Preferential trading agreements: An investigation
In: Journal of international economics, Band 21, Heft 1-2, S. 81-97
ISSN: 0022-1996
144418 Ergebnisse
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In: Journal of international economics, Band 21, Heft 1-2, S. 81-97
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Cutting the Gordian Knot of Economic Reform, S. 101-127
In: Cutting the Gordian Knot of Economic Reform, S. 82-100
In: Journal of development economics, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 181-190
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Cutting the Gordian Knot of Economic Reform, S. 128-160
In: Critical perspectives on the global trading system and the WTO 12
In: Elgar refernce collection
In: Journal of international trade & economic development: an international and comparative review, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 175-180
ISSN: 1469-9559
In: Cutting the Gordian Knot of Economic Reform, S. 46-81
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 35, Heft Dec 86
ISSN: 0021-9886
The 2 central goals of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) are reduced protection and non-discriminatory trade policies. Argues that despite the strong GATT position against the latter, there are many post-war examples that can be cited. One common set--voluntary export quotas, orderly marketing arrangements, and the like--have protection as their aim. The remaining preferential trading agreements (PTAs), ranging from simple one-way trade preferences to full-scale customs union, have discrimination as their purpose. (AM)
Draws on both theory and evaluations of several major Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) to discuss the constraints to achieving liberalisation in PTAs and key problems facing negotiators trying to achieve the best outcomes within given political economy constraints, such as choice of rules of origin and dispute settlement procedures
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 74, Heft 4, S. 932-949
ISSN: 1468-2508
We propose that major powers give foreign aid to developing countries to facilitate politically costly economic reforms that preferential trading agreements prescribe. Democratic developing countries (1) need adjustment assistance more than autocracies and (2) can credibly commit to using fungible revenue to compensate the domestic losers, so a side payment for deeper reforms should only be available for democracies. A quantitative test lends support to the theory. Fully democratic developing countries that form a preferential trading agreement with the European Union or the United States obtain a large increase in foreign aid in the short run. These results imply that donors have used foreign aid to strengthen the effect of preferential trading agreements on economic reforms. Adapted from the source document.
In: Directions in development
In: Trade
In: Forthcoming in The Journal of Politics
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