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In the master narrative of the formation of the modern state, its unified, monopoly sovereignty is presented as universal, the natural culmination of a teleological process. We challenge the naturalness and universality of that claim by historicizing the sovereignty concept. We do so by examining the history of state formation in late medieval and early modern Europe. When, why and how were sovereignty concepts constructed and contested are questions that engage the politics of category formation. After historicizing the sovereignty concept, we turn to the study of federalism in India as state formation process rather than studying it constitutionally or comparatively.

THE STATES AND INDIAN TRIBES HAVE FOUGHT BITTERLY OVER WATER RIGHTS FOR NEARLY A CENTURY. MOST OF THIS CONFLICT TOOK PLACE IN COURTROOMS, BUT IN RECENT YEARS, STATES AND TRIBES HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES THROUGH NEGOTIATED WATER SETTLEMENTS. THIS ARTICLE UTILIZES THE LITERATURE AND THEORY ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION TO IDENTIFY SIX ADVANTAGES THAT ARE EXPECTED TO ACCRUE FROM NEGOTIATIONS. IT THEN ASSESSES THE EXTENT TO WHICH INDIAN WATER SETTLEMENTS HAVE PRODUCED THESE RESULTS.

Bridging the fields of federalism and negotiation theory, Negotiating Federalism analyzes how public actors navigate difficult federalism terrain by negotiating directly with counterparts across state-federal lines. In contrast to the stylized, zero-sum model of federalism that pervades political discourse and judicial doctrine, the Article demonstrates that the boundary between state and federal power is negotiated on scales large and small, and on an ongoing basis. It is also the first to recognize the procedural tools that bilateral federalism bargaining offers to supplement unilateral federalism interpretation in contexts of jurisdictional overlap. The Article begins by situating its inquiry within the age-old federalism discourse about which branch can best safeguard the values that give federalism meaning: Congress, through political safeguards; the Supreme Court, by judicially enforceable constraints; or the Executive, through administrative process. Yet each school of thought considers only how the branches operate unilaterally—on one side of the state-federal line or the other—missing the important ways that each one also works bilaterally across that line to protect federalism values through various forms of negotiated governance. Because unilateral interpretive methods fail to establish clear boundaries at the margins of state and federal authority, regulators increasingly turn to bilateral intergovernmental bargaining to allocate contested authority and facilitate collaboration in uncertain fed-eralism territory. Procedural constraints available within these negotia-tions can help bridge the interpretive gaps unresolved by more conven-tionally understood forms of interpretation. Creating the first theoretical framework for organizing federalism bar-gaining, the Article provides a taxonomy of the different opportunities for state-federal bargaining available within various constitutional and statutory frameworks. Highlighting forms of conventional bargaining, negotiations to reallocate authority, and joint policymaking bargaining, the Article maps this vast, uncharted landscape with illustrations ranging from the 2009 Stimulus Bill to Medicaid to climate policy. The taxonomy demonstrates how widely federalism bargaining permeates American governance, including not only the familiar example of spending power deals, but also subtler forms that have escaped previous scholarly notice as forms of negotiation at all. The Article then reviews the different media of exchange within feder-alism bargaining and the legal rules that constrain them, together with supporting data from primary sources. Finally, it evaluates how some forms of federalism bargaining—legitimized by the procedural constraints of mutual consent and the procedural engineering of regard for federalism values—can supplement unilateral interpretation. Differentiating itself from previous process-based claims, the analysis provides new theoretical justification for the interpretive work that federalism bargaining presently provides and calls for greater judicial deference to qualifying examples. Having offered recommendations about the kinds of federalism bargain-ing that should be encouraged, the Article offers recommendations for legislators, executive actors, stakeholders, practitioners, and adjudicators about how best to accomplish these goals.

"Front-loading" primaries and caucuses -- the movement of state delegate selection contests to the beginning of the nomination calendar -- is problematic for the integrity of the presidential nominating system. Because it results from decentralized decision making by self-interested states, front-loading also poses a problem for federalism. Indeed, most proposed remedies for front-loading would impinge on federalism in some manner. In analyzing those remedies, one must assess their interaction with federalism both procedurally and substantively. For example, a federally imposed national primary would be harmful to federalism on both dimensions; regional primaries negotiated among states would be best for federalism procedurally but are of dubious efficacy; the national parties have an ambiguous relationship to federalism; and a change in federal campaign finance rules would seek to combine a centralized process with a decentralized result. The best solution might be to use available central levers to try to change campaign dynamics and thus the incentives for states to schedule their primaries early. Adapted from the source document.

Some commentators have argued that federalism can undermine the strength of the government, especially in international affairs and capitalist development. This perspective argues that multilateral trade agreements, such as NAFTA, are more difficult to achieve and weaker in effect when negotiated and implemented among federal countries. However, an analysis of the process that created NAFTA and its actual economic accomplishments, so far, strongly suggest that the opposite is true: that federal systems, such as Canada, Mexico and the United States, benefit from that experience of "shared governance" in relation to globalization, especially as it reflects the complexity of sovereing integration, critical to the practical success of that process.