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The book describes and analyzes the formation, operation, and impacts of modern global cartels. It provides a broad picture of the economics, competition law and history of international price fixing. A deeper understanding of the phenomenon is afforded by intensive case studies of collusion in the markets for lysine, citric acid, and vitamins. Particular attention is given to the economic injuries sustained by the cartels' customers. The author assesses whether antitrust enforcement by the European Union, the United States, and other countries is capable of deterring cartels in the foreseeable future. TOC:Introduction.- The Economics of Price Fixing.- Anticartel Laws and Enforcement.- The Citric Acid Industry.- Economic Impacts of the Citric Acid Cartel.- The World Lysine Industry.- The Lysine Conspiracy.- Economic Effects of the Lysine Cartel.- The Global Vitamins Industries.- The Vitamins Conspiracies.- Effects of the Vitamins Cartels.- U.S. Government Prosecutions.- Antitrust Prosecutions by Foreign Governments.- The Civil Suits.- The Business of Fighting Cartels.- Gobal Price Fixing: Summing Up.

Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. Competition Policy and Price Fixing provides the needed analytical foundation. It offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition. In doing so, Louis Kaplow elaborates the relevant benefits and costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions. Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional wisdom, Kaplow shows how this circumscribed view is less well grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important, by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, he explains how the direct approach targets situations that involve both greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable behavior--and is also easier to apply.

Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. Competition Policy and Price Fixing provides the needed analytical foundation. It offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition.

Frontmatter -- PREFACE -- CONTENTS -- CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER II. PRINCIPLES OF COMMODITY CONTROL -- CHAPTER III. GOVERNMENT SUGAR CONTROL -- CHAPTER IV. BUTTER CONTROL -- CHAPTER V. CONTROL OF BUILDING MATERIALS -- CHAPTER VI. WHEAT CONTROL -- CHAPTER VII. OTHER MEASURES OF CONTROL -- CHAPTER VIII. REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS -- APPENDIX A. NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATION AUTHORISING CONTROL -- APPENDIX B. COMPARISON OF INDEX NUMBERS OF CONTROLLED PRODUCTS -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX

This paper addresses two questions about collusion in the Japanese construction industry. First, what mechanisms are used for enforcing the collusive agreement, for dividing the spoils, and for preventing the entry of new firms seeking a share of the collusive profits? Second, how much are prices raised as a result of the collusion?