Suchergebnisse

The Croatian political scene is undergoing radical changes. Since the 2016 parliamentary election, the left-wing has gradually lost ground. One of the key roles in the political process is played by the media, which influence the voters and their choices. In this paper we analysed written texts collected during the 2016 election campaign. Among the most prominent Croatian newspapers the left-wing Novi list and the right-wing Večernji list are chosen as the focal publications. We conducted a text linguistic analysis of the political catchword (phrase, slogan) and its role in creating the political opinions of voters. The analysis provided data about the verbal, nonverbal and paraverbal text segments. These phenomena were abstracted as communicational-pragmatic and language-stylistic entities which are necessary for the successful cognitive framing of the political opinions of the public. In order to create and frame political opinions, the text producer uses subtle persuasive messages. Furthermore, at the content-related level of the text structure analysis, the communicative intention of the producer is shown, while the text function analysis shows the most common text indicators used to transmit the desired content and identifies a potential persuasive message "hidden" in the words. As a result, the number of catchwords published in line with each newspaper's own political orientation is slightly higher than that of the other option, which shows that political neutrality is lacking in the Croatian media.

The article deals with the defining of Swedish neutrality in the initial years of the Cold War. The established truth that the Swedish interpretation of neutrality was adapted to US wishes is not challenged but the reasons for this development are discussed. The main reason for adaptation is identified as the Swedish government's ambitious economic policy which led to economic dependency upon the USA, acceptance of Marshall Aid and economic incorporation into the West. Sweden managed to show the US government that formal neutrality could be combined with practical measures that in fact meant adaptation to US wishes. The argument is also that the USA used economic pressure to achieve its purposes, as when Sweden submitted to US demands regarding strategic exports to Eastern Europe. Concern for the development of Swedish trade and economic growth was important when the Swedish government yielded to the US demands. By formulating the agreement with the USA as an expression of Sweden's autonomously decided policy, Sweden could still claim that formal neutrality had been maintained.

This Article traces two interwoven jurisprudential genealogies. The first of these focuses on the emergence of neutrality in speech and press doctrine. Content and viewpoint neutrality are now the bedrock principles of modern First Amendment law. Yet the history of these concepts is largely untold and otherwise misunderstood. Scholars usually assume that expressive-freedom doctrine was mostly undeveloped before the early twentieth century and that neutrality was central to its modern rebirth. But this view distorts and sometimes even inverts historical perspectives. For most of American history, the governing paradigm of expressive freedom was one of limited toleration, focused on protecting speech within socially defined boundaries. The modern embrace of content and viewpoint neutrality, it turns out, occurred only in the 1960s as the Supreme Court merged earlier strands of rights jurisprudence in novel ways. The emergence of neutrality, this Article shows, was more gradual, more contested, and more contingent than we now assume. Recovering this history reveals the novelty of the modern neutrality paradigm and casts new light on the history of other First Amendment concepts, like prior restraints, low-value speech, and overbreadth.To understand these developments, it is necessary to trace a second doctrinal genealogy that focuses on the concept of fundamental rights. Older views of expressive freedom were embedded in a different conceptual framework for thinking about rights. And once again, the role of neutrality within this tradition was radically different. Today, neutrality is ubiquitous in rights discourse, reflecting the prevailing view that rights are domains in which people can make their own moral choices. Thus defined, rights need not be absolute, but the government must at least maintain neutrality with respect to values. As this Article reveals, however, this neutrality-based view of rights emerged well into the twentieth century, reflecting a transmogrified synthesis of earlier ideas.Recovering these older paradigms powerfully illustrates how deeply our current perspectives shape the way that we view the Constitution. Principles that appear to be inherent to the very idea of expressive freedom or the very idea of rights, it turns out, are refracted through a modern lens. Integrating history into rights jurisprudence thus poses a substantial and unresolved challenge, warranting further engagement by scholars and judges. On its own, history cannot dictate whether our approach to rights needs adjustment. But it can refocus attention on values and choices that modern doctrine too often ignores.

The political ideal of neutrality toward conceptions of the good is unsustainable at the extremely abstract level proposed by some liberal theorists. Neutrality is nonetheless a valuable political ideal. One of the many ways that government can go wrong is to take a position on some question that it would, all things considered, be better for it to abstain from deciding. The classic example is the question of which (if any) religion is true. The idea of neutrality holds that government ought to avoid this pathology.