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In A Theory of Justice John Rawls argued that people in a just society would have rights to some forms of personal property, whatever the best way to organise the economy. Without being explicit about it, he also seems to have believed that protection for at least some forms of privacy are included in the Basic Liberties, to which all are entitled. Thus, Rawls assumes that people are entitled to form families, as well as personal associations which reflect their tastes as well as their beliefs and interests. He seems also to have assumed that people are entitled to seclude themselves, as well as to associate with others, and to keep some of their beliefs, knowledge, feelings and ideas to themselves, rather than being obliged to share them with others. So, thinking of privacy as an amalgam of claims to seclusion, solitude, anonymity and intimate association, we can say that Rawls appears to include at least some forms of privacy in his account of the liberties protected by the first principle of justice. [First paragraph]

In A Theory of Justice John Rawls argued that people in a just society would have rights to some forms of personal property, whatever the best way to organise the economy. Without being explicit about it, he also seems to have believed that protection for at least some forms of privacy are included in the Basic Liberties, to which all are entitled. Thus, Rawls assumes that people are entitled to form families, as well as personal associations which reflect their tastes as well as their beliefs and interests. He seems also to have assumed that people are entitled to seclude themselves, as well as to associate with others, and to keep some of their beliefs, knowledge, feelings and ideas to themselves, rather than being obliged to share them with others. So, thinking of privacy as an amalgam of claims to seclusion, solitude, anonymity and intimate association, we can say that Rawls appears to include at least some forms of privacy in his account of the liberties protected by the first principle of justice. [First paragraph]

Le texte suivant est la transcription de la table ronde qui a clôturé la conférence internationale « Pourquoi la propriété privée ? » (organisée à l'Université libre de Bruxelles en juin 2018). Philippe Van Parijs a accepté d'animer la discussion et d'organiser la confrontation des thèses de Jean-Fabien Spitz, Hillel Steiner et Karl Widerquist sur la propriété privée. La discussion est divisée en trois moments principaux. Tout d'abord, les orateurs clarifient leur propre approche de la propriété privée et la place qu'occupe ce concept dans leur théorie de la justice. Ces clarifications mènent le débat à la question des biens communs (commons) et soulève le problème de leur compatibilité avec les thèses de Jean-Fabien Spitz et Hillel Steiner. Dans un second temps, les conférenciers évaluent comment la dématérialisation de l'économie et le développement des droits de propriété intellectuelle posent de nouveaux défis au concept de propriété privée. Ces évolutions contemporaines sont-elles d'une telle importance qu'ils peuvent les amener à revoir leur position sur la propriété privée ? Et de manière générale, la propriété privée est-elle légitime dans le domaine intellectuel ? Enfin, les trois orateurs répondent à différentes questions du public. Ces questions les amènent à évoquer la tragédie des communs, la nature de la prospérité et les limites légitimes au droit de propriété privée. Cette discussion permet aux trois orateurs de clarifier leurs positions et de faire état explicitement de leurs désaccords (et des raisons qui les fondent) sur certains points majeurs des débats sur la propriété privée.

This article analyses the development of legislation regarding private property in Czechoslovakia between 1948 and 1989 and summarizes available empirical data relating to property rights protection in the given period. Although the legislation took gradual steps towards diminishing the status of private property, no laws were passed that officially or entirely terminated its existence. The legislation of the 1960s set a status quo which codified property rights until the fall of the Communist regime in 1989. Most of the empirical data, which are available only for the 1980s, do not show any significant trend, corresponding with the unaltered situation in the legislation of that decade.

Genomics has developed at a time when science has become increasingly connected with the market. There are, within the domain of genomics, models for the production and distribution of common and/or public goods. Studies these models and suggests solutions which could allow a better balance among private property, collective property, and public property. (Original abstract - amended)

The nature of Marx's opposition to private property is problematic; Marx's theory of ideology precludes direct moral criticism, but the concept of surplus value seems to suggest that private property is unjust. Both views in fact are mistaken. Marx defines freedom in terms of active control over one's life, of expression of one's real individual life in one's activities, & of participation in a community. Marx criticizes private property as denying freedom in this sense. His concept of justice or right, however, is of a standard limited by what is possible in a particular society; thus, capitalist societies are capable of being just in the terms appropriate to them. In communist society, Marx argues, justice will be abandoned entirely in favor of recognition of individual qualities. Capitalism & private property, & the standard of justice which arises from them, are condemned for limiting freedom. A more developed mode of production can produce a higher degree of freedom, but not a higher degree of justice. Marx rejected morality in a restrictive, Kantian sense, but a wider concept of morality which excluded his views would also have to exclude those, for example, of Aristotle & Mill. W. H. Stoddard.