The role of bioethicists amidst crises like the COVID-19 pandemic is not well defined. As professionals in the field, they should respond, but how? The observation of the early days of pandemic confinement in Finland showed that moral philosophers with limited experience in bioethics tended to apply their favorite theories to public decisions, with varying results. Medical ethicists were more likely to lend support to the public authorities by soothing or descriptive accounts of the solutions assumed. These are approaches that Tuija Takala has called the firefighting and window dressing models of bioethics. Human rights lawyers drew attention to the flaws of the government's regulative thinking. Critical bioethicists offered analyses of the arguments presented and the moral and political theories that could be used as the basis of good and acceptable decisions. ; Peer reviewed
The European continent faces an apocalyptic pandemic that poses mortal danger to millions of citizens. This paper seeks to address the role played by European public policy in addressing the Covid-19 pandemic. Currently, each Member State across Europe is applying its own measures to deal with the coronavirus ; namely, decentralised decision-making that could trigger political tensions among the states. The paper argues that European public policy must change rapidly and fundamentally if these tensions are to be successfully managed ; otherwise, such policy might simply cease to exist. Moreover, the known and notorious problem of collective action, information asymmetries, irrationality, negative externalities and the related free-riding phenomenon persistently are distorting the Member States' combined efforts, resulting in deficient attempts to contain the spread of Covid-19. The paper also argues that the current unprecedented outbreak of this superspreading virus calls for a bigger EU-wide coordinated response. We argue that the Covid-19 pandemic is a good example of an area in which the central EU level holds a comparative advantage over lower levels of government. In addition, the paper offers several substantive insights into ways to improve the public policy response in the 'war' against Covid-19.
The COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia is part of the ongoing worldwide pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). It was confirmed to have spread to Indonesia on 2 March 2020, after a dance instructor and her mother tested positive for the virus. Both were infected from a Japanese national.[2][3] By 9 April, the pandemic had spread to all 34 provinces in the country as Gorontalo confirmed its first case, with Jakarta, East Java, and West Java being the worst-hit. The largest increase of new cases in a single day occurred on 10 June, when 1,241 cases were announced. On the same day, for the first time ever, there were more than 700 recoveries recorded and 17,000 samples tested just within a span of 24 hours. As of 10 June, Indonesia has reported 34,316 cases, the second highest in Southeast Asia, behind Singapore. In terms of death numbers, Indonesia ranks sixth in Asia with 1,959 deaths.[4] Review of data, however, indicated that the number of deaths may be much higher than what has been reported as those who died with acute COVID-19 symptoms but had not been confirmed or tested were not counted in the official death figure.[5] Indonesia has conducted 446,918 tests against its 273 million population so far, or around 1,635 tests per million, making it one of the worst testing rates in the world. As a comparison, it is lower than Mauritania which has only around 4.6 million population, yet has conducted 1,649 tests per million.[4] Instead of implementing a nationwide lockdown, the government has approved large-scale social restrictions (Indonesian: Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar, abbreviated as PSBB) and currently are in place for the entirety of three provinces alongside with another six regencies and cities. Some had ended their PSBB and starting to apply New Normal. https://twitter.com/i/events/1270853710529191937 https://twitter.com/i/events/1270855048365371394 https://twitter.com/i/events/1270782139777183744 ; covid19
This paper evaluated the unique challenges of Australians in relation to the global novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. The 2019-2020 bushfires and COVID-19 outbreak have increased rates of anxiety and distress in Australia. On the contrary, unprecedented spending by the Australian Government on health care, employment, and housing has potentially lowered anxiety and stress for some Australians. Research is required to monitor the potential long-term mental health consequences of COVID-19 in Australia.
This paper seeks to better understand the pandemic by looking at the long term (longue durée). It is first recalled that the progressive construction of a horizon of eradication of infectious diseases led the population of rich countries to consider that the great epidemics no longer represented a real danger. A sanitary disarmament of our societies followed. However, the scientific response, its strength and speed, which made it possible to propose a vaccine in less than a year, constituted a real breakthrough, making it possible to envisage a control of the epidemic in these northern countries within a short time. In the face of this breakthrough, however, we can observe a strong permanence of the reactions of populations and societies (incredulity, construction of rumours, instrumentalization by all social and political actors). Finally, after about a century and a half of existence, the parenthesis of freedom of movement during epidemics has closed in the face of COVID-19. The article insists on the importance of the quality of alerts in the control of epidemics since the 14th century and questions the effectiveness of the WHO in this field if a large country does not respect the obligation of immediate declaration. It also questions the entry of humanity in a new pandemic era as a consequence of the demographic growth and the unprecedented scale of exchanges.
In 2021, five decades after it was first defined, ageism was declared by the World Health Organization to be a global challenge that needs to be addressed. This article reviews the potential ageist elements in social media, the mass media, and healthcare practices directed towards older adults during a recent global context, the COVID-19 pandemic. Evidence indicates that some presentations relating to older adults in the mass media and social media contained ageist elements ranging from the more subtle forms of ageism to more explicit forms, such as nicknames given to the COVID-19 pandemic in social media (e.g. 'Senior Deleter'). Evidence also reveals that during the pandemic some medical practices were ageist.
For the UK struggling to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic, the experience of Cuba's Ministry of Public Health over the past six decades provides the clearest case for a single, universal health system constituting an underlying national grid dedicated to prevention and care; an abundance of health professionals, accessible everywhere; a world-renowned science and biotech capability; and an educated public schooled in public health. All this was achieved despite being under a vicious blockade by the United States for all of that time.
This study will present some results of an online survey conducted by the author on a sample of 1640 subjects. The analysis of the results from the perspective of fear determinants during the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed that being less educated, older (but not over 70 years), social-network-informed, widow, or living in a rural area, may result in an increased level of fear. Direct experience with the virus does not result in significant differences in fear levels according to our findings. The impact analysis of fear on attitudinal compliance revealed that higher levels of fear may result in higher levels of compliance with preventive measures and in more willingness to get vaccinated.
Lecciones que deja la pandemia por Covid-19Lições que a pandemia da COVID-19 deixaThe narrow view and meager resources of health systems in Latin America and the Caribbean have not allowed dealing with the new SARS-CoV-2 pandemic adequately, with few honorable exceptions. The emphasis on curative systems, in terms of both infrastructure and human and financial resources, to the detriment of primary health care (PHC) is a blatant example of this historical shortsightedness. Besides the absence of sufficient, governance-skilled nurses, this circumstance reduces the possibility of controlling a pandemic that, while unknown, already had the necessary background for each country to tackle it using disease prevention and health promotion in vulnerable populations. Therefore, the depicted scenario has been conducive to the spread of the pandemic and the consequent impact on the health, social, economic, and political systems of Latin American countries.Para citar este editorial / To reference this editorial / Para citar este editorialSanhueza-Alvarado O. Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic. Aquichan. 2020;20(3):243-245. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/aqui.2020.20.3.1Publicado: 07/09/2020 ; Lecciones que deja la pandemia por Covid-19Lições que a pandemia da COVID-19 deixaLa falta de visión y de recursos de los sistemas de salud de las naciones de América Latina y El Caribe no ha permitido enfrentar de manera adecuada la pandemia por el nuevo coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, salvo honrosas excepciones. El énfasis en los sistemas curativos, tanto en infraestructura como en recursos humanos y financieros, en desmedro de la atención primaria de salud es uno de los principales ejemplos de esta falta de visión histórica, que disminuye la posibilidad de poder controlar una pandemia, efectivamente desconocida, pero de la cual ya se tenían los antecedentes necesarios para enfrentarla desde la prevención y la promoción de la salud en las poblaciones vulnerables de cada país. Se sumó a lo anterior la ausencia —en un número adecuado y de talento en la gobernanza— de enfermeros, por lo cual el escenario fue propicio para la diseminación de la pandemia y la consecuente afectación de los sistemas sanitarios, sociales, económicos y políticos de los países de América Latina.Para citar este editorial / To reference this editorial / Para citar este editorialSanhueza-Alvarado O. Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic. Aquichan. 2020;20(3):243-245. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/aqui.2020.20.3.1Publicado: 07/09/2020 ; Lecciones que deja la pandemia por Covid-19Lições que a pandemia da COVID-19 deixaA falta de visão e recursos dos sistemas de saúde das nações da América Latina e do Caribe não tem permitido enfrentar de maneira adequada a pandemia pelo novo coronavírus (Sars-CoV-2), com raras exceções. A ênfase nos sistemas curativos, tanto em infraestrutura quanto em recursos humanos e financeiros, em detrimento da atenção primária em saúde, é um dos principais exemplos dessa falta de visão histórica, que diminui a possibilidade de poder controlar uma pandemia, efetivamente desconhecida, mas da qual já se tinham os antecedentes necessários para enfrentá-la por meio da prevenção e promoção em saúde nas populações vulneráveis de cada país. A ausência de enfermeiros se soma ao já mencionado —em um número adequado e talento para governar—, por isso o cenário foi propício para se disseminar a pandemia e para a consequente afetação dos sistemas sanitários, sociais, econômicos e políticos dos países da América Latina. Para citar este editorial / To reference this editorial / Para citar este editorialSanhueza-Alvarado O. Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic. Aquichan. 2020;20(3):243-245. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/aqui.2020.20.3.1Publicado: 07/09/2020
We develop an econometric model of consumer panic (or panic buying) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using Google search data on relevant keywords, we construct a daily index of consumer panic for 54 countries from January 1st to April 30th 2020. We also assemble data on government policy announcements and daily COVID-19 cases for all countries. Our panic index reveals widespread consumer panic in most countries, primarily during March, but with significant variation in the timing and severity of panic between countries. Our model implies that both domestic and world virus transmission contribute significantly to consumer panic. But government policy is also important: Internal movement restrictions - whether announced by domestic or foreign governments - generate substantial short run panic that largely vanishes in a week to ten days. Internal movement restrictions announced early in the pandemic generated more panic than those announced later. Stimulus announcements had smaller impacts, and travel restrictions do not appear to generate consumer panic.
