Suchergebnisse

Regulatory agencies may, whether outside of set rules or within their discretion, depart from the original goals or principles set for enforcing the rules, which we term selective enforcement. Taking China, a country in transition, as an example, and using cases and large-sample tests, we present empirical evidence of selective enforcement. The results show that the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) takes into account whether companies violating the rules have a state-owned background and the strength of that background when investigating and punishing non-compliance. After controlling for the degree of violation, state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) are punished less severely than private companies; and the higher the hierarchy of the SOE in question, the less severe the punishment. It also takes longer for SOEs to be punished. We also find that companies that violate the rules less seriously have a greater tendency to apply for refinancing than those that violate the rules more seriously. This may be because the severity of the violation can affect listed companies' expectations of obtaining refinancing. The analysis and conclusions of this study prove useful in understanding the causes and consequences of selective enforcement in transition economies.

Drugs, crime, and public housing are closely linked in policy and politics, and their nexus has animated several intensive drug enforcement programs targeted at public housing residents. In New York City, police systematically conduct "vertical patrols" in public housing buildings, making tens of thousands of Terry stops each year. During these patrols, both uniformed and undercover officers systematically move through the buildings, temporarily detaining and questioning residents and visitors, often at a low threshold of suspicion, and usually alleging trespass to justify the stop. We use a case‐control design to identify the effects of living in one of New York City's 330 public housing developments on the probability of stop, frisk, and arrest from 2004–2011. We find that the incidence rate ratio for trespass stops and arrests is more than two times greater in public housing than in the immediate surrounding neighborhoods. We decompose these effects using first differences models and find that the difference in percent black and Hispanic populations in public housing compared to the surrounding area predicts the disparity in trespass enforcement and enforcement of other criminal law violations. The pattern of racially selective enforcement suggests the potential for systemic violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on racial discrimination.

Drugs, crime and public housing are closely linked in policy and politics, and their nexus has animated several intensive drug enforcement programs targeted at public housing residents. In New York City, police systematically conduct "vertical patrols" in public housing buildings, making tens of thousands of Terry stops each year. During these patrols, both uniformed and undercover officers systematically move through the buildings, temporarily detaining and questioning residents and visitors, often at a low threshold of suspicion, and usually alleging trespass to justify the stop. We use a case-control design to identify the effects of living in one of New York City's 330 public housing developments on the probability of stop, frisk and arrest from 2004-11. We find that the incidence rate ratio for trespass stops and arrests is more than two times greater in public housing than in the immediate surrounding neighborhoods. We decompose these effects using first differences models and find that the difference in percent Black and Hispanic populations in public housing compared to the surrounding area predicts the disparity in trespass enforcement and enforcement of other criminal law violations. The pattern of racially selective enforcement suggests the potential for systemic violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on racial discrimination.

Drugs, crime and public housing are closely linked in policy and politics, and their nexus has animated several intensive drug enforcement programs targeted at public housing residents. In New York City, police systematically conduct "vertical" patrols in public, making tens of thousands of "Terry" stops to detect drugs or weapons each year under the Trespass Abatement Program, or TAP. Both uniformed and undercover officers move systemically within the halls and stairwells of buildings, temporarily detaining and questioning residents and visitors, often at a low threshold of suspicion, and usually alleging trespass to justify the stop. This pattern of selective enforcement through elevated rates of high discretion stops in public housing under TAP raises constitutional concerns at the intersection of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions on racial discrimination -- residents of public housing are overwhelming nonwhite -- and Fourth Amendment prohibitions on suspicionless stops. We use a case-control design to identify the effects of living in a public housing development on the probability of stop, frisk and arrest for trespass or other crimes in New York City's 330 public housing developments from 2005-8. We find that the incidence rate ratio for trespass stops and arrests is 1.5 times greater in public housing than in the immediate surrounding neighborhoods. We decompose these effects using first differences models and find that the difference in percent Black population in public housing compared to the surrounding area predicts the disparity in trespass enforcement. Four-wave cross-lag regressions show that trespass enforcement in public housing is independent from enforcement in the surrounding area, suggesting that public housing is specifically targeted for intensive enforcement. The results raise constitutional concerns about equal protection. Qualitative evidence suggests that stops have a stigmatizing effect on public housing residents and their families, and that they inhibit basic social interactions such as child care arrangements and family visitation.

The 2016 presidential election was one of the most divisive in recent memory, but it produced a surprising bipartisan consensus. Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, and Bernie Sanders all agreed that U.S. trade agreements should be, but are not, "fair." Although only achieving broad consensus recently, the critique that U.S. trade agreements are unfair has been around for decades. Since 1992, much of this fairness critique has focused on ensuring that trade liberalization does not undermine non-commercial values, such as environmental protection and labor conditions. Beginning with the negotiation and ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s, governments have responded by including in their trade agreements a prohibition on the selective enforcement of environmental and labor laws. This ban — a central component of efforts to make sure that free trade agreements are, indeed, fair — aims to prevent a global race to the bottom in environmental and labor standards.These efforts have fallen wide of the mark. This Article makes two novel contributions. First, it demonstrates empirically that selective enforcement is considerably more pervasive than commonly thought. But contemporary selective enforcement is the reverse of the kind of selective enforcement that has traditionally concerned trade critics. Instead of selectively enforcing environmental and labor laws to gain a trade advantage, governments selectively enforce trade laws in ways that undermine environmental and labor interests. To illustrate, the Article presents data from trade enforcement actions in the energy and fisheries sector to demonstrate this claim. In both sectors, trade laws are enforced exclusively against natural resource substitutes, such as renewable energy and farmed fish. The natural resources with which these products compete, fossil fuels and wild fish, benefit from the same allegedly unlawful conduct but are not targeted for enforcement.Second, this Article presents a theory of how selective ...

Defence date: 5 December 2016 ; Examining Board: Professor Marise Cremona (supervisor), EUI; Professor Miguel Maduro, EUI; Professor Francesco Maiani, University of Lausanne; Doctor Günter Wilms, Legal service, European Commission and Legal Advisor, EUI ; The Commission's policy of selective enforcement rests on four pillars: confidentiality, bilateralism, flexibility, and autonomy. For years, the European Parliament, the Ombudsman and stakeholders have put pressure on the Commission to reform its enforcement policy in order to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of EU citizens by, inter alia, allowing complainants access to documentation from its investigations and securing their rights by means of legally-binding measures. They have sought to replace the Commission's existing discretionary model of enforcement with a new approach characterized by such standards as transparency, trilateralism, objectivity, and accountability. The Commission, however, supported by the Court of Justice, has in most part resisted these challenges, changing its policy of selective enforcement only to such a degree that does not substantially interfere with its four pillars. This thesis seeks to explain the reasons for the Commission's commitment to the existing discretionary model of enforcement. By means of the Comparative Institutional Analysis, it is argued that the proposed reforms would distort the balance between the Commission's demand and supply sides. The Commission's capacity to enforce EU law is limited, and burdening it with new responsibilities in order to introduce transparency or objectivity to its operation would lead to the formalization of enforcement measures, increasing its administrative burden and decreasing its efficiency. It would skew its attention towards complainant-relevant violations and transform its enforcement into a vehicle for individual grievances running counter to the Commission's understanding of its enforcement function as guardian of the Treaties. The Commission's opposition to the accountability approach does not, however, mean a rejection of its demands. The EU Pilot is an example of the Commission's effort to address some of these expectations while maintaining the balance between the forces of supply and demand. Selective enforcement thus may not be as much about prioritizing cases as it is about assigning appropriate enforcement measures.

Despite the government's decades-long enforcement efforts, violations of land laws and regulations remain a serious problem in China. Local governments have often been blamed. This article identifies a previously overlooked reason for large-scale violations, by examining the enforcement behavior of the central government. It argues that the government enforces land regulations selectively, depending on the violators' political status. The article focuses on the national policy prohibiting new golf course construction, finding that golf course developers connected with high-level political élites are more likely to violate the prohibition and survive subsequent enforcement actions by the central government. This finding contributes to the literature on regulatory enforcement in authoritarian regimes and has broad implications for reforms in China.