Abstract. This brief survey begins with a suggested procedure for determining whether a given economist viewed a particular goal as an economic or noneconomic objective. Roughly speaking, the approach rests on whether that economist attempted a serious analysis of the tradeoffs between the goal in question and some measure of value. In this view, noneconomic objectives, for any school, include all those objectives that, while recognized as potentially legitimate, are not analyzed in terms of commensurable value measures. Three points to notice about the definition: (1) For any economist, economic objectives should be distinguished from a class of intermediate goods valued largely for their predicted positive impact on production; (2) Some objectives may be altogether dismissed by a school, either as beyond the expertise of economic analysis or as downright harmful; (3) Simply acknowledging the existence of a "cost" to achieving a goal leaves that goal as noneconomic since no attempt at valuation has been made.The paper goes on to sketch three viewpoints toward income equality—that of the classical school as summarized in the work of J. S. Mill, that of the early neoclassicists as represented by Marshall and Pigou, and that of the "new welfare economics" as developed by Kaldor and Hicks. The classical economists valued the relief of poverty, but explicitly attacked anything but the most basic redistributional efforts because of expected dire effects on production. The early neoclassicists built equality implicitly into a utilitarian social welfare function. The "new welfare economics" doubted economists' ability to assess the value of equality, although perhaps not their ability to measure its opportunity cost. Thus the basic argument: both the classicists and the early neoclassicists saw equality as an economic objective, while the new welfare economics was largely built on denying this status to equality.
AbstractSystemic conflicts increasingly affect the global value chains (GVCs) underpinning globalization by creating policy uncertainty and politicizing trade and investment decisions. Unilateral policies to attain competitiveness and noneconomic objectives (NEOs), including national security, create incentives for international cooperation to attenuate policy spillovers. Recent initiatives seeking to do so are organized around supply chain governance and need not be anchored in trade agreements. Whether such cooperation is feasible and can be designed to be effective in realizing NEOs is unclear. Plurilateral GVC-centered cooperation offers a potential path for states to pursue NEOs and reduce policy uncertainty for international business. Research offers little guidance to policymakers on the design of such cooperation. A key open question is to determine whether explicit market access commitments are necessary to sustain cooperation. Creating mechanisms for the epistemic communities that are concerned with a specific NEO or policy area to interact with stakeholders and lead firms operating international production networks can help inform the design of cooperation to attain NEOs more efficiently.
Abstract. Smith uses his analysis of bounties to form one aspect of his overall critique of the mercantile system. He stresses the fact that the system of bounties has not promoted the development of the English economy. However, Smith also stresses that, as destructive as the system of export bounties is to public welfare, these bounties are not significant enough to greatly retard the growth of the English economy, which has more to do with secure property rights and securing investors their return on their investments.
Abstract. This symposium was first presented at a session entitled "Noneconomic Objectives in the History of Economic Thought" that was held at the Allied Social Science Association Meetings in January 2002.
Most development practitioners are well aware that projects to create jobs or generate income in the market economies of Latin America and the Caribbean have a sobering programmatic feature that distinguishes them from other sorts of initiatives: Economic enterprises can fail definitively and unambiguously. Grants with noneconomic objectives can founder too, of course, although as a practical matter their standard of success generally is internal to the project and the supporting grant. Does the operating ethos of donors and NGOs undermine the business prospects of the people they try to assist? (Grassroots/DÜI)
Motivated originally by a concern for the future of the German and Japanese economic models, the authors in this volume actually probe the origins and evolution of these two varieties of nonliberal capitalism. German and Japanese capitalism is nonliberal in that the economies of these countries are more socially and politically regulated than are their Anglo-American counterparts. Markets are also more "embedded" to the degree that economic transactions are also constrained to serve noneconomic objectives, such as social cohesion, or are supported by noneconomic social ties. Embeddedness, it is argued, creates higher levels of "committed labor" and "patient capital" and thus a long-term focus (and cooperation based on loyalty and trust) in economic relations among actors. One of the more intriguing findings of the volume is that formally, very different institutions generate functionally equivalent outcomes and systemic logics across the two cases.
Adelman, I. and Morris, C. T. The derivation of cardinal scales from ordinal data.--Balassa, B. Project appraisal in developing countries.--Dadajan, V. S. A long-term macroeconomic forecasting model of the Soviet economy.--Fei, J. C. H. and Ranis, G. Technological transfer, employment, and development.--Fox, K. A. Combining economic and noneconomic objectives in development planning.--Harberger, A. C. The case of the three numeraires.--Johnson, H. G. An informal classical model of the current economic development problem.--Leibenstein, H. Efficiency wages, X-efficiency, and urban unemployment.--Letiche, J. Dependent monetary systems and economic development.--Singer, H. W. International policies and their effect on employment
Market acceptance of a product in the society is not an easy job; one has to adopt various marketing strategies for its development, introduction, promotion and positioning. The campaigners of brand Modi were very well aware of it. The campaign pivoted around developing Modi as a brand and then selling it. In this bid the campaigners focused on his strengths and also the weakness of the opponents. The research is based on secondary data drawn from sources such as various magazines, blogs, online news reports and websites. The study revealed that the campaign was a success as it duly catered to all the economic as well as noneconomic objectives of Business. The brilliant strategies undertaken and the competitions and challenges faced during the election finally saw the emergence of a national brand with no other competitor i.e. BRAND MODI.Keywords: Narendra Modi, Election campaign, Marketing, Consumers, Brand Modi, Hindu Nationalism
Objective. Research on gubernatorial elections has focused extensively on the impact of the economy, ignoring other noneconomic issues that voters may consider when casting their ballots. This article examines the impact of one such noneconomic issue, crime, to determine whether voters hold governors accountable for crime rates and, if so, whether they incorporate national‐ or state‐level conditions. In addition, I investigate whether more educated segments of the electorate are likely to engage in issue voting.Methods. I empirically analyze these propositions using aggregate‐level data on gubernatorial elections from 1986–2004.Results. The data analysis reveals that crime significantly influences gubernatorial races, voters consider state‐ rather than national‐level conditions, and that crime rates have a larger impact in states with a more educated population.Conclusion. Future inquiries should explore other noneconomic issues at the national and subnational levels to determine the breadth of issues that impact elections.
Investigated is the response of political support for US presidents among occupational & partisan groups to economic & noneconomic events within the framework of a dynamic model of political choice. Estimates of the model reveal the relative sensitivity of different groups' political support to unemployment, inflation, & the real income growth rate, as well as to the Vietnam casualties, the Watergate scandal, & international crisis events. The intergroup differences in political responses to the performance variables are sizeable & generally appear to reflect diverging objective group interests rather than partisan-based perceptions. 4 Tables, 24 References. HA.
Discussions about the role of small enterprise in economic development tend to remain inconclusive partly because of the difficulty of assessing the relative importance of economic and non-economic objectives and partly because of the dearth of factual information on which to base an economic calculus. It is probably true, moreover, that, because of a lack of general agreement as to the economic case for or against small enterprise, non-economic considerations, including some merely romantic attitudes toward smallness and bigness, tend to exert an undue influence on public policies. There may, of course, be no clear-cut economic case. And noneconomic considerations should and will inevitably weigh significantly in policy decisions. If, however, some of the economic questions could be settled by more and better knowledge, these decisions could more accurately reflect the opportunity costs of pursuing non-economic objectives.