Suchergebnisse

Since the beginning of the 1980s, an increase in the number of fixed-term employment contracts has been apparent in a number of free-market-oriented economies. This has been accompanied by amendments to the pertinent legislation. From the early to mid-1980s, a number of EC countries initiated legislation with the object of facilitating the conclusion of fixed-term contracts. How is this development to be assessed from an economic point of view?

AbstractWe explore the relationship between earnings, education, and fixed‐term contracts using data from the 1997 British Social Attitudes Survey. We find that the log hourly wage of workers employed under such contracts is approximately 13% lower than that of their 'permanent' counterparts, even after controlling for a plethora of personal and job characteristics. Standard decompositions indicate that the vast majority of this differential (more than 70%) is attributable to price effects, which may reflect discrimination on the part of the employer. Such findings may, therefore, suggest that employment protection is appropriate for individuals employed under fixed‐term contracts.

The present study aims to contribute to the debate concerning the effects on economic performance and the structure of the labor market of regulations that combine high Employment Protection Legislations (EPL) with consent for the use of fixed-term contracts (FTC). Using a Rajan and Zingales (1998) difference-in-difference empirical technique in a panel of 45 countries, we explore the response of industries that differ in their intrinsic need of worker turnover when they face different levels of EPL and how the possibility of using FTC might change the outcome. Our approach suggests an original demand side explanation of the claiming of FTC.