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Private prisons, like hotels, are most profitable when they are at maximum occupancy and their guests stay for longer periods of time. Because the business-model for private prisons is predicated on incarceration rates dictated by public policy, one would presume that private prison corporations expend great resources to advocating for stricter criminal laws and sentencing. This note explores the role of political lobbying and campaign contributions of private prison corporations to see if a correlative relationship exists between their advocacy and stricter crime laws. Part I of the note provides a history of private prisons in America and explores the laws which lead to the explosive growth in prison populations. Part II will provide an overview of the three largest providers of private prisons and analyzes their political contributions. Part III discusses other business development strategies employed by private prison operators, outside of traditional political lobbying schema. Part IV discusses the present threat to private prison organizations and concludes that public outrage with the capitalization of incarceration, poses an existential threat to private prisons. While private prisons have expended significant resources in political lobbying, the greatest dividends were attributable to their involvement in the American Legislative Exchange Council, which allowed private prisons to draft legislation that produced demand for their services. Nevertheless, these legislative victories are unlikely to withstand the threat posed by widespread public frustration, which has limited these corporations' access to the capital necessary to sustain their operations.

Publicly traded entities are generally treated as corporations for U.S. tax purposes. Under various exceptions, however, publicly traded entities may obtain special treatment if they earn predominately certain specified types of qualifying income. This Article examines potential rationales for granting special tax treatment to certain publicly traded entities. As the analysis in this Article will show, many of the potential rationales are unconvincing. In addition, to the extent that some rationales may be persuasive, the current rules are not designed in a way that best comports with these potential justifications. Therefore, reform is needed. To reform the current system, this Article proposes narrowing the scope of what may be classified as qualifying income so that special tax treatment is bestowed upon publicly traded entities only when warranted by underlying policy justifications. Specifically, this Article proposes that income that is classified as qualifying income under current law should not be classified in that manner unless it is earned by holding a publicly traded asset. In addition, current law grants favorable treatment to all income earned by a publicly traded entity if and only if the entity earns predominately qualifying income. This Article assesses whether tax law should, instead, grant special tax treatment to only qualifying income earned by a publicly traded entity, but with the special treatment applying regardless of whether the entity earns predominately qualifying income. Ultimately, this Article concludes that, on balance, concerns about complexity justify continuation of a regime under which beneficial treatment applies to all income earned by a publicly traded entity if and only if the entity earns predominately qualifying income, provided that the scope of what may be classified as qualifying income is narrowed in the manner proposed by this Article.