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The concept of "trigger" in recent decades has become widely used in domestic and world theory and practice of conflict. However, this term has not yet received in-depth scientific reflection and is used arbitrarily. What is a trigger, what are its components, and how is it fundamentally different from other conflict phenomena – causes, conditions, and many other phenomena of a complex conflict system? This article is an attempt to conceptualize and categorize the concept of a trigger in order to further use it for scientific description and analysis in the plane of practical work with conflict.

Examines role and broader influence of the President Kabila's renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo in rebuilding the national and regional economies, and in resolving conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, and Angola.

Drawing on two complementary mechanisms, this article explores the question of whether electoral institutions and conditions of electoral competition create incentives to promote electoral misconduct in young or developing democracies. The first mechanism explains how majoritarian institutions like disproportional electoral systems are more likely to trigger electoral fraud than consensus electoral institutions like PR. However, for this mechanism to be activated, the incumbent must feel effectively threatened by the opposition. To better understand the way this mechanism works, the electoral history of the country also needs to be taken into consideration. Democracies which have a historical record of running clean elections are less likely to experience fraud than countries with a history of electoral misconduct. I test these theoretical claims using a dataset that contains relevant information for 323 parliamentary elections in 59 new or developing democracies in the period between 1960 and 2006. The empirical analysis shows a strong and robust empirical support for the two mechanisms.

Статья представляет предварительный анализ категориального языка варваристики в контексте взаимодействия цивилизации и варварства. На протяжении истории варварство претерпевало серьезную мутацию, меняя семантику, но сохраняя матрицу своей «материнской» стадиальной лексики. Выработан особый лексикон агрессивных злонамеренных действий, характеризующих или нарастание варварства, или его изживание. Некоторые термины и понятия продолжают употребляться метафорически и методологически, скорее ориентируя, нежели определяя. В статье рассматривается особая деструктивная роль стимулов, толчков, порождающих всплески варварства, что актуализировало необходимость ввести в варваристику новое понятие — «триггер» варварства. Подобная исследовательская задача ставится в исторической науке впервые. Триггер рассматривается в качестве действия, ставшего толчком для сущностного изменения, решающего поворота, скачка или стремительного перехода из одного функционального состояния в другое. Исследовательская стратегия статьи определена когнитивным подходом конкретно-исторического анализа проявления триггеров варварства в широком географическом и хронологическом контексте. Это позволяет обратить внимание на «пороховые погреба» варварства тлеющего, скрытого и скрываемого, на механизм, инструментарий и формы проявления триггеров. Постановка проблемы вызвана необходимостью поиска новых методологий в разработке более глобальной проблемы — цивилизация vs. варварство в условиях современного цивилизационного кризиса, на пороге кардинальных изменений представлений о природе варвара и варварства, которое развивается и эволюционирует быстрее, чем его исследование и осмысление.
The article presents a preliminary analysis of the categorical language of barbarism in the context of the interaction of civilization and barbarism. Throughout history, barbarism has undergone a severe mutation, changing semantics, but still retaining the matrix of its «maternal» stadium vocabulary. A unique lexicon of aggressive, malicious actions has been developed, characterizing either the growth of barbarism or its elimination. Some terms and concepts continue to be used metaphorically and methodologically, orienting rather than defining. The article considers the special destructive role of stimuli and shocks that generate bursts of barbarism, which actualized the need to introduce a new concept into barbarism — the «trigger» of barbarism. Such a research task is being set in historical science for the first time. A trigger is considered an action that has become the impetus for an essential change, a decisive turn, a leap, or a rapid transition from one functional state to another. The research strategy of the article is determined by the cognitive approach of a concrete historical analysis of the manifestation of barbarism triggers in a broad geographical and chronological context. This allows us to pay attention to the «powder cellars» of smoldering, hidden and concealed barbarism, to the mechanism, tools and forms of manifestation of triggers. The problem statement is caused by the need to search for new methodologies in the development of a more global problem - civilization vs. barbarism in the conditions of the modern civilizational crisis, on the threshold of cardinal changes in the ideas about the nature of the barbarian and barbarism, that develops and evolves faster than the research and comprehension.

Passenger subjects estimated automobile speed while traveling along an unlit freeway under day and night conditions. A visual occluding device allowed a 1-s glimpse of the road ahead when a judgment was required. Although subjects underestimated speeds, their judgments were more accurate at night than during the day.

This article focuses on the behavior-begets-behavior dynamic in the context of the interactions of states in crisis. Matching behavior is defined as a reciprocal relationship between incoming behavior (crisis trigger) and outgoing behavior (crisis response). A model of matching or reciprocal behavior is proposed, and several factors — threat to basic values, sociopolitical conditions, and power relations among crisis actors — are examined from the perspective of their potential disruption of the matching process. An initial finding is that crises, like the much more heavily studied conflict processes in general, exhibit a very high degree of matching behavior. However, there is considerable evidence that the factors examined here contribute to the disruption of these processes. A low threat to decision makers' values provides a context in which decision makers may respond with violence to nonviolent crisis triggers. Similarly, deteriorating sociopolitical conditions in countries experiencing a foreign policy crisis contribute to a higher than expected level of violence in crisis behavior. Finally, power parity among crisis actors was found to contribute to disruptions in matching behavior.

Objective. This article examines how events—such as changes in household composition, employment status, disability status, and economic conditions—affect poverty entries and exits. We also examine whether the role these events play in poverty transitions differs in the pre‐ and post‐welfare‐reform periods.Methods. The analysis uses discrete‐time multivariate hazard models along with monthly, longitudinal data from the 1988, 1990, and 1996 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).Results. Analyses show that many events are related to the likelihood of entering and exiting poverty. Of the trigger events examined, individuals living in households that experience a loss or gain of employment are the most likely to enter and exit poverty. We also find that changes in employment are more important in the 1996 to 1999 time period—after welfare reform—than in the 1988 to 1992 time period—prior to welfare reform. Finally, changes in household composition, disability status, and educational attainment are found to play a role in throwing people into poverty and helping them exit from poverty in both time periods.Conclusions. There is no single path into or out of poverty, suggesting that multiple policies can be considered to help alleviate poverty.

Objective. This article examines how events -- such as changes in household composition, employment status, disability status, & economic conditions -- affect poverty entries & exits. We also examine whether the role these events play in poverty transitions differs in the pre- & post-welfare-reform periods. Methods. The analysis uses discrete-time multivariate hazard models along with monthly, longitudinal data from the 1988, 1990, & 1996 panels of the Survey of Income & Program Participation (SIPP). Results. Analyses show that many events are related to the likelihood of entering & exiting poverty. Of the trigger events examined, individuals living in households that experience a loss or gain of employment are the most likely to enter & exit poverty. We also find that changes in employment are more important in the 1996 to 1999 time period -- after welfare reform -- than in the 1988 to 1992 time period -- prior to welfare reform. Finally, changes in household composition, disability status, & educational attainment are found to play a role in throwing people into poverty & helping them exit from poverty in both time periods. Conclusions. There is no single path into or out of poverty, suggesting that multiple policies can be considered to help alleviate poverty. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

Venezuela is approaching one of its most consequential elections. On 28 July, the incumbent President Nicolás Maduro will seek a third consecutive six-year term.[1] Even though he has struck an agreement with the opposition in which both parties commit to creating the conditions for a competitive election, known as the 'Barbados Agreement',[2] many observers doubt that Maduro would allow for a relatively free and fair contest, given that polls do not give him the slightest chance of winning.[3] But what will happen if he actually opts to go down the path of an evidently rigged vote? If the past is any indication, the answer is probably a lot of demonstrations, both peaceful and violent, alongside renewed international isolation that would undermine recent diplomatic openings in the region.[4]The 2018 election and its aftermath
In the last presidential election of 2018, opposition groups considered the playing field tilted in Maduro's favour because the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was stacked with government loyalists. Most opposition candidates opted out of the race except for Henri Falcón. When Maduro claimed victory, Falcón brought the case to the Supreme Court.[5] The election was considered so illegitimate that the then opposition-controlled National Assembly used a constitutional quibble to appoint its head, Juan Guaidó, as interim president in early 2019. This marked a watershed moment, as it gave birth to, de facto, two parallel presidencies.[6]
Rallying national and international outcry, most opposition forces mobilised their supporters to back the appointment of Guaidó. Over 500 protests were led or attended by different opposition movements in 2019 according to ACLED, a dataset that tracks political violence and protests in Venezuela and around the world. These demonstrations set out to repel Maduro's re-election and instead support Guaidó's claim to the interim presidency in 2019. Most of them were peaceful, but 13 per cent were violent or repressed by security forces and government-affiliated mobs known as colectivos. Part of the military also joined the rallies and tried to stage an uprising, but were quashed as well.[7] The government's crackdown on opposition-led and other spontaneous protests led to the death of at least 76 people, a record high in a single year since ACLED started covering the country in January 2018. The crackdown, coupled with growing international isolation and US and European sanctions,[8] contributed to further sinking the country's economy and fuelling the greatest mass exodus ever recorded in Latin America, with around one-fourth of the 28 million Venezuelans leaving the country.[9]
Support for Guaidó progressively waned. Corruption accusations related to mishandling resources,[10] the crackdown of security forces faced by Guaidó's supporters and the eventual failure to overthrow the Maduro government left the public disillusioned. Demonstrations in his support fell from 76 in 2020 to 19 in 2021 and just 2 in 2022. The opposition eventually removed Guaidó from the post of interim president in December 2022.[11]The Venezuelan opposition 2.0
Since then, opposition forces have progressively rebuilt public trust and scored some electoral advances. After boycotting the 2020 legislative elections, some progress in a Norway-led negotiation between the government and opposition paved the way for a slight improvement in the playing field of the 2021 regional elections – including through a more balanced composition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the presence of EU observers. This led opposition parties to participate in the election, despite widespread irregularities and arbitrary candidate disqualifications. As a result, opposition candidates won four of the country's 23 governorships, including Barinas, a historic Chavista stronghold.[12]
Through the 2021 process, opposition parties reckoned that the benefits of electoral participation outweighed the boycott. In October 2023, they signed a deal with the government, the abovementioned Barbados Agreement, committing to use the electoral route to solve the country's crisis. In parallel, the emergence of María Corina Machado as a political icon[13] has rekindled popular enthusiasm and expectation of change, including among Chavistas.[14] Her undisputed victory of the opposition primaries in late 2023, with over 93 per cent of the votes, turned her into a pivotal figure around which to rally. Under her leadership, Edmundo González – Machado's placeholder, since she was not allowed to run – has been recognised as the opposition unity candidate, hence forming a more cohesive front than in previous electoral cycles.[15] González could get 55 per cent of the votes, according to polls.[16]A summer of discontent?
For its part, the government is not doing well, as far as public support is concerned. In 2023, ACLED recorded over 2,700 demonstrations in Venezuela. While these demonstrations related to a range of issues, they mostly revolved around discontent with the faltering provision of services, labour rights and access to justice. This is the highest number since it began covering the country, which hints at both the growing dissatisfaction with the government and the renewed citizen willingness to retake public spaces to express dissent. Despite slight economic improvements after the darkest times of 2018–2019, in fact, Venezuela's economy still faces enormous difficulties.[17]
The government's superficial efforts to go after corruption, furthermore, seem to respond more to internal purges within Chavismo than an actual commitment to punish misconduct.[18] The evident improvements in the security realm – with gang-related violence events nosediving from 1,149 in 2020 to 476 in 2023 – also seem to owe more to the exodus of Venezuelans, including criminals,[19] than the security forces' recent raids in jails and kingpin hunts in marginalised neighbourhoods, as the government claims.[20] Against this backdrop, and regardless of Maduro's attempt to rebrand his public image, from authoritarian to 'friendlier' leader,[21] his public support remains very low, with around 15 per cent vote intention.[22]Looking beyond 28 July
It is hard to predict the eruption of protests. The high toll of the 2019 repression and the disillusionment with the Guaidó initiative has alienated most Venezuelans from politics. Furthermore, the increase in demonstrations in 2023 seems to have been independent of the political opposition's efforts to recompose itself. Opposition parties or representatives spearheaded or participated in just a few dozen of the protests. Hence, it is unclear whether such social discontent can coalesce into mobilisation in favour of the opposition. Nonetheless, the renewed sentiment of hope and participation that a more united opposition front is creating under Machado's leadership,[23] coupled with widespread popular grievances and the subsequent quest for change by different societal sectors, are creating a scenario in which an evidently rigged election may trigger another wave of demonstrations, in addition to international outcry and isolation.
Maduro can choose to allow the return of democracy in the country, even if that likely means losing the presidency. By retaining control of all the other government branches, he would still be in the position to negotiate with the current opposition the conditions for a smooth transition that does not translate into a witch hunt against him and his allies. However, he could also use this influence to hamper González's ability to run the presidency, pitting the judiciary and the legislature against it. Alternatively, he could opt to sway electoral authorities into disqualifying the opposition ticket or manipulating the results and, in doing so, reset the little economic and political progress made in the past couple of years and shepherd the country towards the abyss of authoritarianism, international isolation and socio-political turmoil. In this scenario, he would face the hardships related to having to face widespread mass protests, severed ties with regional governments – including more sympathising ones such as Colombia and Brazil – and the likely full-blown re-imposition of US and EU sanctions. Even though he has already sailed through similarly stormy waters once, the greater cohesiveness of the opposition, some cracks among the Chavista ranks, and the diplomatic and economic pressure that this path entails may hinder his ability to hold on to power for another term. Hopefully, these costs will weigh in his final decision.Tiziano Breda is Associate Analysis Coordinator for Latin America at the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) and Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] Rafael Ramírez, "An Election between Sanctions and Transition: Venezuela at a Crossroads", in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|30 (June 2024), https://www.iai.it/en/node/18622.[2] International Crisis Group, Barbados Deal Sets Venezuela on a Rocky Path to Competitive Polls, 20 October 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/node/21681.[3] Julie Turkewitz and Anatoly Kurmanaev, "How Venezuela's Leader Could Stay in Power, No Matter What Voters Want", in The New York Times, 25 June 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/25/world/americas/venezuela-election-maduro-power.html.[4] Chase Harrison, "Map: Which Latin American Countries Have Restored Relations with Venezuela?", in AS/COA Articles, 21 June 2023, https://www.as-coa.org/node/103328.[5] "Venezuela: Maduro Rival Henri Falcon Demands New Election", in Al Jazeera, 30 May 2018, https://aje.io/ds3kr.[6] Jon Lee Anderson, "Our Man in Caracas", in The New Yorker, 3 June 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/06/10/venezuelas-two-presidents-collide.[7] Scott Smith and Christopher Torchia, "Clashes Rock Venezuela as Guaido, Maduro Vie for Power", in AP News, 1 May 2019, https://apnews.com/0153cace08c84c8fbf34f9c6a7bdd4dd.[8] Anna Ayuso et al., "A Critical Juncture: EU's Venezuela Policy Following the War in Ukraine", in JOINT Briefs, No. 27 (May 2023), https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=1689.[9] Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian and Alexandra Winkler, "The Persistence of the Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Crisis", in CSIS Commentaries, 27 November 2023, https://www.csis.org/node/108349.[10] Angus Berwick and Mariela Nava, "'Missed His Moment': Opposition Corruption Scandal Undermines Venezuela's Guaido", in Reuters, 3 December 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1Y72BB.[11] Mayela Armas, "Venezuela Opposition Removes Interim President Guaido", in Reuters, 31 December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-opposition-removes-interim-president-guaido-2022-12-31.[12] Deisy Buitrago and Mayela Armas, "Venezuela Opposition Gains Hope from Win in Ruling Party Stronghold", in Reuters, 11 January 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-opposition-gains-hope-win-ruling-party-stronghold-2022-01-11.[13] Luz Mely Reyes, "María Corina Machado, la elección sentimental de la 'candidata-no candidata'", in El País, 13 June 2024, https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-13/maria-corina-machado-la-eleccion-sentimental-de-la-candidata-no-candidata.html.[14] Tony Frangie Mawad, "In Venezuela, Some Chavistas Are Quietly Drifting toward the Opposition", in Americas Quarterly, 10 June 2024, https://americasquarterly.org/?p=44891.[15] Andreina Itriago Acosta and Patricia Laya, "Maduro at Crossroads as Venezuela Opposition Joins Together", in Bloomberg, 22 April 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-22/maduro-is-at-crossroads-as-venezuela-s-opposition-joins-together.[16] In Venezuela, there is no run-off. Adriana Núñez Rabascall and Gustavo Ocando Alex, "Encuestas proyectan triunfo de la oposición en Venezuela con 'una brecha muy grande' de votos", in Voz de América, 17 June 2024, https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/7656509.html.[17] Amelia Cheatham and Diana Roy, "Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate", in CFR Backgrounders, last updated on 22 December 2023, https://www.cfr.org/node/231759.[18] Alonso Moleiro, "Venezuela Doubles Down on Anti-Corruption Internal Purges", in El País, 7 April 2023, https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-04-07/venezuela-doubles-down-on-anti-corruption-internal-purges.html.[19] InSight Crime Venezuela Investigation Unit, Why Is Venezuela's Crime Rate Falling?, 28 May 2024, https://insightcrime.org/?p=276710.[20] "¿Qué tiene que ver la intervención de cárceles en Venezuela con las elecciones presidenciales de 2024?", in La Patilla, 17 November 2023, https://www.lapatilla.com/?p=5304787.[21] Patricia Laya and Andreina Itriago Acosta, "'Why Don't You Give Me Likes?': Maduro Wants to Ditch Despot Image", in Bloomberg, 13 June 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-venezuela-elections-maduro-rebrand.[22] Adriana Núñez Rabascall and Gustavo Ocando Alex, "Encuestas proyectan triunfo de la oposición", cit.[23] Tony Frangie Mawad, "From West to East, Machado and González Re-politicized Caracas", in Caracas Chronicles, 8 July 2024, https://wp.me/p6PDXs-mhJ.

Venezuela is approaching one of its most consequential elections. On 28 July, the incumbent President Nicolás Maduro will seek a third consecutive six-year term.[1] Even though he has struck an agreement with the opposition in which both parties commit to creating the conditions for a competitive election, known as the 'Barbados Agreement',[2] many observers doubt that Maduro would allow for a relatively free and fair contest, given that polls do not give him the slightest chance of winning.[3] But what will happen if he actually opts to go down the path of an evidently rigged vote? If the past is any indication, the answer is probably a lot of demonstrations, both peaceful and violent, alongside renewed international isolation that would undermine recent diplomatic openings in the region.[4]The 2018 election and its aftermath
In the last presidential election of 2018, opposition groups considered the playing field tilted in Maduro's favour because the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was stacked with government loyalists. Most opposition candidates opted out of the race except for Henri Falcón. When Maduro claimed victory, Falcón brought the case to the Supreme Court.[5] The election was considered so illegitimate that the then opposition-controlled National Assembly used a constitutional quibble to appoint its head, Juan Guaidó, as interim president in early 2019. This marked a watershed moment, as it gave birth to, de facto, two parallel presidencies.[6]
Rallying national and international outcry, most opposition forces mobilised their supporters to back the appointment of Guaidó. Over 500 protests were led or attended by different opposition movements in 2019 according to ACLED, a dataset that tracks political violence and protests in Venezuela and around the world. These demonstrations set out to repel Maduro's re-election and instead support Guaidó's claim to the interim presidency in 2019. Most of them were peaceful, but 13 per cent were violent or repressed by security forces and government-affiliated mobs known as colectivos. Part of the military also joined the rallies and tried to stage an uprising, but were quashed as well.[7] The government's crackdown on opposition-led and other spontaneous protests led to the death of at least 76 people, a record high in a single year since ACLED started covering the country in January 2018. The crackdown, coupled with growing international isolation and US and European sanctions,[8] contributed to further sinking the country's economy and fuelling the greatest mass exodus ever recorded in Latin America, with around one-fourth of the 28 million Venezuelans leaving the country.[9]
Support for Guaidó progressively waned. Corruption accusations related to mishandling resources,[10] the crackdown of security forces faced by Guaidó's supporters and the eventual failure to overthrow the Maduro government left the public disillusioned. Demonstrations in his support fell from 76 in 2020 to 19 in 2021 and just 2 in 2022. The opposition eventually removed Guaidó from the post of interim president in December 2022.[11]The Venezuelan opposition 2.0
Since then, opposition forces have progressively rebuilt public trust and scored some electoral advances. After boycotting the 2020 legislative elections, some progress in a Norway-led negotiation between the government and opposition paved the way for a slight improvement in the playing field of the 2021 regional elections – including through a more balanced composition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the presence of EU observers. This led opposition parties to participate in the election, despite widespread irregularities and arbitrary candidate disqualifications. As a result, opposition candidates won four of the country's 23 governorships, including Barinas, a historic Chavista stronghold.[12]
Through the 2021 process, opposition parties reckoned that the benefits of electoral participation outweighed the boycott. In October 2023, they signed a deal with the government, the abovementioned Barbados Agreement, committing to use the electoral route to solve the country's crisis. In parallel, the emergence of María Corina Machado as a political icon[13] has rekindled popular enthusiasm and expectation of change, including among Chavistas.[14] Her undisputed victory of the opposition primaries in late 2023, with over 93 per cent of the votes, turned her into a pivotal figure around which to rally. Under her leadership, Edmundo González – Machado's placeholder, since she was not allowed to run – has been recognised as the opposition unity candidate, hence forming a more cohesive front than in previous electoral cycles.[15] González could get 55 per cent of the votes, according to polls.[16]A summer of discontent?
For its part, the government is not doing well, as far as public support is concerned. In 2023, ACLED recorded over 2,700 demonstrations in Venezuela. While these demonstrations related to a range of issues, they mostly revolved around discontent with the faltering provision of services, labour rights and access to justice. This is the highest number since it began covering the country, which hints at both the growing dissatisfaction with the government and the renewed citizen willingness to retake public spaces to express dissent. Despite slight economic improvements after the darkest times of 2018–2019, in fact, Venezuela's economy still faces enormous difficulties.[17]
The government's superficial efforts to go after corruption, furthermore, seem to respond more to internal purges within Chavismo than an actual commitment to punish misconduct.[18] The evident improvements in the security realm – with gang-related violence events nosediving from 1,149 in 2020 to 476 in 2023 – also seem to owe more to the exodus of Venezuelans, including criminals,[19] than the security forces' recent raids in jails and kingpin hunts in marginalised neighbourhoods, as the government claims.[20] Against this backdrop, and regardless of Maduro's attempt to rebrand his public image, from authoritarian to 'friendlier' leader,[21] his public support remains very low, with around 15 per cent vote intention.[22]Looking beyond 28 July
It is hard to predict the eruption of protests. The high toll of the 2019 repression and the disillusionment with the Guaidó initiative has alienated most Venezuelans from politics. Furthermore, the increase in demonstrations in 2023 seems to have been independent of the political opposition's efforts to recompose itself. Opposition parties or representatives spearheaded or participated in just a few dozen of the protests. Hence, it is unclear whether such social discontent can coalesce into mobilisation in favour of the opposition. Nonetheless, the renewed sentiment of hope and participation that a more united opposition front is creating under Machado's leadership,[23] coupled with widespread popular grievances and the subsequent quest for change by different societal sectors, are creating a scenario in which an evidently rigged election may trigger another wave of demonstrations, in addition to international outcry and isolation.
Maduro can choose to allow the return of democracy in the country, even if that likely means losing the presidency. By retaining control of all the other government branches, he would still be in the position to negotiate with the current opposition the conditions for a smooth transition that does not translate into a witch hunt against him and his allies. However, he could also use this influence to hamper González's ability to run the presidency, pitting the judiciary and the legislature against it. Alternatively, he could opt to sway electoral authorities into disqualifying the opposition ticket or manipulating the results and, in doing so, reset the little economic and political progress made in the past couple of years and shepherd the country towards the abyss of authoritarianism, international isolation and socio-political turmoil. In this scenario, he would face the hardships related to having to face widespread mass protests, severed ties with regional governments – including more sympathising ones such as Colombia and Brazil – and the likely full-blown re-imposition of US and EU sanctions. Even though he has already sailed through similarly stormy waters once, the greater cohesiveness of the opposition, some cracks among the Chavista ranks, and the diplomatic and economic pressure that this path entails may hinder his ability to hold on to power for another term. Hopefully, these costs will weigh in his final decision.Tiziano Breda is Associate Analysis Coordinator for Latin America at the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) and Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] Rafael Ramírez, "An Election between Sanctions and Transition: Venezuela at a Crossroads", in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|30 (June 2024), https://www.iai.it/en/node/18622.[2] International Crisis Group, Barbados Deal Sets Venezuela on a Rocky Path to Competitive Polls, 20 October 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/node/21681.[3] Julie Turkewitz and Anatoly Kurmanaev, "How Venezuela's Leader Could Stay in Power, No Matter What Voters Want", in The New York Times, 25 June 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/25/world/americas/venezuela-election-maduro-power.html.[4] Chase Harrison, "Map: Which Latin American Countries Have Restored Relations with Venezuela?", in AS/COA Articles, 21 June 2023, https://www.as-coa.org/node/103328.[5] "Venezuela: Maduro Rival Henri Falcon Demands New Election", in Al Jazeera, 30 May 2018, https://aje.io/ds3kr.[6] Jon Lee Anderson, "Our Man in Caracas", in The New Yorker, 3 June 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/06/10/venezuelas-two-presidents-collide.[7] Scott Smith and Christopher Torchia, "Clashes Rock Venezuela as Guaido, Maduro Vie for Power", in AP News, 1 May 2019, https://apnews.com/0153cace08c84c8fbf34f9c6a7bdd4dd.[8] Anna Ayuso et al., "A Critical Juncture: EU's Venezuela Policy Following the War in Ukraine", in JOINT Briefs, No. 27 (May 2023), https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=1689.[9] Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian and Alexandra Winkler, "The Persistence of the Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Crisis", in CSIS Commentaries, 27 November 2023, https://www.csis.org/node/108349.[10] Angus Berwick and Mariela Nava, "'Missed His Moment': Opposition Corruption Scandal Undermines Venezuela's Guaido", in Reuters, 3 December 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1Y72BB.[11] Mayela Armas, "Venezuela Opposition Removes Interim President Guaido", in Reuters, 31 December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-opposition-removes-interim-president-guaido-2022-12-31.[12] Deisy Buitrago and Mayela Armas, "Venezuela Opposition Gains Hope from Win in Ruling Party Stronghold", in Reuters, 11 January 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-opposition-gains-hope-win-ruling-party-stronghold-2022-01-11.[13] Luz Mely Reyes, "María Corina Machado, la elección sentimental de la 'candidata-no candidata'", in El País, 13 June 2024, https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-13/maria-corina-machado-la-eleccion-sentimental-de-la-candidata-no-candidata.html.[14] Tony Frangie Mawad, "In Venezuela, Some Chavistas Are Quietly Drifting toward the Opposition", in Americas Quarterly, 10 June 2024, https://americasquarterly.org/?p=44891.[15] Andreina Itriago Acosta and Patricia Laya, "Maduro at Crossroads as Venezuela Opposition Joins Together", in Bloomberg, 22 April 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-22/maduro-is-at-crossroads-as-venezuela-s-opposition-joins-together.[16] In Venezuela, there is no run-off. Adriana Núñez Rabascall and Gustavo Ocando Alex, "Encuestas proyectan triunfo de la oposición en Venezuela con 'una brecha muy grande' de votos", in Voz de América, 17 June 2024, https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/7656509.html.[17] Amelia Cheatham and Diana Roy, "Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate", in CFR Backgrounders, last updated on 22 December 2023, https://www.cfr.org/node/231759.[18] Alonso Moleiro, "Venezuela Doubles Down on Anti-Corruption Internal Purges", in El País, 7 April 2023, https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-04-07/venezuela-doubles-down-on-anti-corruption-internal-purges.html.[19] InSight Crime Venezuela Investigation Unit, Why Is Venezuela's Crime Rate Falling?, 28 May 2024, https://insightcrime.org/?p=276710.[20] "¿Qué tiene que ver la intervención de cárceles en Venezuela con las elecciones presidenciales de 2024?", in La Patilla, 17 November 2023, https://www.lapatilla.com/?p=5304787.[21] Patricia Laya and Andreina Itriago Acosta, "'Why Don't You Give Me Likes?': Maduro Wants to Ditch Despot Image", in Bloomberg, 13 June 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-venezuela-elections-maduro-rebrand.[22] Adriana Núñez Rabascall and Gustavo Ocando Alex, "Encuestas proyectan triunfo de la oposición", cit.[23] Tony Frangie Mawad, "From West to East, Machado and González Re-politicized Caracas", in Caracas Chronicles, 8 July 2024, https://wp.me/p6PDXs-mhJ.