Suchergebnisse

In recent years, the structure of executive/employee compensation packages has focused less on stock options and more on restricted stock. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) characterizes both of these alternatives as stockbased compensation. The reasons for the shift are numerous and include increased scrutiny of executive pay after recent corporate scandals and a renewed emphasis on the expensing of stock options using the fair value method. In this case, we focus on the issues that led Jones Apparel Group, Inc. to change its focus from stock options to restricted stock in the compensation package of its Chief Executive Officer. Jones was not subject to any scandal or corporate malfeasance, but the case demonstrates how recent events have impacted companies that use stock-based compensation. The case allows students to compare and contrast the corporate governance and accounting impacts of stock options and restricted stock.

During 2002 and 2003, 140 publicly traded U.S. firms announced their intention to recognize an accounting expense when stock options are granted to employees. Many similar firms elected not to expense options. We study the stock market's reaction. There is no evidence whatsoever that expensing options reduces the stock price. To the contrary, around announcement dates, we find significant price increases for firms electing to expense options and significant price declines for industry/size/performance-matched firms that did not announce expensing at the same moment. The average relative change in market values is 3.65% during a six-day window around the announcement. The magnitude of the market's reaction to expensing depends on agency costs, the magnitude of option expenses, and financial reporting costs. The market's reaction does not seem to be affected by contracting costs (e.g., induced by debt covenants), growth opportunities, or potential political repercussions. Moreover, the decision to expense and the magnitude of the market's reaction are not signals of future operating performance. The market seems to react favorably to transparent reporting while it penalizes firms that give the appearance of having something to hide.

Stock Options sind bereits lange ein Teil der Vergütung des Top-Managements, al-lerdings verursachen diese, immer wieder heftige Diskussionen. Daher stellt sich die Frage, welche Anreizwirkungen ergeben sich durch den Einsatz von Stock Options als variabler Vergütungsbestandteil für das Management. Diese Arbeit beinhaltet einerseits eine Beschreibung über die Anreizwirkungen und andererseits über eventuell entstehende Kosten durch den Einsatz von Manage-ment Stock Options. Mit ausgewählten empirischen Studien werden die Anreizwir-kungen und Kosten herausgearbeitet und aufgezeigt. Um die Studien näher betrachten zu können, wird im ersten Teil dieser Arbeit ein Literaturüberblick über die Grundlagen, welche von den Anreiz- und Vergütungssystemen, über das Shareholder Value Konzept bis hin zur Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie reichen, gegeben. Im Hauptteil der Arbeit wird anhand der Studien gezeigt, dass die Gewährung von Stock Options überwiegend eine positive Wirkung auf die Motivation des Managements hat und zu einer Steigerung des Unternehmenswertes führt. Allerdings haben Stock Options eher keinen, bzw. wenn dann einen negativen Einfluss auf die Dividendenpolitik. Der Einfluss auf die Risikobereitschaft des Managements ist überwiegend positiv, wobei in einer Studie sogar eine stark positive Auswirkung nachgewiesen wurde. Eng daran geknüpft sind die Auswirkungen auf die Investitionsentscheidungen, diese werden ebenfalls mehrheitlich positiv durch den Einsatz von Stock Options beeinflusst. Hinsichtlich der Kosten vertreten die Autoren/innen der angeführten Studien einen gemeinsamen Standpunkt nämlich, dass die Kosten von Stock Options nicht einfach festzustellen sind. Nach einem Resümee der gewonnen Ergebnisse erfolgt eine kurze Zusammenfassung und ein Ausblick auf zukünftige Entwicklungen. ; Stock options have been part of financial compensation systems for top managers for a long time but have also been much disputed. Thus, the question is raised of which incentive effects stock options have as variable compensation elements for managers.This thesis includes a description of incentive effects and of the costs incurred by the use of management stock options. The incentive effects and costs are shown by using selected empirical studies. In order to be able to take a closer look at the studies, the first part of the thesis includes a literature review about the basics concepts, ranging from incentive and compensation systems to the shareholder value concept and to the principal agent theory. Based on the empirical studies, the main part of the thesis shows that granting stock options has a primarily positive effect on the motivation of managers and the value of the respective enterprise. However, if stock options have an effect on dividend payout policy at all, it is negative. The influence on the readiness of managers to assume risks is predominantly positive; one study even showed a very positive effect. Closely connected to this aspect are the effects on investment decisions, on which the use of stock options also have a predominantly positive effect. Regarding the costs, the authors of the studies draw a common conclusion: the costs of stock options are not easy to determine. After a resume of the results, the thesis closes with a short summary and an outlook toward future developments. ; Ines Janisch ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung der Verfasserin/des Verfassers ; Zsfassung in dt. u. engl. Sprache ; Graz, Univ., Masterarb., 2011 ; (VLID)216850

ERTA resurrected the old qualified stock option in the form of incentive stock options—and, in fact, improved upon it in some respects. Here's what to consider in making stock grants accordingly.