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How do we explain variation in judicial assertiveness towards politically powerful militaries? This article argues that the judiciary's willingness to assert itself against the military is contingent upon the type of military prerogative being challenged. Focusing on Pakistan, I find that courts are more willing to contest military prerogatives connected to the military's political authority, than prerogatives connected to its institutional autonomy. This selective assertiveness is strategic, as concerns about military retaliation against the judiciary are more likely to outweigh judicial preferences, on questions of the military's institutional autonomy than on questions of the military's political authority. I test this hypothesis using an original dataset of 720 high court and supreme court judgments pertaining to military prerogatives from Pakistan. I then discuss a sample of judgments selected from the dataset to demonstrate how variation in judicial assertiveness is guided primarily by strategic concerns about the likelihood of military retaliation against the judiciary. In studying the interactions between the judiciary and the military in Pakistan, the article provides a new perspective on the sources of judicial assertiveness and restraint, and the role the judiciary can play in bringing militaries under civilian control in authoritarian and post-authoritarian states.

This article contributes to a burgeoning literature on parliamentary war powers by investigating the case of the US Congress drawing on both International Relations (IR) research and traditional war powers studies. Applying a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis and case study method, we examine the conditions shaping congressional assertiveness. The article shows that the lack of national security interests and divided government are important conditions for members of Congress to criticize presidential intervention policies. While previous US war powers studies focused on the influence of partisanship, this article holds that domestic as well as international factors influence congressional behavior. A short comparative case study of two US military interventions (Libya 2011, ISIS 2014–15) during the Obama presidency serves to illustrate the findings.

China's new assertiveness in the South China Sea has arisen from the growth of its military power, its 'triumphalism' in the wake of the Western financial crisis and its heightened nationalism. The other littoral states of the South China Sea have been troubled by the opacity of Chinese politics and of the process of military decision-making amid a proliferation of apparently separately controlled maritime forces. The more active role being played by the United States in the region, in part as a response to Chinese activism, has troubled Beijing. While most of the ASEAN states have welcomed America as a hedge against growing Chinese power, their economies have become increasingly dependent upon China and they don't want to be a party to any potential conflict between these two giants. The problem is that there is no apparent resolution to what the Chinese call, in effect, these 'indisputable disputes'. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

"Im Februar 2010 erschien die neue russische Militärdoktrin mit den politischen, strategischen und ökonomischen Leitlinien des russischen Militärs für die nächsten zehn bis fünfzehn Jahre. Sie wurde im Westen mit Spannung erwartet - und rief doch eher Enttäuschung hervor. Die NATO wird zur 'Hauptgefahr' für die russische Sicherheit deklariert, und Hinweise auf mögliche Verhandlungen über substrategische Kernwaffen fehlen völlig. Nach dem Kurswechsel der amerikanischen Außenpolitik unter Obama hatte man mehr Entgegenkommen erwartet. Die Autoren werfen einen genaueren Blick auf die Doktrin. Sie stoßen auf deutliche Signale der Kooperationsbereitschaft und entdecken mehr Übereinstimmungen mit westlichen Gefahren- und Risikoanalysen. Zudem enthält die Doktrin Hinweise auf interne Meinungsverschiedenheiten in der russischen Führung. Das könnte neue Verhandlungsspielräume eröffnen. Auch die Aufwertung des Instruments der Rüstungskontrolle und die Einschränkung möglicher nuklearer Einsatzszenarien im Vergleich zu vorangegangenen Doktrinen stützen die positivere Beurteilung der Autoren. Sie ermuntern die Bundesregierung ausdrücklich, sich im Bündnis auf der Basis der Doktrin für stärkere sicherheitspolitische Kooperation mit Russland einzusetzen." (Autorenreferat)

La asertividad de China en los Mares del Sur y del Este de China: acercamiento constructivistaAbstractThis article aims to discuss the issue of China's assertiveness in the South and East China Seas within the constrictivist framework, as economic (liberalism) and military power (realism) are not sufficient to explain the complexity of the problem. It aims to answer the following question: How does the constructivist approach lend itself to the understanding of China's assertiveness in the case of the South and the East China Sea territorial disputes? It will also explore the following hypotheses: the victimized identity perception leads China to be assertive in the South China Sea dispute and the perception of Japan's behavior as aggressive (as in the past) provokes China to be assertive in the East China Sea dispute.ResumenEl presente artículo tiene como objetivo discutir la cuestión de la asertividad de China en Los Mares del Sur y del Este de China dentro del marco constrictivista, ya que el poder económico (liberalismo) y el poder militar (realismo) no son suficientes para explicar la complejidad del problema. Tiene como objetivo responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿Cómo se presta el enfoque constructivista a la comprensión de la asertividad de China en el caso de las disputas territoriales del Mar del Este y del Sur de China? También explorará las siguientes hipótesis: la percepción de la identidad victimizada lleva a China a ser asertiva en la disputa del Mar del Sur de China y la percepción de agresividad en el comportamiento de Japón (como en el pasado) provoca que China sea asertiva en la disputa del Mar del Este de China.

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Note on Transcription of Asian Names -- Contents -- List of Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: The Puzzle of Chinese Assertiveness -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Research Design of This Book -- 1.2.1 Conceptualization of Chinese Assertiveness -- 1.2.2 Elaboration of the Main Hypothesis -- 1.2.3 Elaboration of the Alternative Hypotheses -- 1.2.4 Methodology and Theoretical Considerations -- 1.3 Contributions and Limitations of the Study -- References -- Chapter 2: Chinese Assertive Actions in the South China Sea -- 2.1 Background and History of the South China Sea Dispute -- 2.1.1 Geopolitics and Geoeconomics -- 2.1.2 Legal Context -- 2.1.3 History of the Dispute -- 2.2 Chinese Assertive Policies in the South China Sea -- 2.2.1 The Pre-2011 Period -- 2.2.2 The Period of 2011-2016 -- References -- Chapter 3: A Comprehensive Concept of Power in International Relations -- 3.1 China´s Power: Theoretical and Practical Issues -- 3.2 The Model of Power for Analytical Use in International Relations -- 3.2.1 Defining and Conceptualizing Power -- 3.2.2 Sources of Power in International Relations -- 3.3 Critical Reading of the Literature on China´s Power -- References -- Chapter 4: China´s Sources of Power at the State Level: The Military, Economy, and National Performance -- 4.1 The Military -- 4.1.1 The Military Doctrine and Potential Use of Military Force in the SCS -- 4.1.2 Aggregate Statistical Data -- 4.1.3 Capabilities of Military Forces -- 4.2 The Economy -- 4.3 National Performance -- References -- Chapter 5: China´s International and Societal Levels of Power Sources -- 5.1 The Institutional Setting -- 5.2 Geopolitics -- 5.3 Geo-economics -- 5.4 Soft Power -- 5.5 Legitimacy -- References -- Chapter 6: Theories of Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea

Why has the People's Republic of China (PRC) courted international opprobrium, alarmed its neighbors, and risked military conflict in pursuit of its claims over vast areas of the South China Sea? Answering this question depends on recognizing long-term patterns of continuity and change in the PRC's policy. A new typology of "assertive" state behaviors in maritime and territorial disputes, and original time-series events data covering the period from 1970 to 2015, shows that the key policy change—China's rapid administrative buildup and introduction of regular coercive behaviors—occurred in 2007, between two and five years earlier than most analysis has supposed. This finding disconfirms three common explanations for Beijing's assertive turn in maritime Asia: the Global Financial Crisis, domestic legitimacy issues, and the ascendancy of Xi Jinping. Focused qualitative case studies of four breakpoints identified in the data indicate that PRC policy shifts in 1973, 1987, and 1992 were largely opportunistic responses to favorable geopolitical circumstances. In contrast, the policy change observed from 2007 was a lagged effect of decisions taken in the 1990s to build specific capabilities designed to realize strategic objectives that emerged in the 1970s.

The recent iteration of the Malabar military exercises is an illustration of the growing military interoperability, mutual trust, and coordinated response of the Quad countries. More are needed to maintain stability and security in the Indo-Pacific, threatened increasingly by China's military assertiveness.

Why has the People's Republic of China (PRC) courted international opprobrium, alarmed its neighbors, and risked military conflict in pursuit of its claims over vast areas of the South China Sea? Answering this question depends on recognizing long-term patterns of continuity and change in the PRC's policy. A new typology of "assertive" state behaviors in maritime and territorial disputes, and original time-series events data covering the period from 1970 to 2015, shows that the key policy change—China's rapid administrative buildup and introduction of regular coercive behaviors—occurred in 2007, between two and five years earlier than most analysis has supposed. This finding disconfirms three common explanations for Beijing's assertive turn in maritime Asia: the Global Financial Crisis, domestic legitimacy issues, and the ascendancy of Xi Jinping. Focused qualitative case studies of four breakpoints identified in the data indicate that PRC policy shifts in 1973, 1987, and 1992 were largely opportunistic responses to favorable geopolitical circumstances. In contrast, the policy change observed from 2007 was a lagged effect of decisions taken in the 1990s to build specific capabilities designed to realize strategic objectives that emerged in the 1970s.

This article focuses on the literature developed in the last few years on Russia's foreign policy by exploring six books which can be thought as representative: two general books on Russian foreign policy, one that focuses on security and intervention, another on Russia's soft power and influence in the post-Soviet space, and two others on Russia's relationship with the West. There is an underlying idea in the six books that Russian foreign policy has been deeply marked by Putin's leadership. Russia's foreign policy has been continuously evolving since 2000 towards assertiveness, through which Putin has aimed to regain Russia's lost status of being a great power. In the last few years and especially since Putin came to power for the third time, there has been a proliferation of books on Russian foreign policy. The value of the six books lies in the way they chart the path towards assertiveness in Putin's quest to put Russia again on the map as a great power.Allison R (2013) Russia, the West, and Military Intervention. Oxford: Oxford University Press.De Haas M (2011) Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond. Abingdon: Routledge.Gvosdev NK and Marsh C (2013) Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors. Los Angeles, CA: CQ Press.Leichtova M (2014) Misunderstanding Russia: Russian Foreign Policy and the West. Farnham, MD: Ashgate.Sherr J (2013) Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia's Influence Abroad. London: Royal Institute for International Affairs/Chatham House.Tsygankov AP (2012) Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.