The current report analyses the draft Bulgarian National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) and pinpoints the main obstacles for the implementation of decarbonisation policies in the electricity sector. The main goal of the analysis is to present possible ideas and solutions for improving the NECP and for the more effective adaptation of the EU energy policies in Bulgaria. The assessment evaluates whether the NECP is consistent with the ambitious European goals in energy transition, and whether it has overcome some of the most common decarbonisation myths in Southeastern Europe. The focus is on the governance framework and the action plan for achieving the decarbonisation targets. The assessment reveals how the NECP development process reflects the common energy sector governance deficits in Bulgaria, including the lack of political consistency, the limited transparency of decision-making and the lack of adequate cost/benefit analyses of long-term strategic decisions. The report recommends the implementation of a series of measures for the transformation of the electricity sector towards lower dependence on fossil fuels, the more ambitious integration of renewables-based power plants, as well as the effective inclusion of consumers in the functioning of the Bulgarian energy system.
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The Italian government has recently submitted the final version of its National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP),[1] which outlines Italian measures to achieve its national climate targets by 2030 in line with the objectives set by the European Union. To do so, Italy has put forward targets, strategies and measures also for the decarbonisation of transport, which remains among the hardest to decarbonise. While Italy's greenhouse gas emissions due to energy consumption have decreased by 21 per cent from 1990 to 2022, those related to transport have increased by 8 per cent in the same period. Moreover, the transport sector accounted for 27 per cent of national emissions in 2022, with road transport alone accounting for 92 per cent of those emissions.[2] Against this backdrop, it is important to assess the main targets and political implications of Italy's NECP related to both private cars and heavy-duty road transport (buses and trucks) in order to identify potential gaps and opportunities to reach Italy's climate targets.The dominant role of private cars One area of relevance is private cars, which was responsible for 58 per cent of the total transport emissions in 2022 given its overreliance on fossil fuels, particularly oil products. Italy is one of the largest car markets in Europe with around 41 million vehicles and a median age of the national fleet of 12.8 years.[3] Electrification has emerged as the main solution to decarbonise this segment.[4] For this reason, the NECP set very ambitious targets of 4.3 million battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and 2.3 million plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) by 2030. Furthermore, the NECP set a 34.2 per cent share of renewables in the transport sector's gross final energy consumption by 2030. However, these figures clash with the current situation calling for more consistent support and strategy. Indeed, there were around 240,000 BEVs and 250,000 PHEVs circulating on Italian roads in 2023.[5] To reach the targets, the government will need to put in place stable and clear policies as well as fiscal and economic strategies to facilitate the purchase of EVs. Indeed, Italy is lagging behind in terms of BEV annual sales with around 66,000 in 2023 compared to other member states like Germany (520,000), France (310,000) and the Netherlands (130,000).[6] Such slow EV adoption in Italy is due to multiple factors: high upfront costs, the lack of charging infrastructure and the limited perception of the importance of shifting towards cleaner transport modes. At the same time, there have been positive developments in terms of public charging stations that can partially reduce charging infrastructure concerns and range anxiety. Over the past years, the country managed to expand its charging infrastructure network up to slightly over 54,000 points as of March 2024.[7] Despite this encouraging milestone, Italy will need to further expand the network – especially in the Southern regions and rural areas – in order to be ready to support future demand. Alongside, Italy will need to accelerate the renewable deployment for decarbonising its power sector to meet its renewable target for the transport sector by 2030. A critical barrier for faster EV adoption is lower political commitment, as evident in the inconsistent policies and subsidies (clearly illustrated by the experience of the 2024 bonus)[8] as well as regulatory complexities.[9] The NECP does not provide clear fiscal and market measures to ensure a rapid ramp up of the EV adoption aimed at reaching its 2030 targets. The NECP final version does not properly address another key component of mitigation strategies in the transport sector: energy efficiency through avoiding car use in the first place. To promote this policy, however, users must be provided with effective alternatives, such as reliable, cheap and convenient public transport system, and a safe and liveable road environment that allows people to see active mobility as a viable alternative. Those actions require an effective coordination at different levels, as cities and municipalities need to be supported by the government in developing public transport and active mobility support actions.Heavy-duty road transport: Trucks and buses Road freight represents 29 per cent of total transport emissions. Compared to private vehicles, the current technology makes transport vehicles harder to be electrified, especially considering heavy-duty trucks. Conversely, light commercial vehicles are already seeing a penetration of BEVs, especially in fleets that need to operate in dense urban areas. For this reason, long-distance freight decarbonisation could rely on alternatives to electrification, especially in the short-to-medium term. Biofuels could represent an interesting option, especially when they can be used as drop-in fuels, that is, without mixing them with fossil fuels. Promising fuels include renewable diesel (also called hydrotreated vegetable oil – HVO) or biomethane, which is being supported by dedicated incentives at the national level. Those fuels, when produced from sustainable feedstocks, can represent an effective option, but they should be prioritised to the sectors that cannot be easily electrified, due to the limited amount of available feedstocks. Their strongest advantage is the possibility of exploiting the existing distribution infrastructure and vehicles, thus increasing the speed of deployment and reducing costs, although the supply chain still needs to be upscaled to match the potential demand. Their likeliest applications in transport will probably be aviation and maritime, but also long-distance road transport may need biofuels if no other low-carbon alternatives are feasible. The availability of domestic feedstocks may represent a bottleneck to a broad deployment of biofuels, and international cooperation may be required. Synthetic e-fuels may also be an additional option, although energy consumption across the supply chain remains significant and may hinder their deployment. Another transport fuel that is increasingly seen as a potential alternative to oil products in heavy transport is liquefied natural gas (LNG). The NECP reports that LNG use in transportation reached 0.22 billion cubic metres in 2021,[10] a four-time increase from the 0.05 bcm level of 2018. There are currently around 2,000 vehicles running on LNG, mostly in heavy freight transport, and they can rely on a network of 59 refuelling stations, with a further 41 under development. These figures may represent an interesting opportunity for a quick penetration of bio-LNG, which is already being developed in many sites in Italy, as biomethane is directly liquefied at production sites that are far from the natural gas grid. The NECP also supports the development of hydrogen for high-duty vehicles, in particular through a financial backing of hydrogen refuelling stations (with 230 million euros for at least 40 refuelling stations).[11] This could be a potential chicken-and-egg problem, where the lack of infrastructure hinders the deployment of a particular powertrain. However, in this case, proposed commercial models of hydrogen trucks have faced delays in the last few years.[12] Thus, it is unsure if the availability of a refuelling infrastructure may be enough to allow an effective deployment of hydrogen trucks. The plan also mentions support for high-speed electric charging stations, that are primarily addressing private cars, but can also be of use for heavy-duty vehicles. Although many measures focus on supporting alternative fuels, the NECP also presents some policies that are focused on shifting freight transport modes. Two measures[13] support the shift of long-distance road freight towards alternative sea routes and rail (with an estimated cumulated benefit of 3.9 Mtoe of savings by 2030), while another measure supports the deployment of cargo bikes for companies dedicated to last-mile deliveries in urban areas. Finally, another mode that is usually included in heavy road transport is public transport by bus. Although buses represent a marginal share of transport emissions in absolute terms (less than 3 per cent), they often operate in urban environments, and cleaner technologies that can also reduce pollutant emissions provide additional benefits. Furthermore, as already mentioned, enhancing cleaner solutions in public transport, alongside the expansion of this alternative, would favour a reduction of emissions by private cars. Urban buses are seeing an increase in electric vehicles, but long-distance buses still rely completely on diesel. The main limitations of the current electric vehicles remain the limited range and the time required for the battery charging process. For this reason, alternative options may be needed, just like for trucks, including liquid biofuels or liquified biomethane. Some cities are experimenting with hydrogen buses, but evidence suggests higher costs compared to direct electrification, due to a lower efficiency of the supply chain.Looking ahead Transport remains a very tough sector to decarbonise as proven by the fact that it has been the only sector with rising emissions over the past decades. The limited time to reach the very challenging targets set for 2030 demands strong and consistent policies to accelerate decarbonisation. However, Italy also faces financial constraints, hence requiring an effective and clear strategy based on supporting the most efficient solutions in each transport segment as alternatives to oil products. Otherwise, there will be a waste of money and time. As outlined above, while electrification currently represents the most promising option for light-duty vehicles, other transport segments will probably require a combination of solutions, including liquid biofuels, biomethane, electrification and possibly synthetic fuels. Against this backdrop, concerning private cars, the NECP lacks a clear regulatory and fiscal framework to actually reach its 2030 targets. Streamlining existing funds to favour best option and the expansion of the related infrastructure is essential, while the government should start to develop fiscal reforms on fuel taxes and incentives to accelerate the ramp up of EVs in companies' fleet and long-term rental. At the same time, alternative solutions, such as biomethane, biofuels and hydrogen, can be expanded in heavy-duty road transport where electrification faces larger obstacles. Finally, many policies and investments are focused on infrastructure for alternative energy sources, to limit the dominance of oil products in transportation. While these efforts are important and necessary, we believe that additional effort on reducing mobility demand and supporting public transportation and active mobility, especially in urban areas, may bring significant benefits. Those benefits would go well beyond GHG emissions savings, by decreasing local pollution, increasing safety for all road users, decreasing congestion and improving life quality in Italian cities. An effective and timely decarbonisation of transport requires a combination of actions at different levels and across different domains. While it is becoming clearer that to reach 2030 and 2050 climate targets the contribution of a variety of technologies and solutions is required, it is equally true that government will need to design clear and comprehensive strategy to fully exploit the strengths of and potential benefits generated by each single technology for each subsector in order to achieve targets in a timely, orderly and efficient matter.Pier Paolo Raimondi is a Researcher in the Energy, Climate and Resources Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and a PhD Candidate at the Catholic University of Milan. Michel Noussan is an Assistant Professor at Politecnico di Torino and a Visiting Professor at SciencesPo Paris.[1] Italian Ministry of the Environment and Energy Security (MASE), Clima - Energia: l'Italia ha inviato il PNIEC a Bruxelles, 1 July 2024, https://www.mase.gov.it/node/18830.[2] Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA), Le emissioni nazionali di gas serra. Settore Transporti 2022, May 2024, https://emissioni.sina.isprambiente.it/?p=7502.[3] ACI, Annuario statistico 2024, https://www.aci.it/laci/studi-e-ricerche/dati-e-statistiche/annuario-statistico/annuario-statistico-2024.html.[4] Italian Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, Decarbonising Transport. Scientific Evidence and Policy Proposals, April 2022, https://www.mit.gov.it/node/17330.[5] International Energy Agency (IEA), Global EV Data Explorer, last updated 23 April 2024, https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer.[6] Ibid.[7] Pier Paolo Raimondi, "Electrification of the Road Transport Sector in Europe and the Case of Italy", in Atlantic Council Reports, June 2024, p. 18, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=775013. See also Motus-E website: https://www.motus-e.org.[8] Carmine Fotina, "Bonus auto, partenza sprint per le elettriche: già esauriti gli incentivi", in Il Sole 24 Ore, 3 June 2024, https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/bonus-auto-moto-e-furgoni-via-oggi-prenotazioni-i-concessionari-AGWwRNL.[9] Pier Paolo Raimondi, "Electrification of the Road Transport Sector in Europe and the Case of Italy", cit.[10] MASE, Piano nazionale integrato per l'energia e il clima, June 2024, p. 148, https://commission.europa.eu/node/32214_en.[11] Ibid., p. 244.[12] Daniel G. Lifona, "MAN apuesta por los camiones eléctricos: 'El hidrógeno no es viable'", in Expansión, 10 January 2024, https://www.expansion.com/empresas/motor/2024/01/10/659eba48468aeb1c578b4591.html.[13] The measure "Marebonus" provides economic support to multimodal solutions including maritime transport modes, such as Ro-Ro and Ro-Pax, while the measure "Ferrobonus" includes economic incentives to companies that choose rail intermodality against traditional road freight transport.
This paper provides a summary of the Impact Assessment of the National Energy and Climate Plan of Cyprus, which was submitted by the Cypriot government to the European Commission in January 2020. The analysis is based on detailed modelling of the national energy system in combination with simulations by macroeconomic and household demand models. The study has produced numerous results describing the energy, environmental and economic impacts of different scenarios. This paper focuses on some key findings and recommendations that are of interest to economic policy makers. Results show that the planned energy and climate policies of the Cypriot government, while contributing to compliance of Cyprus with its legally binding energy and environmental obligations, can also yield economic benefits to society. However, they require strong political will to implement, and this especially applies to measures promoting sustainable transport. As further decarbonisation measures will be needed in the coming years, the country can exploit business and investment opportunities arising from the global energy transition.
This paper analyses the EU's policies for energy and climate, using Börzel's theoretical framework on Europeanisation, and examines Member States' Green Deal responses, strategies, and compliance. As expressed in their final NECPs, although Member States' responses vary, most of the critical components were partially addressed, while the others were largely addressed. We observe a considerable variation in Member States' strategies. Member States classified as foot-dragging beforehand are fence-sitting now, while those previously categorised as fence-sitting are now either foot-dragging or pace-setting. The root cause of these classification changes for the Member States within the EU can be traced back to their internal environments in which the involved stakeholders each have a different response pace regarding environment, climate, and energy. We present and analyse our theoretical context, discuss the EU's energy policies and the NECPs, examine Member States' responses and compliance with this new framework, and propose several challenges.
This paper analyses the EU's policies for energy and climate, using Börzel's theoretical framework on Europeanisation, and examines Member States' Green Deal responses, strategies, and compliance. As expressed in their final NECPs, although Member States' responses vary, most of the critical components were partially addressed, while the others were largely addressed. We observe a considerable variation in Member States' strategies. Member States classified as foot-dragging beforehand are fence-sitting now, while those previously categorised as fence-sitting are now either foot-dragging or pace-setting. The root cause of these classification changes for the Member States within the EU can be traced back to their internal environments in which the involved stakeholders each have a different response pace regarding environment, climate, and energy. We present and analyse our theoretical context, discuss the EU's energy policies and the NECPs, examine Member States' responses and compliance with this new framework, and propose several challenges.
As more economies are transitioning away from fossil fuels for their electricity production and towards greener alternatives, many socioeconomic implications of this shift remain actively debated. The present paper attempts to assess the economic impact of investments in renewable energy sources (RESs) for Greece and whether the broader effects of this transition can offset the negative impact that will occur due to the targeted phase-out of lignite plants by 2028, which constitute the predominant power source for Greece. Our methodological approach builds on input–output analysis and the creation of composite RES industries for the estimation of the net effects of a series of monetary shocks that correspond to Greece's phase-out investment plan, utilizing the most recent national input–output tables and satellite structural business statistics. We focus on the structural effects of these shocks on a series of socioeconomic indicators, including GDP, employment, wages, government income (through taxes), and capital formation. The results indicate that even though lignite power production still provides a significant contribution to the Greek economy, investing in renewables presents a significant opportunity for value added and job creation.
The Greek National Energy and Climate Plan was validated by the Greek Governmental Committee of Economic Policy on 23 December 2019. The decisions included in this plan will have a significant impact on the Greek energy mix as the production of electricity from lignite combustion ceases in 2028, when lignite will be replaced by natural gas (NG) and renewable energy sources (RES). This work presents an assessment of the Greek National Energy and Climate Plan by analyzing its pros and cons. The main critiques made are focused on the absence of risk analysis and alternative scenarios, the proposed energy mix, the absence of other alternatives on the energy mix and energy storage, the low attention given to energy savings (transport, buildings), the future energy prices, and the economic and social impacts. This analysis shows that delaying this transition for some years, to better prepare it by taking into consideration the most sustainable paths for that transition, such as using more alternatives, is the best available option today.
This study aims to contribute to the further development of the Member States' reporting to the EU with regard to the National Energy and Climate Change Plans (NECPs), especially with regard to the national progress reports, the NECP updates and a possible revision of the Governance Regulation. The study was designed as a meta-analysis of the current state of knowledge regarding the methodology and impact of selected policies and measures (PaMs), following its appropriate preparation, by means of an analytical framework. The analysis was based on the example of the German NECP, taking into account the NECPs of Denmark, France, Sweden and Slovenia. In total, the authors examined a selection of 23 PaMs as well as ex-ante and ex-post evaluations that analysed the PaMs' impacts. The authors investigated, in particular, the methodology of ex-ante and ex-post evaluations, the contribution of selected PaMs to achieve the EU's climate protection and the energy transition targets adopted for 2030 as well as the socio-economic and further ecological impacts associated with the PaMs. On this basis, the authors developed an in-depth understanding of the selected PaMs and the methodological and systemic uncertainties involved in their ex-ante and ex-post impact assessment. For this purpose, the authors discussed knowledge gaps, uncertainties, conflicts and synergies as well as political challenges, opportunities for action and obstacles to it. As a result, the authors have developed suggestions regarding the content requirements of NECP reporting as well as suggestions that can improve the transparency and traceability of evaluation methods and impact assessments of PaMs.
In: Laes , E & Verbruggen , A 2019 , ' Meta-review of Belgium's integrated National Energy and Climate draft Plan 2021-2030 ' , Economics and Policy of Energy and the Environment , vol. 2019 , no. 1 , pp. 57-72 . https://doi.org/10.3280/EFE2019-001004
The EU energy & climate policy requests from all Member States to submit a National Energy & Climate Plan (NECP) over the year 2019, to reach the aggregate goals of energy efficiency, renewable energy supplies and greenhouse gas emissions reductions by 2030. The complicated Belgian context is briefly described. Then the many comments on Belgium's draft NECP are summarized and annotated. Commentators are the European Commission, various statutory advisory councils on energy and climate policies, NGOs, consultants, etc. The draft plan requires significant improvement for meeting the formal standards imposed by the EU framework. More problematic however are the doubts about the actual capability of Belgium to realize the paper & ink commitments. Delving into the draft NECP and the abundant comments created a growing insight that the bureaucratic NECP approach of the European Commission is obsolete and dysfunctional. For addressing the energy & climate challenges, urgent & drastic, i.e. disruptive transformation is requested. Hence, disruptive thinking, novel frameworks and approaches should prevail.
ungary has one of the highest incidences of energy poverty in the European Union, and a high share of Hungarian low-income households rely on solid fuels. This paper first maps the energy vulnerabilities of Hungarian solid fuel users using six energy vulnerability factors. The mapping underlines that solid fuel users are more exposed to energy vulnerability than average households. This is followed by an analysis of energy-poverty-related objectives and measures outlined in the Hungarian National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), a key policy document of the green energy transition. The paper outlines that the NECP fails to comply with the requirement of setting energy poverty alleviation objectives. Furthermore, the outlined energy-poverty-related policies and measures fail to provide systematic solutions to energy-poverty drivers, especially those solid fuel users' vulnerabilities. Hungary's general antiegalitarian policy environment and the weak design of energy poverty measures in the NECP suggest severe deficiency regarding a just energy transition guarantee. A just energy transition in Hungary is therefore endangered by the fact that EU energy poverty alleviation requirements fall under soft-law coordination mechanisms that make such requirements hardly enforceable in a member state with an antipoor policy bias that is reluctant to tackle energy poverty.
Unidad de excelencia María de Maeztu CEX2019-000940-M ; Hungary has one of the highest incidences of energy poverty in the European Union, and a high share of Hungarian low-income households rely on solid fuels. This paper first maps the energy vulnerabilities of Hungarian solid fuel users using six energy vulnerability factors. The mapping underlines that solid fuel users are more exposed to energy vulnerability than average households. This is followed by an analysis of energy-poverty-related objectives and measures outlined in the Hungarian National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), a key policy document of the green energy transition. The paper outlines that the NECP fails to comply with the requirement of setting energy poverty alleviation objectives. Furthermore, the outlined energy-poverty-related policies and measures fail to provide systematic solutions to energy-poverty drivers, especially those solid fuel users' vulnerabilities. Hungary's general antiegalitarian policy environment and the weak design of energy poverty measures in the NECP suggest severe deficiency regarding a just energy transition guarantee. A just energy transition in Hungary is therefore endangered by the fact that EU energy poverty alleviation requirements fall under soft-law coordination mechanisms that make such requirements hardly enforceable in a member state with an antipoor policy bias that is reluctant to tackle energy poverty.
Hungary has one of the highest incidences of energy poverty in the European Union, and a high share of Hungarian low-income households rely on solid fuels. This paper first maps the energy vulnerabilities of Hungarian solid fuel users using six energy vulnerability factors. The mapping underlines that solid fuel users are more exposed to energy vulnerability than average households. This is followed by an analysis of energy-poverty-related objectives and measures outlined in the Hungarian National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), a key policy document of the green energy transition. The paper outlines that the NECP fails to comply with the requirement of setting energy poverty alleviation objectives. Furthermore, the outlined energy-poverty-related policies and measures fail to provide systematic solutions to energy-poverty drivers, especially those solid fuel users&rsquo ; vulnerabilities. Hungary&rsquo ; s general antiegalitarian policy environment and the weak design of energy poverty measures in the NECP suggest severe deficiency regarding a just energy transition guarantee. A just energy transition in Hungary is therefore endangered by the fact that EU energy poverty alleviation requirements fall under soft-law coordination mechanisms that make such requirements hardly enforceable in a member state with an antipoor policy bias that is reluctant to tackle energy poverty.
The US administration's energy plan has attracted global attention not because it meets the energy needs of US industry and US consumers but rather, because it is a plan that will result in the reduction of climate changing CO2 industrial emissions in the use of fuel to create energy. The plan is bold, aggressive, challenging, controversial, expensive, and long overdue. Its legislative version is greater than 1000 pages and should be referred to in its original form for those seeking a better understanding than can be presented in this brief article.
