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Sahra Wagenknecht's new party has a questionable support base and doubtful prospects—like others of its kind across Europe.

The emergence of left populism, mainly in Southern Europe, in the decade of 2010, questioned the impression that populism in Europe was only right-wing oriented. On the other hand, the expansion of populism as a common denomination favored the perception that all populisms were the same, regardless of ideology: a threat to democracy. It explains why many left parties are reluctant towards being labelled as populist. Besides, left-wing populism connected with the one from Latin America one decade before where the tensions between democratization and authoritarianism have been widely discussed. The European public opinion usually relates the Latin American left populist governments with authoritarianism, associated with the situation in Venezuela first with Hugo Chávez and, especially, now with Nicolás Maduro. For this reason, left populism in Europe was made suspicious of being authoritarian.

EVIDENCE IS SUMMARIZED TO SHOW THAT: (1) IF AUTHORITARIANISM IS MEASURED BY A BEHAVIOUR INVENTORY, IT IS UNCORRELATED WITH EITHER POLITICAL PARTY VOTE OR IDEOLOGY; (2) IF MEASURED BY THE CALIFORNIA F SCALE, IT SHOWS LITTLE IF ANY CORRELATION WITH VOTE; AND (3) SCALES OF LEFTIST POLITICAL SENTIMENT CAN BE CONSTRUCTED WHICH HAVE HIGH POSITIVE CORRELATION WITH THE F SCALE. AS VOTING IS ARGUABLY THE MOST INPORTANT POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR FOR MOST PEOPLE IN A DEMOCRACY, THE ROUGHLY 50% OF HIGH F SCALE SCORERS WHO VOTE LIFTIST ARE PROPOSED AS THE LONG-LOST AUTHORITARIANS OF THE LEFT.

Conventional wisdom dictates that the more citizens lean towards either end of the ideological spectrum, the lower their support for democracy. The main model pitted against this "rigidity-of-the-extremes model" is the "rigidity-of-the-right model". This model assumes that rightist citizens are less supportive. This study proposes and empirically demonstrates the validity of an alternative model, which we call "the authoritarian legacy model". This model predicts that whether leftist or rightist citizens are less supportive of democracy depends on countries' experience with left- or right-authoritarianism. To evaluate its validity, we present a systematic comparative investigation of the relation between citizens' ideological and democratic beliefs, using European and World Values Survey data from 38 European countries (N = 105,495; 1994-2008). In line with this model, our analyses demonstrate that democratic support is lowest among leftist citizens in former left-authoritarian countries and among rightist citizens in former right-authoritarian countries. We find that this relation persists even among generations that grew up after authoritarian rule. These findings suggest that traditional ideological rigidity models are unsuitable for the study of citizens' democratic beliefs.

No political regime can be entirely immune from authoritarian temptations. This article focuses on the distinctive sources and dynamics that apply to post-revolutionary regimes. To prevail in bringing about radical and irreversible change they will require an effective security apparatus that overcomes the backlash that will arise from the previous order. These security requirements provide the first source of authoritarian temptation, but there are three more. Once the regime is firmly established the new rulers can choose what restraints on their conduct to accept. It is tempting to dispense with healthy channels of feedback. Moreover, even the most successful of revolutionary regimes polarise opinion between the old order and the new. And when material hardships arise loyalty may be rewarded above market rationality. In conjunction these amount to a serious set of authoritarian temptations. But there are also some countervailing considerations. A durably successful radical regime must counterbalance the requirements for unity and discipline against the need for creativity and adaptability. Initial emancipatory ambitions may be updated and renewed in order to inspire future generations and legitimise the revolutionary process. Such regimes can seesaw between authoritarian and empowering tendencies, rather than relying on repression alone to keep them in existence. Their legitimation strategy will contain three main components: i) reaffirming and updating their emancipatory origins; ii) downplaying/excusing any authoritarian "deviations"; iii) projecting future prospects for inclusionary development.

"Why do some autocrats allow Islamist movements political space while others exclude them from state-managed political contestation, and what impact does the participation of Islamist movements in politics have on existing opposition to economic liberalization? Employing cross-historical analysis, this book argues that the story of Islamist incorporation is intimately linked to the state's struggle to move beyond the redistributive social pact that emerged under President Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Specifically, political leaders have opened space toward Islamist movements in an attempt to contain opposition to de-Nasserization policies, which limited state sponsored redistributive schemes and welfare programs. The political ascendancy of Islamist movements has weakened opposition to economic liberalization schemes by activating and deepening identity-based divides among proponents of redistribution, particularly the leftist opposition. More broadly, the emergence of Islamists as dominant political actors has crowded out conflicts over redistribution of wealth in national politics in favor of culture wars and battles over the religious identity of the state. This book contributes to our understanding of the role of identity politics and culture wars in advancing economic liberalization"--

Abstract:
Democracy has been on the defensive in contemporary Latin America; under the cover of progressive rhetoric, competitive authoritarianism has emerged. Leftist leaders like Hugo Chávez relied on populism to establish their political hegemony, erode institutional checks and balances, marginalize the opposition through discriminatory legalism, and severely skew political competition. Left-wing populism has done more damage to democracy than the rightist, neoliberal populism of the 1990s. Self-styled socialist leaders command more solid, durable support, use growing economic interventionism to boost their power, invoke nationalism as a shield against foreign democracy promotion, and act as a coordinated group in suffocating democracy.

New Zealand's Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, adopted a "go hard, go early" approach to eliminate COVID-19. Although Ardern and her Labour party are considered left-leaning, the policies implemented during the pandemic (e.g., police roadblocks) have the hallmarks of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). RWA is characterized by three attitudinal clusters (authoritarian aggression, submission, and conventionalism). The uniqueness of the clusters, and whether they react to environmental change, has been debated. Here, in the context of the pandemic, we investigate the relationship between political orientation and RWA. Specifically, we measured political orientation, support for New Zealand's major political parties, and RWA among 1,430 adult community members. A multivariate Bayesian model demonstrated that, in the middle of a pandemic, both left-leaning and right-leaning individuals endorsed items tapping authoritarian submission. In contrast to authoritarian submission, and demonstrating the multidimensional nature of RWA, we observed the typical relationships between political orientation and authoritarian aggression and conventionalism was observed.

Citizens can face a difficult electoral decision when no party even broadly represents their views. In Western Europe, this applies to those citizens with left-wing preferences on economic issues and traditional/authoritarian preferences on socio-cultural issues. There are many voters with such 'left-authoritarian' views, but few parties. Hence, the former often have to choose between parties that only match their views on one of these two ideological dimensions. This study shows that whether these citizens privilege economic or socio-cultural congruence in their electoral preferences depends on the issues they are concerned about. In general, it is found that left-authoritarians privilege economic concerns and therefore prefer parties that are left-liberal. These findings have implications for our general understanding of electoral choice and of changing patterns of political competition in Western Europe. Adapted from the source document.

Published online: 24 Sep 2013. ; Citizens can face a difficult electoral decision when no party even broadly represents their views. In Western Europe, this applies to those citizens with left-wing preferences on economic issues and traditional/authoritarian preferences on socio-cultural issues. There are many voters with such 'left-authoritarian' views, but few parties. Hence, the former often have to choose between parties that only match their views on one of these two ideological dimensions. This study shows that whether these citizens privilege economic or socio-cultural congruence in their electoral preferences depends on the issues they are concerned about. In general, it is found that left-authoritarians privilege economic concerns and therefore prefer parties that are left-liberal. These findings have implications for our general understanding of electoral choice and of changing patterns of political competition in Western Europe.