Suchergebnisse

Using a variety of data sources, the contributors explore how performance standards and incentives affect the behavior of public managers and agency employees, their approaches to service delivery, and ultimately, the outcomes for participants. ; https://research.upjohn.org/up_press/1225/thumbnail.jpg

Abstract
Canada has a complex regulatory structure for occupational health and safety with legislation and regulation split among thirteen regional bodies, plus the federal government. Details for implementation of respiratory protection programs are addressed in a national consensus standard, and for product performance approvals. Canada's has historically accepted those from the US organisation, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).
During the Covid pandemic, many new respirator manufacturing operations started in Canada to address equipment shortages, but prioritization changes at NIOSH to support US requirements meant that the approval time for new Canadian products was of the order of months, exacerbating the supply crisis. The Canadian Government acted promptly to create an interim product approval structure, with the plan for a long-term solution for CSA Group (Canadian Standards Association) to build a new national respirator performance standard and certification system.
Reflecting the urgency of the situation, this new Canadian standard was developed extremely rapidly over 2021 by a dedicated expert committee, incorporating performance requirements that balanced historic familiarity with new features reflecting the best of national and international standards. This new standard and an associated certification system administered by the CSA Group now supports an improved respiratory protective equipment supply chain, and is used in Canada in parallel with the existing NIOSH approval.

This paper examines the performance of the JTPA performance system, a widely emulated model for inducing efficiency in government organizations. We present a model of how performance incentives may distort bureaucratic decisions. We define cream skimming within the model. Two major empirical findings are (a) that the short run measures used to monitor performance are weakly, and sometimes perversely, related to long run impacts and (b) that the efficiency gains or losses from cream skimming are small. We find evidence that centers respond to performance standards.

"We conducted a performance audit of the Police Standards and Training Council (PSTC) to address the recommendation made to you by the joint Legislative Performance Audit and Oversight Committee ... The purpose of the audit was to determine whether PSTC operated efficiently and effectively during State fiscal years 2017 and 2018"--Page i

The Housing Corporation claims that its new standards give greater focus and clarity to service standards in supported housing. How true is this? What will be the benefits — and problems — for the various stakeholders?