Regimental Signalling
In: Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Band 48, Heft 322, S. 1415-1417
ISSN: 1744-0378
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In: Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Band 48, Heft 322, S. 1415-1417
ISSN: 1744-0378
In: National Administrations in EU Trade Policy, S. 63-85
In: Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Band 40, Heft 216, S. 149-164
ISSN: 1744-0378
In: Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Band 25, Heft 112, S. 614-637
ISSN: 1744-0378
In: Africa research bulletin. Economic, financial and technical series, Band 54, Heft 10
ISSN: 1467-6346
In: Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Band 37, Heft 181, S. 213-228
ISSN: 1744-0378
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 383-397
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft 10, S. 9545-9562
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractThe accusation of virtue signalling is typically understood as a serious charge. Those accused usually respond (if not by an admission of fault) by attempting to show that they are doing no such thing. In this paper, I argue that we ought to embrace the charge, rather than angrily reject it. I argue that this response can draw support from cognitive science, on the one hand, and from social epistemology on the other. I claim that we may appropriately concede that what we are doing is (inter alia) virtue signalling, because virtue signalling is morally appropriate. It neither expresses vices, nor is hypocritical, nor does it degrade the quality of public moral discourse. Signalling our commitment to norms is a central and justifiable function of moral discourse, and the same signals provide (higher-order) evidence that is appropriately taken into account in forming moral beliefs.
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 7261
SSRN
Earlier edition published under title : Instructions in military signalling. ; Mode of access: Internet.
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In: European Economic Review, Vol. 124
SSRN
Working paper
In: Sustainability ; Volume 10 ; Issue 11
Many global challenges cannot be addressed by one single actor alone. Achieving sustainability requires governance by state and non-state market actors to jointly realise public values and corporate goals. As a form of public&ndash ; private governance, voluntary standards involving governments, non-governmental organisations and companies have gained much traction in recent years and have been in the limelight of public authorities and policymakers. From a firm perspective, sustainability standards can be a way to demonstrate that they engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a credible way. To capitalise on their CSR activities, firms need to ensure their stakeholders are able to recognise and assess their CSR quality. However, because the relative observability of CSR is low and since CSR is a contested concept, information asymmetries in firm&ndash ; stakeholder relationships arise. Adopting CSR standards and using these as signalling devices is a strategy for firms to reduce these information asymmetries, by revealing their true CSR quality. Against this background, this article investigates the voluntary ISO 26000 standard for social responsibility as a form of public-private governance and contends that, despite its objectives, this standard suffers from severe signalling problems. Applying signalling theory to the ISO 26000 standard, this article takes a critical stance towards this standard and argues that firms adhering to this standard may actually emit signals that compromise rather than enhance stakeholders&rsquo ; ability to identify and interpret firms&rsquo ; underlying CSR quality. Consequently, the article discusses the findings in the context of public-private governance, suggests a specification of signalling theory and identifies avenues for future research.
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