Suchergebnisse

This paper focuses on Indian foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Africa for the period 2008 to 2018, amidst increasing state efforts to improve Indo- African economic ties. This study pioneers the segregation of investments led by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from non-SOEs in an empirical analysis. The motivation is rooted in the scarcity of empirical evidence of Indian FDI in Africa, particularly by non-SOEs. The random effects model was applied on the panel data for 2008-18 to highlight the significant causative effect of country alliances, gross domestic product (GDP) and net overseas development assistance of host countries in attracting greater FDI from Indian enterprises. The effect of corruption levels remains less clear in a statistical sense. These results could inform the political and economic policies of African host countries that seek financial and technical support from India.

This study examines the association between various uncertainties and corporate investment and further investigates this association between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). Moreover, this study analyzes the indirect effects of uncertainty on corporate investment through cash flow. The current research uses an unbalanced panel data of Chinese nonfinancial listed firms for the period 1999–2016. To control endogeneity issues, this study applies a robust two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) technique to estimate the model. Empirical findings indicate that market-based and firm-specific uncertainties have positive effects, whereas economic policy and CAPM-based uncertainties have negative effects on corporate investment. Furthermore, results indicate that the effects of market-based, CAPM-based, and firm-specific uncertainties (economic policy uncertainty) were less (more) prominent for SOEs. Additional analyses show that cash flow stimulates the effect of firm-specific uncertainty on SOEs' investment, whereas it weakens the influence of CAPM-based uncertainty (economic policy uncertainty) on investment of non-SOEs (SOEs). Moreover, cash flow attenuates the market uncertainty effect on investment.

AbstractBased on hand‐collected data on Chinese listed non‐state‐owned enterprises (hereafter, non‐SOEs), this paper investigates how political connection and family involvement affect firms' IPO underpricing. We find that political connection and family involvement, serving as common compensatory mechanisms for institutional deficiencies, can significantly alleviate the IPO underpricing of non‐SOEs. Moreover, evidence shows that in regions with a well‐developed institutional environment, political connection significantly reduces the degree of IPO underpricing. But for companies located in regions with a poorer institutional environment, family involvement helps to achieve lower underpricing. The effects also vary with firm size. Political connection significantly mitigates underpricing of large firms. But for small firms, only family involvement plays a significant role in lowering IPO underpricing. Finally, we find that instead of increasing the offering price, the effect works in another way. Non‐SOEs with political connection and family involvement are no longer growth firms, for which the influence of the regulatory bar set by the China Security Regulatory Committee (CSRC) decreases. These firms tend to experience poorer long‐term performance after the IPO. This may lead to a relatively lower price in the secondary market, resulting in a lower level of IPO underpricing.

AbstractThe objective of the study is to signify the impact of corporate social responsibility performance on state‐owned and non‐state‐owned enterprises' performance. The contributive concept of CSR performance has been formulated while contemplating total tax, staff expenditure, public welfare expenditure, social cost and total equity. To contemplate with deep insight, the moderating role of innovation input and output has been substantiated through empirical results. The data of 502 listed companies on Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan has been endorsed for years 2009–2018. Empirical underpinnings reveal that corporate social responsibility performance boosts the non‐state‐owned enterprises' performance vehemently while state‐owned enterprises have proclaimed insignificant results. Comprehensively, innovation input has decelerated the Non‐state owned Enterprises' performance while innovation output has remained insignificant. Specifically, leverage has been signified as the most deterrent vehicle for declining the Non‐State Owned Enterprises' performance. Intuitively, the theoretical contribution is manifested while deducing the implicative aspect of legitimacy theory which emphasizes on the adoption of corporate social responsibility. Implicatively, the study recommends to ameliorate the corporate structure of state‐owned enterprises comprehensively so that advantage of corporate social responsibility may be attained vigorously. Doubtlessly, empirical results are reliable and authenticated due to the execution of GMM and 2SLS instrumental regressions.

According to OECD (2015), any corporate entity recognized by national law as an enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership, should be considered as a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE). Although most industrialized economies are characterized by open and competitive markets firmly rooted in the rule of law, with private enterprises as the predominant economic actors yet governments continue to own and operate national commercial enterprises in key industries, making them important actors in the market, in the economy and in the society. The SOEs are an established reality world - wide but how well this reality performs is another question, that needs to be considered case by case. However, it may be concluded that when governed transparently and efficiently, SOEs can play a role in creating fairer, more competitive markets. Thus, in order to maximize their contribution to the economy and the society, SOEs should be productive and efficient.