Suchergebnisse

This Article proposes a unified regulatory approach to the issuance of "money-claims"--a generic term that refers to fixed-principal, very short-term IOUs, excluding trade credit. The instability of this market is arguably the central problem for financial regulatory policy. Yet our existing regulatory system lacks a coherent approach to this market. The Article proposes a public-private partnership ("PPP") regime, under which only licensed entities would be permitted to issue money - claims (subject to de minimis exceptions). Licensed moneyclaim issuers would be required to abide by portfolio restrictions and capital requirements. In addition, the government would explicitly insure licensed issuers' outstanding money-claims in return for a fee. The Article compares this PPP regime to the prevailing alternatives. In particular, it considers the likely efficacy of (1) risk-constraint regulation; (2) conditional liquidity support (lender of last resort) facilities; and (3) the new Orderly Liquidation Authority, a centerpiece of the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Act. The Article identifies significant problems with each of these approaches. It concludes that, although the PPP system raises significant implementation challenges of its own, it compares favorably to the available alternatives.

This Article proposes a unified regulatory approach to the issuance of "money-claims"--a generic term that refers to fixed-principal, very short-term IOUs, excluding trade credit. The instability of this market is arguably the central problem for financial regulatory policy. Yet our existing regulatory system lacks a coherent approach to this market. The Article proposes a public-private partnership ("PPP") regime, under which only licensed entities would be permitted to issue money - claims (subject to de minimis exceptions). Licensed money- claim issuers would be required to abide by portfolio restrictions and capital requirements. In addition, the government would explicitly insure licensed issuers' outstanding money-claims in return for a fee. The Article compares this PPP regime to the prevailing alternatives. In particular, it considers the likely efficacy of (1) risk-constraint regulation; (2) conditional liquidity support (lender of last resort) facilities; and (3) the new Orderly Liquidation Authority, a centerpiece of the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Act. The Article identifies significant problems with each of these approaches. It concludes that, although the PPP system raises significant implementation challenges of its own, it compares favorably to the available alternatives.

Research objective: Justification of stakeholder engagement as a possible pillar of efficient regulatory governance
The research problem and methods: To visualize the significance of stakeholder engagement to regulation, the OECD data on stakeholder engagement are interpreted. Then, the case studies of the stakeholder engagement within regulatory impact assessment procedures in the European Union, Korea and the United Kingdom are highlighted. The methodology is based on the comparative analysis of the OECD secondary data and case study comparative analysis.
The process of argumentation: Starting from a view of regulatory policy as the realization of policy goals with regulation, law, and other instruments through which a higher standard of living of the population can be achieved. Concluding with the reasoning that stakeholder engagement is a crucial component of a check-and-balance mechanism in regulatory governance.
Research results: The stakeholder-engagement-driven three-layer division covers: Policy-driven layer (strategy) determined by the contemporary challenges stemmed from emancipation of association consciousness and movements and ICT revolution; Administration-driven layer (operationalization) determined by effectiveness and efficiency as well as public service imperatives; Governance-driven layer serving as the exponent of varieties of conflicting and complementing ideas and interest of social groups, check and balance in the process of monitoring, legitimization and accountability of regulators while wide-spreading the essential public services.
Conclusions, innovations, and recommendations: Stakeholder engagement as a crucial part of regulatory impact assessment has been the pivotal element of the systemic adjustments reaching out to the behavioral adaptations, and to the institutionalization of evidence-based policy making.

AbstractEconomists and lawyers trained in economics tend to speak about regulation from a perspective organized around the basic norm of optimization. In contrast, an important managerial literature espouses a perspective organized around the basic norm of reliability. The perspectives are not logically inconsistent, but the economist's view sometimes leads in practice to a preoccupation with decisional simplicity and cost minimization at the expense of complex judgment and learning. Drawing on a literature often ignored by economists and lawyers, I elaborate the contrast between the optimization and reliability perspectives. I then show how the contrast illuminates current discussions of the reform of bank regulation.

The first-generation literature on policy design has made considerable contributions over the last 30 years to our understanding of the process, politics and implications of policy design and instrument choice. This literature, however, has generally treated institutions as a black box and has not developed a coherent set of frameworks, theories and models of how institutions matter to policy design. In this paper, I unpack the black box of institutions using transaction cost and mechanism design to show how regulations can be better designed in developing countries when institutions are weak, unaccountable, corrupted or not credible. Under these conditions, I show that efficient regulatory design has to minimize transaction costs, particularly agency problems, by having incentive compatible (self-enforcing) mechanisms. I conclude with a second-generation research agenda on regulatory design with implications for environmental, food and drug safety, healthcare and financial regulation in developing countries. Adapted from the source document.