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The principle of proportionality protects civilians and civilian objects against expected incidental harm from an attack that is excessive to the military advantage anticipated from the attack. However, despite its status as a fundamental norm of international humanitarian law (IHL), key terms are not defined in relevant treaties nor do they benefit from critical judicial explanation. This has caused challenges for both academics and military commanders alike in explaining and applying the test for proportionality. The Article expands upon two points that were raised and generated interesting discussion at The Second Israel Defense Forces International Conference on the Law of Armed Conflict during a panel that dealt with contemporary issues in proportionality.

In the immediate post-war period the United States was predominant economically and could command a majority in the U.N. General Assembly; it now faces an increasingly interdependent world economy and an assembly dominated by the Third World. The essays in this book analyze the U.N. system as it functions today. Contributors stress the economic iss

One of the most crucial and controversial questions in the field of international criminal justice is that of whether "superior command" is a good defense in a war-crime trial. The answer is of cardinal importance, since trials of war criminals may prove entirely useless if accused persons are permitted simply to pass on the responsibility for their acts to their superiors. The line would lead straight to the omnipotent leader, who might choose to escape prosecution altogether by putting an end to his life. Opinions of writers on the subject are divided, and so are court decisions, war manuals, and legislative provisions. While the American and British war manuals, backed by Oppenheim's authority, recognize "superior command" as a full defense, Anglo-American practice, expressed in numerous decisions and supported by many authorities, refuses to ascribe to it any exculpating effect. Some theories recognize "superior command" as a defense to a limited extent only, dependent upon whether the subordinate actually knew, or had reasonable grounds for knowing, that a given command contemplated a punishable, or at least an illegal, action.What has not been tried up to now, and what seems a worth-while undertaking, is to analyze the general conception of war crimes and to try to reach a solution of the indicated problem out of a clearer understanding of that conception.

During four decades of experience with nuclear weapons, public awareness and discussion have focused on their basic properties and capabilities--the explosive power they contain, the technical capabilities of the missiles and aircraft that carry them, the size of the Soviet and American arsenals, and the magnitude of destruction those arsenals could accomplish. Yet little attention has been paid to the technologies, procedures, and organizational arrangements used to manage and control nuclear forces. Many assert the importance of "command, control, communications, and intelligence" (C3I), but serious and detailed studies supporting that assertion are few. Managing Nuclear Operations provides a comprehensive and detailed examination of U.S. Nuclear operations and command and control. The contributors, experienced in operations and C3I., discuss peace-time safety and control of nuclear weapons worldwide, the survival under nuclear attack of the reasonable command authorities presupposed by deterrence theory, and the means for terminating nuclear war before it escalates to all-out exchanges. They describe command posts, warning sensors, communications technologies, the selection of nuclear targets, and the exercise of political authority over nuclear operations. The decisionmaking process of command and control is examined, as are the various perspectives of the decisionmakers.

Part I. Introduction -- Chapter 1. Honest Errors in Combat Decision-Making: State of Our Knowledge 75 Years after the Hostage Case -- Part II. Devastating Northern Norway and Forcibly Evacuating Its Inhabitants -- Chapter 2. Occupied Norway 1940-1945: A Brief Background to Hostage -- Chapter 3. Rendulic and the Military Necessity Defence in Hostage: Did He Speak the Truth? -- Chapter 4. Devastation and Forcible Evacuation: Actors and Their Motives -- Part III. Trying Rendulic and Developing the No Second-Guessing Rule -- Chapter 5. The Inclusion of Finnmark's Devastation and Forced Evacuation Charge in Hostage -- Chapter 6. The Adjudication and Findings of Finnmark's Devastation Charge in Hostage -- Chapter 7. The Genesis and Significance of the Law of War "Rendulic Rule" -- Chapter 8. The Limits of Honest Judgment: The Reasonable Commander Test and Mistake of Fact -- Part IV. Assessing an Error's Reasonableness -- Chapter 9. The ICT Revolution, 21st Century Warfare, and Honest Errors -- Chapter 10. Empathy at War: The Distinction between Reasonableness and the Reasonable Military Commander Standard -- Chapter 11. Drone Warfare, Civilian Deaths, and the Narrative of Honest Mistakes -- Part V. Conclusion -- Chapter 12. Conclusion: The Hostage Case, Present Day Knowledge, and Future Implications -- Annex. List of Historical Names and Entities. .

Superior responsibility, otherwise known as command responsibility, is a well established doctrine in both treaty and customary international law. Superiors are held criminally responsible for breaches of international humanitaran law committed by their subordinates. Responsibility arises only after superior fails to take any preventive or punitive action when he was under a duty to do so. There is no common opinion of what that doctrine should stand for, is it a mode of liability for subordinates crimes or a separate offence of superior. It is a crime of omission which has no or little support in national legislation systems. Superior responsibility is a sui generis form of responsibility for omission. Superior responsibility, according to ad hoc tribunals jurisprudence, is constructed of three elements which are superior-subordinate relationship, superior's mens rea and ability to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent subordinate's crime and punish. All these elements must be proofed beyond reasonable doubt. Superior-subordinate relationship can only be established if there existed effective command and control between those two. Effectiveness is a material ability to influence subordinates actions in a way of either stopping them from committing a crime or being able to punish. Superiors mens rea in Rome Statute for military commander and a person, effectively acting as such is more strict than for other superiors, described in art. 28(b). Travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute suggests, that civilians, unlike military commanders, are not capable of fulfilling their obligations in the same way. Due to this reason, a lower standard was introduced. Rome Statute has applied an internationally not known superior duty which could entail criminal responsibility – to keep oneself constantly informed. It is not only contradictory to customary law, but also narrows superiors fundamental right to defense. Ad hoc tribunals have removed a requirement of causality, since International Criminal Court applied it directly in its statute as a compulsory element of the doctrine. Causality may exist between superiors failure to prevent the crime and its occurrence. While in the duty to punish case, causality exists between superiors failure to punish and subordinates remained unpunished.

Superior responsibility, otherwise known as command responsibility, is a well established doctrine in both treaty and customary international law. Superiors are held criminally responsible for breaches of international humanitaran law committed by their subordinates. Responsibility arises only after superior fails to take any preventive or punitive action when he was under a duty to do so. There is no common opinion of what that doctrine should stand for, is it a mode of liability for subordinates crimes or a separate offence of superior. It is a crime of omission which has no or little support in national legislation systems. Superior responsibility is a sui generis form of responsibility for omission. Superior responsibility, according to ad hoc tribunals jurisprudence, is constructed of three elements which are superior-subordinate relationship, superior's mens rea and ability to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent subordinate's crime and punish. All these elements must be proofed beyond reasonable doubt. Superior-subordinate relationship can only be established if there existed effective command and control between those two. Effectiveness is a material ability to influence subordinates actions in a way of either stopping them from committing a crime or being able to punish. Superiors mens rea in Rome Statute for military commander and a person, effectively acting as such is more strict than for other superiors, described in art. 28(b). Travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute suggests, that civilians, unlike military commanders, are not capable of fulfilling their obligations in the same way. Due to this reason, a lower standard was introduced. Rome Statute has applied an internationally not known superior duty which could entail criminal responsibility – to keep oneself constantly informed. It is not only contradictory to customary law, but also narrows superiors fundamental right to defense. Ad hoc tribunals have removed a requirement of causality, since International Criminal Court applied it directly in its statute as a compulsory element of the doctrine. Causality may exist between superiors failure to prevent the crime and its occurrence. While in the duty to punish case, causality exists between superiors failure to punish and subordinates remained unpunished.

The idea of military necessity lies at the centre of the law of armed conflict and yet it is less than fully understood. This book analyses which legal limits govern the commander's assessment of military necessity, and argues that military necessity itself is not a limitation. Military necessity calls for a highly discretionary exercise: the assessment. Yet, there is little guidance as to how this discretionary process should be exercised, apart from the notions of 'a reasonable military commander'. A reasonable assessment of 'excessive' civilian losses are presumed to be almost intuitive. Objective standards for determining excessive civilian losses are difficult to identify, particularly when that 'excessiveness' will be understood in relative terms. The perpetual question arises: are civilian losses acceptable if the war can be won? The result is a heavy burden of assessment placed on the shoulders of the military commander