Across Europe, there are many differing opinions on whether workplace employee representation should be encouraged or discouraged. Yet there is very little evidence on the variations in workplace employee representation across Europe or the reasons for this. We use a workplace survey covering 27 EU countries to show that its incidence is strongly and independently correlated with the degree of centralization in a country's industrial relations regime and the extent of legislative support. Industry rents are also important in explaining trade union presence, but are unimportant in the case of works councils. Turning to the effects of workplace employee representation, we find support for the exit-voice model – traditionally associated with Anglo-Saxon regimes – whereby worker representation is associated with poorer perceptions of the employment relations climate and with lower voluntary quit rates.
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to demonstrate union and non-union's mechanisms ability to "contest" the realm of workplace employee representation at two UK sites. The paper directly compares one union and one non-union mechanism of employee representation at separate sites by employing three "dilemmas" of employee representation: confidentiality, challenge and trust. The paper contributes to enduring debates about the efficacy of employee voice in UK organisations.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses a qualitative and inductive case study approach in two organisations, drawing upon semi-structured interviews, archival documentation, company meetings and a trade union officer diary to record the employee representatives use of voice to influence company decision-making.FindingsThe paper shows how the union achieved improved pay and a more trusting relationship with managers in comparison to the non-union mechanism, which failed to influence managers' decisions at the site and fell into demise.Research limitations/implicationsLimitations are that the paper covers one geographical area and interviews were made with employee representatives and HR and management. The access was limited by the respective case study management regime/s. The data are acknowledged as now historical but remain relevant as a means of understanding wider debates on employee representation and voice. These limitations are now acknowledged in the revised edition of the manuscript, as suggested by the reviewers.Practical implicationsThe practical implications are that the paper shows how employee representatives face similar dilemmas in their operational roles and activities. If these dilemmas are managed with efficacy for members, then this can result in good outcomes for those members and legitimacy for the workplace employee representatives. We also suggest that the use of employee voice as a practical concept is seen here – the practical use of the factors comprising voice in the literature is used to show representatives' abilities to influence management decision-making.Social implicationsThe significance of having a voice at work that raises the profile of employee representatives and their members emerges from this paper. An effective voice mechanism can promote improved employment relations in a workplace setting.Originality/valueThis paper develops knowledge about dilemmas as important and enduring issues for employee representatives, which, when inconsistently managed, can lose them the support of the workforce or, alternatively, empower them to challenge and sometimes alter management decisions.
Die Anzahl organisationaler Veränderungen hat in den letzten Jahren erheblich zugenommen. Sie stellen die betriebliche Interessenvertretung vor neue Herausforderungen. An welchen organisationalen Veränderungen Interessenvertretungen beteiligt sind und wie sich dies auf die von Beschäftigten zugeschriebene Legitimität sowie Maßnahmen der Legitimitätssicherung auswirkt ist bislang jedoch unklar. Zur Reduzierung des Forschungsdefizits wurden 25 Interviews mit Betriebs- und Personalratsmitgliedern in verschiedenen organisationalen Veränderungen geführt und inhaltsanalytisch ausgewertet. Es zeigt sich, dass sich die Legitimitätswahrnehmung abhängig von der Phase der Veränderung und ihrer Reichweite unterscheidet. Insbesondere für die befragten Betriebsratsmitglieder spielt Legitimitätssicherung in Veränderungsprozessen bislang eine eher untergeordnete Rolle. Dennoch legen die vorliegenden Studienergebnisse den Befund nahe, dass Legitimität in Veränderungssituationen durch die Interessenvertretung beeinflussbar ist.
"Über die Verbreitung und Kontextbedingungen von Betriebsräten und betriebsverfassungsrechtlich nicht abgesicherten 'Anderen Vertretungsorganen' (AVOs) liegen nur wenige durch empirische Breitenerhebungen gesicherte Informationen vor. Der Beitrag untersucht diese Aspekte auf Basis einer für Deutschland repräsentativen Erhebung von rund 3.200 Betrieben der Privatwirtschaft. Mit Hilfe theoretischer Vorüberlegungen werden mögliche Einflussfaktoren in verschiedenen Konzepten der Industrial Relations- und Organisationsforschung verortet und systematisiert. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass jeweils unterschiedliche Kontextfaktoren die Betriebrats- und AVO-Existenz erklären: Während Betriebsräte vor allem Ausdruck von Betriebsgrößen- und Branchendifferenzen, betrieblichen Entwicklungspfaden und berufskulturellen Orientierungen der Beschäftigten sind, stehen AVOs in engem Zusammenhang mit der Beteiligungsstrategie des Managements und betriebskulturellen Faktoren." (Autorenreferat)
AbstractVarious scholars and political actors advocate workplace democratisation to give employees greater influence over decision‐making. Many suggest employee board representation (EBR) as a mechanism to facilitate this, but some question how influential employee board representatives (EBRs) are and whether they represent their colleagues' views. This study investigates the extent to which EBR contributes to workplace democratisation, via a comparison of three Australian public sector organisations. The study found EBRs exerted significantly more influence at the Australian National University than at the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and the Australian Film Television and Radio School. Most EBRs wanted to draw upon staff experiences but their communication with colleagues was often constrained. Variances of influence were explained by the number of EBRs, the actions of the Chair, chief executive officer, government, and other board members. Two findings stand out as unique contributions: the importance of appointment powers to EBR influence in the public sector, and EBRs' limited influence on labour issues in the Anglosphere due to the adversarial system of labour bargaining being positioned largely outside the boardroom. The study concludes that EBR is a non‐tokenistic form of workplace democratisation, albeit with a specific scope, which has utility within a mix of democratising mechanisms.Points for practitioners Most EBRs exerted a limited or moderate influence on decision‐making, but others exerted more significant influence. They were most influential on matters related to their experience and expertise and were largely unable to influence workers' pay, conditions, and other labour issues. Most EBRs did not represent their colleagues in a transactional or direct sense, but drew upon their experiences as staff members when making decisions. However, EBRs had fluctuating issues communicating with their fellow employees, largely due to managerial direction around confidentiality. The number of SEDs on the board and the actions of other board members, the Chair, chief executive officer, and the government explained the variances in SEDs' influence between agencies. This study's findings regarding EBR influence were middling compared to European research, but appointment powers were found to be particularly important in the public sector context. EBRs' influence was found to be limited on labour issues, suggesting a potential clash between the corporatist inclination of EBR and the adversarial system of labour bargaining prevalent in the Anglosphere. Elected EBRs offer employees a non‐tokenistic form of representation but within a limited scope of strategy and oversight. Given factors that constrain SEDs' influence and representativeness can be at least partly countered by policy design and political leadership, these findings bolster the policy case for extending EBR throughout the public sector.
