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In studying the history of capitalism, one rarely encounters business enterprises without a capital stock or a profit account, founded and managed by men who expressed no desire for monetary rewards, and lacking owner-entrepreneurs. This paper deals with just such institutions—mutual savings banks. It has been recognized for some time that during the antebellum period mutual savings banks were relatively large and influential institutions. In 1860, when mutuals held a total of $150,000,000 in assets, the next most important type of non-bank financial intermediary, life insurance companies, held assets of only $24,000,000. More impressive was the size of some of the individual mutuals, for in 1860 several mutuals ranked among the ten largest business organizations in the country. Throughout most of the antebellum period the nation's largest mutual was the Bank for Savings in the City of New York. In 1825 this one bank held 56 percent of the nation's savings bank deposits; and ten years later, in 1835, it still accounted for over 34 percent of the country's deposits and 42 percent of its customers. Another New York institution—the Bowery Savings Bank—surpassed the Bank for Savings as the nation's largest mutual in 1860. At that time each of these banks commanded deposits in excess of $10,000,000 and a third New York mutual, the Seamen's Bank for Savings, was approaching that mark. In all, nineteen mutual savings banks were founded in New York City between 1819 and 1860. Table 1 shows the date that each bank opened for business, and the amount on deposit on January 1, 1861.

This study examines the differences and commonalities of how populist parties of the left and right relate to democracy. The focus is narrowed to the relationship between these parties and two aspects of democratic quality, minority rights and mutual constraints. Our argument is twofold: first, we contend that populist parties can exert distinct influences on minority rights, depending on whether they are left-wing or right-wing populist parties. Second, by contrast, we propose that the association between populist parties and mutual constraints is a consequence of the populist element and thus, we expect no differences between the left-wing and right-wing parties. We test our expectations against data from 30 European countries between 1990 and 2012. Our empirical findings support the argument for the proposed differences regarding minority rights and, to a lesser extent, the proposed similarities regarding mutual constraints. Therefore we conclude that, when examining the relationship between populism and democracy, populism should not be considered in isolation from its host ideology.

This study examines the differences and commonalities of how populist parties of the left and right relate to democracy. The focus is narrowed to the relationship between these parties and two aspects of democratic quality, minority rights and mutual constraints. Our argument is twofold: first, we contend that populist parties can exert distinct influences on minority rights, depending on whether they are left-wing or right-wing populist parties. Second, by contrast, we propose that the association between populist parties and mutual constraints is a consequence of the populist element and thus, we expect no differences between the left-wing and right-wing parties. We test our expectations against data from 30 European countries between 1990 and 2012. Our empirical findings support the argument for the proposed differences regarding minority rights and, to a lesser extent, the proposed similarities regarding mutual constraints. Therefore we conclude that, when examining the relationship between populism and democracy, populism should not be considered in isolation from its host ideology.

Despite ubiquitous references to Pfeffer and Salancik's classic volume, The External Control of Organizations, resource dependence theory is more of an appealing metaphor than a foundation for testable empirical research. We argue that several ambiguities in the resource dependence model account in part for this and propose a reformulation of resource dependence theory that addresses these ambiguities, yields novel predictions and findings, and reconciles them with seemingly contradictory empirical evidence from past studies. We identify two distinct theoretical dimensions of resource dependence, power imbalance and mutual dependence, which in the original theory were combined in the construct of interdependence and yet have opposite effects on an organization's ability to reduce dependencies by absorbing sources of external constraint. Results from a study of interindustry mergers and acquisitions among U.S. public companies in the period 1985–2000 indicate that, while mutual dependence is a key driver of mergers and acquisitions, power imbalance acts as an obstacle to their formation. We conclude that our reformulation of the resource dependence model contributes to realizing the potential of resource dependency as a powerful explanation of interorganizational action.