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Working paper
In: USC CLASS Research Paper No. CLASS22-38
SSRN
In: Journal of social philosophy, Band 53, Heft 3, S. 421-440
ISSN: 1467-9833
The book provides a thematic examination of republican theory from the Renaissance, through the Enlightenment and the experiences of the early American republic to contemporary debates. It maps out a republican ideal type according to four themes - popular sovereignty, a view of history which is sensitive to systemic corruption, an insistence on civic virtue and, following Philip Pettit, a conception of liberty as non-domination. Where possible it contrasts the treatment of those themes with that of liberals and other streams of thought.
In: The New Separation of Powers, S. 253-266
In: Republican Democracy, S. 233-252
In: Griot: Revista de Filosofia, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 115-131
The normative basis of the republican conception of justice is freedom as non-domination. This concept of political freedom comprises social relations in equality of power. Non-domination represents the social condition of not being submissive to the capacity of arbitrary interference of others. Republican freedom presupposes the development of human capabilities in their fullness. The potential for human capacity development must be protected by the legal structure of the State. The State has the function of equating the differences of individuals' assets and resources with their institutional structure. It acts to offer the necessary conditions, rights and basic liberties, to individuals in their social and political life. The Republican perspective of Philip Pettit leads to the normative deduction of republican liberty and to demonstrating that the theory of justice has to presuppose the resources necessary for the development of human life in its condition of equality and freedom. The democratic structuring of society presupposes the establishment of social relations that are characterized by the social status of non-domination.
In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 47-67
ISSN: 1741-2730
In response to the republican revival of the ideal of freedom as non-domination, a number of 'radical', 'labour' and 'workplace' republicans have criticised the limitations of Philip Pettit's account of freedom and government. This article proposes that the missing link in these debates is the relationship between republicanism and socialism. Seeking to bring this connection back into view in historical and theoretical terms, the article draws from contemporary radical republicans and the writings of Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg to propose a socialist republican theory of freedom and government. This consists of a conception of freedom as collective autonomy and a participatory democratic vision of a decentralised state with parliamentary institutions, the rule of law, worker-controlled workplaces, community-directed investment and a political culture of solidarity and public-spiritedness. This theory of socialist republicanism seeks to overcome the weaknesses and limitations of each respective independent theory and should appeal to republicans and socialists alike.
In: Springer eBook Collection
ch.1: Introduction -- ch 2: Questioning the Non-Interference Paradigm -- ch 3: Liberal Toleration and Harmful Speech -- ch 4: Critical Republicanism and Harmful Speech -- ch 5: Recognition, Norms, and the Struggle for Normative Authority -- ch 6: Critical Civility: A Republican Theory of Free Speech -- Ch 7: Concluding Remarks.
In: Moral philosophy and politics, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 49-71
ISSN: 2194-5624
Abstract
This paper develops a novel, neo-republican account of just state surveillance in the information age. The goal of state surveillance should be to avoid and prevent domination, both public and private. In light of that conception of justice, the paper makes three substantive points. First, it argues that modern state surveillance based upon information technology and predicated upon a close partnership with the tech sector gives the state significant power and represents a serious potential source of domination. Second, it argues that, nonetheless, state surveillance can serve legitimate republican ends and so unilateral and private technological attempts to block it may be wrongful. Third, it argues that, despite the serious normative failings of current institutions, state surveillance can be justly regulated and made accountable through a legal liability regime that incentivizes tech company intermediaries to ally with civil society groups in order to safeguard the privacy rights of potential subjects of state surveillance.
In: International relations: the journal of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 357-372
ISSN: 1741-2862
Kant's primary concern in writing on international relations is how to achieve 'justice' ( Recht) between states. This means that instead of reading Kant as a theorist of peace or world government, as IR theorists have usually done, he is better read as a theorist international justice. His view of justice, which identifies it with a legal order that respects freedom as independence or nondomination, is broadly republican. But he equivocates on the possibility of justice at the international level, and this narrows what is usually seen as a wide gap between Kant's thought and political realism. The paradox his uncertainty reveals is that it is wrong for states to remain in a lawless condition yet impossible for them to escape it so long as they remain independent. An international order cannot generate genuine law because there are no institutions to make, interpret, or enforce it. This means that states are entitled to determine their own foreign affairs. The gap between sovereignty and justice cannot be closed so long as these ideas are defined as they are within the state. The problem is not that a full, secure, and nonvoluntary system of justice that preserves the sovereignty of states is contingently unlikely. It is conceptually impossible. This conclusion poses a challenge to current theories of global justice.
In: Debating Deliberative Democracy, S. 138-162
In: Texas Law Review, Band 95, Heft 5, S. 993
SSRN
In: Juncture: incorporating PPR, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 131-135
ISSN: 2050-5876
Historian Quentin Skinner revisits the history of republican conceptions of liberty, and draws challenging conclusions about how we should apply them to our present constitutional arrangements, including reforming the House of Lords and stripping the prime minister of their prerogative powers.
In: Clarendon paperbacks