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Background: Work capacity correlates weakly to disease concepts, which in turn are insufficient to explain sick leave behavior. With data mainly from Sweden, a welfare state with high sickness absence rates, our aim was to develop an explanatory theory of how to understand and deal with work absence and sick leave. Methods: We used classic grounded theory for analyzing data from >130 interviews with people working or on sick leave, physicians, social security officers, and literature. Several hundreds of typed and handwritten memos were the basis for writing up the theory. Results: In this paper we present a theory of work incentives and how to deal with work absence. We suggest that work disability can be seen as hurt work drivers or people caught in mode traps. Work drivers are specified as work capacities + work incentives, monetary and non-monetary. Also, people can get trapped in certain modes of behavior through changed capacities or incentives, or by inertia. Different modes have different drivers and these can trap the individual from reincentivizing, ie from going back to work or go on working. Hurt drivers and mode traps are recognized by driver assessments done on several different levels. Mode driver calculations are done by the worker. Then follows employer, physician, and social insurance officer assessments. Also, driver assessments are done on the macro level by legislators and other stakeholders. Reincentivizing is done by different repair strategies for hurt work drivers such as body repair, self repair, work-place repair, rehumanizing, controlling sick leave insurance, and strengthening monetary work incentives. Combinations of these driver repair strategies also do release people from mode traps. Conclusion: Reincentivizing is about recognizing hurt work drivers and mode traps followed by repairing and releasing the same drivers and traps. Reincentivizing aims at explaining what is going on when work absence is dealt with and the theory may add to social psychological research on work and work absence, and possibly inform sick leave policies.

Abstract Background Work capacity correlates weakly to disease concepts, which in turn are insufficient to explain sick leave behavior. With data mainly from Sweden, a welfare state with high sickness absence rates, our aim was to develop an explanatory theory of how to understand and deal with work absence and sick leave. Methods We used classic grounded theory for analyzing data from >130 interviews with people working or on sick leave, physicians, social security officers, and literature. Several hundreds of typed and handwritten memos were the basis for writing up the theory. Results In this paper we present a theory of work incentives and how to deal with work absence. We suggest that work disability can be seen as hurt work drivers or people caught in mode traps. Work drivers are specified as work capacities + work incentives, monetary and non-monetary. Also, people can get trapped in certain modes of behavior through changed capacities or incentives, or by inertia. Different modes have different drivers and these can trap the individual from reincentivizing, ie from going back to work or go on working. Hurt drivers and mode traps are recognized by driver assessments done on several different levels. Mode driver calculations are done by the worker. Then follows employer, physician, and social insurance officer assessments. Also, driver assessments are done on the macro level by legislators and other stakeholders. Reincentivizing is done by different repair strategies for hurt work drivers such as body repair, self repair, work-place repair, rehumanizing, controlling sick leave insurance, and strengthening monetary work incentives. Combinations of these driver repair strategies also do release people from mode traps. Conclusion Reincentivizing is about recognizing hurt work drivers and mode traps followed by repairing and releasing the same drivers and traps. Reincentivizing aims at explaining what is going on when work absence is dealt with and the theory may add to social psychological research on work and work absence, and possibly inform sick leave policies.

Abstract.This article studies the impact of teacher absences on education. Using data spanning three academic years about 285 teachers and 8,631 predominantly economically disadvantaged students from a United States urban school district, it tests assumptions that a substantial portion of teachers' absences is discretionary and that these absences reduce productivity – students' mathematics scores. Since absent teachers are typically replaced by less qualified substitutes, instructional intensity and consistency may decline: ten days of teacher absence reduce students' achievement score by about 3.3 per cent of a standard deviation – enough to lower some students' designation in the state proficiency system and, thus, their motivation to succeed.

We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislation for small firms in Sweden in 2001. According to our differences-in-difference estimates, aggregate absence in these firms fell by 0.2-0.3 days per year. This aggregate net figure hides important effects on different groups of employees. Workers remaining in the reform firms after the reform reduced their absence by about one day. People with a high absence record tended to leave reform firms, but these firms also became less reluctant to hire people with a record of high absence.

We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislation for small firms in Sweden in 2001. According to our differences-in-difference estimates, aggregate absence in these firms fell by 0.2-0.3 days per year. This aggregate net figure hides important effects on different groups of employees. Workers remaining in the reform firms after the reform reduced their absence by about one day. People with a high absence record tended to leave reform firms, but these firms also became less reluctant to hire people with a record of high absence.

We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislation for small firms in Sweden in 2001. According to our differences-in-difference estimates, aggregate absence in these firms fell by 0.2-0.3 days per year. This aggregate net figure hides important effects on different groups of employees. Workers remaining in the reform firms after the reform reduced their absence by about one day. People with a high absence record tended to leave reform firms, but these firms also became less reluctant to hire people with a record of high absence.

AbstractThis paper provides scarce insider econometric evidence on the structure of management compensation and on the incentive effects of fixed base salaries and bonus payments. Six years of personnel data of 177 managers in a German company are analyzed with special emphasis on the highest achievable bonuses under a Management‐by‐Objectives (MBO) incentive scheme. The main finding of panel negative binomial regressions is that higher achievable bonus payments are correlated with fewer absent working days, which supports the incentive effect of performance pay for managers. The fixed base salary component is, however, not significantly correlated with managers' work absence.

A partir des données de l' European Working Conditions Survey de 2010, cette étude s'intéresse aux déterminants des absences au travail pour raisons de santé dans les pays européens. L'accent est mis sur l'impact des règles d'indemnisation des arrêts maladie. Cinq paramètres du système d'indemnisation sont pris en compte : l'obligation ou non de fournir un certificat médical dès le premier jour d'absence, la durée minimale d'affiliation au régime d'assurance sociale, l'existence ou non d'un délai de carence, le niveau d'indemnisation et la durée maximale de versement des indemnités maladie. Les comportements d'absence des salariés sont analysés à l'aide de régres sions logistiques multiniveaux. Les résultats montrent que les écarts entre pays dans la probabilité d'absence au travail peuvent en partie s'expliquer par les différences de législation en matière d'indemnisation des arrêts maladie. Le fait que le salaire soit intégralement maintenu par l'employeur en cas de maladie est l'élément le plus déterminant. Comme attendu, dans les pays où cette règle s'applique, la propension à s'absenter est significativement plus élevée.