Private life
In: Commonwealth human rights law digest, Band 6, Heft 3, S. 386
ISSN: 1363-7169
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In: Commonwealth human rights law digest, Band 6, Heft 3, S. 386
ISSN: 1363-7169
In: Commonwealth human rights law digest, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 233-234
ISSN: 1363-7169
In: The Massachusetts review: MR ; a quarterly of literature, the arts and public affairs, Band 56, Heft 4, S. 695
ISSN: 0025-4878
In: Foreign affairs, Band 78, Heft 5, S. 166-167
ISSN: 0015-7120
Cooper reviews 'Sony: The Private Life' by John Nathan. Sony: The Private Life by John Nathan is reviewed.
In: Russian social science review: a journal of translations, Band 33, Heft 6, S. 14-48
ISSN: 1557-7848
In: Gender & history, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 212-217
ISSN: 1468-0424
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Band 78, Heft 5, S. 166
ISSN: 2327-7793
In: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d00223354f
Running title: The governess, or, Politics in private life. ; Mode of access: Internet.
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In: Regulating Autonomy : Sex, Reproduction and Family
In: Social science quarterly, Band 73, Heft 1, S. 219-220
ISSN: 0038-4941
In: New community: European journal on migration and ethnic relations ; the journal of the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 340-341
ISSN: 0047-9586
In: Australian quarterly: AQ, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 28
ISSN: 1837-1892
In: Sociological analysis: SA ; a journal in the sociology of religion, Band 52, Heft 2, S. 224
ISSN: 2325-7873
This Article proposes a new conception of the administrative regulatory state that accounts for the vast networks of private agreements that shadow public regulations. The traditional account of the administrative state assigns a limited role to private actors: private firms and interest groups seek to influence regulations, and after the regulations are finalized, regulated firms face a comply-or-defy decision. In recent years, scholars have noted that private actors play an increasing role in the traditional government standard setting, implementation and enforcement functions. This Article demonstrates that the private role in each of these regulatory functions is far greater than others have identified. Furthermore, the Article argues that only when this private regulation is considered can the accountability and efficacy of the administrative state be judged. Using environmental regulation as an example, the Article examines a wide range of empirical data to demonstrate that public law requirements spawn a vast body of private agreements. These second-order agreements range from corporate acquisition and credit agreements between private firms to "good neighbor agreements" and other agreements between private firms and non-profit groups. Second-order agreements often concern not only environmental regulation, but labor, worker safety, health care and other regulatory areas. The Article shows that second-order agreements alter the types of parties that have interests in regulatory outcomes, the incentives they face, and the performance of the regulatory regime. The recognition of second-order agreements thus suggests a new agenda for empirical and theoretical work on the public regulatory measures that will generate the optimal blend of public and private regulation.
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