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In noise we hear the possibility of a signal, indeed different signals, and in the multiplicity of signals we hear noise. With variation and selection comes dynamic evolution, a contingent state, one that could be otherwise. The term 'polemogenous' (from the French, polémogène) means that which generates polemics. And polemics are creative. If everyone, every system, were to reason in the same way, there would be silence. Every remark would be redundant, having no informational value. Thus noise is not bad. The essence of finance economics, like all that is social in nature, is a forming of meaning. Whatever cannot be formed meaningfully is not available to the system. This unavailability, as 'noise', is the dynamic difference (noise/information) that scintillates the system. Information, like morality, is polemogenous – it stirs contention. Without noise and the possibility of its conversion to information there would be no opportunities to exploit. This paper applies a systems theoretical understanding of observation to conceive of finance economics as the economy's means of observing its noise and capitalizing on that polemic. Niklas Luhmann's method is utilized to explicate some ideas on noise by financial economist Fischer Black, who suggests the incomprehensible is computable. This is finance. The fact that logical grounds, absolute deductions, and clear calculations are claimed to be rare in finance is no barrier to understanding it. Rather, this polyphonic and polemogenous information-selection is the 'ground' of finance, not as totalizing logic, but as different difference-production for the sake of deriving economic opportunity.

Abstract
Philosophy is presented in a wide range of forms, none of which can be convincingly claimed to be the "genuine" one. Historically speaking, there is not one "proper" way of doing philosophy, evidencing what may be called the social contingency of philosophy. This paper aims to provide a "critical" philosophy of today, in the Kantian sense of a philosophy that reflects on the conditions of its possibility, and thereby acknowledges the limitations they impose. Conceptually, our approach is grounded in Niklas Luhmann's social systems theory, in which "functional differentiation" and "second-order observation" are two crucial characteristics of modern society. The paper discusses how presentations of philosophy align themselves with the second-order observation mechanisms of the specific social systems in which they are "hosted." This paper deals in particular with two such systems: academics and social (or mass) media. These forms of presenting philosophy produce two different kinds of philosophy presenters: the expert and the influencer.

This paper discusses the meaning of the concept of 'second-order observation' used by Niklas Luhmann (1927–1998). Luhmann identifies second-order observation as a defining characteristic of modern world society. According to Luhmann, all social systems construct a social reality on the basis of the observation of observations. Rating agencies in the economy or the peer-review process in the academic system are examples of social mechanisms manifesting second-order observation. Social media also represent organized second-order observation. The paper suggests that in a society based on second-order observation, 'genuine pretending' is an adequate mode of existence. This notion is derived from the Daoist text Zhuangzi. It indicates a disassociation from social roles which allows their performers to exercise these roles with ease and, at the same time, maintain a state of sanity.

The discovery of x-rays, one of the most beautiful experiments ever carried out, generates numerous controversies and these, in turn, can trigger a series of counterproductive information regarding not only the History of Science but also the teaching activity. The aim of this article is to resolve these controversies concerning what ocurred and highlight the important role of the German physicist Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen, highlighting not only his genius but, especially in this case in particular, his condition of second-order observer. It is not uncommon to find information in various media refering to this discovery under the claim that it was the result of a fortuitous event, and this denotes a profound lack of knowledge about the facts or a disrespect for the renowned discoverer. Such allegations about the event depreciate the extraordinary discovery that impacts humanity, from the deed to the present. Thus, through a brief historical reconstruction, it was tried to present here what had happened judiciously. With this respect, the brilliant scientist is given the status of a second-rate observer, from the philosophical point of view. This condition resonates with the diachronic aspect of the History of Science, according to the perspective presented here, and it is also supported by the time taken by the discoverer from the beginning of his research until the end of it. Keywords: X-Ray. Second-Order Observer. History of Science. ResumoO descobrimento dos raios-x, um dos mais belos experimentos já realizados, gera inúmeras controvérsias e essas, por sua vez, podem desencadear uma série de informações contraproducentes no tangente não só a História da Ciência como também à atividade de ensino. O presente artigo tem como objetivo dirimir tais polêmicas com respeito ao ocorrido e destacar o importante papel do físico alemão Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen, destacando não só sua genialidade, mas sobretudo, neste caso em particular, a sua condição de observador de segunda ordem. Não é raro encontrar em diversos meios de comunicação informações com respeito a referida descoberta sob a alegação de que a mesma fora fruto de um caso fortuito e isso denota profundo desconhecimento sobre os fatos, ou então, desrespeito com o renomado descobridor. Tais alegações sobre o sucedido depreciam a descoberta extraordinária que impacta a humanidade, desde o feito até a atualidade. Assim, através de breve reconstrução histórica, buscou-se aqui apresentar o ocorrido criteriosamente. Com este respeito passa-se a atribuir ao brilhante cientista a condição de observador de segunda ordem, do ponto de vista filosófico. Tal condição encontra ressonância no aspecto diacrônico da História da Ciência, segundo a perspectiva aqui apresentada e está amparada, também, pelo tempo empreendido pelo descobridor desde o início de sua pesquisa até a finalização da mesma. Palavras-chave: Raios-x. Observador de Segunda Ordem. História da Ciência.

Nomination: Second‐order elections revisited by Pippa Norris, p.109 Reflections: European elections as member state second‐order elections revisited by Karlheinz Reif, p.115

Abstract The composition of the directly elected European Parliament does not precisely reflect the 'real' balance of political forces in the European Community. As long as the national political systems decide most of what there is to be decided politically, and everything really important, European elections are additional national second‐order elections. They are determined more by the domestic political cleavages than by alternatives originating in the EC, but in a different way than if nine first‐order national elections took place simultaneously. This is the case because European elections occur at different stages of the national political systems' respective 'electoral cycles'. Such a relationship between a second‐order arena and the chief arena of a political system is not at all unusual. What is new here, is that one second‐order political arena is related to nine different first‐order arenas. A first analysis of European election results satisfactorily justifies the assumption mat European Parliament direct elections should be treated as nine simultaneous national second‐order elections.

THE AUTHOR ANALYZES AN ESSAY, "NINE SECOND-ORDER NATIONAL ELECTIONS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN ELECTION RESULTS" BY KARLHEINZ REIF AND HERMANN SCHMITT, PUBLISHED IN 1980. REIF AND SCHMITT ARGUED THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE DIRECTLY-ELECTED EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DID NOT PRECISELY REFLECT THE REAL BALANCE OF POLITICAL FORCES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY BECAUSE THE ELECTIONS WERE ESSENTIALLY NATIONAL SECOND-ORDER ELECTIONS.

Special double issue: developing second order cybernetics - a collection of papers from the UK Cybernetics Society Guest Editor: Bernard Scott This special double issue is based on the presentations made at a conference with the theme "Second Order Cybernetics (SOC)", which had been organised by the UK Cybernetics Society in London in 2002.Previously published in: International Journal of Systems & Cybernetics, Volume 33, Number 9/10, 2004

Considering the current state of system theory, the theory of self-organization and autopoiesis, we come to the conclusion that, first of all, we must identify what would determine the essence of cybernetics for us. Among the reasons why it is difficult to reveal the essence of cybernetics is the presence of numerous di­rections of this system theory, which are mutually overlapping. Despite the fact that due to this breadth the active development of cybernetics is ensured, it also causes the lack of certainty. Such a lack of certainty in some cases is perceived as inconsistency. The analysis mentioned in this article is not focused on stream­lining the categories, concepts related to cybernetics. It seems necessary only to present the key features inherent in the cybernetic approach. Nor can we bypass what is usually called cybernetics 2.0, second-order cybernetics, or cybernetics of self-referential or self-observing systems. The emergence of second-order cy­bernetics is associated with the interpretation of the system and its environment in relation to an infinite sequence of discrimination processes carried out by the observer. The observation of events that occur in the field of observation is referred to as first-order observation. In the case of second-order observation, the observer does not see what he does not see. This observation is an observa­tion of an observation. In the works of Heinz von Förster, we see that as a re­sponse to the negative assessment by humanists of the main object of cybernetic research – the machine – he distinguishes two types of machines: machines that are trivial, and machines that are not among them, that is, non-trivial. And it is the study of non-trivial machines that constitutes the content of self-referential cybernetics.

The article discusses the emergence of second-order cybernetics based on work in experimental epistemology and the study of the nervous system, as well as the emergence of a new understanding of the cognitive process. Studies have shown that it is necessary to include a scientist-observer in the descrip­tion of a system, since his or her specific characteristics and subjective world­view can influence the result of observation. The authors give examples of neurophysiological experiments that served as the basis for the conclusion that knowledge is a biological phenomenon, that each individual constructs his own "reality", which is consistent with the world of sensory experience, but is not identical to it. There are two ways of understanding cybernetics of higher orders. The first approach emphasizes that higher orders of cybernetics can be based on the introduction of additional dimensions (for example, second-order cybernetics relies on neurophysiology, third-order cybernetics takes into ac­count data from sociology and political science, fourth-order cybernetics uses data related to the environment and social responsibility). The second ap­proach is based on the opinion that there is no need for cybernetics of higher orders beyond second order cybernetics, since the observer himself can deter­mine any system of interest to him (for example, a group within an organiza­tion, a society or the environment) and create any number of additional de­scriptions (H. von Förster). The authors of the article come to the conclusion that second-order cybernetics offers a higher conceptual level, drawing atten­tion to the scientist (observer). Second order cybernetics leads to second order science. It points to a suitable epistemology for an information society. The in­clusion of the scientist (observer) in observations changes the epistemological foundation of science.