Political contributions
In: American federationist: official monthly magazine of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, S. 24-25
ISSN: 0002-8428
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In: American federationist: official monthly magazine of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, S. 24-25
ISSN: 0002-8428
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 54, S. 56-68
ISSN: 0032-3195
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 56-68
ISSN: 1538-165X
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In: Public choice, Band 69, Heft 3, S. 351-356
ISSN: 0048-5829
THE GROWTH OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING OVER THE PAST DECADE HAS ATTRACTED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION. RECENT STUDIES HAVE ANALYZED THE IMPACT OF CONTRIBUTIONS ON LEGISLATIVE VOTE PATTERNS AND THE EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING ON ELECTION OUTCOMES. THIS PAPER VIEWS POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AS ONE FORM OF VOTING AND ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE UNDERSTANDING OF THE DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS TO UNDERSTANDING OF THE DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS TO CONTRIBUTE TO POLITICAL CANDIDATES. ITS CONCLUSION IS TWOFOLD: FROM A RESEARCHER'S VIEWPOINT, THE RESEARCH SUGGESTS THE IMPORTANCE OF AGE, WEALTH, TAX RATES, AND MARITAL STATUS AS DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY TOP U.S. WEALTH-HOLDERS; AND FROM A POLITICIAN'S VIEWPOINT, THE RESEARCH SUGGESTS THAT INDIVIDUAL ECONOMIC VARIABLES SUCH AS MARGINAL TAX RATES AND WEALTH ARE MAJOR DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS TO CONTRIBUTE TO POLITICIANS.
In: Legislative Reference Bureau. Report no. 6, 1968
In: Public choice, Band 69, Heft 3, S. 351-355
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 351
ISSN: 0048-5829
Interest groups can influence political decisions in two distinct ways: by offering contributions to political actors and by providing them with relevant information that is favorable for the group. We analyze the conditions under which interest groups are more inclined to use one or the other channel of influence. First, we identify an indirect cost of searching for information in the form of an information externality that increases the cost of offering contributions. We then show that an extreme interest group might find it beneficial to abandon information provision altogether and instead seek influence solely via contributions. Finally, we apply our model to cast doubt on the "conventional wisdom" that competition among information providers increases the amount of information provided: when the identified information externality is taken into account, wee show that competition decreases information search. Thus, our analysis lends support to a rather cynical view of lobbying wherein lobby groups provide little or no useful information to the political process.
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Greaf explained the benefits of text-to-give and text-to-donate include the speed and conveniences, while negatives include contribution limits, time it takes to receive the money, and security concerns. She highlighted notable text-to-give and text-to-donate campaigns such as the 2010 Haiti charitable event, Keep a Child Alive, and the NFL and United Way events. Greaf proposed that campaigns should be required not to use the text-to-give, but to use the text-to-donate. She also proposed that at a specific contribution levels, liability should be on the individual contributor and not the political committee. A summary of the event is available here.
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In: [Studies in money in politics] 3
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In: University of Colorado Law Review, Vol. 86 (2015)
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