Suchergebnisse

Georgia was the first state in the United States to ban the execution of persons with intellectual disability, and did so 14 years prior to the federal mandate in Atkins v. Virginia (2002). In doing so, it became and remains the only state to invoke the highest of standards, beyond a reasonable doubt. When states use a standard higher than the lowest of three, defendants raising the claim of intellectual disability are placed at an increased risk for rights violations that may include lack of due process, the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, and finally, in the extinction of life. The purpose of this case study is to analyze the 2013 legislative informational hearing hosted by the Georgia House of Representatives Non-Civil Judiciary committee on the state's standard of proof using Foucault's medico-judicial perspective. Based on this analysis, the second purpose of the study is to propose a position of advocacy and respective strategy for changing Georgia's standard of proof of intellectual disability. Lastly, this article recommends a strategy of leveraging the medical model of intellectual disability in the criminal justice context as an instrument for diminishing the risk for unlawful execution and enhancing the securement of accommodations while in state penal custody, as per federal law.Keywords: Intellectual disability; death penalty; medico-judicial discourse; standard of proof; beyond a reasonable doubt; impressionist narrative

AbstractAn aesthetic sense—a taste for the creation and/or appreciation of that which strikes one as, e.g., attractive or awesome—is often assumed to be a distinctively H. sapiens phenomenon. However, recent paleoanthropological research is revealing its archaeologically visible, deeper roots. The sensorimotor/perceptual and cognitive capacities underpinning aesthetic activities are a major focus of evolutionary aesthetics. Here we take a diachronic, evolutionary perspective and assess ongoing scepticism regarding whether, and to what extent, aesthetic capacity extends to our evolutionary cousins, the Neanderthals. The goal of this article is twofold. First, it serves as a defence of the attribution of Neanderthal aesthetic capacity by marshalling archaeological data best explained by positing a Neanderthal aesthetic sense. Second, it offers an opportunity to make progress on understanding some epistemically relevant features of the wider debate in evolutionary aesthetics. First, we outline and analyse a range of distinct 'sceptical arguments' derived from attitudes and claims found in the literature and broader debate that aim to dial down the case for Neanderthal aesthetic capacity. We show that these arguments not only miss their target, they divert the debate away from more compelling questions. We then consider the case for protoaesthetic capacities and sensitivities in the Acheulean stone tool industry and argue that Neanderthals likely inherited the protoaesthetic package from ancient ancestors that they shared with H. sapiens. Finally, we sketch and defend a research agenda for framing Neanderthal aesthetic niche(s) beyond H. sapiens-derived standards, which we see as a priority for future archaeological, cognitive, and philosophical research. While we resist sceptical arguments and the often-implied inferiority of Neanderthals to humans, we also deny that Neanderthals and ancient humans were indistinguishable. Understanding the differences is an important goal of interpretation, and we apply this line of reasoning to the case of aesthetics.