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Der digitalisierte Steuerpflichtige ist digitalisiert in seinem Wirtschaften und digitalisiert in seiner Interaktion mit der Finanzverwaltung. Digitale und digitalisierte Wirtschaftsmodelle stellen sowohl den Gesetzgeber auch den Abgabenvollzug vor Herausforderungen, weil einerseits die physische Anknüpfung von Sachverhalten an staatliches Territorium nahezu unmöglich wird und andererseits staatliche Kontrolle von digitalen Wirtschaftsmodellen im derzeitigen System schwer möglich ist. Halten sich Steuerpflichtige an ihre Pflichten gegenüber der Finanzverwaltung, bietet die Digitalisierung jedoch Chancen für die Effizienzsteigerung des Vollzuges. Die Balance zwischen staatlicher Effizienz durch Digitalisierung und Schutz des Einzelnen vor übermäßigen Eingriffen in das Grundrecht auf Wahrung der Privatsphäre einerseits und das Recht auf gute Verwaltung andererseits, scheint derzeit jedoch noch nicht umfassend erreicht. ; Digital is present in both, the economic lives of taxpayers as well as their interaction with tax authorities. Digital and digitalized business is challenging lawmakers and tax enforcement authorities alike. Firstly, making the connection between the facts of a case and state territory is virtually impossible and secondly, government control over digital business is hardly feasible. Digitalization processes however, offer opportunities provided that taxpayers comply with their obligations vis-à-vis the tax authorities. Admittedly, we have not yet struck a balance between efficient administrative processes through digitalization and sufficient protection of the individual against intrusion of his or her fundamental right to privacy on the one hand and the right to good administration by the institutions on the other hand.

Offshore tax evasion, international money laundering, and aggressive international tax planning significantly reduce government revenues. In particular, for some low-income countries the amount of capital flight (where elites move and hide monies offshore in tax havens) exceeds foreign aid. Governments struggle to enforce their tax laws to constrain these actions, and they are inhibited by a lack of information concerning international capital flows. The main international policy response to these developments has been to promote global financial transparency through heightened cross-border exchanges of tax information. The Article examines elements of optimal cross-border tax information exchange laws and policies by focusing on three key challenges: information quality, taxpayer privacy, and enforcement. Relatedly, the Article discusses how the exchange of automatic "big tax data" combined with data analytics can help address these challenges. The recommended laws and policies will improve how countries share tax information, which in turn will help inhibit global financial crimes.

July 1977. ; Bibliography: p. 87-88 (app.5) ; app.1. Privacy law in the States.--app.2. Citizen as taxpayer.--app.3. Employment records.--app.4. Privacy act of 1974, an assessment.--app.5. Technology and privacy. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Includes bibliographical references. ; This dissertation endeavours to establish whether the Tax Administration Act sufficiently protects the taxpayers' constitutional rights to privacy and right to be informed. Specifically it will be investigating these rights versus the powers provided to SARS under the different fiscal statutes to access information and to exchange information internationally. The research focussed on the rights conferred on taxpayers in terms of the Constitution versus the powers awarded to SARS in terms of the Tax Administration Act and the Income Tax Act. The research included other relevant fiscal statutes, books, case law, websites, articles and comments of experts. It has been said that the Commissioner of SARS has "draconian powers" that infringe on the rights of taxpayers. My research concludes that most of these rights are reasonable and justifiable limited in the interest of a democratic society in order to fund the administrative and financial burden on the state. The current society with advanced information technology has resulted in information being easily accessible and transferred and accordingly our privacy is being more invaded than before. This is also the case in dealings with the tax authorities but is considered a justifiable infringement in order to collect taxes to finance an open and democratic society. Tax authorities around the world are entering into tax information exchange agreements that make the sharing of taxpayer information permissible by law. The search and seizure powers without a warrant are substantially unconstitutional. It should be noted that these powers have been challenged in court and the Commissioner will not easily authorise such actions without being convinced that his actions are above the law. Taxpayers' will therefore not be subject to these powers on a regular basis. Taxpayers' are not always informed of their right to administrative justice that ensures lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative actions by the Commissioner. The newly appointed tax ombudsman will be a more cost effective remedy for challenging the powers of SARS and it is likely that the future will bring about more precedents that will prevent the abuse of powers. The Tax Ombudsman will have a duty to educate taxpayers' about their rights and also to educate the SARS officials on reasonable and procedurally fair conduct.

The United States Whistleblower Program's inadequate protections have placed the privacy and confidentiality rights of United States taxpayers in a vulnerable state. By using the United States Whistleblower Program as an example, this paper seeks to illustrate the risk of eroding the confidentiality and privacy rights of the taxpayer, which is a risk that other national and international governments should likewise attempt to mitigate in their own whistleblower protection programs.

ABSTRACT
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is charged with enforcing the U.S. tax code and has historically fulfilled this charge efficiently. The IRS is among the most cost-effective government agencies, costing just 33 cents for each $100 it collects (Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 2021a). The effectiveness of the agency is associated with factors like a relatively high voluntary compliance rate and the use of technology to improve audits and enhance taxpayer service. Technology-supported audits have dual roles; they increase perceived detection, which deters noncompliance, and they increase actual detection, which identifies noncompliers; both roles help to improve revenue collection. Technology-supported taxpayer service increases the cost-efficiency of the agency and taxpayer satisfaction. This study provides a historical overview of the computerization of the IRS, noting obstacles, like budget constraints, politicization of the agency, historically short leadership tenure, risks associated with private-sector contracts, and taxpayer privacy concerns.

Massive amounts of data on human beings can now be analyzed. Pragmatic purposes abound, including selling goods and services, winning political campaigns, and identifying possible terrorists. Yet 'big data' can also be harnessed to serve the public good: scientists can use big data to do research that improves the lives of human beings, improves government services, and reduces taxpayer costs. In order to achieve this goal, researchers must have access to this data - raising important privacy questions. What are the ethical and legal requirements? What are the rules of engagement? What are the best ways to provide access while also protecting confidentiality? Are there reasonable mechanisms to compensate citizens for privacy loss? The goal of this book is to answer some of these questions. The book's authors paint an intellectual landscape that includes legal, economic, and statistical frameworks. The authors also identify new practical approaches that simultaneously maximize the utility of data access while minimizing information risk

Over the last decade, there has been a revolution in cross-border tax information exchange and reporting. While this dramatic shift was the product of multiple forces and events, a fundamental reality is that politics, technology, and law intersected to drive the shift to the point where nation-states will now transmit and receive from each other significant ongoing flows of taxpayer information. States can now expect to accumulate large stashes of data on cross-border income, assets, and activities on a scale and level of comprehensiveness unmatched by previous information exchange regimes. This article examines the pressing follow-up question of how this data will be used and what issues nation-states will confront when data comes home. Although concerns about data protection and use have been raised in critiquing the new crossborder information exchange regimes, a systematic examination of how governments might use or fail to use data and when those uses will pose unacceptable risks has yet to be undertaken. This article analyzes how domestic politics, priorities, and institutions are likely to affect tax enforcement and data usage at the nation-state level going forward. We argue that despite the dominant focus on global developments, domestic politics and technological constraints will likely play an equally if not more significant role in data use and protection as countries receive data and decide what to do with it. The mere fact that collective political will on a global level produced the information revolution does not prevent domestic forces from either derailing the revolution in practice or redirecting data to other uses. This article maps the potential risks and examines the extent to which individual nation-states will have the capacity or inclination to conduct enforcement, protect taxpayer privacy, and attend to distributional outcomes and risks. We ultimately articulate a framework for understanding the country-level factors likely to affect outcomes and pathways when data comes home.