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The science paper devotes to the study of the ratio of human dignity and the right to free development of personality based on legal doctrine and practice in Germany and Ukraine. The right to free development of personality can be attributed to one of the examples of individual freedom. However, the right to free development of personality is a part of the system of basic human rights under the Basic Law of Germany. Besides, according to Article 2 (1) of the Basic Law of Germany, the right to free development of personality is a basic human right in the German legal system. The right to free development of personality is the first basic human rights that continue a system after human dignity. Also, іn the Constitution of Ukraine, the right to development of personality is guaranteed in Article 23 as a constitutional human right. It means, that we might ratio to the right to free development of personality and human dignity as a constitutional value. Therefore, to achieve the goals of the study, the materials of the German and Ukrainian doctrines are considered and the practice of protection of the right to free development of personality in combination with the guarantee of human dignity. Finally, the author turns to the study of the hierarchy of constitutional values. This problem is relevant in both German and Ukrainian legal doctrine. There are different approaches to the analysis and definition of the system of constitutional values among researchers of constitutional values. Besides, human dignity is a basic constitutional value in democratic countries and an absolute human right. In the practice in the European constitutional courts often human dignity ratios with different basic human rights. Constitutional courts have to choose the criteria for the limitation of human rights and to protect dignity as a constitutional value. The author aims to contribute to the growing researches in human dignity issues.

Der 6. Band dieser englischsprachigen Reihe – übersetzt und herausgegeben vom Bundesverfassungsgericht – ist einem Grundpfeiler der deutschen Grundrechtslehre gewidmet: dem allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrecht. Nach einer thematischen Einführung, verfasst von Mitgliedern des Gerichts, werden 45 Leitentscheidungen präsentiert, die den verfassungsrechtlichen Schutz von Selbstbestimmung, Identität und privater Lebensgestaltung nachzeichnen – von den Anfängen bis zur jüngsten Rechtsprechung zu Recht auf Vergessen, Suizidhilfe und Auslandsaufklärung des BND. Eine wertvolle Ressource für die internationale Rechtspraxis, Wissenschaft und für alle an Rechtsvergleichung Interessierten.

Abstract: Most of the legislation that has been enacted in many legal systems requires express consent to licenses of personality rights and often a written one. Tacit consent, a theory built on wrong grounds, is more rarely admitted. This refusal shall be approved, since not only its existence but also its scope is dubious. The personal component of personality rights obliges us to recognize a right to revoke one's consent. Such a right of withdrawal is not necessarily incompatible with the fundamental principles of the law of obligations. The right of withdrawal, which is recognized by many countries and even sometimes included in the law, is generally considered as a discretionary one, which has effects only for the future. Its exercise requires the restitution of the royalty as well as the indemnification of the damnum emergens, whereas the lucrum cessans should be only taken into account in case of an abuse of the right to withdraw one's consent. Résumé: La plupart des lois qui ont été adoptées dans de nombreux systems juridiques afin de régir les licences d'exploitation de droits de la personnalité exigent un consentement exprès, et souvent un consentement écrit. En revanche, le consentement tacite, théorie créée sur des fondements inappropriés, est plus rarement admis, ce qui doit être approuvé, puisque non seulement l'existence, mais aussi la portée d'un tel consentement sont incertaines. La composante morale des droits de la personnalité oblige à reconnaître à leur titulaire le droit de révoquer son consentement aux licences de droits de la personnalité. Une telle faculté de revocation n'est pas nécessairement incompatible avec les principes fondamentaux du droit des obligations. La faculté de révocation, qui est reconnue dans de nombreux pays, et même quelquefois intégrée à la loi, est généralement considérée comme discrétionnaire, et n'a d'effet que pour l'avenir. Son exercice exige la restitution de la contrepartie perçue par le modèle, ainsi que l'indemnisation du damnum emergens, tandis que le lucrum cessans ne devrait être pris en compte qu'en cas d'abus de la faculté de révocation.

Abstract
The refugee is typically understood as a uniquely modern figure, but US refugee debates and legislation are as old as the country. This essay considers how eighteenth-century debates about refugees can defamiliarize and enrich narratives about the US rights tradition that Hannah Arendt and others have developed based on post–World War accounts of refugees. Drawing on the first US refugee act in 1798, the essay moves beyond the iconic universalisms of natural rights and the abstract model of citizenship associated with it by identifying a grievance-based tradition of settler rights characterized by individualized narratives of patriotic service and political injury. The first section of the essay distinguishes the contemporary, post–World War association of "refugee" with statelessness from an earlier, protection-based understanding of the term that is rooted in its etymological connection with the safety of refuge. The second section uses Thomas Paine's self-characterizations as a "refugee" to reframe his better-known contributions to rights philosophy. The third section concludes by reading the twenty-seven grievances in the Declaration of Independence as the most canonical example of what the essay calls the "aggrieved personality of rights": the personal allegiances, circumstances, and injuries that inspire individuals to seek redress in the language of rights.