getting started as the Israeli aerial assault is likely to transition to a ground offensive.Given the extensive and careful planning that clearly went into the recent Hamas attack, it can be assumed that Hamas's planning did not end there. The group surely anticipated a strong Israeli reprisal, has done all it can to prepare for that reprisal, and has calculated that when the whole episode is over it will have served Hamas's interests more than Israel's. Drawing Israel into an extremely difficult urban warfare campaign on Hamas's own turf may have been one of the group's objectives.The hostages Hamas seized in southern Israel (as many as 150) vastly complicates any Israeli military operation. Hamas claims that Israeli airstrikes already have killed 13 of the hostages — an unconfirmed but plausible claim given the destruction from the airstrikes. The remaining hostages will be in grave danger from a ground assault, regardless of whether Hamas positions them to function as human shields.Animosity across the region and much of the rest of the world will be substantial and will work against Israeli interests and Israeli security. Arab governments will be less inclined than before to expand relations with Israel.In the occupied West Bank — where even before October 7, anger over Israeli policies and actions made the chance of a new popular uprising or intifada significant — heightened anger over more Israeli killing of Palestinian brethren in Gaza increases that chance. There already are signs of the current violence in Gaza spilling over into the West Bank, with at least 46 Palestinians killed and 700 injured in clashes with Israeli security forces and settlers since the Hamas attack.In Gaza itself, an expansion of Israeli-inflicted bloodshed among the Palestinian residents will feed expanded anger against Israel among the remaining residents, with all the potential for new violence that such anger always has entailed. Destruction of Hamas's military capability, even if that could be completely achieved, does not remove the problem. Hamas was never the whole story of violent Palestinian reaction to Israeli policies. Much of the recent rocket fire from Gaza has been carried out by the Palestine Islamic Jihad, a smaller and more radical Gaza-based group. The anger and the violence will find other channels — perhaps through groups and cells not yet formed — even if neither Hamas nor the PIJ were still functional.The Israeli objective in a new ground invasion of Gaza may go beyond "mowing the lawn," to use the Israelis' term for their periodic surges in military attacks against Palestinians, and extend to destroying the ability of Hamas to function any more as Gaza's de facto government. But even if that objective is achieved, then a big unanswered question is, who does govern the Gaza Strip? The Palestinian Authority is widely discredited among Palestinians and seems unable to rise above its residual role as a security auxiliary to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Direct Israeli rule of Gaza would be a prescription for even more resentment over occupation and more potential for violent Israeli-Palestinian clashes.U.S. policy on the crisis shows signs of having been swept up in some of the same emotions and rage as most Israelis have. In this respect, the policy is tracking with a broader mood that the Hamas attack has generated in the American body politic, in which the safest public posture is expression of unflinching support for Israel. It is even more hazardous to one's political health than it usually is to say anything that places the crisis within the context of longstanding Israeli policies toward the Palestinians. Related to this, the Biden policy of essentially going all in with Israel likely has domestic political calculations behind it.The administration's pronouncements have often reduced the crisis to an easy-to-emote-over tale of good versus evil, which ignores likely motivations for what was a carefully calculated attack undertaken in response to Israeli policies and actions.Continuing this theme, administration officials have likened what Hamas did to the Islamic State or ISIS. The brutal tactics that Hamas used during its incursion into southern Israel can indeed be compared to some notorious actions by ISIS, but beyond that the comparison is meaningless. ISIS is not part of any longstanding situation comparable to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. ISIS is an international terrorist group whose ideology and ambitions know no international boundaries.Hamas is a nationalist group seeking political power in a Palestinian state and has no interest in international terrorism beyond that theater. ISIS has never spoken about observing an open-ended truce to live peacefully next to a state that is currently its adversary. Hamas has. ISIS has never competed in, much less won, a free and fair election. Hamas has. Why and how the tactics and objectives of Hamas have evolved into what it displayed this month have to do with peaceful avenues of competition being closed. To reduce the entire conflict into a matter of one set of outrageous tactics is to miss all the other dimensions of that conflict.Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has been calling for de-escalation. Russia and China have called for an immediate cease-fire, and Russia is proposing a U.N. Security Council resolution to that effect.The Biden administration is moving in the opposite direction. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on social media endorsed Turkish efforts to secure a cease-fire, but later deleted the post. While President Biden said on Sunday that Israeli occupation of Gaza would be a "big mistake," current administration policy is to otherwise endorse the escalation of the violence that Israel currently is conducting in the Gaza Strip.The administration should think carefully about how U.S. interests differ from Israeli interests and objectives. Israel violently exacting revenge in this case is not a U.S. interest. Given that the foremost responsibility of a government is ensuring the safety and security of its own citizens, one of the important U.S. interests at stake concerns how some of those citizens may have become hostages in the Gaza Strip and will be greatly endangered by escalated Israeli military attacks.In addition to Americans among the hostages Hamas seized, an estimated 500 to 600 other U.S. citizens — mostly Palestinian Americans — are in the Gaza Strip. They are hostages, too — trapped there after the Israeli shutdown of all movement in and out of the territory, and in serious danger of becoming casualties of Israeli air or ground operations. One of those Americans, a woman whose home is Salt Lake City and currently is stuck in Gaza with her family, said, "I feel like I've been abandoned by my country. We're American citizens and we're not being treated as American citizens."Another U.S. interest is preventing the current warfare to spread regionally. The more that the fighting involving Israelis and Gazans escalates, the greater is the danger of such spread, even though other actors in the region are not seeking a wider war. Those in the U.S. who habitually try to stir up conflict with Iran are using the current crisis to do more stirring. This is despite the fact that no evidence has emerged of any direct Iranian role in the Hamas attack — as attested to most convincingly by official Israeli spokespeople, given that the Israeli government usually is eager to implicate Iran in anything condemnable. Press reports citing sources within the U.S. government indicate that Iranian government officials were surprised by Hamas's action.The Biden administration nonetheless has foolishly picked this moment to draw Iran into the Gaza crisis in a way by reneging at least temporarily on its commitment, under a recent prisoner swap deal that freed five imprisoned Americans, to permit some frozen Iranian assets to be used for humanitarian purposes inside Iran. Accusations by opponents of the administration that this money had some connection, however indirect, with Hamas military operations are patently false, given that none of the money involved had yet been expensed. The administration's move will further damage U.S. credibility regarding a willingness to make good on commitments, thereby making it more difficult for the U.S. to reach beneficial agreements with any other government, not just Iran.The administration evidently wanted to make a critical statement about the longstanding and well-known supply relationship between Iran and Hamas. If a patron that has supplied arms or money to a client is to be punished — to the extent even of previous agreements being reneged upon — this raises a question about yet another U.S. interest at stake in the current crisis: avoiding opprobrium and repercussions stemming from some other state's actions.If Iran is to be condemned for any actions by Hamas, even actions Iran did not instigate or control, then what is the attitude to be taken toward the United States regarding destructive and anger-inducing actions in Gaza by its client Israel, the recipient of voluminous U.S. financial, military, and diplomatic support?The world won't likely remember gentle admonitions from President Biden about observing the rule of law. It will instead focus on the U.S. effectively giving a green light for — and materially assisting — an assault that not only flouts the laws of war but brings death and suffering to thousands of innocent persons.There will be hostile reactions to all this, including from violent extremist groups. Revenge is an urge that is not unique to Israelis. Those who are quick to make comparisons with ISIS should reflect on the fact that probably the most consistent theme in the propaganda, interrogations, and claims of terrorists — including al-Qaida — who have attacked U.S. interests has been U.S. support for Israel and its treatment of the Palestinians.

Contingent liabilities create management problems for governments. They have a cost, but judging what the cost is and whether it is worth incurring is difficult. Except in the case of contingent liabilities created by simple guarantees of debt, governments usually can incur contingent liabilities without budgetary approval or recognition in the governments accounts. So governments may prefer contingent liabilities to other obligations. (The uncertainty surrounding contingent liabilities can work differently. It is well known that PPPs create contingent liabilities, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and others often warn of the risks. The initial reaction of a cautious Ministry of Finance may be to seek to avoid all contingent liabilities.) Management problems also arise once a government has incurred a contingent liability. Projects need to be monitored to reduce risks if possible. Spending on contingent liabilities must sometimes be forecast, despite the difficulty.

Problem setting. According to the Law of Ukraine # 3477-IV «On implementation of judgments and application of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights», 23.02.2006 (Art. 17) the courts of Ukraine apply the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols (hereinafter – Convention, ECHR) and the case-law of the European Court of Human Right (hereinafter – the Court, ECtHR) as the source of law. By the Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine # 431, 10.09.2014 the Government Commissioner on ECtHR matters has been authorized to co-ordinate «the implementation of the Court's judgments, which are the interpretation of norms of Convention and its inalienable part, contain the norms of law and are subject to application in the way of implementation of international treaties». Such positions clearly show the aspiration of Ukraine to strengthen the role of European standards of human rights in national legal order. At the same time the case-law of the ECtHR covers not only the numerous legal standards related to concrete rights and freedoms, but also the doctrinal approaches to the interpretation and application of the ECHR which lay the foundation of the Court's jurisprudence. There is lack of studies of such doctrinal approaches in Ukraine while the conditions of their application at the national level are generally unknown. Resent research and publications analyses. Such doctrinal approaches are well developed in the ECtHR case-law and are deeply explored by European scholars (i. e. R. Bernhardt, D. Gomien, D. Harris, G. Letsas, R. St. J. Macdonald, S. Maringele, F. Matscher, J. McBride, H. Petzold, M. de Salvia, L. Zwaak). Meanwhile a few Ukrainian researchers have paid attention to the problem of principles and methods of interpretation and application of the ECHR (L. Gouseynov, T. Doudash, V. Marmazov, P. Rabinovich, S. Fedic, L. Tsvigoun, S. Shevchouc and some others). The deep analysis of the doctrines, which are developed due to the Court's case-law are absent in Ukrainian jurisprudence. Paper objective. Main objective of the article is to study the doctrine of state's positive obligations to secure the conventional rights and the legal grounds of such obligations under the ECHR law in correlation with the other doctrinal approaches which are used by the ECtHR in the perspective of their implementation on the national level. Paper main body. As the basic concepts and principles (also known as the methods of interpretation and application of the Convention) official on-line resources of the Council of Europe indicate: dynamic purposive interpretation (the concept of "Convention as a Living Instrument"), the autonomous concepts, negative and positive obligations, subsidiarity, proportionality, just satisfaction, "margin of appreciation" of the state, equality of arms, horizontal application of rights and their hierarchy. Among them there are several doctrines (the doctrines of dynamic purposive interpretation, "margin of appreciation" of the state, autonomous concepts and the state's positive obligations) which have been recognized and developed due to the Court's jurisprudence. They accumulate the «unwritten law» of the Convention (as they are not mentioned in the text of ECHR) and aim to ensure the sequence and logic system of promotion and protection of human rights. They are closely interrelated and interdependent. These doctrines are more about the scope and character of the state's obligations under the Convention, rather then the subject to direct application in court proceedings on domestic level. Meanwhile these doctrines provide the means of assessment of compliance of the national policies and legal practice in the field of fundamental rights and freedoms with the European standards. Conclusions of the research. Thus the principle doctrinal approaches to the interpretation and application of the human rights and fundamental freedoms ensure the conceptual and methodological unity of the law of the Convention. Due to the Court's case-law these doctrines obtained official recognition, international authority, validity and credibility as well as the normative (regulative) features. So they shall be incorporated to the national legal order. For that they shall be well-known to all kinds of the state agents (legislative body, state administration and law-enforcement bodies and judiciary) who shall fulfill their duties with respect to the doctrinal standards. Key words: human rights, state's positive obligations, "margin of appreciation" of the state, purposive dynamic interpretation, case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. ; Раскрыто основное содержание доктрины позитивных обязательств государства по гарантированию закреплённых в Конвенции прав и свобод, правовые основания таких обязательств; а также их корреляция с иными доктринальными подходами, на которые опирается Европейский суд по правам человека при толковании и применении Европейской конвенции по правам человека (телеологического динамического толкования, «границ усмотрения» государства, «автономных понятий» и др.) в свете перспектив их практического внедрения на национальном уровне ; Розкрито основний зміст доктрини позитивних зобов'язань держави щодо гарантування викладених у Конвенції прав і свобод та правові підстави таких зобов'язань, а також її кореляція з іншими доктринальними підходами, на які спирається Європейський суд з прав людини при тлумаченні та застосуванні Європейської конвенції з прав людини (телеологічного динамічного тлумачення, «меж розсуду» держави, «автономних понять» та ін.) у світлі перспектив їх практичного впровадження на національному рівні.

Problem setting. According to the Law of Ukraine # 3477-IV «On implementation of judgments and application of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights», 23.02.2006 (Art. 17) the courts of Ukraine apply the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols (hereinafter – Convention, ECHR) and the case-law of the European Court of Human Right (hereinafter – the Court, ECtHR) as the source of law. By the Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine # 431, 10.09.2014 the Government Commissioner on ECtHR matters has been authorized to co-ordinate «the implementation of the Court's judgments, which are the interpretation of norms of Convention and its inalienable part, contain the norms of law and are subject to application in the way of implementation of international treaties». Such positions clearly show the aspiration of Ukraine to strengthen the role of European standards of human rights in national legal order. At the same time the case-law of the ECtHR covers not only the numerous legal standards related to concrete rights and freedoms, but also the doctrinal approaches to the interpretation and application of the ECHR which lay the foundation of the Court's jurisprudence. There is lack of studies of such doctrinal approaches in Ukraine while the conditions of their application at the national level are generally unknown. Resent research and publications analyses. Such doctrinal approaches are well developed in the ECtHR case-law and are deeply explored by European scholars (i. e. R. Bernhardt, D. Gomien, D. Harris, G. Letsas, R. St. J. Macdonald, S. Maringele, F. Matscher, J. McBride, H. Petzold, M. de Salvia, L. Zwaak). Meanwhile a few Ukrainian researchers have paid attention to the problem of principles and methods of interpretation and application of the ECHR (L. Gouseynov, T. Doudash, V. Marmazov, P. Rabinovich, S. Fedic, L. Tsvigoun, S. Shevchouc and some others). The deep analysis of the doctrines, which are developed due to the Court's case-law are absent in Ukrainian jurisprudence. Paper objective. Main objective of the article is to study the doctrine of state's positive obligations to secure the conventional rights and the legal grounds of such obligations under the ECHR law in correlation with the other doctrinal approaches which are used by the ECtHR in the perspective of their implementation on the national level. Paper main body. As the basic concepts and principles (also known as the methods of interpretation and application of the Convention) official on-line resources of the Council of Europe indicate: dynamic purposive interpretation (the concept of "Convention as a Living Instrument"), the autonomous concepts, negative and positive obligations, subsidiarity, proportionality, just satisfaction, "margin of appreciation" of the state, equality of arms, horizontal application of rights and their hierarchy. Among them there are several doctrines (the doctrines of dynamic purposive interpretation, "margin of appreciation" of the state, autonomous concepts and the state's positive obligations) which have been recognized and developed due to the Court's jurisprudence. They accumulate the «unwritten law» of the Convention (as they are not mentioned in the text of ECHR) and aim to ensure the sequence and logic system of promotion and protection of human rights. They are closely interrelated and interdependent. These doctrines are more about the scope and character of the state's obligations under the Convention, rather then the subject to direct application in court proceedings on domestic level. Meanwhile these doctrines provide the means of assessment of compliance of the national policies and legal practice in the field of fundamental rights and freedoms with the European standards. Conclusions of the research. Thus the principle doctrinal approaches to the interpretation and application of the human rights and fundamental freedoms ensure the conceptual and methodological unity of the law of the Convention. Due to the Court's case-law these doctrines obtained official recognition, international authority, validity and credibility as well as the normative (regulative) features. So they shall be incorporated to the national legal order. For that they shall be well-known to all kinds of the state agents (legislative body, state administration and law-enforcement bodies and judiciary) who shall fulfill their duties with respect to the doctrinal standards. Key words: human rights, state's positive obligations, "margin of appreciation" of the state, purposive dynamic interpretation, case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. ; Раскрыто основное содержание доктрины позитивных обязательств государства по гарантированию закреплённых в Конвенции прав и свобод, правовые основания таких обязательств; а также их корреляция с иными доктринальными подходами, на которые опирается Европейский суд по правам человека при толковании и применении Европейской конвенции по правам человека (телеологического динамического толкования, «границ усмотрения» государства, «автономных понятий» и др.) в свете перспектив их практического внедрения на национальном уровне ; Розкрито основний зміст доктрини позитивних зобов'язань держави щодо гарантування викладених у Конвенції прав і свобод та правові підстави таких зобов'язань, а також її кореляція з іншими доктринальними підходами, на які спирається Європейський суд з прав людини при тлумаченні та застосуванні Європейської конвенції з прав людини (телеологічного динамічного тлумачення, «меж розсуду» держави, «автономних понять» та ін.) у світлі перспектив їх практичного впровадження на національному рівні.

Problem setting. According to the Law of Ukraine # 3477-IV «On implementation of judgments and application of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights», 23.02.2006 (Art. 17) the courts of Ukraine apply the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols (hereinafter – Convention, ECHR) and the case-law of the European Court of Human Right (hereinafter – the Court, ECtHR) as the source of law. By the Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine # 431, 10.09.2014 the Government Commissioner on ECtHR matters has been authorized to co-ordinate «the implementation of the Court's judgments, which are the interpretation of norms of Convention and its inalienable part, contain the norms of law and are subject to application in the way of implementation of international treaties». Such positions clearly show the aspiration of Ukraine to strengthen the role of European standards of human rights in national legal order. At the same time the case-law of the ECtHR covers not only the numerous legal standards related to concrete rights and freedoms, but also the doctrinal approaches to the interpretation and application of the ECHR which lay the foundation of the Court's jurisprudence. There is lack of studies of such doctrinal approaches in Ukraine while the conditions of their application at the national level are generally unknown. Resent research and publications analyses. Such doctrinal approaches are well developed in the ECtHR case-law and are deeply explored by European scholars (i. e. R. Bernhardt, D. Gomien, D. Harris, G. Letsas, R. St. J. Macdonald, S. Maringele, F. Matscher, J. McBride, H. Petzold, M. de Salvia, L. Zwaak). Meanwhile a few Ukrainian researchers have paid attention to the problem of principles and methods of interpretation and application of the ECHR (L. Gouseynov, T. Doudash, V. Marmazov, P. Rabinovich, S. Fedic, L. Tsvigoun, S. Shevchouc and some others). The deep analysis of the doctrines, which are developed due to the Court's case-law are absent in Ukrainian jurisprudence. Paper objective. Main objective of the article is to study the doctrine of state's positive obligations to secure the conventional rights and the legal grounds of such obligations under the ECHR law in correlation with the other doctrinal approaches which are used by the ECtHR in the perspective of their implementation on the national level. Paper main body. As the basic concepts and principles (also known as the methods of interpretation and application of the Convention) official on-line resources of the Council of Europe indicate: dynamic purposive interpretation (the concept of "Convention as a Living Instrument"), the autonomous concepts, negative and positive obligations, subsidiarity, proportionality, just satisfaction, "margin of appreciation" of the state, equality of arms, horizontal application of rights and their hierarchy. Among them there are several doctrines (the doctrines of dynamic purposive interpretation, "margin of appreciation" of the state, autonomous concepts and the state's positive obligations) which have been recognized and developed due to the Court's jurisprudence. They accumulate the «unwritten law» of the Convention (as they are not mentioned in the text of ECHR) and aim to ensure the sequence and logic system of promotion and protection of human rights. They are closely interrelated and interdependent. These doctrines are more about the scope and character of the state's obligations under the Convention, rather then the subject to direct application in court proceedings on domestic level. Meanwhile these doctrines provide the means of assessment of compliance of the national policies and legal practice in the field of fundamental rights and freedoms with the European standards. Conclusions of the research. Thus the principle doctrinal approaches to the interpretation and application of the human rights and fundamental freedoms ensure the conceptual and methodological unity of the law of the Convention. Due to the Court's case-law these doctrines obtained official recognition, international authority, validity and credibility as well as the normative (regulative) features. So they shall be incorporated to the national legal order. For that they shall be well-known to all kinds of the state agents (legislative body, state administration and law-enforcement bodies and judiciary) who shall fulfill their duties with respect to the doctrinal standards. Key words: human rights, state's positive obligations, "margin of appreciation" of the state, purposive dynamic interpretation, case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. ; Раскрыто основное содержание доктрины позитивных обязательств государства по гарантированию закреплённых в Конвенции прав и свобод, правовые основания таких обязательств; а также их корреляция с иными доктринальными подходами, на которые опирается Европейский суд по правам человека при толковании и применении Европейской конвенции по правам человека (телеологического динамического толкования, «границ усмотрения» государства, «автономных понятий» и др.) в свете перспектив их практического внедрения на национальном уровне ; Розкрито основний зміст доктрини позитивних зобов'язань держави щодо гарантування викладених у Конвенції прав і свобод та правові підстави таких зобов'язань, а також її кореляція з іншими доктринальними підходами, на які спирається Європейський суд з прав людини при тлумаченні та застосуванні Європейської конвенції з прав людини (телеологічного динамічного тлумачення, «меж розсуду» держави, «автономних понять» та ін.) у світлі перспектив їх практичного впровадження на національному рівні.

학위논문 (석사) -- 서울대학교 대학원 : 국제대학원 국제학과(국제협력전공), 2020. 8. 신성호. ; North Korea's nuclear program and the complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula have been one of the biggest challenges in the history of denuclearisation negotiations. The Trump administration appeared to have been improving the relationship with North Korea and making a dramatic progress on the denuclearisation process through multiple high-level visits and meaningful summits however, his accomplishment has become on the verge of collapse again, just as other previous administrations had undergone. One critical component of the nuclear negotiation with North Korea is the role of the US and the US diplomacy, alongside with various multilateral initiatives and cooperation. Using the US diplomatic framework of coercive diplomacy, this paper seeks to understand the major causes of failure of the US diplomacy during the Obama administration and the negotiation with North Korea in particular. The findings suggest that the strength of motivation and the sense of urgency of negotiating countries one of key factors that facilitates the negotiation process. The findings also suggest that international community, particularly the regional actors plays an increasingly important role during the negotiation process and thus needs to be actively facilitated in negotiations over North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Analysing the previous administration's negotiation process, this study is expected to provide an insightful lesson for the Trump administration. ; 오바마 행정부의 핵심 외교적 성과 중 하나는 바로 이란과의 포괄적공동행동계획(Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: JCPOA) 합의이다. 취임 이후 스마트파워 외교를 내세워 세계와 소통하겠다고 다짐했던 오바마 대통령의 의지는 이란과 국제사회의 핵문제에 대한 합의를 가능하게 했다. 하지만 같은 적대국 관여외교를 펼친 북한과는 핵 협상을 진전시키지 못했을 뿐만 아니라 임기가 지날수록 북한에의 관심이 시들 해지는 모습을 발견할 수 있었다. 왜 북한은 예외적인 모습으로 남겨졌을까? 이 논문은 왜 오바마 대통령의 외교정책이 미국의 적대국과의 비핵화 협상 과정에서 각기 다른 결과를 낳았는지에 대한 이유를 주요 연구 문제로 다루며, 이를 설명하기 위해 알렉산더 조지 (Alexander L. George)의 강압외교 (coercive diplomacy) 이론을 활용한다. 이 논문은 우선 이란과 북한과의 핵 협상 과정을 각각 분석하여 오바마 대통령의 두 임기 동안 미국이 어떤 강압전략을 채택하였으며, 그 적대국들이 (각각 이란과 북한) 어떤 역강압 전략을 채택하여 맞대응 하였는지를 분석한다. 이 분석을 기반으로 오바마 행정부의 대이란 전략과 대북 전략에서 드러나는 공통점과 차이점을 비교∙분석함으로써 협상의 성공 및 실패의 요인을 설명한다. 그 결과, 알렉산더 조지가 제시한 '강압외교가 성공하기 위한 8가지 조건' 중에서 크게 동기의 비대칭과 강압국의 요구에 순응해야 하는 긴박감 그리고 국내 및 국제적 지지를 협상의 성패를 가르는 주 요인을 꼽았으며, 이러한 결과는 현재 교착상태에 빠진 북핵 협상을 재가동 하기 위해서는 북한 국내상황에 대한 충분한 이해와 더불어 국제사회의 협력 및 지지가 중요하다는 점을 시사한다. ; Chapter I. Introduction 1 1. Background of the Research 1 2. Research Purpose and Objectives 3 3. Thesis Structure 4 Chapter II. Literature Review 5 1. Theoretical Framework: Coercive Diplomacy Theory 5 1) Concept of Strategic Coercion and Theory of Coercive Diplomacy 5 2) Three Types of Coercive Diplomacy 7 3) Strategies of Coercive Diplomacy 8 4) Conditions that Favour Successful Coercive Diplomacy 10 2. Obama Doctrine and the US Security Strategy 13 1) Obama Administration's US Foreign Policy in Various Dimensions 13 2) Obama's Vision on the Nuclear-Free World 17 Chapter III. An Analysis of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran 20 1. The Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran: the US Strategic Coercion 20 1) From 'Try-and-See' to 'Gradual Turning of the Screw' Coercive Diplomacy 21 2) Iran's Counter Coercive Diplomacy and Increasing Multilateral Coercion 26 3) New Sanctions and Prolonged Iranian Counter Coercive Diplomacy 29 4) The Impact of Sanctions and Obama's Re-election 32 5) Election of President Rouhani and the Joint Plan of Action 34 2. Assessing the Use of Coercive Diplomacy under the Obama Administration: The Case of Iran 36 1) The First Term of Obama's Presidency and the Enmity Trap 36 2) The Second Term of Obama's Presidency and Clash with Israel 37 Chapter IV. An Analysis of Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea 39 1. Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea: the US Strategic Coercion 39 1) Strategy of Disengagement and 'Try-and-See' Coercive Diplomacy 39 2) North Korea's Use of Terror and Nuclear Coercion 42 3) Vicious Cycle of 'Coercive Counter Coercive Diplomacy' and Continuous Escalation of Tension 46 4) Third Nuclear Test and the Increase of North Korean Nuclear Deterrence 50 5) Ongoing Nuclear Tests and An Endless Loop of Coercive Diplomacy- Counter Coercive Diplomacy 53 2. Assessing the Use of Coercive Diplomacy under the Obama Administration: The Case of North Korea 56 1) Deterioration of Information on North Korea 57 2) Strengthening North Korea's Nuclear Capability 58 Chapter V. Comparative Analysis of Iran and North Korea in the Nuclear Negotiation Process 59 1. Asymmetry of Demands and Motivations and Its Impact on Negotiations 59 1) Negotiation with Iran: High Motivation and High Sense of Urgency 59 2) Negotiation with North Korea: Low Motivation and Low Sense of Urgency 62 2. The Role of Multilateral Talks and Active Support from Regional Actors 65 1) China's New Role during the JCPOA Negotiations 65 2) Active Cooperation from E3 on Sanctions Policy 68 3) Ambivalent Attitude of China on North Korean Nuclear Issue 73 4) Contradictory Attitude of Russia and its Insignificant Role 77 Chapter VI. Conclusion 80 1. Main Objectives and the Findings of the Study 80 2. Limitations 86 Bibliography 88 초록 97 ; Master