Suchergebnisse

Artykuł omawia stosunki między Europą i krajami Bliskiego Wschodu oraz konsekwencje tych relacji w ciągu ostatnich dwóch dekad, poprzez analizę "arabskiej wiosny". Określenie "arabska wiosna" odnosi się do serii wydarzeń obejmujących demonstracje, przemoc i wojnę domową, które przetoczyły się przez kraje arabskie od końca 2010 r. Wywołane przez siły oporu wobec autorytarnych reżimów doprowadziły do upadku przywódców Egiptu, Tunezji i Libii. Protesty zwolenników demokracji, zrównoważonej gospodarki i likwidacji korupcji rządowej udało się jednak wykorzystać do swoich celów islamistom. Wprawdzie nie było wówczas jasne, jakie nowe reżimy przejmą władzę, ale powszechnie oczekiwano, że będą to siły islamistyczne. W kategoriach deklaracji, polityki i zaangażowania fizycznego Europa zareagowała na wydarzenia arabskiej wiosny pozytywnie w obawie, że wyniki protestów mogą zostać wykorzystane przez siły islamistyczne, mimo że przez dziesięciolecia państwa Zachodu łączyła z wieloma obalonymi tyranami współpraca i przyjazne stosunki. Polityka przymykania oka na brak demokracji i łamanie praw człowieka w tych krajach była jednak często postrzegana jako sprzeczna z wartościami europejskimi. W dniu 25 maja 2011 r. Unia Europejska opublikowała dokument przyznający, że nie udało jej się przeprowadzić reform politycznych w sąsiednich krajach arabskich. Po wydarzeniach arabskiej wiosny konieczne było wypracowanie nowego podejścia do wzmocnienia partnerstwa między Europą a światem arabskim. Cele europejskiej polityki wobec świata muzułmańskiego obejmują powstrzymanie masowej migracji muzułmańskiej, zmniejszenie wpływu fundamentalistycznego i radykalnego islamu na Bliskim Wschodzie, a także wśród muzułmanów w Europie, oraz zapewnienie dostaw surowców energetycznych z tych krajów. Sprostanie tym wyzwaniom będzie znaczącym krokiem we właściwym kierunku.

This article analyses the extend of the connections between islam and the democratization processes that came together with the "arab spring", originated by the crowds on the streets. This process, even, envisages a less happy ending than what was expected, in which Coran's religion plays a definitive role, enemy of democracy. In face of this, the author proposes, firstly, the features that define democracy to then relate them with the nucleus of Coran's tradition and, finally, establishes how religious movements have acted in relation to democratic principles. ; Este artículo analiza el recorrido de las conexiones entre el islam y los procesos democratizadores que se aglutinaron en tono a la "primavera árabe", originados por las multitudes en las calles. Este proceso, aún inconcluso, vislumbra un final menos feliz de lo esperado en el cual juega un rol definitorio la religión coránica, enemiga de la democracia. Frente a ello, el autor propone, en primer lugar, los rasgos que definen la democracia para luego relacionarlos con el núcleo de la tradición coránica y, finalmente, establecer cómo los movimientos religiosos han obrado en relación a los principios democráticos.

Why were some, but not all the Arab mass social protests of 2011 accompanied by relatively quick and nonviolent outcomes in the direction of regime change, democracy, and social transformation? Why was a democratic transition limited to Tunisia, and why did region-wide democratization not occur? After the Arab Uprisings offers an explanatory framework to answer these central questions, based on four key themes: state and regime type, civil society, gender relations and women's mobilizations, and external influence. Applying these to seven cases: Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, Valentine M. Moghadam and Shamiran Mako highlight the salience of domestic and external factors and forces, uniquely presenting women's legal status, social positions, and organizational capacity, along with the presence or absence of external intervention, as key elements in explaining the divergent outcomes of the Arab Spring uprisings, and extending the analysis to the present day.

We examine the role of democracy shocks in the cross-country economic growth processes over a period of five decades since 1960. The recent uprisings that arose independently and spread across the Arab world form the main context of our investigation. We study if (i) a shock to democracy in one country triggers institutional reforms and growth upsurge in the neighbouring countries, and (ii) the magnitude and direction of response to democracy shocks are contingent upon income pathways of countries. To estimate the spillover effects of democracy shocks, we model and estimate growth interdependence among individual countries with similar democratic characteristics. To study the nature of responses of democracy shocks on cross-country growth processes, we build and estimate a Global Vector Autoregression (GVAR) model where we allow countries to be interdependent with regard to bilateral migration and geographical proximity. Using the GVAR model, we also stimulate a positive shock to democracy in Egypt-the most populous Arabic country-and study its impacts on institutional reforms and economic growth in the rest of the Arab World. We find that high and upper-middle income countries are immune to democracy shocks in Egypt, whereas the lower middle and low income countries are susceptible to another revolutionary wave.

In the closing scene of The Last of Us (2016), we see the torso of a young black man who stands naked before a clearing in the forest. As he gazes out at a cascade of water tumbling down to a rocky pool below, the young man's image gradually fades away, absorbed into the landscape. Nothing about this scene, from the blackness of the protagonist to the coniferous forest, has any clear reference point in Tunisian national cinema. Indeed, director Ala Eddine Slim has expressed distaste for being classified as a regional filmmaker, preferring that his work be seen as international, transcending borders.
And yet, to the familiar eye, this film belongs unmistakably to Tunisia's postrevolutionary political transition, a time fraught with unpredictable shifts in national identity and the contours of the state. Slim is part of a new generation of Tunisian filmmakers who have won critical acclaim on the international festival circuit since the 2011 revolution. More than a burst of creative energy released by the demise of autocratic rule, their experimental aesthetic emerges, in part, from struggles within Tunisian filmmaking establishment that have shaped the conditions of production under political transition. In this essay, I track the intergenerational conflicts that have prompted to the recent extroversion of young Tunisian filmmakers, who have set their sights beyond the nation for funding and recognition.

Abstract
The momentous events that became known as the Arab Awakening or Arab Spring, or as some even called it the Arab Democratic Spring (2011–14) – although the Arabic term is thaura – meaning a revolution – were a historic development that took by surprise and later even stunned leaders, scholars, commentators and reporters in western countries, mainly in Europe and in North America. Part of the surprise and the inability of the western media to predict the uprisings and above all their dismal and totally unexpected outcome is the subject of this article. An attempt will be made to understand why the western media got it so wrong. Since it can be safely assumed that the Arab Spring has ended its run, certain questions regarding the reporting of this event are in order.

Eruptions of Popular Anger: The Economics of the Arab Spring and Its Aftermath sets out to answer three puzzles—the "Arab inequality" puzzle of civil uprisings in countries with low-to-moderate and stagnant economic inequality, the "unhappy development" paradox of increasing dissatisfaction at a time of moderate-to-rapid development, and the paradox of political violence in middle-income countries. The book's empirical investigation rules out high and rising inequality as a reason for the Arab Spring uprisings. It shows that the real problem was the erosion in middle-class incomes and the growing dissatisfaction with the quality of life, the shortage of formal sector jobs, and corruption. Frustration was particularly high among the young, educated, middle-class residents in urban areas. The old social contract, which had delivered development results in the past and under which Arab governments provided public-sector jobs and subsidized services in return for subdued voice, was unsustainable and malfunctioning. The public sector could no longer be the employer of choice, but the private sector did not generate enough formal sector jobs, because of distortions that constrained its growth and policies that offered advantages to a few firms with political connections, limiting competition and private investment. The breakdown in the social contract increased the premium on freedom and created impetus for political change. This report shows that the Arab Spring revolutions and the subsequent spread of violence and civil wars in the post–Arab Spring Middle East and North Africa region can be traced to the broken social contract, institutional weaknesses, and regional divisions in societies polarized along ethnic and sectarian lines. The Arab Spring and its aftermath indicate the need for a new social contract under which governments promote private-sector job creation, design public services in a way that holds providers accountable to beneficiaries, and promote inclusion and good governance.

Este artículo analiza el recorrido de las conexiones entre el islam y los procesos democratizadores que se aglutinaron en tono a la "primavera árabe", originados por las multitudes en las calles. Este proceso, aún inconcluso, vislumbra un final menos feliz de lo esperado en el cual juega un rol definitorio la religión coránica, enemiga de la democracia. Frente a ello, el autor propone, en primer lugar, los rasgos que definen la democracia para luego relacionarlos con el núcleo de la tradición coránica y, finalmente, establecer cómo los movimientos religiosos han obrado en relación a los principios democráticos. ; This article analyses the extend of the connections between islam and the democratization processes that came together with the "arab spring", originated by the crowds on the streets. This process, even, envisages a less happy ending than what was expected, in which Coran's religion plays a definitive role, enemy of democracy. In face of this, the author proposes, firstly, the features that define democracy to then relate them with the nucleus of Coran's tradition and, finally, establishes how religious movements have acted in relation to democratic principles.

This article examines to what extent the Arab Spring constitutes a critical juncture – a major turning point – for the EU's sanctions policy towards Egypt, Libya, Syria and Tunisia. Based on a multidimensional critical juncture operationalization, we find that the Arab Spring only constitutes such a turning point for the EU's sanctions policy towards Syria. Both the level and nature of measures differ substantially from previous years. By contrast, the EU's sanctions practice towards Libya, Egypt and Tunisia shows more resilience. More generally, changes in the nature of the measures are prominent, whereas changes in the level of the policy instruments and in underlying norms and goals are limited.