Suchergebnisse

This report documents the current state of pension provision in Thailand and options for reform that would increase the adequacy and sustainability of the pension system. While the focus here is on income support, the welfare of the elderly depends on many other government policies ranging from labor market policies to aged care and health services. It is also important to assess the pension system in terms of its broader impact on fiscal sustainability and national savings. This analysis can be found in a companion World Bank report that looks at the macroeconomic implications of aging in Thailand. The next section describes the schemes for the formal sector (public and private sector) followed by sections two and three which cover voluntary programs for the informal sector and non-contributory or 'social' pensions, respectively. Section four assesses performance based on three criteria, adequacy, sustainability, and coverage. The last section concludes.

This paper analyses which factors are most important for explaining why people in fifteen European countries prefer either public, occupational or private pension provision. We make a distinction between personal characteristics such as age, gender and occupation, nationality and the actual, current kind of pension provision that respondents have. Using a large European survey, we find that although all three types of variables are important, the current pension provision and nation-specific effects have a much stronger effect than personal characteristics. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

Privatization entails a number of quite different aspects that overlap only to some extent: (1) responsibility in provision; (2) possibilities of exit from statutory plans; (3) the transfer of the administration and management of schemes from public bodies acting in a unitary non-competitive administrative environment to private sector actors acting in a more fragmented competitive market based environment; (4) the transfer of the risks of retirement from the collective to the individual; and (5) the 'recommodification' and 'financialization' of retirement risks. The paper develops a compound index of private pension provision based on a number of quantifiable variables (theoretical replacement rates of public plans, assets of funded pension schemes, private pension expenditure and coverage by private pension plans) that tries to tap into these different aspects. It can be used to empirically categorize the extent to which Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have privatized their pension provision.

To examine pensions Samuelson's overlapping‐generations model is generally used: its basic workings are set out here for an open economy. Pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYGO) pensions are attractive when the rate of population growth exceeds the real rate of interest; then all generations are better off for the existence of the pension. The only cost is the income tax distortion. Once the rate of growth falls below the real interest rate, only the cost is left and it is better for the state to'fund'its pensions. If the state borrows to finance the transition to a funded system, it substitutes explicit debt for unfunded liabilities, which leaves its balance sheet unchanged; this avoids the problem of the existing young generation'paying twice'for its pensions.

The development of integration within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union actualizes the issue of regulation of pension relations. The adoption of the Agreement on Pension Provision laid the foundations for international cooperation in the field of pension provision. However, significant institutional differences in national pension systems may hinder the effective implementation of oldage pension provision.Aim. To investigate the possibilities and difficulties of international cooperation in the pension sphere in the context of national differences in old-age pension provision in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union.Tasks. To consider the national pension systems in terms of old-age pensions in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union and conduct their comparative analysis; to show the features of international regulation of old-age pensions in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union.Methods. In this work, the method of statistical data analysis was used to identify the features of the national old–age pension provision, comparative analysis — when comparing national pension systems in terms of old-age pensions, as well as the method of expert assessments when identifying difficulties of international cooperation in the pension sector.Results. Institutional features of old-age pension systems in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union have been found. The grounds for international regulation of old-age pensions are revealed. Difficulties in the formation of pension rights of citizens of the Union countries have been found.Conclusions. The countries of the Eurasian Union faced similar economic and demographic challenges. Pension reforms have resulted in the design of pension systems with national institutional differences, which can become causes of social injustice and pension inequality.

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is threefold: to adapt the innovation diffusion models to describe and predict the diffusion of private pension provision; to evaluate the suitability of diffusion models based on the historical data from the Romanian and Ukrainian voluntary pension systems; and to compare the diffusion parameters of private pension provision in these countries. The study proven that diffusion models, such as the Rogers model and the Bass model, can reproduce the diffusion of innovations in the field of pensions. The Rogers diffusion parameters for Romania and Ukraine are almost identical; this gives grounds for a conclusion about the similar behavioral patterns in post-socialist countries. However, some limitations on models use are noted. During the crisis and when using the nudge mechanism, models are not always well-fitting, but when new pension schemes are introduced or new pension funds are opened, models can be used in "guessing by analogy".

This article discusses plans, supported by President George W. Bush, to introduce individualised pension provision as a form of privatisation of social security in the US in the context of the experience of analogous policies in the UK.

Contemporary debates over the future direction of retirement pensions policy have been dominated by a polemic over the scope of, and the future balance between, the respective roles of public and private sectors in the management and delivery of benefit "entitlements". This debate has negatively judged the institutional capacity of the state sustainably to supply adequate national retirement provision. This development is viewed as problematic as it is contentious in that it seeks to abandon lessons learned from the long, albeit currently underestimated, historical pedigree of public‐private partnership in institutional pensions provision. Against the ascendancy of World Bank‐driven attitudes regarding the limitations of "public"' pensions provision, it is argued that due recognition be given to the ongoing capacity of state sectors to contribute positively to the management and delivery of old‐age pensions. Argues further that the social welfare‐driven imperatives which led states initially to become increasingly more involved in national pensions provision remain no less salient today and for the future, and are particularly salient for developing economies with poorly developed private financial sectors.

AbstractPensions provision in the UK has been undergoing upheaval for several decades, as an already liberal regime has gradually been further liberalised, resulting in the rollout of defined contribution provision via the pseudo‐compulsory automatic enrolment system. Yet, the system is dysfunctional, insofar as it replaces the institutional guarantors essential to pensions provision with hazy notions of individual responsibility. The ability of capitalism to reproduce itself is jeopardised as a result. Increasingly, the state, despite scaling back the state pension system, is intervening to subsidise and substitute for a marketised system. Despite the significant risk of poor outcomes for millions of savers in the automatic enrolment system, and the integral role of the state in private provision, pensions policy receives little attention in political debates, or by political scientists. This is driven in part by a lack of salience among the public, which is itself a result of the peculiar temporality of pensions. Yet it is a product also of the disciplinary norms of political science, and the positionality of political scientists.