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AbstractWelfare grants in the United States very from year to year and from state to state. Actual grants are very different from stated nominal levels of support for two reasons. First, grants are reduced for income. Second, not all qualified families receive welfare. Some do not apply. Others are discouraged, wrongly denied, or poorly counselled. The actual level of welfare support per child is estimated herein at the state level for single female household heads for each year from 1979 to 1990. A tobit estimation technique is employed to account for the probability of not receiving welfare when otherwise qualified.

In plural societies, social welfare can be a terrain of political contestation, particularly when public welfare functions are underdeveloped and ethnic or religious groups provide basic social services. It is well established that such organizations favor in-group members, but under what conditions do they serve out-group communities? To address this question, the authors compare the welfare programs of the predominantly Sunni Muslim Future Movement and the Shiite Muslim Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although they operate under the same institutional rules and economic contexts and boast the largest welfare programs in their respective communities, the Future Movement aims to serve a broader array of beneficiaries, including non-Sunnis, whereas Hezbollah focuses more exclusively on Shiite communities. Based on analyses of an original data set of the spatial locations of welfare agencies, qualitative data from interviews with providers and beneficiaries, and case studies of areas where the two parties established and did not establish welfare agencies, the authors argue that distinct political mobilization strategies—whether electoral or nonelectoral—explain different patterns of service delivery across the two organizations.

In plural societies, social welfare can be a terrain of political contestation, particularly when public welfare functions are underdeveloped and ethnic or religious groups provide basic social services. It is well established that such organizations favor in-group members, but under what conditions do they serve out-group communities? To address this question, the authors compare the welfare programs of the predominantly Sunni Muslim Future Movement and the Shiite Muslim Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although they operate under the same institutional rules and economic contexts and boast the largest welfare programs in their respective communities, the Future Movement aims to serve a broader array of beneficiaries, including non-Sunnis, whereas Hezbollah focuses more exclusively on Shiite communities. Based on analyses of an original data set of the spatial locations of welfare agencies, qualitative data from interviews with providers and beneficiaries, and case studies of areas where the two parties established and did not establish welfare agencies, the authors argue that distinct political mobilization strategies-whether electoral or nonelectoral-explain different patterns of service delivery across the two organizations. (World Politics / SWP)

Welfare is often administered locally, but financed through grants from the central government. This raises the question how the central government can prevent local governments from spending more than necessary. Block grants are more efficient than matching grants, because the latter reduce the local governments' incentive to limit welfare spending. However, conventional block grant financing is less equitable, indeed, it may put a heavy burden on local governments in economically weak regions. This paper considers block grants which depend on exogenous spending need determinants, and are estimated from previous period welfare spending. This allocation method gives rise to perverse incentives by reducing the marginal costs of welfare spending. We derive the conditions for such a grant to be more efficient than a matching grant, and apply our results to the Netherlands, where such a grant exists since 2004. We conclude that the Dutch style grant is likely to be more efficient than a matching grant. As it is also more equitable, other countries might want to consider introducing a similar grant.

Economic analysis of spectrum policy focuses on government revenues derived via competitive bidding for licenses. Auctions generating high bids are identified as "successful" and those with lower receipts as "fiascoes." Yet spectrum policies that create rents impose social costs. Most obviously, rules favoring monopoly predictably increase license values but reduce welfare. This article attempts to shift analytical focus to efficiency in output markets. In performance metrics derived by comparing 28 mobile telephone markets, countries allocating greater bandwidth to licensed operators and achieving more competitive market structures are estimated to realize efficiencies that generally dominate those associated with license sales. Policies intended to increase auction receipts (e.g., reserve prices and subsidies for weak bidders) should be evaluated in this light.

This paper examines welfare policies and budget allocation of programs for different migrant groups in South Korea. The results of a budget allocation analysis show that social welfare policies for migrants predominantly focus on the group of marriage migrant women, whereas foreign workers are excluded from many welfare policies, although they comprise the majority of migrants in Korea. The concentration of welfare policies on marriage migrant women may result in program duplication and hinder the balanced treatment of migrants in Korea. A restructured allocation of the budget would contribute not only to promoting the successful integration of migrants but also to enhancing the efficiency of public expenditure.