Victory in war: foundations of modern military policy

"In the midst of confusion in the scholarship about victory, this study explores two fundamental problems. First, we do not have precise language or theory that scholars, civilian and military policymakers, and the public can use to agree on what "victory" means, when it is attained, or when the state fails to achieve it. Second, it examines what a theory of victory whould look like, how it is distinct from military strategy or theory of war, what scholars and policymakers would gain by developing one, and how theory contributes to debates about war. This study provides more systematic answers to these and other questions"--

War demands that scholars and policy makers use victory in precise and coherent terms to communicate what the state seeks to achieve in war. The failure historically to define victory in consistent terms has contributed to confused debates when societies consider whether to wage war. This volume explores the development of a theoretical narrative or language of victory to help scholars and policy makers define carefully and precisely what they mean by victory in war in order to achieve a deeper understanding of victory as the foundation of strategy in the modern world

War demands that scholars and policy makers use victory in precise and coherent terms to communicate what the state seeks to achieve in war. The failure historically to define victory in consistent terms has contributed to confused debates when societies consider whether to wage war. This volume explores the development of a theoretical narrative or language of victory to help scholars and policy makers define carefully and precisely what they mean by victory in war in order to achieve a deeper understanding of victory as the foundation of strategy in the modern world

"In the midst of confusion in the scholarship about victory, this study explores two fundamental problems. First, we do not have precise language or theory that scholars, civilian and military policymakers, and the public can use to agree on what "victory" means, when it is attained, or when the state fails to achieve it. Second, it examines what a theory of victory whould look like, how it is distinct from military strategy or theory of war, what scholars and policymakers would gain by developing one, and how theory contributes to debates about war. This study provides more systematic answers to these and other questions"--

For millennia, policymakers and statesmen have grappled with questions about the concept of victory in war. How long does it take to achieve victory and how do we know when victory is achieved? And, as highlighted by the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, is it possible to win a war and yet lose the peace? The premise of this book is that we do not have a modern theory about victory and that, in order to answer these questions, we need one. This book explores historical definitions of victory, how victory has evolved, and how it has been implemented in war. It also subsequently develops the intellectual foundations of a modern pre-theory of victory, and discusses the military instruments necessary for victory in the twenty-first century using case studies that include US military intervention in Panama, Libya, Persian Gulf War, Bosnia/Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq