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In their game-theoretic formulations, the liberal paradoxes of Amartya Sen and Alan Gibbard show a tension between freedom on the one hand, and Pareto optimality and stability on the other. This article examines what happens to the liberal paradoxes if a negative conception of freedom is used. Given a game-theoretic definition of negative freedom, it is shown, first, that the liberal paradoxes disappear in this new context: there are game forms in which individuals have a minimal amount of negative freedom and which guarantee the existence of Pareto-optimal and stable outcomes. Furthermore, if a game form gives each individual a maximal amount of negative freedom, the Pareto optimality of each stable outcome of the corresponding game is guaranteed. However, many games that provide such maximal negative freedom do not contain stable outcomes. We show that the liberal paradox may reappear in the mixed extension of such games.

EXAMINING THE QUESTION OF WHETHER FREEDOM IS MEASURABLE CONTRIBUTES TO THE ANALYIS OF THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IN TWO WAYS. IT INVOLVES ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH CRITERIA FOR ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW FREE INDIVIDUALS OR SOCIETIES ARE AND IT HELPS TO SHOW HOW FAR DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF FREEDOM REALLY CONFLICT. CRITICS OF PURE NEGATIVE CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM HAVE ARGUED EITHER THAT FREEDOM IS UNMEASURABLE ON SUCH A CONCEPTION, OR THAT SUCH A CONCEPTION IS COUNTERINTUITIVE BECAUSE THE MEASUREMENTS OF FREEDOM IMPLIED BY IT CONFLICT WITH THE INTUTITIVE COMPARISONS WHICH WE NORMALLY MAKE. CLOSER EXAMINATIONS OF THE NATURE OF MEASUREMENT AND OF THE NATURE OF ACT INDIVIDUATION SHOW BOTH OF THESE CRITICISMS TO BE ILL FOUNDED.

This article offers a new scheme of the relation between positive and negative freedom that is based on a retrieval of T. H. Green's theory of freedom and on further reconstructions of his theory. Some of the distinctions in the literature have proven difficult to sustain, and this has resulted in a weakening of the dichotomy in principle, and of the concepts of positive and negative freedom independently of each other. The main distinction between negative and positive freedom offered here is based on the relation of freedom to the will. We have two kinds of freedom, in both our private and social spheres, because there are two types of goods that we, as human beings, pursue: ordinary and moral. This distinction proves to be sustainable, manages to explain the antagonistic nature of the two concepts, and provides grounds for the support of the two kinds of freedom in their own right.

Freedom of expression is a key value of a liberal democracy. In the Netherlands, like other democracies, freedom of expression has become a hot topic. Events such as the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn (2002) and Theo van Gogh (2004), the Danish cartoons affaire (2005) and the Paris Charlie Hebdo shooting (2015) have ignited debates concerning the scope and limits of the right to freedom of expression. There are roughly speaking two prevalent opinions in the current heated debate about freedom of expression: either free speech is under attack or there is simply too much of it. This brings me to the following main question of the article: what are the justifications to curtail freedom of expression in a liberal democracy? I will show in this article that Isaiah Berlin´s ideas of freedom are extremely useful in exploring the boundaries of free speech. After presenting a case dealing with the boundaries of freedom of expression, I will explain the two concepts of liberty as designed by Isaiah Berlin. I will demonstrate that, generally speaking, we value freedom, when it becomes practically meaningful, when it is a condition in which people have the opportunity to become or do something else. I will analyze Berlin's preference for negative freedom and discuss his criticism of positive freedom. Next, I will analyze whether freedom of expression is a positive or negative freedom. This outcome helps to better understand appropriate boundaries on freedom of expression.

ABSTRACT. This paper revolves around two recently decided cases by the Supreme Court of Canada that illustrate how that Court views fundamental legal rights in terms of public policy and administrative decision making by creatures of statute in a free society. The protagonists in each case differ, as do the legal arguments, but the salient socio-political issues are the same, the conflict between value pluralism and value monism, and what Isaiah Berlin calls positive and negative liberty. That is, should society enforce one set of values over all others, and if not, when, if ever, ought public values enshrined in law, trump private values that are also legally protected? Based upon the Court's approach to resolving incommensurable rights in conflict this paper reflects on how educational policy and decision makers might deal with that conundrum by considering matters of positive and negative liberty from a communitarian perspective white nurturing value pluralism, and freedom. PLURALISME ET LIBERTÉ INDIVIDUELLE DANS L'ÉDUCATION AU CANADA: LES CAUSES DE TRINITY ET DE SURREY RÉSUMÉ Cette étude porte sur deux récentes décisions rendues par la Cour suprême du Canada qui illustrent comment cette Cour interprète les droits juridiques fondamentaux en matière de politique publique et de prise de décision administrative par la création de lois dans une société libre. Dans les deux cas, les protagonistes et les arguments juridiques diffèrent, mais les enjeux socio-politiques importants sont les mêmes, soit le conflit entre le pluralisme et le monisme et ce que Isaiah Berlin appelle liberté sociale et liberté individuelle. Plus précisément, la société doit-elle imposer un ensemble de valeurs plutôt qu'un autre, et, sinon, dans quelles situations, le cas échéant, les valeurs publiques enchâssées dans la loi devraient-elles l'emporter sur les valeurs privées qui sont également protégées par la loi? L'étude, qui se fonde sur l'approche de la Cour pour prendre des décisions relativement à des droits incommensurables conflictuels, examine de quelle façon les décideurs dans le domaine éducatif peuvent envisager cette énigme en prenant en considération les questions de liberté sociale et individuelle d'un point de vue communautarien, tout en cultivant le pluralisme et la liberté.