Understanding Subgroup Optimization: Experimental Evidence on Individual Choice and Group Processes

In: Journal of public administration research and theory, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 49-73

Abstract

Subgroup optimization occurs when a group solves its internal problems of cooperation, but that cooperation is detrimental to the organization as a whole. Here, small-group experiments designed to model this problem are reported that tested hypotheses from the solidarity & prisoners' dilemma literatures. Data on 76 groups involving 380 Ss (college students & local residents in Logan, Utah) indicate that interacting Ss reject individual, material incentives in favor of maximizing payoff for the subgroup -- even when such action harms an outgroup & collective efficiency. Results also indicate that such parochial tendencies can be offset depending on perception of the outgroup & decision-making structures. Implications include the importance of the concept of the "public interest" to an adminstrator's decision calculus. 6 Exhibits, 1 Appendix, 48 References. AA