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IT IS INCREASINGLY COMMON TO FIND ANALYSES OF BRITAIN AS A corporate state, or more circumspectly as developing a tripartite system of economic and industrial policy-making. Unfortunately, such work is often marked by a lack of definitional rigour and an inadequate consideration of relevant empirical material. In view of these limitations in the literature our article has two aims. Initially it examines the relationship between corporatism and tripartism, showing that in many ways tripartism can be viewed as a variation on one strand of corporatist thought, and what is more that it is the strand which appears most relevant to discussions of Britain. Subsequently, against this background, we examine empirical evidence to establish how far Britain can be described as having a tripartite system of economic and industrial policy-making.

Examined is the relationship between liberal corporatism & tripartism in England. Tripartism can be viewed as a subtype of liberal corporatism. Characteristics of an ideal/typical tripartite system are outlined. The relationships between the British government, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), & the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in the last decade are then examined to establish how far Britain is developing a tripartite system of industrial & economic policy making. Relations between the government, TUC, & CBI from 1965 to 1976 have had no stability, & no consensus exists between the three parties on economic & industrial policy. In addition, the CBI & the TUC are incapable of becoming elements in tripartite policy making, as they have inadequate resources and limited control over their members. Neither the CBI nor the TUC have sufficient influence over government to be viewed as pillars of a liberal corporatist state. 2 Tables. AA.

Focuses on position of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC).

This special issue explores changes in the nature of tripartite arrangements between firms, governments and organized labour across the last century, focusing on their post-1945 heyday. Although tripartism has its origins at the turn of the Twentieth Century, the post-1945 long boom represented an historical high-water mark that may now be seen as quite distinct from our own long period of volatility and crisis. Historical concerns are frequently stimulated by those of the present and this is especially the case in contemporary history. Anglo-Saxon historians may feel that the age of tripartism is at an end, but the contributions within this issue show that although this may accurately reflect current perceptions, tripartism continues , albeit often in weak forms, in other national and transnational contexts; its history therefore retains contemporary resonance. In our present age, it is commonly assumed that the relative power of employers has increased at the expense of government – the central co-ordinating actor in tripartism – and organized labour. Within the firm, not only workers, but also traditional managers have been displaced by assertive investors and allied to them, a new managerial class that has little emotional capital sunk in the firm other than as a vehicle for shareholder value maximization or release, and personal enrichment. From the business historian's viewpoint, these assumptions raise a number of issues surrounding long term trends and diversity in the nature of the capitalist ecosystem within which tripartism is located. In this connection, there are four alternative points of view on broad approaches to labour management. The first, rooted in the then apparent solidity of the British postwar tripartite settlement, was that the incorporation of labour's institutions was structurally essential to the state's role in avoiding or genuinely resolving crises. The second sees tripartism as very much an historical exception, representing to a large extent a product of a very specific set of historic circumstances around the Great Depression and the post-World War Two long boom. The third, a variant of the second, would see historic compromises between state, the firm, and workers as a reflection of the thirty year period of relative global prosperity and growth which had deeper historic roots stretching back at least into the Nineteenth Century. The fourth highlights national diversity in global capitalism and views the labour management options adopted according not only to temporal trends but also to such dimensions as space, scale, and global centre-periphery relations. The latter view implies that elements of post-war compromises may persist, even if, within many of the advanced societies, they do so in dilute form.

It is reasonable to argue that the impact of new technology could produce an important challenge to the political system's capacity to adapt to change. The impact of the new technology may also produce new interests and alliances. Already there has been an interesting example of attempted co-operation between the CDI and the TUC, against a background of government encouragement in the context of the NEDC. Discussions between the CDI and the TUC on the development of a joint approach to new technology initially went well. At one stage it appeared that an agreement on new technology had been reached. In the event, the CDI Council failed to ratify the 'agreement' and this particular initiative collapsed. However, a tripartite approach to new technology is now firmly established in the NEDC framework. Benefits of such an approach are unlikely to be spectacular though more gradual changes in attitudes to technological change may result.

A COMMON FEATURE OF SEVERAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN POST-COMMUNIST EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE WHICH SEEKS TO INTEGRATE SOCIAL BARGAINING BETWEEN BUSINESS, LABOR AND GOVERNMENT INTO THE POLICY PROCESS. THIS ARTICLE FOCUSES ON THE TRIPARTITE STRUCTURES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND IN SLOVAKIA. IT CONTENDS THAT TRIPARTITE STRUCTURES ARE NOT THE CENTRAL FEATURE IN EMERGING POLITICAL STRUCTURES, BUT NEITHER ARE THEY IRRELEVANT TO THAT PROCESS. THEIR ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE CHANGE OVER TIME AND REFLECT THE OUTCOME OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN DISTINCT CONCEPTIONS. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES THAT THE MOST DIRECT ACHIEVEMENTS OF CZECH AND SLOVAK TRIPARTISM COME UNDER TWO MAIN HEADINGS. THE FIRST IS THE PREVENTION OF ANY MAJOR SOCIAL UNREST. THE SECOND IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND LABOR LAWS.

Pt. I.: Introduction. Lim Chong Yah: The National Wages Council. A keynote address. - S. 3-7. Chew, R.: The National Wages Council. Themes and issues. - S. 8-14. Pt. II.: Structure and objectives. Lim Chong Yah: The National Wages Council. The politics of consensus. - S. 15-27. Lim Chong Yah: The National Wages Council. Targets and goals. - S. 28-47. Lim Chong Yah: The National Wages Council. Issues and initiatives. - S. 48-69. Tan Wee-liang: A legal perspective of the National Wages Council. - S. 70-92. Pt. III.: Macroeconomic impact. Chew Soon-beng ; Chew, R.: Tripartism in Singapore. The National Wages Council. - S. 93-111. Lee Suan-hiang: Productivity-wage linkage and competitiveness. The role of the state. - S. 112-126. Cao Yong: Unit labour cost, industrial restructuring and productivity change in Singapore's manufacturing sector. - S. 127-146. Hoon Hian-teck ; Kee Hiau Looi: Factors shaping Singapore's wages and unemployment and the role of the National Wages Council. - S. 147-165. Tay Boon Nga: The National Wages Council, Central Provident Fund and home ownership. - S. 166-182. Yu-Foo Yee-shoon: The National Wages Council and women in Singapore. - S. 183-195. Lloyd, P.: A long-term view of labour migration, foreign investment and growth in the Singapore economy. - S. 196-218. Pt. IV.: Impact on wages and wage system. Then Yee-thong: The National Wages Council and the wage system in Singapore. - S. 219-229. Chew, R.: Output, employment and wage determination in Singapore. - S. 230-247. Bauer, J.: Remuneration and older workers. - S. 248-266. Chew, I. ; Tan Ern Ser: Flexiwage and performance appraisal in Singapore. - S. 267-278. Robinson, D.: A comparison of occupational wage structures in Singapore and other countries. - S. 279-326. Pt. V.: Theoretical perspectives. Tan Kim-heng: Issues in the macroeconomic management of wages, competitivenesss, profitability and productivity in Singapore. - S. 327-342. Wu Ying: Training costs and efficiency wages. - S. 342-356. Pt. VI.: Consensual incomes policy in Australia. Hogan, W. ; King, S.: Incomes policies and wages outcomes in Australia, 1983 to 1996. - S. 357-381