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AbstractAxiomatic rationality is defined in terms of conformity to abstract axioms. Savage (The foundations of statistics, Wiley, New York, 1954) limited axiomatic rationality tosmall worlds(S,C), that is, situations in which the exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of future statesSand their consequencesCare known. Others have interpreted axiomatic rationality as a categorical norm for how human beings should reason, arguing in addition that violations would lead to real costs such as money pumps. Yet a review of the literature shows little evidence that violations are actually associated with any measurable costs. Limiting axiomatic rationality to small worlds, I propose a naturalized version of rationality for situations of intractability and uncertainty (as opposed to risk), all of which are not in (S,C). In these situations, humans can achieve their goals by relying on heuristics that may violate axiomatic rationality. The study of ecological rationality requires formal models of heuristics and an analysis of the structures of environments these can exploit. It lays the foundation of a moderate naturalism in epistemology, providing statements about heuristics weshoulduse in a given situation. Unlike axiomatic rationality, ecological rationality can explain less-is-more effects (when using less information can be expected to generate more accurate predictions), formalize when one should move from 'is' to 'ought,' and be evaluated by goals beyond coherence, such as predictive accuracy, frugality, and efficiency. Ecological rationality can be seen as a formalization of means–end instrumentalist rationality, based on Herbert Simon's insight that rational behavior is a function of the mind and its environment.

In this article, I readdress the issue of rationality, which has been so far considered in western liberal democracies and in planning theory as procedural, and more recently as post-political in the post-foundational approach, aiming to show how it can gain a substantive and politicising character. I first discuss the problems and limits of the treatment of rational thinking as well as rational consensus-seeking as merely procedural and post-political. Secondly, utilising the notion of Realrationalität of Flyvbjerg, I discuss how rationality attains a politicising role due to its strong relationship with power. Using the concept of planning rationality aiming at public interest, I present the general position and actions of professional organisations in Turkey, focusing on the Chamber of City Planners, as an example illustrative of my argument. I finally argue that rationality becomes a substantive issue that politicizes planning, when it is put forward as an alternative to authoritarian market logic. In doing so, I adopt the Rancièrian definition of the political, defined as disclosure of a wrong and staging of equality. In conclusion, I first emphasize the importance of avoiding quick rejections of the concepts of rationality and consensus in the framework of planning activity and planning theory and secondly, call for a broader definition of the political; the political that is not confined to conflict but is open to rational thinking and rational consensus.

An analysis of the psychol'al meaning of `rationality' to provide 'a framework within which the bases of internat'l att's can be more meaningfully interpreted than by recourse to superficial labels.' Rational act's are those that develop as logical consequences of the perceived relation of the event to one's values. Rationality implies both cognitive consistency & empirical validity. Non-rational att's, on the other hand, result from influences outside the individual's cognitive system. Thus, rather than 2 distinct types of people, two ideal types of thought process are seen. 2 pressures operate in the direction of the rationality of att structures: (1) those arising from the person's intimate contact with the event system to which the attitude structure refers, & (2) soc pressures toward cognitive consistency within Western culture. Influences toward nonrationality stem from: (a) the unconscious personality structure, & (b) soc systems in which the individual interacts. Thus, 'it would appear quite plausible that att's toward internat'l events maintained by the average citizen carry a strong flavor of non-rationality' because: (i) it is virtually impossible for the average individual to test empirically the applicability of his att's to the events themselves, & (ii) the realm of foreign affairs is generally remote from the most pressing concerns of individuals. I. Taviss.

ABSTRACT.If in a game with multiple proper coordination equilibria there is a single one that is best for all participants, it isrationalfor each participant to choose the strategy that has the best equilibrium as one of its possible outcomes. This seems so obvious that any plausible theory of rationality should be expected to be applicable to such situations. However, this is not true for the "orthodox" theory of rational choice, as Robert Sugden has convincingly shown. In this paper, I shall argue that this failure is due to an implicit individualistic understanding ofintentionality. John R. Searle's concept ofcollective intentionality(as put forth in hisConstruction of Social Reality) and his more recent theory ofRationality in Actionprovides important conceptual tools pertaining to a more comprehensive theory of rationality. The account I shall develop differs from Searle's own, as for reasons to be found in his overall project, Searle's departure from the orthodox view of rationality gets stuck half‐way.