Suchergebnisse

The chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Europe & his senior policy adviser argue that the US needs a strong European partner to help promote common interests in Europe & the world beyond. Adapted from the source document.

The rise of China is one of the greatest challenges for the transatlantic relationship. Despite similar concerns, fundamental differences could prevent a joined-up European and US approach.

This article analyses the conditions under which a race to the top or California effect is likely to take place. To that end, it examines two cases in which the EU restricted or threatened to restrict imports from the United States and Canada because of differences in regulatory standards. In one case, the European data protection directive, a California effect occurred. In the other case, the EU ban on hormone-treated beef, no California effect occurred. An analysis of these two cases leads to two additions to existing explanations of the California effect. The analysis also has a number of implications for the debate on the race to the bottom thesis.

Since the end of World War II, outer space has been an arena in which both high and low politics have played out, and both the US and Europe have been heavily invested. This article examines the case study of space exploration as a window into the evolving nature of the transatlantic relationship. With the US government regularly deprioritizing Europe in its foreign policy and at times taking the transatlantic relationship for granted, the author argues that transnational and non-state actors have played an important role in maintaining the stability of the alliance. In terms of space, this means that the space community—space agencies, private actors, space enthusiasts, engineers, and scientists, among others—often enable transatlantic cooperation despite initial conflictual rhetoric stemming from political leaders. Importantly, while these transnational or non-state actors tend to view space as a peaceful domain for all of humankind, governments and militaries often treat space as the next battlefield. To support this argument, the article considers two major transatlantic space developments: the US's Space Force, which reflects a US desire to be dominant in space, and Europe's Galileo satellite system, which reflects a European goal to have strategic autonomy from the US. The author argues that the idea that space should be a peaceful domain for all of humankind is more strongly reflected in outcomes, despite the presence of conflictual, militaristic rhetoric.

Since the Second World War, the United Kingdom has served as a transatlantic bridge between the United States and Europe and as a conduit of the US influence in European affairs. Since joining the EU, Britain has been one of the main contributors to the European Union's foreign, security, and defense policies. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU in 2020 marked a milestone in European politics. The UK's decision to leave the European Union has raised questions concerning probable implications of Brexit for the transatlantic relationship and the European balance of power. Brexit entails multifaceted changes in Britain's global posture, in particular, new nuances in its dealings with the United States and European partners. These shifts embrace a wide range of political, defense, security, and economic issues. They have stirred up debates on the British strategy's tilt towards the Indo–Pacific and Britain's future cooperation with its American ally and the EU. Having considered developments in the Washington–London–Brussels relations in the wake of the Brexit referendum, this article figures out trends in the interactions of these key players that reflect their visions of a post-Brexit reality.

Technological innovation has become a critical element of international cooperation and geopolitical rivalry. This has impacted key areas of the transatlantic partnership, presenting both opportunities and challenges for EU–US relations, either rejuvenating a relationship mired in rifts or deepening those rifts. Instead of examining how these structural cracks have emerged and are growing, this article zooms in on the challenge to transatlantic relations posed by technological innovation, both as a driver of cooperation and a cause for further rivalry. In doing so, the article explores three interrelated elements: the transatlantic technology gap and the EU's quest for technological sovereignty, approaches to technological innovation and the role of emerging and disruptive technologies, and the values-based governance of digital and technology issues. As fast-paced technological transformation continues to disrupt societies and economies on both sides of the Atlantic, technology should be at the heart of a revived phase in EU–US cooperation and trust.

The long-standing close relationship between the democracies of Europe and North America has been based on shared values. However, the central value we share is not democracy in the abstract. Rather, it is the spirit of individual liberty and the conviction, deeply rooted in our culture, that governments must be bound by the rule of law that preserves the rights of individuals and of minorities, plus a willingness to make sacrifices to defend these values. The will to protect and defend these values have been eroding on both sides of the Atlantic. But the process of erosion is clearly further advanced in Europe, where the institutions of the welfare state matter enormously and large portions of the populace have become dependent on state aid. These developments have brought both Americans and Europeans to a crossroads. On the one hand, Americans must resist the seductive urge to shrug off global responsibilities and retreat into isolation and, on the other, Europeans must beware of pushing their North American allies away. To preserve the transatlantic partnership we must grasp that what increasingly divides us is not policy disputes or political styles but the crumbling commitment of Western culture to the values that made it special and without which no will to defend it can possibly exist.